The Winter War: Russia Against Finland

by Richard W. Condon

Non Fiction Historical

Genres: History, Military History, World War II, War

160 pages, Paperback

First published November 3, 1972

Reviews

[Julio The Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the least known and decisive conflicts of the Second World War, decided by frost on the ground. The Winter War of 1939-40 exposed the terrible weakness of the Russian Red Army at the start of World War II, gave the world a lesson in the heroism of a tiny country facing off against the neighborhood Goliath, revealed the total bankruptcy of Britain and France in the face of aggression, again, and taught the Nazis Russia could be beaten in battle, or so they thought. "Russia has two generals on whom she can always count---General January and General February" said Czar Nicholas I. Why didn't the Russians heed this lesson when assaulting Finland in December of 1939? After Stalin and Hitler divided Eastern Europe among themselves and partitioned Poland, the Soviet Union demanded territorial concessions of her three Baltic neighbors and Finland. The Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, caved in, losing their independence, but Finland was a special case and harder nut for Stalin to crack. Russia expected the Finns to give up control of over half of Lake Ladoga, facing Leningrad, in return for Russian territory further north along their border. Strange though it may sound, Finland accepted Czar Nicholas's challenge to fight a winter war while Stalin neglected his wise caveat. Under terrible weather conditions in December the Soviet Union launched dozens of divisions of infantry, tanks, artillery and planes against the "Mannerheim Line", named for Finland's anti-communist legendary general and commander of the armed forces, Carl Gustav Mannerheim, on the north of the lake and in the Finnish-Soviet Arctic region. All failed. Why? The Finns applied the tactics the Russians would later use during Barbarossa. The best defense lies in the terrain and climate of one's invaded country. The Finnish soil, speckled by lakes and deep forests, was perfect for fighting a guerrilla war on skis, and so long as the ice on the ground remained thin the Russians could not utilize their tanks effectively. The Russians made blunder after blunder that helped the Finns. At first the Red Army had no ski troops, nor could the Red Air Force run bombing raids under winter skies. Russian commanders had a Christian-like faith in launching wave after wave of assault troops, much like their Czarist counterparts in 1914, no matter how high the casualties. Artillery, infantry and armored columns did not fight in a coordinated fashion. Politics back home likewise played a debilitating role in the first phase of the war. After Stalin's purges of 1937-38 bled the Red Army dry his officers in Finland feared taking any initiative in battle or disobeying the Political Commissars attached to every unit. Only when Stalin realized what a giant imbroglio the Finnish campaign had become, and how eagerly Hitler anticipated more Soviet losses, did he make the decision to fight a different kind of war. Stalin assigned General Timoshenko, a survivor of the purges, to take charge of the Finnish war. (Zhukov was on the other side of the world, fighting the Japanese in Mongolia.) Timoshenko quickly dispersed with the human assault waves of his predecessors and opted instead for piercing the Finnish defenses wherever opportune through artillery. Once the breach was made troops and tanks would pour in, surrounding the Finns in their own bunkers. The Red Air Force was ordered to pulverize Finnish positions, using terror tactics where accuracy of the bombs did not matter. The weather helped Timoshenko too. In January through February of 1940 the ground froze so hard Soviet tanks could rapidly move through lake territory. In the Winter War Goliath did defeat David, but only when a firm and smart head was placed on his shoulders. Britain and France, still appeasing Germany after having declared war on her, offered the Finns help with supplies and troops but only with important and impossible provisos. Norway and Sweden had to grant permission for the passage of troops through their territory, they would not, and the Finns had to draw Germany into their war up north to ease pressure on the Western Front during the "Phony War". Faced with Soviet advances and lack of testicular fortitude by France and Britain Mannerheim opted for peace with Stalin, who demanded even more Finnish territory than in 1939. Still, Finland was not completely occupied and Communized like the Baltic states. Condon theorizes that Stalin, fearful of Hitler, did not dare shock public opinion in the Western Europe with such a prospect. Hitler, looking Eastward, saw an easy target in the Soviet Union after its initial humiliation in 1939; a false premise and hope dashed at the gates of Moscow in 1941. WINTER WAR features the great attributes of the Ballantine Books World War II Series; magnificent maps and photographs accompanying a text that in just 160 pages tells a complex story in microscopic detail.

[Joe Krakovsky · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE WINTER WAR is an excellent condensed history of the war between Russia and Finland in the winter of 1939/40.

The background is as follows. Germany was at war with Britain and France who had pledged their support to Poland, which Germany had invaded. That had been possible as Germany and Russia had signed a pact, which neither really expected to be honored. In order for Germany to mass her might in the west now that Poland was conquered, they gave Russia a free hand in the east. As a result, like a schoolyard bully, Russia occupied Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the eastern border of Romania. The League of Nations could do nothing about it. When Russia tried to take parts of Finland is when David met Goliath.

This little book explains how the little country of some 4 million people stood up to and humiliated a country of some 180 million. For 105 days the valiant Finns, with practically no outside help, not only held back the Russian hordes but even went on the offensive at times. Finnish artillery was out dated. Their tanks were obsolete and rarely used. They never had more than 287 aircraft and not much of a fleet, yet they destroyed over 900 Russian planes, they captured or destroyed some 1,600 Russian tanks, and at least 200,000 Russian soldiers were killed. Who knows how many were wounded.

The Soviet leaders had thought that the Finns would not resist but what I found interesting was that the Finnish Communists fought for their country instead of serving as 5th Columnists as the Soviets had expected. The Russians finally won, but it had been at a terrible cost.

Plenty of photos and maps are included.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good little book. It gives a fast look at the Winter War between Russia and Finland in 1939/40. Part of the great Ballantine's Illustrated History series at #24, this book seem like it may be a cut down version of Condon's other work. There are several passages in the midst of battles where the scale between units seem to change in a manner that suggests it was edited poorly. Otherwise this is a great little resource with many maps, photos and illustrations of the war. With such a dearth of material on this conflict, this is a great resource for all levels of interest. The military enthusiast will find the bibliography a great jumping off point for deeper study...

[Michael Cosgrove · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good summary of the reason and progress of the war and the determination by the Finns to keep their independence.

[IKO · Rating 2 out of 5]

ben blij eindelijk eens een algemeen overzicht van dit conflict gekregen te hebben

[Russell R · Rating 5 out of 5]

another good book by Ballantine

[Andrew Wardle · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars. A solid if unexceptional book from a generally excellent series.
Like many of the campaigns detailed in this series of monographs, the "Winter War" of 1939-40 earns a few paragraphs at best in most histories of WW2. This book redresses the balance, giving an informative account of the three-month conflict between the mighty Soviet Union, concerned to obtain some Finnish territory as a buffer zone (particularly for the city of Leningrad) against future aggression, and the young Finnish nation of 4 million people, concerned to protect their neutrality and newly-won independence. The result was a foregone conclusion, but the Finns resisted heroically, giving the Red Army a number of bloody noses (particularly the "military classic" victory of Suomussalmi) before being forced to accept terms.
The book is a bit of a mixed bag, giving a good account of the fighting, with a profusion of maps (mostly helpful, but see later), and some perceptive analysis of the performance of the Red Army and the reasons for the Finns' early successes.
However, as with many books in this series, it would have benefitted from some editing. The author writes in an excitable, hyperbolic style which can be painful to read, and his over-use of adverbs would have brought a sharp rebuke from his compatriot Mark Twain. Like some other authors in this series, he rarely uses one word where three will do.
Passages such as ".......their other efforts were as singularly unsuccessful";
".......seemed to strike at will when and where they pleased";
and some peculiar choices of word ("reversal" where he means "reverse" for example) are war crimes against the English language.
And, despite having 11 maps, a feast for a book of only 156 pages, the account of the final Soviet offensive in the Karelian Isthmus describes several crucial actions around the hamlet of Merkki.......which is not shown on any of them !
Historical analysis is also a bit mixed. There is perceptive comment on the Red Army's overconfidence (units being given strict orders not to violate Swedish neutrality, initial gung-ho attacks with poor coordination squandering the Russians' overwhelming superiority in aircraft, armour, and artillery), and on the lessons learned in the campaign which were of value in the coming struggle against Germany.
However there are also some very questionable assertions:
The Red Army's defence of Stalingrad said to be helped by experience of street fighting gained in Finland - the only street fighting occurred at Suomussalmi and Kuhmo, from which there were few Russian survivors - and it is vanishingly unlikely any of the veterans made it to the winter of 1942.
Prof Condon seems to want to have it both ways at times: the Red Army is criticised for its unimaginative frontal attacks on the Karelian Isthmus (where the concentration of troops on a small front made frontal attacks the only game in town), but the alternative approach, sending troops into the roadless wilderness of Northern Finland, where their superiority in tanks, artillery and aircraft were virtually nullified, was predictably disastrous.
And a generally informative section on the unavailing attempts of Britain and France to provide succour to Finland is marred by an extraordinarily sloppy statement for a historian: "Though there is little evidence to prove it (sic) , there can be small doubt that the Anglo-French interest in the conflict influenced the Kremlin to make peace." I had very great doubts: the Russians made peace when Finland agreed to cede the territory they had originally demanded.
So, not the best book in this series, but a worthwhile read for anyone wanting to know more about the neglected corners of WW2.