Davis Hanson is one of those scholars who develop an idea they see as earth shattering and then view everything through its lens. in this case the idea is that ideal way of Greek war was a citizen militia composed of farmers who bought their own equipment, marched to war based on consensus among similar citizen farmers who ran their polis through assembly, fought a short, single day battle and marched home to work their farms once again. Anything that doesn't fit that image is bad, unGreek, distasteful and either tyranny or mob rule. Earlier period is rejected because elites monopolised the power, later is rejected because mob took the power. In his view power has to be held by citizen farmers of certain means, not too rich and not too poor. it shouldn't be concentrated in the hands of aristocracy nor diluted in the hands of landless poor. And of course heavy hoplite infantryman in phalanx fighting similar warrior on the other side is the only way to fight. None of that light infantry or slingers rabble. also none of the aristocratic cavalry either. and most certainly no navy!
Most of this book is VDS ranting how Greeks failed to live up to this idea and ideal, starting with Peloponnesian War that introduced the nasty and corrupting concepts of all season warfare, mercenaries, light troops, raiding, sieges. And of course need to find means to finance all that and that was done through another nasty mean, the taxes. And to top all that Athens were relying on navy. Navy! You can almost hear him hiss when he describes how filthy, low born sailors recruited from the dregs of society and city's poor demanded same political rights as upstanding citizen farmers.
And all of that culminates in chapter on Alexander's war which is basically just page after page of ranting how many people his army killed (on or off battlefield) and enslaved, how many cities were sacked and how much loot that brought in. Thankfully he managed to include couple of pages describing how Macedonians fought, what their army was composed off and how his conquests were done and which battles he fought but that seems more like an afterthought.
Overall he is laser focused on proper way to fight wars "the western way of war" relying on maximum application of military force and seeking decisive battle so war ends quickly, civilian oversight and civilian and military living not in isolation from each other and that idea has merit. But he also ignores (deliberately?) long list of examples where western world deliberately chose the opposite. But this idea is perhaps something that should be covered elsewhere, sufficient to say he tries to apply to Greek world in one size fits all solution. Sadly this means this book is more of a vessel to get that idea across in simplified manner to reach wider audience than overview of how Greeks fought. So if you are expecting to learn a lot about hoplite equipment and tactics you will be disappointed. It is there but buried under so much preaching and selling his idea(l) that you'll need to work to separate the two.
Too bad because this could have been a nice, if short, introduction to Greek warfare.