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Allenby: Soldier and Statesman
Originally published in 2 volumes as: Allenby, a study in greatness, and Allenby in Egypt; originally published in present form in 1946 by G. Harrap, London.
- GenresMilitary History
384 pages, Hardcover
Published January 1, 1974
About the author
Archibald Wavell
20 books2 followersField Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell was a senior officer of the British Army. He served in the Second Boer War, the Bazar Valley Campaign and the Great War, during which he was wounded in the Second Battle of Ypres. He served in the Second World War, initially as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, in which role he led British forces to victory over the Italians in western Egypt and eastern Libya during Operation Compass in December 1940, only to be defeated by the German Army in the Western Desert in April 1941. He served as Commander-in-Chief, India, from July 1941 until June 1943 (apart from a brief tour as Commander of ABDACOM) and then served as Viceroy of India until his retirement in February 1947.
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February 1, 2023
In the period following World War 1, General Allenby was held by some to be ‘the greatest figure of the greatest war ever waged.’ Others saw him as a ‘thud-and-blunder’ general, deserving of his nickname ‘the Bull’.
General Wavell, also considered at a later time to be one of Britain’s leading generals, provides an informed and interesting biography of Allenby's career as a soldier and a statesman.
Blooded in the Boer War, Allenby saw some limited action on the Western Front in 1915-16, before being transferred in 1917 to lead the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in Britain’s campaigns in the Middle East against the Ottoman Empire.
A cavalry general, Allenby commanded the highly mobile ANZAC Mounted, Australian Light Horse and British Yeomanry cavalry divisions. His forces launched the Australian Light Horse’s famous cavalry charge at Beersheba, which lead to the taking of Jerusalem in December 1917. Wavell quotes an officer of a Yeomanry regiment who said on Allenby’s arrival in the Middle East, “Seldom in the course of military history has the personality of a new commander had such a marked effect on his troops.”
Wavell wrote the first part of this book before the Italian entry into the war in 1940. Although he had not encountered them at the time when he started writing, Wavell’s experiences in the Middle East were to echo many of those of Allenby. Both Allenby and Wavell navigated both military and political responsibilities in the Middle East. The similarities in the career of the biographer and his subject are even found in the book’s title. Schofield’s biography of Wavell, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman echoes the title of Wavell’s biography of Allenby.
The forces of each general included a significant number of Australian, New Zealand and Indian troops. Both generals used ‘surprise and mobility’ as their ‘main weapons for the discomfiture of his adversaries’. Both used deception, misdirection and secrecy to gain an advantage in the bare open plains of the Middle East deserts.
The quote from Shakespeare (Sonnet XXXIII) that Wavell selected to describe Allenby’s victory at the Battle of Arras in 1917:
Even so my sun one early morn did shine
With all-triumphant splendour on my brow;
But out, alack! He was but one hour mine.
could equally have applied to Wavell’s victory at Beda Fomm in February 1941, before the decisive Axis counterattack in March 1941.
Allenby’s experience fighting the Turks in Syria in 1918, where the terrain made rapid progress impossible, would have been one of the factors that led to Wavell’s reluctance to engage the Vichy French forces in Syria in 1941.
Wavell notes Allenby's view that ‘The authorities at home were apt to be short-sighted in the distribution of new aeroplanes’ which had the potential to ‘change the whole balance of air-power’ in the Middle East but not have much impact on the Western Front. Wavell experienced similar challenges as his air forces in the Middle East were consistently under-equipped.
The second part of Wavell’s biography, written in 1940-41, when Wavell was heavily engaged in his own campaigns against the Axis (it is surprising he found the time to write) deals with Allenby’s post-war political roles.
Both Allenby and Wavell faced similar political challenges. They both had political advisers send out to ‘advise’ them on their military and political challenges in the Middle East, Allenby in 1925 after the war ended and Wavell in 1941 at the nadir of British strength.
Allenby had been frustrated that, in contravention of international law, under which no major change could be introduced when an occupied territory was under military administration, the British Foreign Office had sent a Zionist Commission to Palestine in the spring of 1918. This resulted in his removal as Commander-in-Chief of the ‘Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations (O.E.T.A.) by the British Cabinet and his appointment as Special High Commissioner of Egypt.
In 1919 Allenby supported T.E. Lawrence’s push for restoration of Arab rule in Syria and warned at a meeting in Paris for the Peace Conference ‘that if they French were imposed on an unwilling Syria “there would be trouble and even war” between French and Arabs.’ He also advocated for Egyptian independence.
Wavell highlights that Churchill was ‘the most determined’ opponent to the agreed solution for Egyptian independence. Churchill had also been an advocate for the flawed Sykes-Picot agreement which divided the failing Ottoman empire into French- and British- administered areas without any regards to the wishes of the Arab and the equally flawed Balfour Declaration which promised a Jewish national home in Palestine irrespective of the wishes of the existing Palestinian inhabitants. The cost of Churchill’s imperialism is still borne by people in the region today.
Wavell outlines how in ‘the devious bargainings of the Conference’ the British ‘agreed that Syria should be placed under French mandate’ in exchange for which Britain would retain Iraq and Palestine. These decisions would haunt Wavell in 1941.
Ultimately, at the end of a six-year appointment as Special High Commissioner Allenby ‘secured for Egypt independence from a reluctant British Government’. Wavell notes that the declaration of Egypt as an independent Sovereign State ‘is Allenby’s principal contribution to political history.’
Their similarities as soldiers and as statesmen extended to their personalities. Both were careful to issue general orders providing the recipient with the widest-latitude – “These are merely general orders; don’t be tied to any definite line; carry out the work in the way that seems best” – mirroring what in the German Wehrmacht was known as Auftragstaktik.
Both were ‘scrupulously loyalty to superior authority’. Both also lacked ‘the power to communicate enthusiasm’ and were not ready debaters, something that was a particular challenge for Wavell when confronting the oratorical skills of Churchill.
Allenby hated war and took an interest in flowers and nature. So did Wavell.
In many ways’ Wavell’s biography of Allenby seems to accentuate characteristics they shared and those Wavell valued. It is surprising that biographers of Wavell have not drawn more heavily on this book as it highlights many of the principles which guided Wavell’s decision making and the values and characteristics of a leader to which he aspired.
At times, the similarities between author and subject seem to result in Wavell deflecting blame. Wavell attributes Allenby’s failure to vigorously exploit the initial success during the Battle of Arras in 1917 to Allenby’s orders rather than his lack of initiative.
Allenby’s critics charge that he was a bad-tempered, obstinate hot-head, a ‘thud-and-blunder’ general, deserving of his nickname ‘the Bull’. Wavell acknowledges this weakness. Allenby’s wrath was a notable phenomenon with ‘sudden explosions of temper … often over some comparatively trivial breach of discipline’ doing ‘much to destroy the good impression that the sight of the Army commander in the front trenches made…’. But while describing this, Wavell leaves unexplored the adverse impact this had on his effectiveness as a leader.
Wavell’s biography of Allenby is a rewarding read for those interested in the personalities that shaped military history.
General Wavell, also considered at a later time to be one of Britain’s leading generals, provides an informed and interesting biography of Allenby's career as a soldier and a statesman.
Blooded in the Boer War, Allenby saw some limited action on the Western Front in 1915-16, before being transferred in 1917 to lead the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in Britain’s campaigns in the Middle East against the Ottoman Empire.
A cavalry general, Allenby commanded the highly mobile ANZAC Mounted, Australian Light Horse and British Yeomanry cavalry divisions. His forces launched the Australian Light Horse’s famous cavalry charge at Beersheba, which lead to the taking of Jerusalem in December 1917. Wavell quotes an officer of a Yeomanry regiment who said on Allenby’s arrival in the Middle East, “Seldom in the course of military history has the personality of a new commander had such a marked effect on his troops.”
Wavell wrote the first part of this book before the Italian entry into the war in 1940. Although he had not encountered them at the time when he started writing, Wavell’s experiences in the Middle East were to echo many of those of Allenby. Both Allenby and Wavell navigated both military and political responsibilities in the Middle East. The similarities in the career of the biographer and his subject are even found in the book’s title. Schofield’s biography of Wavell, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman echoes the title of Wavell’s biography of Allenby.
The forces of each general included a significant number of Australian, New Zealand and Indian troops. Both generals used ‘surprise and mobility’ as their ‘main weapons for the discomfiture of his adversaries’. Both used deception, misdirection and secrecy to gain an advantage in the bare open plains of the Middle East deserts.
The quote from Shakespeare (Sonnet XXXIII) that Wavell selected to describe Allenby’s victory at the Battle of Arras in 1917:
Even so my sun one early morn did shine
With all-triumphant splendour on my brow;
But out, alack! He was but one hour mine.
could equally have applied to Wavell’s victory at Beda Fomm in February 1941, before the decisive Axis counterattack in March 1941.
Allenby’s experience fighting the Turks in Syria in 1918, where the terrain made rapid progress impossible, would have been one of the factors that led to Wavell’s reluctance to engage the Vichy French forces in Syria in 1941.
Wavell notes Allenby's view that ‘The authorities at home were apt to be short-sighted in the distribution of new aeroplanes’ which had the potential to ‘change the whole balance of air-power’ in the Middle East but not have much impact on the Western Front. Wavell experienced similar challenges as his air forces in the Middle East were consistently under-equipped.
The second part of Wavell’s biography, written in 1940-41, when Wavell was heavily engaged in his own campaigns against the Axis (it is surprising he found the time to write) deals with Allenby’s post-war political roles.
Both Allenby and Wavell faced similar political challenges. They both had political advisers send out to ‘advise’ them on their military and political challenges in the Middle East, Allenby in 1925 after the war ended and Wavell in 1941 at the nadir of British strength.
Allenby had been frustrated that, in contravention of international law, under which no major change could be introduced when an occupied territory was under military administration, the British Foreign Office had sent a Zionist Commission to Palestine in the spring of 1918. This resulted in his removal as Commander-in-Chief of the ‘Occupied Enemy Territory Administrations (O.E.T.A.) by the British Cabinet and his appointment as Special High Commissioner of Egypt.
In 1919 Allenby supported T.E. Lawrence’s push for restoration of Arab rule in Syria and warned at a meeting in Paris for the Peace Conference ‘that if they French were imposed on an unwilling Syria “there would be trouble and even war” between French and Arabs.’ He also advocated for Egyptian independence.
Wavell highlights that Churchill was ‘the most determined’ opponent to the agreed solution for Egyptian independence. Churchill had also been an advocate for the flawed Sykes-Picot agreement which divided the failing Ottoman empire into French- and British- administered areas without any regards to the wishes of the Arab and the equally flawed Balfour Declaration which promised a Jewish national home in Palestine irrespective of the wishes of the existing Palestinian inhabitants. The cost of Churchill’s imperialism is still borne by people in the region today.
Wavell outlines how in ‘the devious bargainings of the Conference’ the British ‘agreed that Syria should be placed under French mandate’ in exchange for which Britain would retain Iraq and Palestine. These decisions would haunt Wavell in 1941.
Ultimately, at the end of a six-year appointment as Special High Commissioner Allenby ‘secured for Egypt independence from a reluctant British Government’. Wavell notes that the declaration of Egypt as an independent Sovereign State ‘is Allenby’s principal contribution to political history.’
Their similarities as soldiers and as statesmen extended to their personalities. Both were careful to issue general orders providing the recipient with the widest-latitude – “These are merely general orders; don’t be tied to any definite line; carry out the work in the way that seems best” – mirroring what in the German Wehrmacht was known as Auftragstaktik.
Both were ‘scrupulously loyalty to superior authority’. Both also lacked ‘the power to communicate enthusiasm’ and were not ready debaters, something that was a particular challenge for Wavell when confronting the oratorical skills of Churchill.
Allenby hated war and took an interest in flowers and nature. So did Wavell.
In many ways’ Wavell’s biography of Allenby seems to accentuate characteristics they shared and those Wavell valued. It is surprising that biographers of Wavell have not drawn more heavily on this book as it highlights many of the principles which guided Wavell’s decision making and the values and characteristics of a leader to which he aspired.
At times, the similarities between author and subject seem to result in Wavell deflecting blame. Wavell attributes Allenby’s failure to vigorously exploit the initial success during the Battle of Arras in 1917 to Allenby’s orders rather than his lack of initiative.
Allenby’s critics charge that he was a bad-tempered, obstinate hot-head, a ‘thud-and-blunder’ general, deserving of his nickname ‘the Bull’. Wavell acknowledges this weakness. Allenby’s wrath was a notable phenomenon with ‘sudden explosions of temper … often over some comparatively trivial breach of discipline’ doing ‘much to destroy the good impression that the sight of the Army commander in the front trenches made…’. But while describing this, Wavell leaves unexplored the adverse impact this had on his effectiveness as a leader.
Wavell’s biography of Allenby is a rewarding read for those interested in the personalities that shaped military history.
December 26, 2022
A book written about a great soldier. My great great Uncle served under him in 2/10th Middlesex in 53rd division. My great nan did not speak of him her brother but I have his photograph but not his medals. This puts into some perspective what my relative sent through. A good book written in style of English not used today.
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