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Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq
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- GenresHistory
320 pages, Paperback
First published December 14, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
January 24, 2020
One of the best works of the Iraq war and occupation literature, Mr. Steele brings expertise and insight as wide as the Middle East to a colonial farce that - as usual - ended in a quiet, private sigh totally opposite the flag-waving bombast of entry. (And seems will never find lasting completion.)
The most engrossing segments for me were his depiction of the origin and rise of Iraq's sectarian violence. I disagree with his assertion that "Saddam started the rot." As with the ethnic violence of the former Yugoslavia, the resentments were the natural product of separate communities often in competition over land and resources. Under Saddam, as in Tito's Yugoslavia, a centralizing state went a long way toward mitigating - though not eliminating - these communal differences. Broad-based social programs and upward mobility were major integrating factors. The breakdown of the state and its integrative functions in employment, education, and basic services were the key economic ingredient of the subsequent ethnic violence, of which Mr. Steele makes some passing comments.
It might be a conspiratorial exaggeration to say that the occupiers encouraged ethnic pogroms in a divide and conquer strategy - I say, "might" - but as in Yugoslavia the breakdown of Iraq's larger national space caused individuals to withdraw into family and community, playing into the hands of power-seeking groups now free to emerge from the margins. Economic downturn and a desire to "protect one's own" was the direct result of neo-liberal reforms and war, in the Balkans and Iraq. These immediate issues fanned the flames of "ancient hatreds" that had been on low burn for generations. Mr. Steele rightly sees the American desire for neat and simplistic analysis, looking for political guys good or bad to play with, as the fatal flaw in Western "good intentions."
He is also spot-on disagreeing with the Western obsession to paint its Iraq occupation as a parallel with post-war Germany and Japan. In those countries, the West was eager to conciliate traditional local elites, who were anxious in turn to collaborate out of fear of Communism. But in Iraq there was no outside enemy and no traditional elite to serve as foils of occupation. Instead there was a colonial hauteur and vindictiveness running throughout PCA Paul Bremer's viceregal reign. The result was a neo-Peoples' Republic imposed by a Soviet-style "revolution from abroad."
As to the criticism that Mr. Steele's work is outdated by the "surge", which supposedly brought the mess to a peaceful end, recall that Iraq dropped out of sight in the Western media almost immediately after its announcement. We have no full picture of Iraq afterward, but it does seem that the "success" alluded to was built on bribery and a belated hands-off policy that allowed "little Saddams" to keep the peace on a local and regional level. In other words, spreading money - as Saddam once did with jobs and promotions and rising standards of living - is what quieted the uproar, not the expanded number of US high-laced boots. As the rise of ISIS now proves, those believing in popular "acceptance" of "America's Mission" proved as gullible as those "liberals" who once, allegedly, tooted how the Iraqi people "loved Saddam."
The most engrossing segments for me were his depiction of the origin and rise of Iraq's sectarian violence. I disagree with his assertion that "Saddam started the rot." As with the ethnic violence of the former Yugoslavia, the resentments were the natural product of separate communities often in competition over land and resources. Under Saddam, as in Tito's Yugoslavia, a centralizing state went a long way toward mitigating - though not eliminating - these communal differences. Broad-based social programs and upward mobility were major integrating factors. The breakdown of the state and its integrative functions in employment, education, and basic services were the key economic ingredient of the subsequent ethnic violence, of which Mr. Steele makes some passing comments.
It might be a conspiratorial exaggeration to say that the occupiers encouraged ethnic pogroms in a divide and conquer strategy - I say, "might" - but as in Yugoslavia the breakdown of Iraq's larger national space caused individuals to withdraw into family and community, playing into the hands of power-seeking groups now free to emerge from the margins. Economic downturn and a desire to "protect one's own" was the direct result of neo-liberal reforms and war, in the Balkans and Iraq. These immediate issues fanned the flames of "ancient hatreds" that had been on low burn for generations. Mr. Steele rightly sees the American desire for neat and simplistic analysis, looking for political guys good or bad to play with, as the fatal flaw in Western "good intentions."
He is also spot-on disagreeing with the Western obsession to paint its Iraq occupation as a parallel with post-war Germany and Japan. In those countries, the West was eager to conciliate traditional local elites, who were anxious in turn to collaborate out of fear of Communism. But in Iraq there was no outside enemy and no traditional elite to serve as foils of occupation. Instead there was a colonial hauteur and vindictiveness running throughout PCA Paul Bremer's viceregal reign. The result was a neo-Peoples' Republic imposed by a Soviet-style "revolution from abroad."
As to the criticism that Mr. Steele's work is outdated by the "surge", which supposedly brought the mess to a peaceful end, recall that Iraq dropped out of sight in the Western media almost immediately after its announcement. We have no full picture of Iraq afterward, but it does seem that the "success" alluded to was built on bribery and a belated hands-off policy that allowed "little Saddams" to keep the peace on a local and regional level. In other words, spreading money - as Saddam once did with jobs and promotions and rising standards of living - is what quieted the uproar, not the expanded number of US high-laced boots. As the rise of ISIS now proves, those believing in popular "acceptance" of "America's Mission" proved as gullible as those "liberals" who once, allegedly, tooted how the Iraqi people "loved Saddam."
December 19, 2019
Makes you wonder what journalist were doing when all this was happening (maybe waiting for it to end so that one can write a book about it)
Account of how US and UK made a blunder by invading a country scarred by imperialism and religions division .
Well written and insightful .
Account of how US and UK made a blunder by invading a country scarred by imperialism and religions division .
Well written and insightful .
July 11, 2021
It's a good thing Steele pointed this out. I think my cousin found their Iraq in the back of his pickup truck during spring cleaning this year.
March 17, 2008
Not very insightful. Makes familiar arguments but without much detail. The background history he provides is too brief to be of much value. He advocates an immediate withdrawal but doesn't offer a plan on how to do it, nor
does he acknowledge the serious challenges Iraq would face afterwards. There are many books available about Iraq. You'd be better off reading a different one.
does he acknowledge the serious challenges Iraq would face afterwards. There are many books available about Iraq. You'd be better off reading a different one.
November 20, 2008
Much detail on the arrogance of the Bush administration in its treatment of Iraqis and the lack of planning for the post invasion situation.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews