On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815

by Carl von Clausewitz, Arthur Wellesley, Daniel Moran (Translator)

This book at last makes available in English a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men had vast experience in the Napoleonic Wars, and both were prominent participants in the campaign. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army; the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to author VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. He also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history, via the work of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück. Oddly, Clausewitz's study of the campaign of 1815 was never published in English, and Wellington's once-famous response to it has been strangely but studiously ignored by British military historians since 1914. Hence this book. It contains Wellington's initial battle report; Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife Marie; correspondence within Wellington's circle concerning Clausewitz's work; Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (not just the Battle of Waterloo); Wellington's memorandum in response; and enlightening essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Battle of Waterloo. Major General [U.S. Army] David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., writes in the April 2011 edition of The Journal of Military "Long overdue, we now have two English translations of [Clausewitz's] The Campaign of 1815 [i.e., Peter Hofschröer's translation of Clausewitz's study and Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow's edition of the full Clausewitz-Wellington exchange]. Either of these volumes would be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any serious student of military affairs, but On Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 is clearly the richer of the two." Napoleonic expert Bruno Colson wrote [in War in History 19(3)] that Pedlow “convincingly resurrects Wellington’s ideas and actions, and gives a final and excellent reply to the arguments of Peter Hofschröer, while remaining balanced, recognizing the latter’s merits and quoting him courteously. Waterloo ‘was neither a British victory nor a Prussian victory; it was an Allied victory,’ says Pedlow (p. 282). For Waterloo enthusiasts, this essay alone justifies buying the book.” Noted Clausewitz scholar Jon Sumida (U.Md) writes that "On Waterloo is essential reading for those seeking an understanding of Clausewitz’s distinctive approach to historical case study as the basis of practical knowledge of armed conflict. Clausewitz’s history of the campaign of 1815 incorporates methods of critical analysis explained in Book II of On War, which were addressed primarily to the observation and assessment of past cases of strategic and operational decision-making by commanders-in chief. The Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow edition provides a highly readable translation of a work previously accessible only in German that illustrates Clausewitz’s approach to the replication and evaluation of the experience of high command." The Christopher Bassford is Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, DC. Daniel Moran is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, CA. Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium.

Genres: History, Military History

318 pages, Paperback

First published July 30, 2007

About the author

Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier, military historian and military theorist. He is most famous for his military treatise Vom Kriege, translated into English as On War.

Clausewitz has served in the Rhine campaign (1793–1794), when the Prussian army invaded France during the French revolution and in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815.

Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen where Russia, Prussia and the United Kingdom formed an coalition that later defeated Napoleon Bonaparte.

Reviews

[Al · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an extremely interesting look at the Battle of Waterloo from the perspective of Clausewitz, who was a staff officer with the Prussian army during the battle. The counter point is provided by the Duke of Wellington, and the contrasting views were of additional interest based on how the battle was viewed at different levels. Even with these two views, the whole of the battle can only be partly understood. It is clear in Clausewitz' narrative that he is using this narrative as an attempt to refine his theories, as well as achieve a deeper understanding of the events. As Bassford states in the introduction, Clausewitz saw theory as a means for providing the framework for analysis and judgement. The editors did an outstanding job in organizing Clausewitz' text, as well as the letters between members of Wellington's ring and Wellington's response to Clauswitz' analysis. Footnotes are kept to a bare minimum, and only used as a means to amplify points in the text. This is a terrific adjunct to "On War" and well worth the time to read.

[Russell Phillips · Rating 3 out of 5]

Clausewitz doesn't appear to be particularly biased, though Wellington does seem to dislike any hint of criticism. Where possible, Clausewitz gives evidence for his conclusions, though in some cases he has to guess at what a commander intended. He always makes it clear where his conclusions are the result of studying evidence, and where he has had to guess at intentions. Quite often, particularly when dealing with the movements of the French, there are contradictory accounts, and Clausewitz makes it clear which he has given credence to, along with his reasons for doing so.

All in all, I found this to be a very interesting read. It was hard going in places, but worth the effort.

[Martin Samuels · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is easy to get the impression that the only thing Clausewitz wrote was his seminal On War. In reality, he produced a significant number of pieces, many never intended for public view, which were published by his widow in a series of volumes. His analysis of Waterloo is one of these. As Christopher Bassford notes, it is remarkable that, although the work prompted the Duke of Wellington to make his only written statement of the campaign (other than his Despatch, written immediately after the battle itself), Clausewitz's monograph had been virtually forgotten and never before published in English translation. This fine work by Bassford and his fellow editors addresses this significant gap, and in fascinating style sets out both the correspondence around Wellington's decision to write his response to Clausewitz's arguments, the full text that Clausewitz had written, and Wellington's memorandum. These are supported by two essays by the editorsd, covering aspects emerging from the arguments.

First and foremost, the translation of Clausewitz's text is clear and readable. His lines of agument and perspective come out clearly. These reveal Clausewitz's ability to perceive the political factors that drove Napoleon's course of action, and hence also provide the basis for Clausewitz to criticise errors made by Napoleon. In addition, Clausewitz also goes through every stage of the campaign, from the initial deployment of the British and Prussian Armies through until the end of hostilities in early July (a fortnight after Waterloo). In this analysis, Clausewitz shows he was not constrained by national rpide, making as many criticisms of the Prussian commanders as he does of Wellinton or Napoleon. The result is a fascinating perspective of a well-known campaign, which reveals new insights.

Greatly recommended to anyone interested in the campaign itself, but also to anyone concerned with military strategy or with command. A masterclass in the art of writing military history.

[And · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's a bit kind of "this happened and then this happened". There is a lot of the "why", re intention, motive and situational responding. I suppose maybe it's about tactics whereas I'm currently interested in strategy.

Yes I think that's fair. It's aim is granular tactical analysis whereas my wants is overview of strategic thinking and decision making.

I found Kissinger's doctoral thesis (A World Restored) to be scratching the itch I have, for reference. Although that was just as granular, but at the diplomatic level, over a much greater period. It was hard going (it's an academic thesis not for popular consumption) but interesting. Tactics on the other hand, are of little interest. Modern day warfare is too different for it to be of interest, I am afraid (in my admittedly uneducated opinion).

User error. Closing.

[Mikhail Filatov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Must read for anyone interested in Napoleonic wars history.
Clausewitz is quite critical -and for good reason-of Napoleon actions during this campaign and Bonaparte attempts to find a scapegoat in Grouchy.
His criticism of Wellington actions before Waterloo, when he delayed the assembly of his troops as he was not sure of the real direction of French attack caused Wellington reply. This the only memoirs Wellington left on this subject. What is interesting, that in Wellington response he emphasised political importance of making sure that Brussels was protected vs. purely military reasons from Clausewitz to focus on French army only,

[Jwt Jan50 · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is not for the 'faint of heart.' Clausewitz is a tough 'slog' on a good day. What is refreshing here is the admirable work done by the authors - especially revealing were Clausewitz's letters to the wife written shortly after Waterloo detailing his part in the Prussian retreat. Also, his part in the Prussian defeat of 1806, his writing thereon and his resigning to throw in with the Russians in 1812. Who knew. And, his death from cholera. And Wellington. His letters and memorandum written some 20+ plus years later. Confess to speed reading/skipping parts of Clausewitz. But, the rest is superbly done and presented.

[Christopher · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding. The additional selections presented by the editors do an excellent job of placing Clausewitz's analysis of the campaign and Wellington's response in their necessary context. My one exceedingly minor gripe is that Pedlow's concluding chapter feels somewhat out of synch with the rest of the book, focused as it is on historiographic debate over the timing of various orders and decisions. It strikes me as an oddly discordant tack-on to a book that would have been fantastically concluded by Moran's excellent comment. Just the same, essential reading for serious students of Clausewitz, of Wellington, and/or of the Waterloo Campaign.