On Truth

by Harry G. Frankfurt

Whatever benefits and rewards it may sometimes be possible to attain by bullshitting, by dissembling, or by sheer mendacity, societies cannot afford to tolerate anyone or anything that fosters a slovenly indifference to the distinction between true and false.

In a world of spin, rhetoric, blagging and bullshitting, a basic level of scepticism and the impulse to question first impressions is widely considered a virtue. Yet the very purpose of such caution - the discernment of truth - has for some time been undermined by a postmodern generation of authors, journalists, historians and philosophers who categorically deny the existence of any exterior, objective truth, elevating instead the impenetrable subjectivity of the individual above all else.

Blending philosophical insight with sheer common sense, Harry Frankfurt's incisive sequel to On Bullshit is a defence, a vindication, and a celebration of Truth. Whether concerning ourselves with work, pleasure, people or poetry, Frankfurt demonstrates that a belief in a basic notion of Truth is essential not just to our everyday involvement with the physical world, but to the concepts of identity, confidence, trust, conviction, society, and communication that endow our lives with meaning.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Essays, Audiobook, Psychology, Logic, Theory

101 pages, Hardcover

First published October 31, 2006

About the author

Harry Gordon Frankfurt was an American philosopher. He was a professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University, where he taught from 1990 until 2002. Frankfurt also taught at Yale University, Rockefeller University, and Ohio State University.
Frankfurt made significant contributions to fields like ethics and philosophy of mind. The attitude of caring played a central role in his philosophy. To care about something means to see it as important and reflects the person's character. According to Frankfurt, a person is someone who has second-order volitions or who cares about what desires he or she has. He contrasts persons with wantons. Wantons are beings that have desires but do not care about which of their desires is translated into action. In the field of ethics, Frankfurt gave various influential counterexamples, so-called Frankfurt cases, against the principle that moral responsibility depends on the ability to do otherwise. His most popular book is On Bullshit, which discusses the distinction between bullshitting and lying.

Reviews

[Keith · Rating 2 out of 5]

I don't write many reviews for books to which I give less than three stars; in fact, I rarely rate books that low at all. But this was fairly ridiculous.

I found this by accident in my local library because it was at the end of a shelf near another book I wanted to read, and I resolved to read it next because I enjoyed his earlier On Bullshit so very much. In the end, however, it became clear to me that Frankfurt is far more familiar with bullshit than with truth.

Basically, the entire, relatively short tract reads as a bitter screed against postmodernism. Now, I'm no great fan of that aberrant offshoot of western philosophy myself, in part because it seems to me to eat its own tail if carried out far enough, which I suppose is among the reasons why it has fallen somewhat out of favor in the last decade (apart from having been done to death in pop culture). Nevertheless, it strikes me as ludicrous to dismiss the entire field out of hand, especially if one isn't going to do so well and convincingly.

The author early exhibits a fundamental inability or unwillingness to distinguish between relative and absolute truth, which concept was well established in eastern philosophies over a millennium ago, even if it took longer to penetrate the west. He then goes on to adopt an error from the Ethics of Spinoza to assert an imperative link between Love, Joy, and Truth, and then posits immutable truths while evidently ignoring the fundamentally mutable nature of phenomenological reality, and failing to recognize the influence of culture on the construction and perception of these questionable truths.

Amazingly, he also fails herein to distinguish between bullshit and lying, which was half the substance of his previous book. He then fails to carry his own acknowledgement "that we cannot realistically be confident of our own ability to distinguish truth from falsity" to its necessary conclusion. In what may be a misguided attempt to take a literary turn, he thoroughly misreads Shakespeare's Sonnet 138 ("When my love swears that she is made of truth") in order to completely undermine his own central thesis, and finally wraps up by flattening the spectra of both factuality and utility into an untenable binary system.

I still recommend On Bullshit highly as a primer on the rhetoric of the early 21st century, but I also strongly recommend giving this one a miss unless one needs a cogent example of how a professor emeritus should NOT construct an epistemological argument. It's one "get off my lawn!" short of a rant. However, since it was amusingly well-written in spite of all this, and I did enjoy reading (and mentally arguing with) it a bit, I give it two stars instead of one.

(Edited for typos 2017-06-09)

[Lauren Smith · Rating 2 out of 5]

On Truth exists largely as a footnote to Harry G. Frankfurt's earlier work, On Bullshit. An excellent example of a concise, clear argument, On Bullshit was a brilliant essay on the subject of bullshitting - of communicating without any regard for truth. Bullshitters, Frankfurt argues, are distinct from liars, because liars at least know what the truth is, even though they choose to contradict it. Bullshitters on the other hand don't know and don't care about the truth. They communicate with a specific goal in mind (eg. persuasion, improving their popularity), and will say anything in order to achieve this goal.

The purpose of On Truth is to fill a gap identified in the argument against bullshit - an explanation of the importance of truth, a reason why we should care about it.

Read the full review on my blog Violin in a Void

[#AskMissPatience · Rating 4 out of 5]

A poignant take away, for me, indifference to truth is indifference to life.

This statement made me reflect on people who struggle with acknowledging stories they tell themselves. May be based on fact, which is true and perception from feelings, weave a narrative of bullshit (referring to Frankfurt’s predecessor, On Bullshit) and may include lies for personal gain or amusement. The target audience vibes like those buying from a snake oil salesman.

This may or may not be an attempt to harm others. In the end, BS is likened to a demon who is set to destroy truth and the integrity of the person spewing. Crafting what appears to be honest into a pit that grows so deep from digging the hole this can become the burial plot of what they lose from ignoring truth.

A lie is clear, but BS is brackish water a self loathing Bull Shark of misrepresentation cannot find its way to nourishment of facts and truth. Instead it bites its way at anyone who will tolerate their attacks on truth.

This brief trek of a read requires better attention. Found myself rereading multiple paragraphs. Began a review. Got distracted doing dishes and missed points.

Because I wanted to ponder spots like chapter four. Which I’m on the fence about Mr Frankfurt’s assessment of writings by Baruch (de) Spinoza (24 November 1632 – 21 February 1677).

The references about what Spinoza said on love and joy. I kept thinking 1 John 4:8. Frankfurt spent the chapter speaking about everything but.

This is where what influences me implicates what ‘truth’ is, to me. If it is not wrapped in the Word and His (God’s) Love can it be anything else is my thought. Hundred percent no. Yet, to someone else perhaps. We’d have to agree to disagree.

I’d ask open ended questions how they came to their conclusion and share my own.

I think Mr Frankfurt attempts to convey truth is absolute but without mentioning faith it seems impossible to marinate the plausible nature of the words domaine.

For me, by faith would have to disagree. This is why I need to reread.

I’m excited to be challenged by a theme based on one word with big ideas that need my focus. Dig in to get the most out of a topic that’s near and dear to me.

Stay tuned for a reread and full review. Imma take a break to explore another topic. I’ll be back :)

[Sven · Rating 2 out of 5]

5/10

Ik wilde nog iets schrijven over paradigma's en de waarde daarvan, maar Oscar staat achter mij met een Heidegger shirt en een Nietzsche petje en houdt een pistool tegen mijn hoofd dus ik hou het maar bij "Boeee!!!"

[Oscar · Rating 1 out of 5]

2/10

Het was me een ware marteling (wel enorm om de zinloze waarheidsliefde van deze verdronken vogelverschrikker moeten lachen)

[Sam van Driel · Rating 2 out of 5]

Over open deuren gesproken, de waarheid is beter dan de onwaarheid in de praktische zin van het woord. Wie had dat gedacht?!

[Shawna · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you have to choose between reading On Bullshit and On Truth, read this one. It's more accessible and more pungent at the same time. Very much worth my time to read, then re-read, then read again as I worked to understand all that is in this small book. What Frankfurt argues is not that truth exists or matters, but that we must be both responsible and devoted to the truth lest we hurt ourselves, others, or the whole of society by creating a world that is essentially too small for us. "How, then, can we fail to take the importance of factuality and of reality seriously? How can we fail to care about the truth? We cannot."

[Roman Zadorozhnii · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Мы действительно не можем жить без истины. Истина нужна нам не только для того, чтобы понимать, как хорошо жить, но и для того, чтобы знать, как вообще выживать. Более того, она является тем, что мы просто не можем не замечать. Мы тем самым всегда уже признаем, пусть и неявно, что истина важна для нас; и, следовательно, мы всегда уже понимаем (пусть и снова неявным образом), что истина – это не просто свойство убеждения, к которому мы можем позволить себе быть равнодушными. Такое равнодушие было бы не просто результатом халатной небрежности – оно быстро оказалось бы для нас фатальным. Следовательно, в той мере, в какой мы ценим важность истины для нас, мы в принципе не можем позволить себе отказаться от желания знать истину о множестве самых разных вещей, либо от желания достичь ее.”

[Rebekka Vandeputte · Rating 2 out of 5]

On bullshit vond ik een interessante en frisse etymologische analyse van een relatief onbestudeerd woord in ons taalgebruik en hoe dit verschijnsel een plek inneemt in de samenleving. On truth is echter een onwijs slappe hap, totale bitterheid tegenover het postmodernisme en bevat grote aannames zonder grond (ironisch lol). Bv Frankfurt’s statement dat de kunst en het bedrijven ervan ook per definitie ingedeeld is in fout en juist. Verder was het een profielwerkstuk over de grote lijnen van de utilitaristische functie van waarheid. Geen enkele zin voegde iets toe aan mijn bestaande kennis.

[Nostalgia Reader · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars

[John Reis · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a nice sequel to On Bullshit. He begins with the thought that truth has practical utility. He says, “Surely, it is unquestionable, regardless of what postmodernists or anyone else may say, that engineers and architects, for instance, must achieve—and do at times succeed in achieving—genuine objectivity.”

“No one in his right mind would rely on a builder, or submit to the care of a physician, who does not care about the truth.”

Chapter II begins, “Still, many people manage to convince themselves—that normative(i.e. evaluative) judgments cannot properly be regarded as being either true or false.”

“Surely it is apparent, however, that in large part we select the objects that we desire, that we love, and to which we commit ourselves, because of what we believe about them—for instance, that they will increase our wealth or protect our health, or that they will serve our interests in some other way.” “Unless we know whether we are justified in regarding various factual statements as true, we cannot know whether there is really any sense in feeling and choosing as we do.”

“Civilizations have never gotten along healthily, and cannot get along healthily without large quantities of reliable factual information.

“We need truth not only in order to understand how to live well, but in order to know how to survive at all.”

But we often ignore the dictates of rationality; why imagine that people will take truth seriously? Frankfurt brings in Spinoza who thinks that we will be compelled to be rational by love. “Spinoza was convinced that every individual has an essential nature that it strives, throughout its existence, to realize and sustain.”

“Spinoza believed it follows from this that people cannot help loving truth. They cannot help doing so, he thought, because they cannot help recognizing that truth is indispensable in enabling them to stay alive, to understand themselves, and to live fully in accord with their own natures.” P. 48

Why are truths useful at all? Because we must cope with reality. “Insofar as truths possess instrumental value, they do so because they capture and convey the nature of these realities.” “Without truth, either we have no opinion at all concerning how things are or our opinion is wrong.”

In Chapter Five, “…we could not properly consider ourselves to be functioning rationally at all if we did not acknowledge the difference between being true and being false.”

“It is because we appreciate that truth is important to us that we care about accumulating truths.” “When certain aspects of our experience fail to submit to our wishes, when they are on the contrary unyielding and even hostile to our interests, it then becomes clear to us that they are not parts of ourselves.”

“Thus, our recognition and understanding of our own identity arises out of, and depends integrally on, our appreciation of a reality that is definitively independent of ourselves.” This of course is similar to the point I have made in the past about how God cannot know himself before there is something else. Consciousness is of something.

[Man O'neal · Rating 2 out of 5]

Well written. But as a philosophical argument I felt as though this was rather pointless and without surprise. When you really break it down, you may find that this is just academic rambling with no real direction or ultimate purpose.

[Marc Lamot · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pragmatic approach to the question of whether truth really exists. Frankfurt interprets the object-subject dilemma in a different way. Emphasis on the importance of truth for how the subject deals with the object.

[Mike Jorgensen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nowhere near the level of his previous essay, but still enjoyable. I read some of the negative reviews and noticed that he mostly gets critiqued for what he omits. Given that it is fewer than 100 tiny pages, it is safe to assume he omits quite a bit. Instead, I grade him on what is here. It is a natural impulse for humanists who write negative pieces (like 'On Bullshit') to want to put something positive forward. The first comparison that comes to mind is Timothy Snider, who, in his discipline, wrote "On Tyranny" only to follow up a few years later with "On Freedom."

My philosophy is a little rusty, at least as it pertains to academic vernacular. I believe I would call his approach pragmatism. He argues for objective truth, although his gauge for objective truth bypasses all debates about epistemology and operates with "what works." STEM fields require true facts to proceed with their work; most of them are not concerned with the abstract concept of truth, but rather they require it to function.

I don't believe Frankfurt is trying to take down postmodernity. I believe he would readily acknowledge all of the messy concepts with overreaching metanarratives and the subjectivity that enters into moral, ethical, and even political discussions. His truth is more of fact-based than abstract-based, although, admittedly, he argues the entire book from an abstract-based sense of truth to assert a fact-based sense.

It isn't a perfect definition or apology for truth, but even his definition of truth is a welcome addition in an age rampant in his definition of "bullshit."

[Alex · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book made me want to be a philosophy major.

The exploration of the truth and the why it is important is a key part of our modern day. This essay is a must read in spelling out how why the pursuit of truth is as important as ever. I throughly enjoyed it and it made me take a step back and look at the way that I look at truth.

[Arianna]

decided i was better off reading cliff notes

[Ayush · Rating 4 out of 5]

An argument worth considering, but perhaps one that does not engage with the more interesting counter-arguments.

[Lucía Rosa · Rating 1 out of 5]

Sin sentido

[Thomas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reread this today. A companion piece to his On Bullshit.

Again, seems so relevant to today’s political climate.

[Eliot · Rating 3 out of 5]

Author shares his opinions on the importance of truth and touches on some cognitive biases with non scientific support. Good topic given the amount of non truths we are exposed to and the weak ability of our brains to separate the truth from fiction. Writing is as dry as ancient Greek philosophy, probably by design. Critical thinkers will yawn, as will people with a predilection for narratives, but each for different reasons.

[Helen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a somewhat interesting volume on aspects of the truth. Unfortunately, it was for me a rather dull book, as it was mostly about abstractions. It was relatively easy to read, not conceptually difficult, but just dull.

I enjoyed reading the bit about the lovers in a sonnet by Shakespeare who lie to each other for their own reasons, and how each knows the other is lying, and goes along with the lies, which somehow binds them closer to each other, since this story demonstrated that sometimes people need to subscribe to lies, and maybe even live a lie, partially, to survive.

The truth is what we all strive for - those who lie are, as Frankfurt said, in a world of their own and thus unreachable. Also, being deceived does make us feel a little crazy as we usually feel we know we can tell a lie from the truth.

Yet, the truth is, many could not survive without lies, especially lies that people tell each other that each know are lies etc.

Since this book is not a page-turner, I found it impossible to become too interested in it. I thought it was in general, dry. It took me a long time to read this rather slender book because I never became that interested in it. Still, it was somewhat interesting to the extent that the topic itself, which is usually taken for granted (i.e. we all know what is the truth, and why we need to pursue it, and tell the truth and so forth) was treated in a thorough, thought-provoking manner.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 1 out of 5]

Eg Theory Book review

On Frankfurt’s Truth and Bullshit

I want to briefly summarize my reading of Frankfurt’s position. And then I’ll focus on a particular shortcoming: I don’t think Frankfurt focuses enough on how and what for Truth is used in practice. From the perspective of their relationship to investigation and inquiry, Truth and Bullshit start to seem much less distinct than Frankfurt makes them. And both start to look like the negative force — although in the case of Truth: sometimes a necessary negative.

First, I am not sure if these two works should really count as books; they are basically 20 page essays reformatted with big font, wide margins, and small pages to make cute booklets.

However, since I picked them up at Barnes & Nobles as books, I thought that I would classify them as such.

The former was originally published as an essay in 1986 and after its repackaging as a book it reached #1 on the New York Times bestseller list.

This motivated the latter as a follow up.

Frankfurt observes that our life is full of bullshit, and sets out to provide an analysis and definition of the phenomena.

He summarizes his finding at the start of the second book: “bullshitters, although they represent themselves as being engaged simply in conveying information, are not engaged in that enterprise at all.”

In this deception, they have a commonality with liars, but “what they care about primarily… is whether what they say is effective in accomplishing this manipulation. Correspondingly, they are more or less indifferent to whether what they say is true or whether it is false.”

This indifference is not shared by the liar who must keep an eye on the truth in order to mislead you.

As such, Frankfurt believes that the bullshitter is more dangerous to society than the liar.

He avoids pinning down exactly what he means by truth, suggesting that the common sense notion — by which, at my most generous reading, I assume he means something like Sellars’ manifest image — will do.

Unsurprisingly, he doesn’t only see truth as important but follows Spinoza to the conclusion that anybody who values their life must also (maybe unknowingly) love truth.

"Civilizations have never gotten along healthily, and cannot get along healthily, without large quantities of reliable factual information. They cannot flourish if they are beset with troublesome infections of mistaken beliefs. To establish and to sustain an advanced culture, we need to avoid being debilitated either by error or by ignorance."

The above statement is certainly effective in manipulating me to believe in the value of truth.

However, it is also sufficiently vague as to make it impossible to test whether what Frankfurt says is true or whether it is false.

Certainly the adaptive nature of positive illusions or our work on religion and the social interface theory might hint toward falsehood.

But a sufficiently slippery definition of truth can hint truth.

The real issue is that Frankfurt presents a straw-man of people who deflate or question capital-T ‘Truth’ as an organizing principle.

The whole point of pragmatic approaches to the question is to eliminate Truth as a category in favour of that with lets us avoid error and provide flourishing.

As such, they can agree with Frankfurt’s claim above without attributing it to ‘Truth’. In fact, they might point to very useful and cohesion enhancing beliefs that would not be Truth for Frankfurt.

If we are to think about Truth then I think we need to think about how Truth is used in practice.
In the real world.

From my experience, it isn’t static Truth that enables advances or lets us escape error and ignorance.

Rather, it is dynamic Investigation. Truth’s job, instead, is to end investigation and inquiry. To say “this case is done, let’s move on”.

Sometimes this is an important thing to do. Not everything needs to be debated. Not everything needs to be investigated. And not everything needs to be questioned. There have to be priorities.

And in this regard Truth can be useful.

..........

I think this also lets us better understand bullshit.

One of the practical uses of bullshit is usually the same as the practical use of Truth: stop investigation and inquiry.

Except whereas in using Truth as our stop requires some due diligence and wondering about if the point in question is a reasonable place to stop.

And sometime even gives us a means to potentially resume investigation later. Bullshit lets us avoid this.

But both end investigation.

..........

A tempting dissimilarity between Truth and Bullshit’s relationship to Investigation might be their role in motivating investigation.

A common position for Truth, and one that Frankfurt takes throughout, is that a desire for Truth can motivate us to investigate.

So from my anti-Frankfurt perspective: even if Truth itself is a — at times desirable and necessary — negative, it’s motivation role is a positive.

But I don’t think this is that different from Bullshit.

At least from the garden-hose of misinformation kind of bullshit.
From the merchants of doubt kind of bullshit.

One of the safety mechanisms built into our notion of Truth is that if we get two conflicting ‘truths’ then we should restart investigation to resolve the contradiction.

This is what bullshit can capitalize on if instead of stopping investigation, it wants to start it.

By throwing enough disinformation at us, it becomes difficult to know what to believe.

This can prompt us to investigate. However, since we are so conditioned on truth and mostly bad at actually carrying out investigations, this often ends up with us just arbitrarily picking the most comfortable — or most repeated or easily accessible — set of propositions as our static set.

In the end, I don’t think the line between Bullshit and Truth is nearly as clear cut as Frankfurt makes it.

In particular, if we focus on the uses to which we put both concepts. And without focusing on this practical aspect, I think that Frankfurt fails to engage with the more interesting challenges to capital-T ‘Truth’.

But these are my recollections from a pair of books I read 4 years ago. So I might have forgotten some of the nuance of Frankfurt’s position.

[Billie Pritchett · Rating 2 out of 5]

Although I think the subject of Harry Frankfurt's book is immensely interesting, this book wasn't. Frankfurt argues that truth is important because it is useful in people's lives and that the discovery of truth provides people with an understanding of the limitations of reality. The argumentation is sound, but the book could have been more substantive. For example, he could have given detailed cases that demonstrate the usefulness of truth and the limitations people can discover by virtue of understanding reality. But the essay is sketchy when it comes to details. And, again, this is in spite of the fact that I agree with his reasoning to the importance of truth. I should say, though, that the presentation of the topic of truth is similar to the presentation of the topic of BS. Where that book succeeded and this book failed was in the need to delineate the concept that was being presented. With the previous book, there was a need to delineate the concept of BS. Here Frankfurt does not feel as though he needs to delineate the concept of truth, but rather frame commonsense ways that truth is important, which leads to a somewhat boring book.

[Maximo David · Rating 4 out of 5]

“On Truth”, de Harry G. Frankfurt, ofrece un enfoque fascinante sobre el peso de la honestidad y, por contraste, el impacto de la mentira en la sociedad, no solo a nivel psicológico, sino también cultural. Describe cómo vivir bajo una realidad falsa (a manos de un mentiroso) puede asemejarse a habitar un mundo imaginario: al descubrir la verdad, se rompe esa construcción y uno entra en una especie de locura, dudando no solo de los demás, sino también de uno mismo y del propio criterio para distinguir entre lo real y lo ficticio.

El mentiroso, por su parte, queda atrapado bajo ese velo de falsedad, aislado de todo vínculo genuino y de la posibilidad de ser realmente visto.

Fascinante.

[Tom Horton · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hoping for profound, got practical instead.

[John Kameas · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dude really tried to debunk the entirety of postmodernism in like two sentences.

[Ben DeCuyper]

I really appreciated On Bullshit, but Frankfurt lost me with On Truth. As a baseline, Frankfurt asserts there are truths that people must respect. The truths in question are not analyzed. Rather, Frankfurt deals with “the truth” as a concept in and of itself. I would’ve appreciated this more if he had addressed scale. At varying scales, the most basic truths are thrown into unresolved territory. For example, I know it is true that I recycle because I take my recycling out to the curb and watch it get picked up. On a small (quantum) scale, the objects I recognize as “recyclable contents” are indecipherable from the quantum foam in which their elementary particles are enmeshed. On a large (outside of my immediate view) scale, I can’t know for sure that my recycled contents successfully make it to the recycling plant. While this example may be dramatic, I believe it successfully illuminates my belief that “the truth” is a spectrum contingent on scale.

Frankfurt paints a picture of what it may feel like when someone places trust in a friend and learns this friend has lied to them. He says this will cause someone to feel that they are “by nature out of touch with reality, [and] may well feel that [they are] a little crazy.” (p.86) I feel that a similar feeling may arise when we advance our understanding of long-held truths and discover we were wrong. Rather than our worldview being thrown into disarray, (and people losing faith in the integrity of our institutions, practices, etc.), we should be primed with the understanding that the truth is forever unfolding. In fact, we should be constantly doubting and searching for ways to improve our understanding of what is “true.” Instead, Frankfurt believes that if we lack truths through “ignorance and error” we will be destined to “proceed only very tentatively, feeling our way.” (p.61) This sounds like a death sentence. How can one avoid atrophy if they are unwilling to experience “error.” I believe the premiere mode of bullshitting is someone pretending they have a full understanding of something when the very notion of a “full understanding” is unachievable and unethical. People who pretend they don’t need to “feel their way” are full of shit. I suppose this makes me one of the “postmodernists” Frankfurt condemns.

The highlight of the book was the inclusion of Shakespeare’s sonnet 138 which ends with the following “… Therefore I lie with her and she with me, And in our faults by lies we flattered be.” Even during this portion of the book, I felt skeptical with Frankfurt’s takeaways. In response to the sonnet, Frankfurt writes, “Each knows what the other is really thinking. And each knows that the other knows this: they lie egregiously to each other, but neither is fooled. Each knows that the other is lying, and each is aware that his or her own lies are seen through.” (p.91) This explanation reminds me of the following explanation Frankfurt gave regarding “bull sessions”:

It is understood by everyone in a bull session that the statements people make do not necessarily reveal what they really believe or how they really feel… Each of the contributors to a bull session relies, in other words, upon a general recognition that what he expresses or says is not to be understood as being what he… believes to be true. (On Bullshit p.36-37)

In the case of Shakespeare’s sonnet, this “experimental or adventuresome” behavior has also been colored by flirtation and seduction. I would argue that within Frankfurt’s framework of truth-telling, lying, and bullshitting, the activity described in Shakespeare’s sonnet (even though Shakespeare refers to it as lying) is not lying at all. They’re lovingly “shooting the shit.”

Frankfurt is vehemently against the notion of “being true to oneself.” This sentiment is a continuation of the closing statement made in On Bullshit. There is a contradiction, however, when Frankfurt says, “In our efforts to conduct our lives successfully, however, a readiness to face disturbing facts about ourselves may be an even more critical asset than a competent understanding merely of what we are up against in the outside world.” It is also a contradiction when Frankfurt praises Spinoza’s belief that people love the truth “because they cannot help recognizing that truth is indispensable in enabling them to stay alive, to understand themselves, and to live in accord with their own natures.” (p.47)

Now, I’m going to read The Primacy of Doubt which includes the following opening quote from James Gleick:
“He [Feynman] believed in the primacy of doubt, not as a blemish on our ability to know, but as the essence of knowing.”

[Ghost14 · Rating 4 out of 5]

"On Truth" by Harry G. Frankfurt provides a philosophical argument for the fundamental importance of truth in human life, with strong implications for the workplace. This short essay contends that truth is essential for making informed decisions, building trust, and fostering honest communication. In the context of professional life, Frankfurt’s insights are particularly relevant to issues like workplace integrity, ethical leadership, and organizational culture.

Abstract (Work-Life Context)

Frankfurt begins by observing that truth is often undervalued in society, where subjective preferences and opinions frequently overshadow objective facts. In a workplace context, this disregard for truth can manifest in various harmful ways, such as misinformation, misrepresentation, or lack of transparency in decision-making. Frankfurt argues that maintaining a commitment to truth is crucial for the effective functioning of any organization.

Truth, Frankfurt suggests, is the foundation of reliable communication, which is essential for collaboration and productivity. Without truth, trust breaks down between employees, managers, and stakeholders, leading to dysfunctional relationships, poor morale, and unethical behavior. Furthermore, decisions based on inaccurate or deceptive information can result in costly errors, financial losses, and reputational damage.

In work life, truth also underpins personal integrity. Employees who value truth are more likely to engage in honest self-assessment, admit mistakes, and grow professionally. For leaders, commitment to truthfulness is key to ethical leadership. Leaders who distort the truth or encourage others to do so risk creating a toxic work environment that stifles innovation and accountability.

Pros

1. Relevance to Workplace Ethics: The book emphasizes the ethical implications of truth, making it highly applicable to discussions about integrity, transparency, and trust in professional settings.


2. Improved Decision-Making: Frankfurt’s argument underscores that truth is essential for accurate decision-making. In a work context, this means that honest reporting and transparency are key to avoiding costly mistakes.


3. Building Organizational Trust: By showing how truth fosters trust and cooperation, Frankfurt’s work is a strong defense for creating a culture of honesty and open communication in the workplace.


4. Encourages Accountability: The emphasis on truth aligns with professional values of accountability and responsibility, which are crucial for personal and organizational success.



Cons

1. Lacks Specific Workplace Examples: While the essay’s themes are highly relevant to work life, Frankfurt does not directly address workplace scenarios or provide concrete examples that would help readers apply his ideas more practically.


2. Overly Philosophical for Some Audiences: Though concise, the book is still rooted in philosophical abstraction. Readers seeking practical tools for fostering truthfulness in a workplace might find it lacking in actionable advice.


3. Simplistic Approach to Complex Problems: Frankfurt’s essay offers a broad defense of truth but doesn’t deeply engage with the complex organizational dynamics that can lead to the suppression of truth, such as power imbalances or internal politics.


4. Repetitiveness: Some readers might find Frankfurt's emphasis on truth to be repetitive, as he reiterates the same core arguments throughout the book without offering new insights that apply directly to work-life scenarios.



Conclusion

In "On Truth," Harry G. Frankfurt makes a compelling case for why truth should be valued and preserved in both personal and professional life. While the book is not explicitly focused on work environments, its message about the importance of truthfulness resonates strongly in the context of organizational ethics, leadership, and team dynamics. Though some may find it too abstract or repetitive, "On Truth" provides a philosophical foundation for the idea that honesty and transparency are essential for a healthy and productive work environment.

[Dario Andrade · Rating 4 out of 5]

Esse é um breve ensaio, segundo ele uma continuação do seu On bullshit. No livro anterior ele dava mais atenção aos “impostores e embusteiros que tentam, com o que dizem, manipular as opiniões e as atitudes daqueles a quem se dirigem. O que lhes importa basicamente, portanto, é se o que dizem é eficiente para conseguir essa manipulação. Assim, eles são mais ou menos indiferentes sobre se o que dizem é verdadeiro”. Uau, isso me parece tremendamente atual, talvez mais atual do que o próprio Sobre a verdade.
Publicado em 2005, em Sobre a verdade ele se debruçou a respeito de um elemento que havia deixado de fora do ensaio anterior: por que a verdade é importante? O que há de tão fundamentalmente relevante na verdade?
O alvo dele, me parece, eram os pós-modernistas, que tinham como mote um relativismo extremo que não via distinção entre várias ‘versões’. De certo modo, isso – até então contido nos ambientes universitários – se espalhou como fogo selvagem na sociedade. Na terceira década do século XXI, fala-se, somente em narrativas, que nada mais são do que ‘versões’. Danem-se os fatos, dizem as pessoas hoje. O que importa são as narrativas, as minhas verdades (que muito frequentemente são apenas opiniões pessoais destituídas de quaisquer vínculos com a realidade).
Diz ele, ainda, que “qualquer sociedade que consegue ser minimamente funcional tem de ter, julgo eu, grande apreço pela utilidade infindavelmente multiforme da verdade”. Isso significa que ao procurarmos um médico não devemos estar preocupados que ele nos mostre a ‘sua verdade’, mas os fatos e elementos que nos levam a certas conclusões. Alguém aí pensou em cloroquina?
Talvez ele tenha sido otimista demais com a racionalidade humana. Escrevendo antes das redes sociais, ele não poderia ver como apenas alguns anos depois, as pessoas não só compartilhariam a falsidade, como ainda encontrariam apoio, amizade, cooperação em torno de ideias falsas. Teorias conspiracionistas sempre existiram, mas com as redes sociais elas adquiriram muito maior expressão e difusão. Talvez, hoje, as pessoas não se preocupem tanto com a verdade, mas com a certeza, mesmo que seja a mais absurda possível. Busca-se a certeza como algo capaz de oferecer conforto. Penso, por exemplo, quando vejo tuítes em que pessoas defendem que se deve estar 100% com o seu líder político.
Bem, antes que divague muito, voltemos ao livro. Ele afirma que a incapacidade de distinguir verdadeiro e falso significa o colapso da racionalidade como uma possibilidade. Bem, é exatamente isso o que se vive hoje. Ele defende que “em minha opinião, contudo, quase sempre é mais vantajoso encarar os fatos com que temos de lidar do que continuar a ignorá-los”. Bem, hoje, 2021, a minha impressão é que um grande número de pessoas se sente mais confortável em viver dentro de uma mentira. Basta que ela tenha uma ilusão de realidade suficiente para produzir conforto. Obviamente isso produz tremendos estragos a longo prazo, mas me parece que se escolhe mais frequentemente o prazer imediato do que o futuro, mesmo que isso signifique piora lá na frente.
Por fim, ele cita uma poeta – desconhecida para mim – chamada Adrienne Rich – que observou que “o mentiroso leva uma existência de indizível solidão”. Ela se referia às relações individuais, amorosas principalmente. Talvez valha como um reflexão sobre tudo o que é a verdade.

[Nicholas Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

4 and a half.

A neat book, fits in the pocket like a gold nugget. Truly, truly: not much to knock here. Stylistically: compact, confident, self-assured and staightforward. Frankfurt is always admirably plainspoken and spares us the common vice of inflation, pleonastic tirades, and the engorgement of prose with fancy to hide the inadequacies of one's position, the many blemishes. Frankfurt doesn't want to hide at all. His position is completely transparent and simple:

Truth matters, and the main reason it matters is because facts about how things are (reality) are indispensable in navigating and changing the world and in the construction and maintenance of a well-functioning society and culture.

I am reminded of Wittgenstein's remark from the Tractatus that once he had accomplished his task, it should be apparent how little he has done--how little is done really when philosophy is done right. Good philosophy is innocuous, a clearimg out, and sometimes has an even bland and "No Duh" flavor. After the work and uncovering, one just looks at the result. The truth peers back up at us like a turtle, a bit dumb, uninterested and unconcerned, then we return to our days.

I don't think I'm on board in complete detail, especially because he doesn't give us complete detail. He doesn't pretend to exhaust the philosophical discussion on truth, just put it on commensical grounds. In any case, it is a good pitch for a pragmatist conception of truth. And I imagine some people knock him for critiqueing post-truth folks and "it's all historically conditioned ahhhh!" folks. He calls out a subgroup of them as postmodernists, and harshly, yet vaguely. He doesn't really cite anyone. It always makes it easier to slamdunk someone when that someone is a phantom.

Nonetheless, it is hard to disagree that when people point out that sociologically- and historically-based states of affairs have an air of contingency that doesn't attach itself to things like physics and engineering, that they fail to say to what extent and what hangs on it. Usually they just purport that everything is historically conditioned and socially constructed and fall back in their chair, arms folded, like they've struck the bedrock of knowledge.

Mussolini was the dictator of Italy throughout World War 2. That's true.

Golf, though socially constructed (artificial; from-us), has a great many facts about it: to make a birdie is to score one stroke less than the par is on any given hole; it takes place on big ugly-ass fields; and so on.

So the onus of what the "problem" is and whatever its limits may be are on the person bringing it up. But here I am fighting phantoms.

Anyways. It's really an admirable and concise essay. I don't know why folks would have much problem with it. Also, there is an incredibly cogent and lovely analysis of Spinoza's idea of joy and love thrown in there. Great. Might have to return to Spinoza.