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Very Short Introductions #248
Keynes: A Very Short Introduction
John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) is a central thinker of the twentieth century, not just an economic theorist and statesman, but also an important figure in economics, philosophy, politics, and culture. In this Very Short Introduction Lord Skidelsky, a renowned biographer of Keynes, explores his ethical and practical philosophy, his monetary thought, and provides an insight into his life and works.
In the recent financial crisis Keynes's theories have become more timely than ever, and remain at the centre of political and economic discussion. With a look at his major works and his contribution to twentieth-century economic thought, Skidelsky considers Keynes's legacy on today's society.
In the recent financial crisis Keynes's theories have become more timely than ever, and remain at the centre of political and economic discussion. With a look at his major works and his contribution to twentieth-century economic thought, Skidelsky considers Keynes's legacy on today's society.
208 pages, Paperback
First published October 7, 2010
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719 people want to read
About the author
Robert Skidelsky
68 books133 followersLord Skidelsky is Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at the University of Warwick. His three volume biography of the economist John Maynard Keynes (1983, 1992, 2000) received numerous prizes, including the Lionel Gelber Prize for International Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations Prize for International Relations. He is the author of the The World After Communism (1995) (American edition called The Road from Serfdom). He was made a life peer in 1991, and was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 1994. He is chairman of the Govenors of Brighton College
Robert Skidelsky was born on 25 April 1939 in Harbin, Manchuria. His parents were British subjects, but of Russian ancestry. His father worked for the family firm, L. S. Skidelsky, which leased the Mulin coalmine from the Chinese government. When war broke out between Britain and Japan in December 1941, he and his parents were interned first in Manchuria then Japan, but released in exchange for Japanese internees in England.
From 1953 to 1958, he was a boarder at Brighton College (of which he is now chairman of the board of governors). He went on to read history at Jesus College, Oxford, and from 1961 to 1969, he was successively research student, senior student, and research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. In 1967, he published his first book, Politicians and the Slump, Labour Government of 1929-31, based on his D.Phil dissertation. The book explores the ways in which British politicians handled the Great Depression.
During a two year research fellowship at the British Academy, he began work in his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley (published in 1975) and published English Progressive Schools (1969). In 1970, he became an Associate Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University. But the controversy surrounding the publication of his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley - in which he was felt to have let Mosley off too lightly - led John Hopkins University to refuse him tenure. Oxford University also proved unwilling to give him a permanent post.
In 1978, he was appointed Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick, where he has since remained, though joining the Economics Department as Professor Political Economy in 1990. He is currently Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University.
The first volume of his biography of John Maynard Keynes, Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920, was published in 1983. The second volume, The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937 (1992) won the Wolfson Prize for History. The third volume, Fighting for Britain, 1937-1946 (2000) won the Duff Cooper Prize, the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Biography, the Lionel Gelber Prize for International Relations and the Arthur Ross Council on Foreign Relations Prize for International Relations.
Since 2003, he has been a non-executive director of the mutual fund manager, Janus Capital and Rusnano Capital; from 2008-10 he sat on the board of Sistema JSC. He is a director of the Moscow School of Political Studies and was the founder and executive secretary of the UK/Russia Round Table. Since 2002, he has been chairman of the Centre for Global Studies. In 2010, he joined the Advisory Board of the Institute of New Economic Thinking.
He writes a monthly column for Project Syndicate, "Against the Current", which is syndicated in newspapers all over the world. His account of the current economic crisis, Keynes: The Return of the Master, was published by Penguin Allen Lane in September 2009. A short history of twentieth-century Britain was published by Random House in the volume A World by Itself: A History of the British Isles edited by Jonathan Clark in January 2010. He is now in the process of writing How Much is Enough? The Economics of the Good Life jointly with his son Edward Skidelsky.
Robert Skidelsky was born on 25 April 1939 in Harbin, Manchuria. His parents were British subjects, but of Russian ancestry. His father worked for the family firm, L. S. Skidelsky, which leased the Mulin coalmine from the Chinese government. When war broke out between Britain and Japan in December 1941, he and his parents were interned first in Manchuria then Japan, but released in exchange for Japanese internees in England.
From 1953 to 1958, he was a boarder at Brighton College (of which he is now chairman of the board of governors). He went on to read history at Jesus College, Oxford, and from 1961 to 1969, he was successively research student, senior student, and research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. In 1967, he published his first book, Politicians and the Slump, Labour Government of 1929-31, based on his D.Phil dissertation. The book explores the ways in which British politicians handled the Great Depression.
During a two year research fellowship at the British Academy, he began work in his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley (published in 1975) and published English Progressive Schools (1969). In 1970, he became an Associate Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University. But the controversy surrounding the publication of his biography of Sir Oswald Mosley - in which he was felt to have let Mosley off too lightly - led John Hopkins University to refuse him tenure. Oxford University also proved unwilling to give him a permanent post.
In 1978, he was appointed Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick, where he has since remained, though joining the Economics Department as Professor Political Economy in 1990. He is currently Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University.
The first volume of his biography of John Maynard Keynes, Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920, was published in 1983. The second volume, The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937 (1992) won the Wolfson Prize for History. The third volume, Fighting for Britain, 1937-1946 (2000) won the Duff Cooper Prize, the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Biography, the Lionel Gelber Prize for International Relations and the Arthur Ross Council on Foreign Relations Prize for International Relations.
Since 2003, he has been a non-executive director of the mutual fund manager, Janus Capital and Rusnano Capital; from 2008-10 he sat on the board of Sistema JSC. He is a director of the Moscow School of Political Studies and was the founder and executive secretary of the UK/Russia Round Table. Since 2002, he has been chairman of the Centre for Global Studies. In 2010, he joined the Advisory Board of the Institute of New Economic Thinking.
He writes a monthly column for Project Syndicate, "Against the Current", which is syndicated in newspapers all over the world. His account of the current economic crisis, Keynes: The Return of the Master, was published by Penguin Allen Lane in September 2009. A short history of twentieth-century Britain was published by Random House in the volume A World by Itself: A History of the British Isles edited by Jonathan Clark in January 2010. He is now in the process of writing How Much is Enough? The Economics of the Good Life jointly with his son Edward Skidelsky.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
March 11, 2019
قدم الكتاب كينز وتطور أفكاره بشرح مبسط ووفق في ذلك.
لكنه كان منحازاً للتمحور حول بريطانيا والولايات المتحدة عندما
اعتبر أن كل العالم يدور في فلكهن وأن هذا شئ طبيعي وعادل!!
زاد الطين بلة الفصل الأخير الذي كتب لينشر مع طبعة الكتاب الجديدة في ٢٠١٠ للتعليق علي النظرية الكينزية في ضوء الازمة الاقتصادية العالمية عام 2008.
February 26, 2018
If you think you understand and can summarize John Maynard Keynes, and whether that makes you a fan or a foe, this book will make you think again.
Chapter 1: The life
Chapter 2: Keynes's philosophy of practice
Chapter 3: The monetary reformer
Chapter 4: The General Theory
Chapter 5: Economic statesmanship
Chapter 6: Keynes's legacy
Epilogue: The view from 2010
Chapter 1: The life
Chapter 2: Keynes's philosophy of practice
Chapter 3: The monetary reformer
Chapter 4: The General Theory
Chapter 5: Economic statesmanship
Chapter 6: Keynes's legacy
Epilogue: The view from 2010
December 1, 2020
جون مينارد كينز هو اقتصادي بريطاني ولد عام 1883 م في كامبريدج وتوفي في عام 194م. قام بوضع أحد أهم النظريات الاقتصادية المستمدة من الاقتصاد الرأسمالي الكلاسيكي الذي وضعه آدم سميث، أطُلق عليه الاقتصاد الكلي أو الاقتصاد الكينزي، ومن خلاله يحاول كينز توظيف الرأسمالية بشكل يجعلها أكثر عدالة وفاعلية من خلال بعض التدخلات التي تقوم بها الدولة في الاقتصاد.
January 15, 2019
It's not introductory enough for someone with little background knowledge in economics so cannot properly argue the merits of the information.
September 8, 2024
Keynes : A Very Short Introduction (2010) by Robert Skidelsky is a Very Short Introduction that is superbly done. Skidelsky was a Professor of Political Economy who wrote a number of books on Keynes.
The book first has a chapter on Keynes life. Following that there is a chapter on his philosophy of practice and where is philosophy came from. There is then a a chapter on his General Theory. Skidelsky then describes Keynes’s economic statesmanship. Finally there is a discussion of Keynes’s legacy.
The weakness of the book is the brevity with which Skidelsky has to go over Keynes’s economic ideas. For anyone roughly familiar with them it’s hard to get a good picture and for anyone unfamiliar with them it would be hard to get a good grasp. This is due to the need for brevity in a short book.
The book is excellent overall. Even being short it should give almost any reader new facts and views into Keynes’s work. I’d never considered how Keynes was foolish in his behaviour toward the United States and wasn’t a great negotiator. Also the fact that Keynes really predated the huge rise of the welfare state after the war was something I hadn’t thought about. Also how Keynes viewed the policies of Hjalmar Schacht, the German economics minister under the Nazis was something that few think about.
Keynes : A Very Short Introduction is really an excellent short introduction to Keynes’s life, thought and impact.
The book first has a chapter on Keynes life. Following that there is a chapter on his philosophy of practice and where is philosophy came from. There is then a a chapter on his General Theory. Skidelsky then describes Keynes’s economic statesmanship. Finally there is a discussion of Keynes’s legacy.
The weakness of the book is the brevity with which Skidelsky has to go over Keynes’s economic ideas. For anyone roughly familiar with them it’s hard to get a good picture and for anyone unfamiliar with them it would be hard to get a good grasp. This is due to the need for brevity in a short book.
The book is excellent overall. Even being short it should give almost any reader new facts and views into Keynes’s work. I’d never considered how Keynes was foolish in his behaviour toward the United States and wasn’t a great negotiator. Also the fact that Keynes really predated the huge rise of the welfare state after the war was something I hadn’t thought about. Also how Keynes viewed the policies of Hjalmar Schacht, the German economics minister under the Nazis was something that few think about.
Keynes : A Very Short Introduction is really an excellent short introduction to Keynes’s life, thought and impact.
January 31, 2019
I've given this a four-star rating not because of it's content so much as its form. I love the size and design of these little books by the Oxford University Press. I just desire them. There was nothing wrong with the content, I just don't have the economic awareness to understand a lot of it. Why did I read it? I was inspired to give it a go after reading Brave New World by Huxley. He was influenced by the economic and political scene of the 1930s when he wrote BNW and Keynesian economics were prominent at the time. He didn't much agree with them. I had a vague idea about his policies from student discussions back in the 80s but thought I'd like to understand them better. This was a tough challenge but I'm glad I persevered. I'd quite like to bring Keynes back for a day and ask him what he thinks about B**X*T!
March 29, 2020
I’ve only recently come to appreciate the appeal of biographies. It struck me that I would read an original work of science or philosophy, like Freud or Jung or Newton or Hayek not for the concepts they were known for, but for their personal stories and the process by which they come to those concepts, for the concept of conceptualization as it were. I recently read SSC’s book review of Herbert Hoover and was completely mesmerized by the idea of such singular forces of nature, such great men of history, such exemplary concentrations of energy, industry, intelligence, and competence. I’ve arrived at Keynes therefore as one of many polymaths who top the tables of most productive people ever, it appears to be my flavor of the moment.
For what is just a VSI, this is a lovely book clearly written by a true expert, not like many of the other fly by night operator VSI’s I’ve been a victim of lately. There is a cohesive insight into the mind, motivations and passions of Keynes, where they came from, whether through life experiences, birth, or intellectual influences, and how they forever guide the channel of his ever-evolving points of view. Especially given he’s a polymath, this sort of treatment is both highly important as well as ostensibly very very difficult. The insight, for instance, that his treatise on probability was a guiding principle for an economist, meant as a response to a philosopher (G.E.Moore) and a statesman (Edmund Burke), is a wonderful example of the eclectic mix of interests, projects, and confluences.
Everything is tied together spectacularly, with a keen eye for a polymath’s philosophy of chunking conceptually similar ideas. I’ve discovered that while my memory for quotable quotes is notoriously poor, I have no trouble remembering and retrieving quotes that are contextually indistinguishable from the author himself writing, in the most fitting way possible, out the thesis as it follows from the text above. It helps also if you understand the concept well enough by then, and happen to think exactly along the same lines. I speak specifically of the quote about how capitalism and socialism actually agree on the laws of economics, one thinks they are true and inevitable, the other thinks they are true and intolerable, and that Keynes proposes to prove they are not true at all. Brilliant.
Notes
Keynes argued strongly against the disastrous reparations. Understood it would cause another war. A sympathetic view of how he created mood of appeasement of Germany
Laissez faire capitalism of the 19th century was dead.
Capitalism is so irreligious it needs to be immensely not moderately successful to survive. Is this the answer to JP about how Marxism is antithetical to religion?
Word unemployment doesn't exist before 1880s
He proposes a policy to Balance accounts of nation (not just the government). Equal aggreg supply and demand at full employment. Inflation when demand more than supply. War made the experiment that proved his theory, what peace would never have done.
His economics driven by philosophy of the good life. Intuitive reasoning of plato over econometrics.
Positive ethical values like pity, courage, justice depend on the existence of bad states like suffering, danger. Social reform might decrease ethical goodness?
Rationality of beliefs. Probability as logical insight not fact of nature, frequency. Statistical inference only for cases with stable frequency, rather than average frequency. Anti empirical?
Govt not for ethical good but to create conditions of calm, freedom for pursuit of ethical good
Too many poor, so redistribution won't increase utility. Whereas very wealthy has its own unique utility and service to govt. Bill gates or 5000 middle class? 49% to 51%? Stable fortunes and permanent families are an invisible social asset.
Govt as supplying certain wants. Right to good govt not self govt.
Injustice not in arbitrary endowments but arbitrary changes in settled arrangements like value of money. A matter of uncertainty. End of laissez faire of the 19th century.
From Individual capitalism of small firms to Socialized capitalism of big firms, public utilities.
Believed in 3 virtues of Socialism. Justice. Public service. Utopianism nonprofit.
Concept of Money. Went from Means of exchange (no problem) to Store Of Value (problem)
Causation flowed from money to prices. More gold. Lower interest. Higher growth. Prices rise slowly, in meantime benefit of higher growth
But gold market is independent. So central bank can't control monetary policy tightly. Ppl in unreliable govts, India, hoard tangible reserve gold.
Against gold because USA dominance would become apparent. Better to have artificially managed dollar and sterling blocs
Classical view thet saving leads to investment. But he felt enterprise is the main driver. Wealth will grow and saving will result.
If savings more than investment. Interest rates down, anticipation of higher profitability of investment. Otherwise depression. Demand supply view of equilibrium below full employment. Revolution in economics.
Impact of great depression. Monetary policy didn't work too well, cheap sterling didn't spark recovery. Natural experiment Britain Vs USA with more flexible wages, prices but collapsed output.
Interval between falling demand (drop in sales) and drop in prices shows direction of causation?
Necessary condition for money as store of value, is uncertainty, protection against anxiety.
Consumption function and investment multiplier are main policy tools of the general theory.
Paradox of thrift. Increased saving without increased profitability of investment reduces income and therefore savings.
Increased savings means entrepreneurs predict less income for consumption ie profitability.
Investment % of income needs to increase
Animal spirits. Spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction
Keynes setup his own theory against his own view of classical theory, which opponents denied holding.
Rejected: employment determined in labor market. If money wage flexibility, then no obstacle to full employment.
Classical Model of pain Vs pleasure of employment - downward demand for labor, marginal utility Vs upward pain of labor, supply. So employment at equilibrium. Cannot have involuntary unemployment, only voluntary leisure.
Keynes said supply will overshoot demand. Involuntary unemployment. Because wages won't fall in real terms of prices/demand falls. Hence labor demand will fall.
Conceded savings might also be influenced by interest rate, not just by income.
John Hicks portable Keynesian model: is/lm curves.
Desire for liquidity makes a decentralised entrepreneurial economy unstable with oscillations around subnormal activity
Does money cause the economy to misbehave, or uncertainty cause money to misbehave?
1940 booklet how to pay for the war. First major application of his general theory. Just in time.
Ww1: high inflation. Wealthy profits commandeered as loans - owned high % of national debt. Falling real wages. Ww2: deferred earnings, excess income mopped up by direct taxes and compulsory savings.
Keynesian revolution, endorsed even by anti Keynesians like Hayek.
Nature's way: inflation transfers money from workers to entrepreneurs which is then taxed. But now, unions mean real wages cannot fall. Either entre says yes, then consumption is not decreased and no excess revenue, or entre says no and supply is disrupted. Keynes wants social justice by preventing price fluctuations.
Socialists prefer egalitarian rationing of food than deferred earnings, and state allocation of manpower based on need rather than market.
Post war international economy set by US. Britain heavily in debt.
Stable exchange rates anti inflation discipline.
Hitler's new deal was more coherent and successful in tackling unemployment than Roosevelt's.
Germany Japan UK were all economically against US, risk of free trade. US major aim of ww2 to dismantle mercantile blocs
US wanted rights over UK import laws. Keynes instead came up with clearing union that would give debtor rights over surplus post war. Germany did this in 30s, Walther Funks, Fixed exchange rates, division of labor, shield against deflation of international gold standard
America still fighting as if peacetime trade war by the time they enter in Dec 1941
Keynes wanted to use unique opportunity to regain liberal economic order that had been lost in ww1.
Keynes dead and buried? Microeco for growth and employment. Macro for inflation? But deflation has created consistent high unemployment?
But unemployment is structural not Keynesian, no lack of demand.
Classical eco: downward rigidity of wages causes unemployment. Keynes equilibrium needs government policy to maintain full employment.
Macroeco restored faith in capitalism.
Friedman killed Keynesian eco? Govt attempts to reduce unemployment below market set natural rate accelerated inflation
Price stability rather than full employment became stated goal of macroeconomics
Growth Keynesians. Growth was demand constrained. Depression perspective that didn't take supply constraints seriously
Public spending will boost investment and productivity gains. Some inflation will trigger growth. State is wise. Market is stupid.
60s inflation without any improvement in any other variable. Slumpflation 70s
Classical economists were right? Demand pressure, supply shortage, prices up. Oil prices 73. Wage control squeezed profit. More public spending..
Price falls in depression. Rises in boom. So in Keynes, spending goes up to negate falling price. So price always rises regardless of upturn or downturn. Change perception of unemployment as unacceptable cost to acceptable price of reducing inflation
Safe zone of Phillips curve between unemployment and rate of change of wages.
Anti Keynesians : political class maximises political utility not social welfare.
Efficient markets hypothesis assumes pricing of risk which is knowable probability. Keynes talked about uncertainty, ie Unknowable probability.
Marginal efficiency of capital. Expectation of profit over interest rate.
World stayed poor so long because of bias to preserve existing wealth than create new, hoarding over investing, that pushed up interest rates.
He saw India's historical obsession with hoarding gold, interest rates never down to compatibility with growth of real wealth.
Inequality is bad for capitalism. You can only consume so much. After that you save. But if consumption has maxed out, then I don't need your savings because I have nowhere to invest. Unless I find more and more complementary goods for the rich.
If uncertainty is inevitable, then Keynes is general theory. If it's just imperfect information, then classical theory is general
In short, Keynesian policies come to us today wrapped up in a history of rising inflation, unsound public finance, expanding statism, collapsing corporatism, and general ungovernability, all of which have seemed inseparable from the Keynesian cure for the afflictions of industrial society. We do not want to traverse that path again. By the 1980s, Keynes, who was praised for having saved the world from Marxism, had joined Marx as the God that failed.
There is nothing in Keynes’s social philosophy, or the Liberalism of his day, which would have supported the seemingly relentless expansion of the welfare activities of the state which contributed so heavily to the fiscal crises of the 1970s. Finally, he was an apostle of growth not for its own sake, but only as a means to leisure and civilized living. In fact, he argued in the late 1920s that ‘technological’ unemployment was a sign that the economic problem was being solved. ‘The full employment policy by means of investment is only one particular application of an intellectual theorem,’ he wrote to T. S. Eliot in 1945. ‘You can produce the result just as well by consuming more or working less… Less work is the ultimate solution [to the unemployment] problem.’
Expectation that the rate of capital accumulation would fall was not unreasonable after post-war reconstruction and ‘catch-up’ had run their course. Much more questionable was the extension of Keynesian thinking from the short-run problem of securing full employment of existing resources to the problem of increasing the growth of these resources. For ‘growth’ Keynesians, active demand management (including fiscal deficits) was required not just to prevent or offset recessions but to realize the economy’s long-run growth potential, an altogether more elusive idea. Keynes himself would have said – in fact he did say – that at full employment any exogenous injection of demand leads to inflation. This is the ‘special case’ to which classical economics applied, when faster growth of output can come about only through increased productivity and improved technique – matters on which Keynes had nothing distinctive to say.
Eventually governments had had enough. In face of the second oil price rise of 1979–80, Western governments tightened fiscal and monetary policy, bringing about the most severe slump since the 1930s. Developing countries, which had maintained their public investment booms throughout the 1970s by borrowing recycled petrodollars at negative real interest rates, found themselves faced with crippling foreign debt burdens as export earnings collapsed, real interest rates rose to punitive levels, and foreign investment dried up. In return for rescheduling and new loans, the IMF imposed tough stabilization packages. World-wide, state-led growth policies had precisely the opposite effect to those intended: they had raised, not lowered, the cost of producing goods and services, and they had lowered, not raised, the capacity of economies to produce marketable output. The Keynesian age was over.
‘inflation tax’ than Keynes in 1923: ‘A government can live by this means when it can live by no other. It is the form of taxation which the public finds hardest to evade and even the weakest government can enforce, when it can enforce nothing else.’
State apparatus equipped by right theories and run by benevolent old Etonians
Friedman believes that most traumatic shocks are political. Governments are irretrievably tempted to manipulate the monetary parameters in order to secure helpful short-run results. Therefore their discretionary activity should be strictly circumscribed by rules. Keynes believed that unmanaged economies are inherently volatile, with a tendency to subnormal activity, so that policy can play a large part in both stabilizing and raising their performance. He thought governments could be sufficiently trusted to carry out contra-cyclical policy with competence and probity.
Keynes’s recipe for a less uncertain economy consisted of three main elements: measures to stimulate investment, measures to stimulate consumption, and a reform of the international monetary system to prevent the transmission
For what is just a VSI, this is a lovely book clearly written by a true expert, not like many of the other fly by night operator VSI’s I’ve been a victim of lately. There is a cohesive insight into the mind, motivations and passions of Keynes, where they came from, whether through life experiences, birth, or intellectual influences, and how they forever guide the channel of his ever-evolving points of view. Especially given he’s a polymath, this sort of treatment is both highly important as well as ostensibly very very difficult. The insight, for instance, that his treatise on probability was a guiding principle for an economist, meant as a response to a philosopher (G.E.Moore) and a statesman (Edmund Burke), is a wonderful example of the eclectic mix of interests, projects, and confluences.
Everything is tied together spectacularly, with a keen eye for a polymath’s philosophy of chunking conceptually similar ideas. I’ve discovered that while my memory for quotable quotes is notoriously poor, I have no trouble remembering and retrieving quotes that are contextually indistinguishable from the author himself writing, in the most fitting way possible, out the thesis as it follows from the text above. It helps also if you understand the concept well enough by then, and happen to think exactly along the same lines. I speak specifically of the quote about how capitalism and socialism actually agree on the laws of economics, one thinks they are true and inevitable, the other thinks they are true and intolerable, and that Keynes proposes to prove they are not true at all. Brilliant.
Notes
Keynes argued strongly against the disastrous reparations. Understood it would cause another war. A sympathetic view of how he created mood of appeasement of Germany
Laissez faire capitalism of the 19th century was dead.
Capitalism is so irreligious it needs to be immensely not moderately successful to survive. Is this the answer to JP about how Marxism is antithetical to religion?
Word unemployment doesn't exist before 1880s
He proposes a policy to Balance accounts of nation (not just the government). Equal aggreg supply and demand at full employment. Inflation when demand more than supply. War made the experiment that proved his theory, what peace would never have done.
His economics driven by philosophy of the good life. Intuitive reasoning of plato over econometrics.
Positive ethical values like pity, courage, justice depend on the existence of bad states like suffering, danger. Social reform might decrease ethical goodness?
Rationality of beliefs. Probability as logical insight not fact of nature, frequency. Statistical inference only for cases with stable frequency, rather than average frequency. Anti empirical?
Govt not for ethical good but to create conditions of calm, freedom for pursuit of ethical good
Too many poor, so redistribution won't increase utility. Whereas very wealthy has its own unique utility and service to govt. Bill gates or 5000 middle class? 49% to 51%? Stable fortunes and permanent families are an invisible social asset.
Govt as supplying certain wants. Right to good govt not self govt.
Injustice not in arbitrary endowments but arbitrary changes in settled arrangements like value of money. A matter of uncertainty. End of laissez faire of the 19th century.
From Individual capitalism of small firms to Socialized capitalism of big firms, public utilities.
Believed in 3 virtues of Socialism. Justice. Public service. Utopianism nonprofit.
Concept of Money. Went from Means of exchange (no problem) to Store Of Value (problem)
Causation flowed from money to prices. More gold. Lower interest. Higher growth. Prices rise slowly, in meantime benefit of higher growth
But gold market is independent. So central bank can't control monetary policy tightly. Ppl in unreliable govts, India, hoard tangible reserve gold.
Against gold because USA dominance would become apparent. Better to have artificially managed dollar and sterling blocs
Classical view thet saving leads to investment. But he felt enterprise is the main driver. Wealth will grow and saving will result.
If savings more than investment. Interest rates down, anticipation of higher profitability of investment. Otherwise depression. Demand supply view of equilibrium below full employment. Revolution in economics.
Impact of great depression. Monetary policy didn't work too well, cheap sterling didn't spark recovery. Natural experiment Britain Vs USA with more flexible wages, prices but collapsed output.
Interval between falling demand (drop in sales) and drop in prices shows direction of causation?
Necessary condition for money as store of value, is uncertainty, protection against anxiety.
Consumption function and investment multiplier are main policy tools of the general theory.
Paradox of thrift. Increased saving without increased profitability of investment reduces income and therefore savings.
Increased savings means entrepreneurs predict less income for consumption ie profitability.
Investment % of income needs to increase
Animal spirits. Spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction
Keynes setup his own theory against his own view of classical theory, which opponents denied holding.
Rejected: employment determined in labor market. If money wage flexibility, then no obstacle to full employment.
Classical Model of pain Vs pleasure of employment - downward demand for labor, marginal utility Vs upward pain of labor, supply. So employment at equilibrium. Cannot have involuntary unemployment, only voluntary leisure.
Keynes said supply will overshoot demand. Involuntary unemployment. Because wages won't fall in real terms of prices/demand falls. Hence labor demand will fall.
Conceded savings might also be influenced by interest rate, not just by income.
John Hicks portable Keynesian model: is/lm curves.
Desire for liquidity makes a decentralised entrepreneurial economy unstable with oscillations around subnormal activity
Does money cause the economy to misbehave, or uncertainty cause money to misbehave?
1940 booklet how to pay for the war. First major application of his general theory. Just in time.
Ww1: high inflation. Wealthy profits commandeered as loans - owned high % of national debt. Falling real wages. Ww2: deferred earnings, excess income mopped up by direct taxes and compulsory savings.
Keynesian revolution, endorsed even by anti Keynesians like Hayek.
Nature's way: inflation transfers money from workers to entrepreneurs which is then taxed. But now, unions mean real wages cannot fall. Either entre says yes, then consumption is not decreased and no excess revenue, or entre says no and supply is disrupted. Keynes wants social justice by preventing price fluctuations.
Socialists prefer egalitarian rationing of food than deferred earnings, and state allocation of manpower based on need rather than market.
Post war international economy set by US. Britain heavily in debt.
Stable exchange rates anti inflation discipline.
Hitler's new deal was more coherent and successful in tackling unemployment than Roosevelt's.
Germany Japan UK were all economically against US, risk of free trade. US major aim of ww2 to dismantle mercantile blocs
US wanted rights over UK import laws. Keynes instead came up with clearing union that would give debtor rights over surplus post war. Germany did this in 30s, Walther Funks, Fixed exchange rates, division of labor, shield against deflation of international gold standard
America still fighting as if peacetime trade war by the time they enter in Dec 1941
Keynes wanted to use unique opportunity to regain liberal economic order that had been lost in ww1.
Keynes dead and buried? Microeco for growth and employment. Macro for inflation? But deflation has created consistent high unemployment?
But unemployment is structural not Keynesian, no lack of demand.
Classical eco: downward rigidity of wages causes unemployment. Keynes equilibrium needs government policy to maintain full employment.
Macroeco restored faith in capitalism.
Friedman killed Keynesian eco? Govt attempts to reduce unemployment below market set natural rate accelerated inflation
Price stability rather than full employment became stated goal of macroeconomics
Growth Keynesians. Growth was demand constrained. Depression perspective that didn't take supply constraints seriously
Public spending will boost investment and productivity gains. Some inflation will trigger growth. State is wise. Market is stupid.
60s inflation without any improvement in any other variable. Slumpflation 70s
Classical economists were right? Demand pressure, supply shortage, prices up. Oil prices 73. Wage control squeezed profit. More public spending..
Price falls in depression. Rises in boom. So in Keynes, spending goes up to negate falling price. So price always rises regardless of upturn or downturn. Change perception of unemployment as unacceptable cost to acceptable price of reducing inflation
Safe zone of Phillips curve between unemployment and rate of change of wages.
Anti Keynesians : political class maximises political utility not social welfare.
Efficient markets hypothesis assumes pricing of risk which is knowable probability. Keynes talked about uncertainty, ie Unknowable probability.
Marginal efficiency of capital. Expectation of profit over interest rate.
World stayed poor so long because of bias to preserve existing wealth than create new, hoarding over investing, that pushed up interest rates.
He saw India's historical obsession with hoarding gold, interest rates never down to compatibility with growth of real wealth.
Inequality is bad for capitalism. You can only consume so much. After that you save. But if consumption has maxed out, then I don't need your savings because I have nowhere to invest. Unless I find more and more complementary goods for the rich.
If uncertainty is inevitable, then Keynes is general theory. If it's just imperfect information, then classical theory is general
In short, Keynesian policies come to us today wrapped up in a history of rising inflation, unsound public finance, expanding statism, collapsing corporatism, and general ungovernability, all of which have seemed inseparable from the Keynesian cure for the afflictions of industrial society. We do not want to traverse that path again. By the 1980s, Keynes, who was praised for having saved the world from Marxism, had joined Marx as the God that failed.
There is nothing in Keynes’s social philosophy, or the Liberalism of his day, which would have supported the seemingly relentless expansion of the welfare activities of the state which contributed so heavily to the fiscal crises of the 1970s. Finally, he was an apostle of growth not for its own sake, but only as a means to leisure and civilized living. In fact, he argued in the late 1920s that ‘technological’ unemployment was a sign that the economic problem was being solved. ‘The full employment policy by means of investment is only one particular application of an intellectual theorem,’ he wrote to T. S. Eliot in 1945. ‘You can produce the result just as well by consuming more or working less… Less work is the ultimate solution [to the unemployment] problem.’
Expectation that the rate of capital accumulation would fall was not unreasonable after post-war reconstruction and ‘catch-up’ had run their course. Much more questionable was the extension of Keynesian thinking from the short-run problem of securing full employment of existing resources to the problem of increasing the growth of these resources. For ‘growth’ Keynesians, active demand management (including fiscal deficits) was required not just to prevent or offset recessions but to realize the economy’s long-run growth potential, an altogether more elusive idea. Keynes himself would have said – in fact he did say – that at full employment any exogenous injection of demand leads to inflation. This is the ‘special case’ to which classical economics applied, when faster growth of output can come about only through increased productivity and improved technique – matters on which Keynes had nothing distinctive to say.
Eventually governments had had enough. In face of the second oil price rise of 1979–80, Western governments tightened fiscal and monetary policy, bringing about the most severe slump since the 1930s. Developing countries, which had maintained their public investment booms throughout the 1970s by borrowing recycled petrodollars at negative real interest rates, found themselves faced with crippling foreign debt burdens as export earnings collapsed, real interest rates rose to punitive levels, and foreign investment dried up. In return for rescheduling and new loans, the IMF imposed tough stabilization packages. World-wide, state-led growth policies had precisely the opposite effect to those intended: they had raised, not lowered, the cost of producing goods and services, and they had lowered, not raised, the capacity of economies to produce marketable output. The Keynesian age was over.
‘inflation tax’ than Keynes in 1923: ‘A government can live by this means when it can live by no other. It is the form of taxation which the public finds hardest to evade and even the weakest government can enforce, when it can enforce nothing else.’
State apparatus equipped by right theories and run by benevolent old Etonians
Friedman believes that most traumatic shocks are political. Governments are irretrievably tempted to manipulate the monetary parameters in order to secure helpful short-run results. Therefore their discretionary activity should be strictly circumscribed by rules. Keynes believed that unmanaged economies are inherently volatile, with a tendency to subnormal activity, so that policy can play a large part in both stabilizing and raising their performance. He thought governments could be sufficiently trusted to carry out contra-cyclical policy with competence and probity.
Keynes’s recipe for a less uncertain economy consisted of three main elements: measures to stimulate investment, measures to stimulate consumption, and a reform of the international monetary system to prevent the transmission
June 28, 2019
I am neither a man of economic nor mathematics myself.
However, the detailed yet compact history of global politico-economics through the involvement of Keynes being comprehensively provided by this book surely gives the reader a constructive picture of how the global politico-economic system has been shaped throughout the centuries.
However, the detailed yet compact history of global politico-economics through the involvement of Keynes being comprehensively provided by this book surely gives the reader a constructive picture of how the global politico-economic system has been shaped throughout the centuries.
February 23, 2016
المفروض نحل مشاكلنا الاقتصادية ازاي
الحلول ديما بيكون ف ناس ملهاش مصالح فيها
دور الحكومات ف الحلول و تقاطعه مع بقائها
هل كل حل قديم يصلح الان او يصلح ف اي دولة
اقرأ و هتعرف
الحلول ديما بيكون ف ناس ملهاش مصالح فيها
دور الحكومات ف الحلول و تقاطعه مع بقائها
هل كل حل قديم يصلح الان او يصلح ف اي دولة
اقرأ و هتعرف
December 12, 2018
Excellent intro. Although I think you need some familiarity with modern Marco to get through the book.
November 14, 2025
Kort och koncist. Men främst för de som är intresserade för Nationalekonomisk historia.
Börjar med en kort biografi, övergår till Keynes ungdoms filosoferande, monetära reformer och sedan hans General Theory, för att försöka avhjälpa 1930-talets depression. Fri marknad med riktade statliga insatser. Sedan genomgång av vem som var för eller emot hans teorier.
Problemet är väl att Skidelsky skrev ett storverk i tre delar om Keynes, från 1983-2000, och det här verkar vara en sammanfattning från ca 1995, när Keynes gloria kommit på sned, han var avpolletterad. Men så ville man ge ut den här nyutgåvan 2010, hade åsikterna svängt, så det lades till ett uppdaterat efterord, som visar på att den ursprungliga Keynes idéer visst behövs.
Så är det med Ekonomisk teori, det svänger.
Börjar med en kort biografi, övergår till Keynes ungdoms filosoferande, monetära reformer och sedan hans General Theory, för att försöka avhjälpa 1930-talets depression. Fri marknad med riktade statliga insatser. Sedan genomgång av vem som var för eller emot hans teorier.
Problemet är väl att Skidelsky skrev ett storverk i tre delar om Keynes, från 1983-2000, och det här verkar vara en sammanfattning från ca 1995, när Keynes gloria kommit på sned, han var avpolletterad. Men så ville man ge ut den här nyutgåvan 2010, hade åsikterna svängt, så det lades till ett uppdaterat efterord, som visar på att den ursprungliga Keynes idéer visst behövs.
Så är det med Ekonomisk teori, det svänger.
January 2, 2022
Have a glance at the first chapter. Don't like the style of the content. And it is not easy to follow as a beginner of economics. More like for advanced readers for economics. If you would like to know the essential point of Keynes's theory of economics, I don't think this book is a good one.
November 3, 2024
Dry as anything but worth persevering with. Keynes and his work are quite what you might commonly think from throwaway mentions of him in contemporary politics, particularly in the UK and US (fittingly, given his focuses on these).
November 18, 2017
Looking forward to reading Skidelsky's three volumes on Keynes.
December 16, 2023
Not a comprehensive book, I needed to consult Wikipedia when reading.
April 13, 2015
ผมรู้จักเคนส์ในฐานะบิดาด้านเศรษฐศาสตร์มหภาค เมื่อราวสมัยมัธยมปลาย
แต่ยิ่งโตขึ้น ยิ่งได้ทราบว่าความเป็นจริง ศาสตร์ที่เคลื่อนไหวได้อย่างสังคมศาสตร์ ไม่มีแนวคิดใดจีรัง เช่นเดียวกับแนวคิดสำนักเคนส์
หนังสือเล่มนี้ แนะนำให้เรารู้จักเคนส์ผ่านผลงานหลายชิ้นที่ทำให้เขาเป็นที่รู้จัก ผ่านการถกเถียงจากนักวิชาการที่ทั้งเห็นด้วยและไม่เห็นด้วยกับแนวคิดของเขา พร้อมกับเกร็ดความรู้ที่แสดงความปราดเปรื่องของเราในเหตุการณ์ต่างๆ
น่าเสียดาย หนังสือเล่มนี้อ่านยากไปเสียหน่อย แม้ผู้แปลจะพยายามอย่างยิ่งในการอธิบาย แต่หากจะอ่านให้เข้าใจ โดยเฉพาะในช่วงกลางเล่ม อย่างน้อยที่สุดผู้อ่านควรทราบความสัมพันธ์พื้นฐานระหว่าง การว่างงาน เงินเฟ้อ และปริมาณเงิน
เป็นอีกหนึ่งเล่มที่ผู้สนใจเศรษฐศาสตร์ไม่ควรพลาดครับ
แต่ยิ่งโตขึ้น ยิ่งได้ทราบว่าความเป็นจริง ศาสตร์ที่เคลื่อนไหวได้อย่างสังคมศาสตร์ ไม่มีแนวคิดใดจีรัง เช่นเดียวกับแนวคิดสำนักเคนส์
หนังสือเล่มนี้ แนะนำให้เรารู้จักเคนส์ผ่านผลงานหลายชิ้นที่ทำให้เขาเป็นที่รู้จัก ผ่านการถกเถียงจากนักวิชาการที่ทั้งเห็นด้วยและไม่เห็นด้วยกับแนวคิดของเขา พร้อมกับเกร็ดความรู้ที่แสดงความปราดเปรื่องของเราในเหตุการณ์ต่างๆ
น่าเสียดาย หนังสือเล่มนี้อ่านยากไปเสียหน่อย แม้ผู้แปลจะพยายามอย่างยิ่งในการอธิบาย แต่หากจะอ่านให้เข้าใจ โดยเฉพาะในช่วงกลางเล่ม อย่างน้อยที่สุดผู้อ่านควรทราบความสัมพันธ์พื้นฐานระหว่าง การว่างงาน เงินเฟ้อ และปริมาณเงิน
เป็นอีกหนึ่งเล่มที่ผู้สนใจเศรษฐศาสตร์ไม่ควรพลาดครับ
March 1, 2016
بعد الازمة العالمية في ٢٠٠٨ اعادعلماء الاقتصاد التقدير لنظريات كينز في الاقتصاد بعد هجرانها فترة طويلة في ظل الانتعاش الاقتصادي منذ بداية التسعينات الكتاب يلقي الضوء على سيرة كينز ثم يلقي الضوء على نظريات كنز الاقتصادية والانتقادات الموجهة لها
October 24, 2011
One of the best and shortest books about the great master. Read especially the final chapter about the significance of Keynes in the current crisis.
April 8, 2012
This was originally written in the 90's with an epilogue in 2010 to cover the recent financial crisis.
Relatively easy to read introduction to Keynes's life and work.
Relatively easy to read introduction to Keynes's life and work.
May 28, 2012
good short overview on keynes.
March 15, 2013
konuyu biraz daha iyi ogrendim.
December 7, 2015
เข้าใจเลยว่าทำไมจบมาเกรดต่ำนัก
March 16, 2016
A good introduction to the Master, his theories and detractors.
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