To The Gates Of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign – A Military History of McClellan and Lee's Decisive Bloodiest Battles in 1862

by Stephen W. Sears

To the Gates of Richmond charts the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, General George McClellan’s grand scheme to march up the Virginia Peninsula and take the Confederate capital. For three months McClellan battled his way toward Richmond, but then Robert E. Lee took command of the Confederate forces. In seven days, Lee drove the cautious McClellan out, thereby changing the course of the war. Intelligent and well researched, To the Gates of Richmond vividly recounts one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War.

Genres: Civil War, History, American Civil War, Nonfiction, Military History, American History, War

512 pages, Paperback

First published September 1, 1992

About the author

Stephen Ward Sears is an American historian specializing in the American Civil War.

A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.

Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.

Reviews

['Aussie Rick' · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was the very first book I read on the American Civil War. I read this book in 1994 and since then I haven't stopped buying Civil War books. I have read Sears other two books, "Antietam: Landscape Turned Red" and "Chancellorsville" and enjoyed them both very much. This book covers the Federals Peninsula Campaign of 1862 and the text flows along smoothly, so much so that I found it hard to put down. The author describes the battles and characters so well that you can see them in front of you. I enjoyed this book so much that I have no hesitation in recommending it to anyone who wants to have a good read about the Civil War.

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

It really isn’t fair that I read this book – and am now rating it – after having read Allen Guelzo’s Gettysburg: The Last Invasion. Stephen Sears’ To the Gates of Richmond, about George McClellan’s failed Peninsula Campaign of 1862, is not a bad book. To the contrary, it is sturdy and dependable, just like the Honda Civic you drove back in high school. But when compared with Guelzo’s bracing new history (and yes, I know, the books were written at different times, about different battles), it’s hopelessly old fashioned.

So no, it’s not fair at all. But life is not fair. If it were, I would be living in a lighthouse and would spend my days on the beach being handfed éclairs by tuxedo-clad monkeys while reading Civil War books. My wife, meanwhile, would be painting this scene in watercolors.

But enough about me and my totally normal conception of fairness.

The Peninsula Campaign was General George McClellan’s ill-fated and tragicomic attempt to seize the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. It was the largest campaign of the war, and comprised some of the bloodiest fighting. (Nearly a quarter of the men involved were killed, wounded or missing).

In his ponderous, plodding style, McClellan was able to get his Army of the Potomac to within sight of the church spires of Richmond. (No mean feat, since McClellan – ignoring basic demographic information – was absolutely convinced that the Confederates had hundreds of thousands of men at their disposal). At the battle of Seven Pines, Confederate General Joseph Johnson was wounded, and in a stroke of fortune, Robert E. Lee took command. During the subsequent Seven Days battle, Lee hammered McClellan’s men (and more importantly, McClellan’s fragile psyche), forcing the Army of the Potomac to retreat.

This is a fascinating and often overlooked story of the Civil War. I’ll admit, I often gloss over the Peninsula Campaign in favor of more famous engagements, such as Shiloh, Antietam, or Gettysburg. Thus, I picked up this book with some anticipation. I’d already read three of Sears’ other Civil War titles – Landscape Turned Red, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg – so I was looking forward to tweaks to the conventional wisdom, along with precise insights into the major players.

To the Gates of Richmond falls short of those other works, and was to me a mild disappointment. That is not to say it’s a bad book. Indeed, I don’t think I could actually define a complaint that anyone else would notice. But I know what excites me, and this isn’t it.

Sears’ account of the Peninsula Campaign is sturdily constructed, chronologically straightforward, and utterly unadorned. It tells a methodical tale: a plan is created; a plan is put in motion; some battles take place; the plan goes to hell. Intermixed with the marching and the maps are the usual (and often nondescript) first-person reminisces of the men involved.

It was all frankly underwhelming.

I’m not asking for a reinvention of the wheel. I do not base my enjoyment of Civil War literature on whether or not the author was able to uncover the Templar plot that I know was actually behind everything.

What I wanted, though, was for Sears to be as good as Sears can be.

In Chancellorsville, for instance, Sears has a fantastically nuanced take on General Joseph Hooker. Rather than reflexively damning the man for being at the butt-end of Lee’s greatest victory, Sears takes the time to discuss the man’s positive attributes, his organizational flair, and his strategic concepts. But he’s also able to take Hooker to task for his glaring failures, both broad-based and tactical.

There is nothing resembling that in To the Gates of Richmond. Most of the major actors in the drama are persons in name only. We do not get to know any of them to any degree. This is especially frustrating since the Peninsula Campaign took place early in the war; accordingly, many of the familiar corps and division commanders were then leading brigades or even regiments.

Surprisingly, Sears devotes precious little time to the vainglorious oaf man at the center of the whirlwind: George Brinton McClellan. To be sure, McClellan is an enigma: supremely talented and confident, yet also debilitated by command decisions. However, Sears wrote a biography on Little Mac, so I expected much more analysis of his psychological makeup.

To the Gates of Richmond satisfies at the most basic level. It is easy to follow. It is well researched. It is plainly written. A newcomer to the Civil War certainly will not get lost in the thickets of company-level minutiae.

It is a good book. Unfortunately, I was looking for a great one.

[Sean Chick · Rating 3 out of 5]

I almost gave this two stars, but relented. I heard this was Sears' worst book and my fears were correct. It lacks the narrative punch of his other books and his deft analysis of command relationships is absent. The book is the pinnacle of McClellan bashing, and Sears (who is known to pick his favorites) spares nothing to blast McClellan as incompetent and arrogant. McClellan according to Sears is an idiot who was also a coward of sorts. McClellan's solid grasp of strategy and logistics is barely mentioned. Lincoln and Stanton, who did much to torpedo the campaign, are generally given a pass.

If McDowell had come down to Richmond the city would have fallen. As it is Lincoln took the bait in the Valley and the Rebels won. McClellan was a deeply flawed general. I just don't see him as a strutting fool. Sears, at least at this stage, was unable to thread the needle and see where McClellan, Lincoln, and Stanton were right and wrong. He does elude to Lincoln making some errors, but as ever Abraham Christ avoids criticism.

My other knock is a lack of information on the Confederates (at least until the Seven Days) and the politics of the campaign. The whole thing could have been deeper. Instead, one gets an adequate but highly biased account. The book came at the height of McClellan bashing, buttressed by Ken Burns' cruel treatment of the general. Fortunately, the debate is still raging and McClellan is being reassessed.

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

A lot of people who have read this book would say it is not Stephen Sears best work, but for me, being a civil war history buff, I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Most of the battles discussed about the American Civil War are Gettysburg, Antietam, Shiloh, Vicksburg, and Bull Run, with not much emphasis on other important campaigns or battles. The peninsula campaign is one of those sections of the war that I feel is not given much coverage, and so when I bought a used copy of it from my local library, I was excited I had found a book on the peninsula campaign.

Stephen sears gives a detailed account on what took place during the campaign, the various Seven Days of battles, the thoughts, the fighting, the feelings and just how close the union could’ve been to defeating the confederacy in 1862 (or bringing it close to defeat).

For me, I soaked up the details, and it gave me a clearer insight into the campaign, so I think it deserves a five star rating.

[Bill · Rating 4 out of 5]

For once, after reading a book that I rather enjoyed, I somehow feel like I have little to say about it. Nothing specific leapt out at me, prompting me to jot down a page number or an insightful quote or a perceptive passage. And yet I still found the book very readable, easy to follow and came away learning a lot of information I hadn’t known. 

So I did what I normally don’t do - read the reviews here before writing my own - to help me figure out what it was that I just read, and why I didn’t have stronger and more eloquent opinions about it as many others seem to.

What I found was that the general consensus is that this is not Stephen Sears’ best work. But I have never read Stephen Sears before this. The consensus also seems to be that he’s far too harsh on General McClellan. But I have not studied McClellan closely enough to reach my own conclusions about that. So maybe I can’t adequately articulate what I thought about the book, because I don’t have enough of a foundation to base it on.

What I can say, is that this is not a dry, dense, dull account focusing on granular details of troop movements and battle tactics. But neither is it a vivid, dramatic narrative that makes you feel as though you’re right there in the middle of the action. What it is, is more of a generals’-eye view of the Peninsula Campaign that culminated in the Seven Days Battles, as McClellan crept his way northward to try to capture Richmond, and then retreated, and Lee first took command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Since the book covers an entire campaign and not just a single battle, it necessarily focuses on the bigger picture.

In doing so, Sears makes it easy to follow and keeps the narrative flowing, so I never felt lost in the details. There are just enough descriptions of individual soldiers' experiences to give you a feel for the battles without overwhelming you with specifics about what happened to whom at what location at what hour. The focus is largely on the generals, their strategies, their maneuvers, their successes and missteps.

So is Sears unfair to McClellan? Clearly Lee got the better of him, and anyone vaguely familiar with the Civil War knows the stories about McClellan’s grandiosity, hesitancy and tendency to overestimate the strength of the enemy. Sears largely sticks to this view. I didn’t find him unduly harsh until the narrative reached the sixth day of the campaign ahead of the Battle of Glendale, when he writes that "McClellan had lost the courage to command" and "deliberately fled the battlefield." Later, though, he defends McClellan from accusations that he did the same ahead of the next battle. And he also finds fault with Lee and other Confederate officers, acknowledging that, at this early stage of the war, everyone was relatively new at this and mistakes were going to be made. 

Ultimately, the criticism directed at McClellan doesn’t necessarily come across as unwarranted so much as it is one-sided. I would have liked for Sears to have more fully explained his conclusions, weighing the merits of McClellan’s complaints, and whether he could and should have gotten more support from Washington. 

So as a day-by-day, battle-by-battle account of the campaign and those who led it, I thought Sears managed to tell it in an engaging, interesting way, complete with colorful anecdotes like the reconnaissance that was conducted by hot air balloon. The story might have been told more dramatically, and there could have been more analysis and insight into why certain decisions were made and why things turned out the way they did. So I may not eagerly reread this someday, seeking out memorable passages or recalling favorite moments. But for someone who just wants a solid, informative read about what happened and how the Peninsula Campaign played out, this more than fits the bill in a satisfying, if not quite dazzling, way. For a book about which I felt I had little to say, that in the end may be the best way to say it.

[Katherine Addison · Rating 4 out of 5]

Military American Civil War history. Does exactly what it sets out to do and does a good job of examining both sides of the military conflict of the Peninsula Campaign of 1862. I think he could do a better job with the issue of slavery, but since this was written 30 years ago, I'm not entirely surprised he doesn't.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A strong, well-written history of the war’s largest and most complex campaign. While quite detailed, Sears manages to avoid getting bogged down in minutiae.

Sears tells the well-known story of how McClellan, under pressure from Lincoln, advanced toward Richmond but was foiled by a combination of faulty intelligence, Confederate ruses, and, of course, his own over-cautiousness and mistaken belief in his numerical inferiority. Although McClellan was under the impression of battlefield success due to supposed “victories” like Yorktown, none of these were the result of any decisive action on McClellan’s part. While a superb organizer with an excellent grasp of concept, he was an egotistical and self-delusional man, and a weak commander when it came to actual battlefield actions. Sears gives us vivid portraits of the battles of Seven Pines and Seven Days’, where McClellan was far from the front lines and was repeatedly saved only by the initiative of his subordinates. McClellan had opportunity after opportunity to take Richmond, but the army was repeatedly thwarted by McClellan’s timidity and, according to Sears, his simple inability to lead.

At the same time, Sears portrays the various problems the Confederates encountered, such as manpower shortages and logistical shortcomings. A lack of coordination and insistence on overly complicated maneuvers resulted in merely piecemeal Confederate attacks, when they were capable of mounting them at all. While Sears does acknowledge Robert E. Lee’s often brilliant leadership during the campaign, Lee also hampered his own operations with overly complicated plans, and his high expectations of subordinates often failed to be realized. Sears concludes that Lee led his troops, while McClellan didn’t, and this comes through as the main theme of the Peninsula Campaign. Sears also argues that Lee was able to learn from his experience, while McClellan clearly wasn’t.

A thorough, sweeping, and well-researched history, although some more maps would have helped.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent Civil War military history, by Stephen W. Sears, published in 1992. He goes into detail about a major ACW campaign, using many quotes by participants, from their letters and journals. I did not realize that the Peninsula Campaign of 1862 ( including the Seven Days) was the largest campaign of the Civil War, not the Gettysburg Campaign or the Lee vs. Grant Overland Campaign. 250,000 men were involved, 1/4 were killed, wounded, or missing by the time the fighting ended.
One thing I knew about the campaign was that Union General George McClellan was an ultra-cautious commander, who feared risking his army in battle. Unbelievably enough, despite the fact that the North heavily outnumbered the South, McClellan always believed that the Confederate forces outnumbered his forces. It seems to me this was his excuse for his extreme caution...His plan was a sound one, to invade Virginia from the sea and march west to take the Confederacy's capital, Richmond, and win the war. But he needed to move faster, much faster, to achieve his goal of taking Richmond.
Robert E. Lee took command of the Confederate Army facing McClellan at "the gates of Richmond" and took the initiative to go on the offensive against the Federals. In the Seven Days actions, Lee not only saved Richmond by driving McClellan's larger army back but came the closest that he ever did to destroying a Union army. McClellan felt it was a victory that he saved the Army of the Potomac when he retreated to Harrison's Landing on the James River, a base that could be protected by Union gunboats. I think it was a mistake that Lincoln did not fire McClellan then and there. But who would have replaced him at that point?
Sears' book is excellent military history, drawing on many eyewitness accounts, my only quibble being that I would have liked more maps and in greater detail ( I did some googling). 4/5 stars.

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Never had connected these series of battles together as "Seven Days Battles" before reading this account. One battle outcome and results, and the positioning of different parts of the armies, definitely influenced other subsequent battles. Liked the perspective of the change of leadership from Joe Johnston to Lee that I don't think I understood before. It wasn't really a "done deal" that Lee would command in the field until he was needed, that I wasn't aware of previously. Hadn't known about Glendale and Gaines Mills battles before this book, and latter is actually a very significant engagement in that it started the beginning of McClellands retreat back down James peninsula, and thus start of the end of his career at head of Army of Potomac.

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Peninsula Campaign is fascinating in the most frustrating of retrospective ways: as a reader, you cringe at McClellan's slow crawl up from the York-James Peninsula, practically shouting from the present to move the columns forward, forget the delusions of hundreds of thousands of Rebel soldiers, and press on to Richmond and end the war so that Antietam, Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Petersburg remain obscure geographical points rather than bloody markers of American history. For all of the shouting, though, the result stands: Lee was utterly successful, at a strategic level, in shooing the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond and on to different, and more Confederate-friendly, battlefields, later in the war.

Stephen Sears delivers a very solid and engaging take on the Peninsula battles, marching through details on the company and regimental level, but also maintaining a focus on the overall campaign and the march of the armies. While more maps would be useful for the reader, the descriptions of battle movements are crisp and accessible.

Sears shows little love for McClellan throughout the book. The Young Napoleon comes off more as the Grand Coward of the campaign, not only for failing to push his army forward and press his numerical advantages, but also for his personally leaving the battlefields at numerous points during the Seven Days, absconding to the safety of a naval gunboat in the James River, utterly dejected and demoralized. Robert E. Lee is not the infallible Lee of later myth, but a sometimes-lax leader, creating battleplans far too intricate and leaving subpar generals too much leeway to scuttle his vision. However, Lee possesses the singular drive and strategic concept to achieve his ends: forcing the Army of the Potomac from within bell-sounding distance of Richmond back to the James River, saving the Confederate cause and flinging the war into its next bloody phase.

[Brian Willis · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the turning points of the war that doesn't get the attention it deserves in larger treatments, Sears brings the incisive "major battle" analysis to the 1862 campaign to end the war by invading the peninsula of southern Virginia to surround and compel Richmond to surrender.

Indeed, George McClellan had the numbers and the resources to make this happen. The failure lies primarily with him and his delusional amplification of the secessionist numbers to over twice their actual amount (to defend their own capital!) and his characteristic bluster lacking the courage to hazard a decisive battle through an ingenious attack scheme.

Another key factor was the decision during this particular campaign to place Robert E. Lee in charge of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee was precisely what McClellan lacked or refused to do: a master strategist who ordered daring and sometimes risky maneuvers that were firmly grounded in a knowledge of the strategic tendencies of the opposing general. Indeed, McClellan HAD Lee beaten if he would have pushed right up against the gates of Richmond, but Lee knew McClellan all too well and was able to push the Union Army backwards and expel them from the peninsula.

The Seven Days' battles that surrounded this push are compelling reading for Civil War buffs with many acts of daring as well as stupefying blunders from a highly disorganized Union army. I don't want to spoil too much but there are many little moments of high interest. There are a number of illustrations and incredibly useful maps to keep the strategies fresh and vivid. If you have a solid grasp of the Civil War overall, as well as a few of the narratives of other major battles under your belt, this could very well be your cup of tea.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thorough telling of George McClellan's failed attempt to capture the city of Richmond in 1862 in order to quickly put an end to the Southern rebellion. Steven Sears did an excellent job of introducing the major players on both sides of the conflict and of laying out each of their motivations and strategies during the 5 month long campaign. After reading this book, I have a much better understanding of George McClellan's character and why the Peninsula Campaign ultimately failed.

I recommend this book to anyone who has a fairly good understanding of the events of the Civil War. If you want a broader overview of the Civil War, this book is probably too detailed. It spends quite a bit of time on troop movements at each of the battles. I found this aspect of the book somewhat difficult to follow, and also a bit dry, as I am not familiar with many of the names of the commanders. I ended up referring to maps frequently while I was listening to the audiobook to help me visualize the battle. It also helped me immensely to visit the Seven Days battlefield sites before I listened to the book. If you live in the Richmond area, I highly recommend driving the Battlefield Tour and visiting some of the battlefield sites before you read the book.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

Man, this is dry stuff. It's like reading a box score from an old-time baseball game — lots of names and lots of stats, but you really have to work hard to get the highlights of the contest. I started this book three years ago in anticipation of a trip to the Richmond peninsula. I'm glad I got some of the background I did, before the trip. But after the trip, the unfinished book languished on my night stand for months and months. Finally, I decided to muscle my way to the end.

What saddens me most in reading books about the Civil War is how senseless it was. Historians speak of Gettysburg as the high water mark of the Confederacy, but I think the Battle of Glendale was as good as it was going to get for the Rebs. Lee had a real shot at decimating the Army of the Potomac right there and then. There were so many mistakes and miscommunications that the battle ended as a tactical victory. Instead, the war dragged on for three more year with oceans of blood spilled for a lost cause.

I can only recommend this book to the die-hard Civil War historians out there. If you want a better narrative telling, I highly recommend Shelby Foote.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Stephen Sears delivers an excellent account of the Peninsula Campaign waged by the Army of the Potomac aimed at capturing Richmond in 1862. The plan to use the navy to land and march to Richmond via Williamsburg was one of the most daring operations of the war and provided for two largely untested armies to engage in major combat. It was the highest number of soldiers committed on each sides and while not the bloodiest it comes close in terms of numbers lost. It sealed McCellan's fate and gave rise to Lee as her retooled the Army of Northern Virginia. This story also includes the famed clash between the Merrimack and Monitor that changed how naval warfare would be perceived until World War II. Sears writes very clear and easy to understand military campaigns that take into account domestic politics or north and south, naval conditions and the rise of the failed intelligence network under Pinkerton. For those who want a concise account of the march to Richmond there is no better than this one and I highly recommend it.

[Josh Liller · Rating 4 out of 5]

In 1862, George McClellan was finally persuaded to move on Richmond with the Army of the Potomac. Beloved by his troops, his campaign would be largely undone by his fears and overcautious decisions, which bordered on paranoia and cowardice.

Meanwhile, Robert E. Lee would assume command of the Army of Northern Virginia. His grand schemes for the destruction of the Union army would be undone by fatigued and otherwise ineffective lieutenants, poor communication, and worse maps.

It was the largest campaign of the war in terms of combined number of soldiers involved from both sides, won by the Confederates despite suffering nearly twice as many casualties and losing nearly all the battles. From its initial stages till the final withdrawal, Sears covers the campaign with great depth.

This book was published a decade before his stellar book about Gettysburg which I read previous to this one.

[Michael Kleen · Rating 5 out of 5]

In To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, Stephen W. Sears charts the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, Union General George McClellan’s grand plan to march up the Virginia Peninsula and capture the Confederate capital. More men and weapons of war were assembled for this campaign than for any other operation of the American Civil War. For three months, McClellan crawled toward Richmond. When Robert E. Lee took command of Confederate forces, he drove McClellan back to his ships in seven bloody days. How did this happen? Sears examines the men (from lowly privates to generals) and the politics that changed the course of history.

Major General George B. McClellan was a complex figure. He was an outspoken Democrat who expressly fought only to preserve the Union. He was supremely confident in his own abilities and loved the Army of the Potomac. It loved him back. How then, with over 100,000 men under his command, did he not only fail to capture the Confederate capitol, but fail spectacularly?

Sears’ narrative is unparalleled. His writing is clear, concise, and informative. He portrays a McClellan broken by Robert E. Lee’s aggressiveness–his only thought was to preserve his beloved army from what he believed was a vastly superior rebel force. He gave up strategic ground and countless supplies just to escape. The Union Army’s loss of war material in the campaign was “beyond calculation.”

To the Gates of Richmond highlights many surprising details about this early chapter of the war. Not only did the Union Army employ hot air balloons and ironclad ships for the first time, but some soldiers purchased iron plates to use as body armor (soon discarded for being too heavy). The Confederates had tricks up their sleeves as well. General Gabriel J. Rains utilized improvised explosive devices (land “torpedoes”) to harass the advancing Yankees. The Confederate high command frowned on this tactic, however, and transferred him to apply his particular set of skills against enemy ships in the James River.

Sears makes a compelling case that George McClellan, though young, was a general whose mind was trapped in another era. He sought a decisive battle outside Richmond, one that would force the warring parties to the peace table. There he would negotiate concessions and save the Union, as happened in the past. But this was a new kind of war, and after the Peninsula Campaign there was no going back. What began as a war to preserve the Union became a revolution to remake America.

Stephen Ward Sears (born July 27, 1932), of Norwalk, Connecticut, is a graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College. He began his writing career in the 1960s as a World War 2 historian but later found a niche writing about the Army of the Potomac in the American Civil War, and particularly its most famous commander, General George B. McClellan. His other books include Gettysburg (2003) and George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (1988).

[Joseph Ficklen · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book I remember my dad reading as a kid, I have walked almost all the battlefields mentioned in the book, and it is a story near and dear to my heart. The story is so iconic and yet so strange. You have the first battle of the Ironclads at Hampton Roads, John Magruders playful ruse de guerres around Yorktown, McClellan's megalomania, Johnston's caution, and Lee's reckless courage. George McClellan led a 100,000 man army to the gates of Richmond at a cost in men and blood a fraction of what his successors would expend to get into the Confederate capital, with far less success attending. What makes it even more remarkable is that McClelland pressed on, deliberately and cautiously, all while thinking that the Confederates outnumbered him something like 2:1, when those odds were at the very least reversed.

The turns of fate are agonizing. What if Huger had started out sooner at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks? What if Jackson had a few more hours of sleep during the Seven Days? What if the Confederates had managed to cut off and destroy a major portion of the Army of the Potomac? The Seven Days would make an excellent wargame.

I enjoyed this book and learned a great deal. The Peninsula Campaign is pretty obscure in the grand scheme of the Civil War, but a vital moment in the course of the Civil War in Virginia.

[Nick Roser · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had a hankering to move back out to the Eastern Theater. I’m glad I did. This one strikes a really nice balance between the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of The Peninsular Campaign. The narrative is easy to follow and Sears, per usual, uses first hand accounts, letters, after action inquires, and reports to flesh out the personas and the action. Highly recommended.

[Marshall Snyder · Rating 4 out of 5]

McClellan proves to be a dolt; Lee assumes command of the Army of Northern Virginia; and the North loses an opportunity to win the war early.

[Lois · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was reading way out of my comfort zone, but for a good reason. The story aspects of this event motivated me to read on ("All through the winter Lincoln had tried with scant success to pin General McClellan down to some concrete plan and schedule of action, and it now appeared he had finally succeeded.") the battlefield maneuvers and the officers prescience or misjudgements had to be slogged through.

What I was after in this book was deepening my understanding of my own family history. I will describe great great grandfather Eliab's movements to summarize what I culled from the read.

Eliab was mustered in to the 22nd Regiment, Company D of the Massachusetts Volunteers in Reading, MA on September 6, 1861. He, with his fellows, was transported to Washington D.C. to be trained for soldiering in General McClellan's Army of the Potomac. Sometime in the later weeks of March 1862 he embarked on one of the numerous boats assembled to take General Fitz John Porter's troops from Alexandria to Fort Monroe (at the tip of the VA peninsula) amongst "high spirits". He was one of 121,500 men delivered in a 3 week period. "As they landed, Federal troops were marched to hastily laid out camps on the outskirts of the fort and at nearby Newport News and Hampton."
Unfortunately for all, the leader of this "Great Campaign", McClellan was misled and unrealistic about the number and placement of General Lee's army. On April 2nd McClellan met with his Generals, drawing up plans for the march on Yorktown. On April 4th "The day was pleasant and the march was easy. . .the few Rebels sighted faded back before the advance." The next day it rained and "the whole Yankee army promptly sank in mud, often up to their knees." The rebels were in a good defensible position to hold Yorktown and McClellan sent orders to Fort Monroe "to bring forward the siege train and to repair the roads and establish forward depots for the heavy paraphernalia of a siege." It rained. Siege preparation for most of the troops involved heavy labor- trench digging, road building. The most dangerous job was being assigned to be a forward picket. The camps were miserable and muddy. First aggressive action was not taken by McClellan until April 16. Eliab's regiment saw action at Yorktown. On May 3rd the Confederates withdrew and the Army of the Potomac took possession of Yorktown. Then they pursued the retreating Rebels.

Eliab's regiment does not appear to have been in the front lines at Battles of Williamsburg or Seven Pines. However, on May 27 he made his way with Gen. Fitz John Porter's troops to Hanover Court House in a driving rainstorm; a hard march through mud. "There was an hour or so of brisk fighting in a wood lot and around a house and barn at the crossroads and then the outmanned Rebels beat a hasty retreat." Once at Hanover Court House the fighting was fierce. "We met the Rebels on the verge of the woods and whipped them out of it in no time. . .they made a stand in an open field and again we pressed upon the enemy and drove them into the most incredible disorder." 731 Rebels were captured. There were nearly 300 killed on each side that day. Eliab was not among them. Hanover Court House had been a diversion to protect McClellan's right flank.

May 31st Eliab was stationed at Mechanicsville, on the right flank of the action taking place at Seven Pines that day. Though there was much carnage that day, Porter's infantry was not called to the front lines. By this time General McClellan reported "I am tired of the sickening sight of the battlefield, with its mangled corpses and poor suffering wounded. Victory has no charms for me when purchased at such cost." Meanwhile the health of the soldiers of both armies grew poorer every day. We know from Eliab's military records that he had chronic diarrhea. This was a common complaint given that the troops were often reliant on surface water for drinking. Men would have had to be desperately ill before they would report to a military hospital.

By the end of June, General Lee was well aware that General Fitz John Porter was guarding the Federal right flank and the supply line north of the Chickahominy river. He intended to do something about this - sending A.P. Hill to attack Porter's front and Jackson to attack Porter's rear and flank. On June 26th, the day of the Battle at Mechanicsville, Jackson started late, was confused as to his route and arrived when the battle was nearly over. Porter had set up fairly impenetrable defenses on a rise behind Beaver Dam Creek. "The line was braced, in position or in reserve by thirty-two guns in 6 batteries, and the woodland in front cleared for fields of fire. Timber was felled on the west bank to form an abatis." The repeated Rebel attacks were repulsed. Firing was so fast from the Federal side that some of the batteries exhausted their ammunition. The Confederates lost 1,475 soldiers that day, compared to 361 Federal losses. Eliab, who had been stationed with his infantry regiment at the rear was in reserve that day. When victory was announced to the troops "great bursts of cheering traveled along the lines, and regimental bands struck up impromptu concerts of national airs."

The next morning Gen. Porter was ordered to pull back to a defensible position, protecting the Chickahominy bridges from Jackson until the heavy guns, supply and baggage trains could be started for the James river. Other divisions were on the alert that they might be needed to support Porter. The position chosen for Porter by the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac was on an oval shaped plateau above the steep sided, boggy Boatswain's swamp, in a place called Gaines Mill. "Fitz John Porter arranged his 5th Corps on the plateau that morning facing west and north." He had 27,160 men of all arms in the Gaines Mill position. Infantry fashioned rough fieldworks. There was skirmishing against Porter's right and center in the morning. Dust clouds along the Chickahominy on the left signaled Rebels gathering there. At 2 pm Porter sent for reinforcements. A.P. Hill signaled the Confederate advance at 2:30. Eliab was at the front, near center in Martingale's unit. Initial fighting broke out on his right and continued along the line, becoming quite savage. A.P. Hill continued this assault for two hours. Gen. Porter reported to headquarters "We're holding them, but it's getting hotter and hotter." When Confederate General Ewell arrived he was sent to reinforce against the center of the Federal line. One of every five men he sent lost their lives. "The air was thickly wreathed in low-hanging smoke from the musketry, so that from a distance only the tree tops were visible." General Porter pushed troops from the reserve into gaps in the line. By 5 pm Porter reported "I am pressed hard, very hard. About every regiment I have has been in action." He feared he would be driven from his position without reinforcements. When light began to fade, Generals Lee and Jackson knew they had one more chance for a concerted attack and again sent it against the center. Jackson's directive to his troops: "Tell them this affair must hang in suspense no longer; sweep the field with the bayonet." In fits and starts, rushes and repulses the Rebels came on. As some of them hit the swamp and came within point blank range of Federal guns, they let out the 'Rebel Yell'-a sound like "forty thousand wild cats". Was Eliab there? "Their numbers were at least equal to their attackers, but with even the best infantryman available able to get off only three shots a minute, they simply could not fire fast enough to break the swift advance. Finally the first line panicked and turned and fled." The army's only recourse was to retreat.

I do not know at what point Eliab left the field that day- how much of this he endured. I do know that he was shot in the hip, and that he at some point was taken or made his way to Savage Station field hospital. He was ultimately abandoned behind enemy lines as the Confederates pursued McClellan's army to the James River and then off the peninsula. Eliab became a prisoner of war in Richmond and was eventually paroled in a prisoner exchange. He was a broken man, but returned to MA, managed to marry and father my great grandfather. This read has helped me appreciate how tenuous life is, and has placed me in an emotional lineage of deep hurt, yet survival. I would not recommend it for most, although this read is an important and major accomplishment for me.

[Lloyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a very readable and informative history of this particular campaign in 1862 when the Union’s Army of the Potomac tried to capture Richmond by traveling up the Virginia peninsula created by the James and York Rivers. This is a very well researched work. Overviews of the battles are provided along with first-hand accounts derived from the participant’s letters, diaries and journals. The author, Stephen Sears, provides insight into the plans of both the Union forces and the Army of Northern Virginia as well as what went wrong with those plans. He provides a critical analysis of the strengths and weakness of each side including the primary leaders, both civilian and military. Thus, while the plans often seem to be well conceived, the execution of those plans left plenty to be desired. Since this campaigned occurred very early in the American Civil War, neither side was really prepared to maneuver and command such large armies. So, this campaign and the defense was a giant shake-down cruise for each army. Tragically for the rank and file soldiers, military leadership skills were being learned and short-comings exposed during this time. Mr. Sears provides a strong opinion about the skills of the Union Commander, George B, McClellan and it is not a favorable opinion.

[Emily · Rating 3 out of 5]

Sears has a great eye for detailing the ideas and politics behind army movements, but his ongoing flaw for me is that when it comes to battle he approaches descriptions from an extremely granular level without knotting them together with a higher-level explanation. I love knowing about the individual actions of regiments but without an understanding of how they all fit in, it’s hard to follow the overall pace and movement. I think his book on Gettysburg is masterful; however that book, as well as this one and Landscape turned Red and his bol on Chancellorsville follow the same essential formula. In general Sears is a masterful and absorbing Civil War battle chronicler with an excellent eye for detail and personalities - however, we missed out on so much of those personalities in this book. Bruce Catton calls Fitz John Porter one of the best of the Western generals, but we get very little of his motivations or personalities here, except that he has a deft hand with a balloon and the unfortunate character flaw of believing in General McClellan. In this book I would have preferred a shade more top-down history and analysis, which Sears has missed. Overall, a read for a new student of the Peninsula campaign.

[Bob R Bogle · Rating 4 out of 5]

In October 2018 I made a tour of the Virginia Peninsula between the York and James Rivers to visit the battlefield sites related to George McClellan's 1862 campaign through the region. I was already familiar with the stories and characters involved in the campaign, on both the Union and Confederate sides, and I'd previously visited some of the sites involved. But with my own interests centered more in Western campaigns than in actions in the East, for these several years since 2018 I've been eager to dive deeper into McClellan's grand campaign, and indeed Stephen W Sears' 1992 book To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign had been waiting on my bookshelf for a long time.

I try to maintain what objectivity I can about times and events I little know, and the "strategic skill sets" brought to the table by certain Civil War personalities often leave me filled with doubts. I've remained uncommitted concerning the balance of leadership merits and deficits of these Civil War participants for a long time, no matter what established opinion has to say about them. Yet I imagine I'm not alone among American Civil War aficionados who would assign such figures as George McClellan and Joseph E Johnston to this category of problematic figures. Of course many people do have strong, undeviating opinions about such personalities, but I've always found the historical evidence about some of these figures to be decidedly mixed. In fact I've put Robert E Lee into this ambiguous category, along with even such an almost universally despised figure as Braxton Bragg. I've been willing to give even overwhelmingly popular and unpopular generals the benefit of the doubt before learning more about them so I can pass more informed judgment. To the Gates of Richmond has allowed me to finally judge a few of these generals, and to better understand the confusing dynamics at play in these early stages of the War. Indeed, the greatest impact of Sears' book on me has probably been on my understanding of how the War was perceived by its participants, and how its prosecution evolved over time.

To the Gates of Richmond is somewhat unusual for a one-volume history of a major Civil War campaign. I anticipated that Sears would dig down deeper than he did into many important characters on both sides of the conflict who cut their teeth in this campaign and went on to bigger and (often) better things. Among this number I would include: Oliver O Howard, Thomas F Meagher, John Sedgwick, Daniel E Sickles, Daniel Butterfield, Gouverneur K Warren, Joseph Hooker, Darius N Couch, Henry W Slocum, George G Meade DH Hill, James Longstreet, AP Hill, George E Pickett, William Mahone, Lewis A Armistead, and even now less luminous players like Edwin V Sumner, Samuel P Heintzelman, Philip Kearny, Philip St George Cooke, George Stoneman and Theophilus H Holmes. How much I should like to know the opinions of these participants during various stages of the campaign, and more precisely where they were deployed at various times during its execution. I acknowledge that a detailed history including all such material would hardly fit into one volume; still, I would have appreciated having more such material occasionally peppered into the narrative that Sears delivers.

For the most part Sears reserves the limelight for his main characters: George McClellan, Joseph E Johnston, Robert E Lee and, to a lesser extent, Thomas J Jackson. Yet even these main characters tend to come through somewhat obliquely: the task of painting the grand scheme of the campaign occupie Sears the most. As a result, To the Gates of Richmond turns out to read something like a "Peninsula-lite" history. However, I judge that this may be the most "fun," or "enjoyable" Civil War campaign volume I've read to date. Sears certainly does not pull his punches when he criticizes his main characters. Cutting to the chase, Sears has little if anything good to say about George McClellan or Joseph E Johnston, and he gets in a number of cruelly cutting jabs at both.

A virtue of taking such a high bird's eye view of these battles is that by eliminating the subtle details we do get a better grasp of the leadership qualities of the main cast on display, and finally this book has allowed me to formulate more decisive opinions about both McClellan and Joseph E Johnston. For as I read this book and contemplated its lessons, I was struck by the notion that no one this early in the War (with the likely exception of US Grant, far away in the West) had a good grasp on how to fight it. To a degree, most of the commanding officers on both sides were still utterly preoccupied with theoretical aspects of warfare, and their theories were all either obsolete or were nearly impossible to execute given the limitations of lines of communication available. Those who became most successful as commanders would be the ones who were more comfortable with replacing theory with a combination of aggression and on-the-scene improvisation. Grant seems to have known this right from the start; Lee probably learned it very quickly during the Peninsula campaign, although his subordinates during this period did not. Jackson's poor performance during the campaign is well-known, and Sears shines no new light on that mystery.

My overall opinion about Lee as a strategian continues to be complicated, but my opinions about McClellan and Johnston have finally gelled because of Sears' book: both were far too theoretical for what this War required, and so neither can be viewed as a successful field commander. In the case of Johnston, it makes me most uncomfortable to side with the opinions of Jefferson Davis over those of William T Sherman, but so it goes. McClellan, however, has finally become transparent for me, and a Henry Halleck quote sums up the matter succinctly at the end of To the Gates of Richmond. General McClellan, Halleck wrote, "does not understand strategy and should never plan a campaign." That, I think, is exactly correct, and aptly encapsulates the entire campaign.

[Jeffrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Having had a firm memory of the overview Shelby Foote gave of this same campaign, it was interesting to see the differences in their interpretations of the event. For the most part, this book is harsher on the Confederate command and control than Foote was. I would say that Sears is a little bit nicer to Jackson than Foote, but just because Sears tries to give an explanation for Jackson's behavior. It was an enjoyable (well, as enjoyable as the destructions of thousands of lives can be), fast read. I feel I'll need to find yet another book on this topic to get a third watch and not know what time it is at all.

[Jim Pfluecke · Rating 5 out of 5]

The start of the book is its weakest part. Rather than give some background on the armies, there organization, etc, as Sears did in his Chancerlorsville book, he jumps right into the campaign.

From there, it is excellent. Sears weaves the politics, personalities, operations, and strategy seamlessly into a narrative. The descriptions of the battles are rich in qoutes from participants. In fact, a strenght of the book is its use of letters and diaries of the participants, especially the privates, NCO's, and regiment officers. He also uses McClellan's writings to shed light on his decision making process.

Highly recommend to anyone interested in the American Civil War.

[Tom Harman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Stephen W. Sears’ To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign is a masterful and meticulously researched account of one of the most pivotal yet underappreciated episodes of the American Civil War: General George B. McClellan’s ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful 1862 campaign to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond. Through a combination of exhaustive research, vivid narrative, and incisive analysis, Sears delivers a compelling study that illuminates both the strategic complexities of the campaign and the personal failings of its central figure, McClellan. This book stands as a definitive work on the Peninsula Campaign, offering readers a richly detailed exploration of military strategy, leadership, and the human cost of war.
Sears’ greatest strength lies in his use of firsthand sources, which lend the book an unparalleled depth and authenticity. Drawing from letters, diaries, official reports, and memoirs of soldiers, officers, and civilians on both sides, Sears reconstructs the campaign with remarkable clarity. These primary sources allow readers to experience the perspectives of those who lived through the events, from the muddy trenches of Yorktown to the chaotic battlefields of Seven Pines and the Seven Days Battles. Sears skillfully weaves these voices into a cohesive narrative, balancing the granular details of individual experiences with the broader strategic and political context of the war. For example, the frustrations of Union soldiers under McClellan’s cautious leadership are palpable in their own words, while Confederate accounts reveal the desperation and resilience that defined their defense of Richmond.
The book’s central focus is General George B. McClellan, whose leadership—or lack thereof—shaped the outcome of the Peninsula Campaign. Sears paints a nuanced but ultimately damning portrait of McClellan, highlighting his brilliance as an organizer and strategist but excoriating his paralyzing indecision and tendency to overestimate Confederate strength. McClellan’s failure to seize the initiative, despite commanding a well-equipped Army of the Potomac, is a recurring theme. Sears meticulously documents how McClellan’s excessive caution and obsession with avoiding risk led to missed opportunities, most notably during the siege of Yorktown and the climactic Seven Days Battles. The latter, in particular, serves as the campaign’s tragic denouement, as McClellan, rattled by Robert E. Lee’s aggressive counteroffensives, “lost his nerve” and ordered a retreat that squandered the Union’s numerical and logistical advantages. Sears’ analysis is both fair and critical, acknowledging McClellan’s strengths while exposing how his psychological and leadership shortcomings doomed the campaign.
The book also captures the human toll of the campaign, with vivid descriptions of battles like Gaines’ Mill and Malvern Hill, where thousands fell in brutal, close-quarters combat. Sears’ prose is engaging yet precise, making complex military maneuvers accessible without sacrificing scholarly rigor. To the Gates of Richmond is a triumph of historical writing, offering a definitive account of a campaign that, while a Union failure, shaped the course of the Civil War. For anyone seeking a deeper understanding of McClellan’s flaws, the challenges of early Union strategy, or the gritty realities of 19th-century warfare, Sears’ work is essential reading.
Rating: 4.9/5 stars

[Alex Halo · Rating 5 out of 5]

audiobook version


my only other individual campaign book experience before this was Allen Guelzo's book on Gettysburg, which was over 20+ hours in length and went into extremely precise details, even down to the physics and mechanisms of musket fire and minie ball trajectories.


this book covering the Peninsula Campaign does not go as deep and its not as long. But it's a great read on its own. The campaign being one largely of maneuver across a largely compressed area of land makes it extremely easy to follow much of the movements and battles without needing a map on hand. a few cursory glances at a map is enough to get most of the crucial information ingrained into the memory.

sometimes the narrative starts to stray a bit, as minor digressions such as explaining the history behind the naming of locations and the family members ancestry going back to before the revolution are often included as they come up in the narrative rather than included in a separate section before the relevant army arrives to the location. as well, some of the back and forths between union generals, sometimes amounting to minor nitpicking and ego ruffling, are given a little too much attention than they probably deserve. oftentimes my attention drifted during these sections and little of value was lost.


the narrator is competent enough, but not particularly remarkable. little to no attempt is made to differentiate speakers when he is quoting and his style is often scholarly and a bit bouncy, like a college professor lecturing for an introductory course. it's the kind of narration style I'd expect for a broader civil war history, not a highly specific book focusing on a single 4 month period in one specific location.


Overall this was a great read and the minor downsides are not enough to detract from the experience at all

[Mark Matzeder · Rating 4 out of 5]

I grew up on the Virginia Peninsula so all the landscape in "To the Gates of Richmond" is familiar to me, so Stephen W. Sears' descriptions came alive for me. Despite being something of a 'History buff' most of what I knew of McClellan's 1862 Peninsular Campaign was that it happened. Most texts on the American Civil War give a few paragraphs to the Campaign, maybe a chapter. "To the Gates of Richmond" provided a much richer understanding of the failures of reconnaissance and logistics that plagued the Federal operations.
The much-maligned General George McClellan was maligned further in Sears' recounting. I knew he was an incompetent general; Sears portrays him as a narcissistic malingerer. Through all The Young Napoleon's bombastic laments to Washington and his own wife I kept thinking, "You know, Bonaparte would have attacked in this situation."
Confederate Stonewall Jackson did not fare much better in Sears' depiction. For all his tenacity at Manassas and strategic mastery of inferior opponents in the Shenandoah Campaign Jackson shambles through the Seven Days like a cantankerous old cuss, bristling at being placed under the newly-promoted Lee.
And it's Lee's frustration at directing the disparate parts of the Richmond Defense amid poor maps, poor roads, and poor communication that drives the narrative of "To the Gates of Richmond." McClellan and Lee are a couple of chess masters maneuvering each other to a stalemate on a board littered with discarded pawns. Stephen W Sears reminds us that these pawns bleed.

[A · Rating 4 out of 5]

Yes, i like it. Yes, it is a well paced narrative of the story of McClellan's failed foray down to Richmond in 1862. Well told, generally fair. But.... and this will be a general comment because it does sort of drive me crazy in countless civil war books, but this books sort of epitomizes the bias of extolling Lee at the expense of all else. Throughout the Peninsula campaign, Lee barely triumphs- often due to McClellan's cautious bungling and misjudgments. But... it is never Lee's fault that things go wrong... it is always his people who don't write his orders down correctly or commanders practically willfully misreading his supposed intent. Never is it Lee... bungling. And yet... for McClellan and well, for everyone else (south included) they are simply "wrong" (or - though the author doesn't use these words: stupid, lazy, cowardly, slow, etc). As i mention this courses though these civil war histories - even supposedly objective (non south leaning, like this one) is suffused with this Lee worship. But when he isn't clear with orders and doesn't have the alignment right and the battle fails... isn't that his fault (as it would be if it were McClellan or anyone else)?

[Steven Condon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent book by Sears, which captures the scope, intensity, and tragedy of this campaign. He does an excellent job of pointing out George McClellan’s failures, particularly when he analyzes McClellan’s abandonment of seven of his eleven divisions to fight without a commander at the crucial battle of Glendale. My only two complaints with Sears classic book also have to do with Sears coverage of generals whose contributions or lack of them had much to do with the outcome of this critical battle.

First Sears is unaware that a major hero of the Battle of Glendale was Union division commander Phil Kearny, who personally led the 63rd Pennsylvania Regiment in a charge that turned back the Confederate onslaught that nearly captured Kearny's lone artillery battery. As Kearny wrote in a letter to his wife a few days after Glendale:

"...It is perfectly absurd, at a fearful Battle on the 30th instant, I held the New Market Road, on the right. General McCall on the left. General McCall’s Pennsylvanians ran to a man. I headed my 63 Pennsylvanians, and bore back a mass of the enemy that no more minded our Battery, and its 6 pieces, deluging grape on them, than if it were sugar plums. And yet, as rapidly as each piece fired, I could see eight or ten men fall. So much for my rashness, as the dirty envious vile intriguers are pleased to denominate my inspiring men to fight, because they know, when matters are difficult, I am at their head, between them and danger, at least showing that I count on being followed..." (Kearny, Philip. 1988. Letters from the Peninsula: The Civil War Letters of General Philip Kearny, William B. Styple, ed., Kearny, NJ: Belle Grove Publishing Company, page 125)

Having studied Kearny’s Letters from the Peninsula and Irving Werstein’s 1962 biography, Kearny the Magnificent: the Story of General Philip Kearny, 1815-1862, and also having delved into John Watts De Peyster’s nineteenth century biography of Kearny, I can confidently say that Kearny was not making up the claim of personally leading this charge at Glendale. It was not the first such daring and successful charge he led on the Peninsula. Historians have been fooled because Kearny intentionally left the fact out of his official post battle report of Glendale and then died about two months later at the battle of Chantilly. Kearny omitted mentioning the fact that he led this critical charge at Glendale because, as I state in a footnote of my book:

“…he had already received too much criticism for personally exposing himself, a division commander, to such dangers. Kearny was convinced that he was being denied promotion to major general precisely because people accused him of such 'rashness,' whereas Kearny saw his trademark practice of boldly leading from the front as personal leadership necessary for inspiring men—and for him it seemed to work.” (Excerpt From: Steven E. Condon. Stonewall Jackson and the Midcourse Correction to Second Manassas. This material protected by copyright.)

My other gripe with Sears is that he lets Stonewall Jackson off too lightly for his nap at Glendale. While pointing out that Jackson slept through much of the battle of Glendale, Sears, like historian Clifford Dowdey before him (The Seven Days: the Emergence of Lee, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964) is quick to make the excuse that Jackson was exhausted. Given that Glendale was one of the crucial battles of the Civil War, a battle that might even have won the South its freedom (as Sears himself seems to hint when he quotes Porter Alexander’s post war comment to that effect), a soldier who took four Confederate divisions out of the battle because he fell asleep at his post, seems as much deserving of censure and investigation (if not perhaps conviction) by a court-martial, as any private who fell asleep at his post during war time. If Jackson was medically unfit for command that day, it was his duty to turn over command to his highest ranking subordinate. This most likely would have been Jackson’s right hand man Dick Ewell (the general who succeeded Jackson when Jackson was later killed) or Jackson’s friend and former brother-in-law division commander D. H. Hill.

Because Huger and Jackson put no pressure on Slocum, Richardson or Smith’s divisions, Union corps commander Bull Sumner was able to shuffle troops from the Union far right to shore up the critical Union center, McCall and Kearny’s divisions, where Longstreet and A.P. Hill nearly burst through. As Sears himself points out, McCall’s division was a shambles with all 3 brigade commanders out of commission and its numerous artillery batteries all eventually either abandoned, withdrawn or captured. Because of this same lack of pressure on the Union right, Kearny’s immediate superior, corps commander General Heintzelman, was able to borrow from Slocum the First New Jersey Brigade to further reinforce Kearny.

These critical reinforcements might have saved the day for the Union at Glendale. A breakthrough of the Union center that day might have rolled up four of the seven Union divisions. Such a dramatic victory would have been a crushing blow to McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, a disastrous setback for the Union war effort, and might well have prompted Britain and France to recognize the South’s independence, an event that might have been the death knell for Lincoln’s struggle to hold the Union together.

Given all this, was not Jackson deserving of official censure for his abandoning of his post? Was not a court-martial investigation or at least a court of inquiry called for? Should not we today recognize the severity of Jackson’s mistake and censure him for it? One has to take the bad with the good. Jackson made tremendous contributions to the South’s war effort but he was also guilty of one of the greatest military blunders of the war, his failure to turn over command at Glendale.