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The Responsibility of the Philosopher
Over the course of his career, Gianni Vattimo has assumed a number of public and private identities and has pursued multiple intellectual paths. He seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning religion and critiquing and serving the state. Yet the diversity of his life and thought form the very essence of, as he sees it, the vocation and responsibility of the philosopher. In a world that desires quantifiable results and ideological expediency, the philosopher becomes the vital interpreter of the endlessly complex.
As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue.
As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue.
- GenresPhilosophy
168 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
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56 people want to read
About the author
Gianni Vattimo
138 books93 followersGianteresio Vattimo, also known as Gianni Vattimo (born January 4, 1936) is an internationally recognized Italian author, philosopher, and politician. Many of his works have been translated into English.
His philosophy can be characterized as postmodern with his emphasis on "pensiero debole" (weak thought). This requires that the foundational certainties of modernity with its emphasis on objective truth founded in a rational unitary subject be relinquished for a more multi-faceted conception closer to that of the arts.
His philosophy can be characterized as postmodern with his emphasis on "pensiero debole" (weak thought). This requires that the foundational certainties of modernity with its emphasis on objective truth founded in a rational unitary subject be relinquished for a more multi-faceted conception closer to that of the arts.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
February 18, 2017
I have had quite some difficulty in coming to terms with this work — not so much in the reading of it (the translation by William McCuaig appears to me to be quite lucid enough); nor in coming to grips with Vattimo’s “take” as such; but more in attempting to determine where I stand in relation to these revelations (just when I think I am in the “right” place, I find myself suddenly plunged into what appear to me to be slippery slides into areas which renew doubts and confusion), and these twists and turns seem to be quite deliberate in intention. This should not be interpreted as me questioning the validity or otherwise of the contents, but comprehending what it all might mean is both bewildering and perplexing.
Perhaps it is best to begin with a description of the book itself, and then leave my musings about it for later:
The printing history tells us that the work was originally published in Italian in 2000, entitled Vocazione e responsibilità del filosofo (The Vocation and Responsibility of the Philosopher); the translation was copyrighted by Columbia University Press in 2010; and this edition published in 2012. The book is rather short (117 pages of main text, which comprises a 45 page Introduction (including a 9-page Postscript dated 2009) by its editor, professor Franca D’Agostini. This leaves us with a mere 72 pages of Vattimo’s writings, divided into 5 sections: Philosophy and Science; Philosophy, History, Literature; Logic in Philosophy; To speak the Truth [links to religion]; and The Vocation to Philosophy and the Responsibility of Philosophy [note here the reference to Philosoph y , whereas the title of the work relates to the Philosoph er ].
The Introduction, as such, is an attempt to explain Vattimo’s thoughts, particularly in relation to his pensiero debole (translated as “weak thought”) suggested solution, and to “place” them within the context of late 20th-c Continental European philosophising. This is all well and good, if the reader is familiar with the many references to the thoughts of individual philosophers peppered throughout. I wasn’t, so I found this aspect, while easy enough to read, almost impossible to fully comprehend.
The main text by Vattimo is easier to read, and represents his take on his re-examination of some basic principles he considers relevant (see the titles of the five headings listed above). I feel that many readers might fine these pieces gentler and more accommodating, in a philosophical kind of way. They are personal and amicable expressions of his thinking, and disarming as a result. Perhaps too disarming. I think I could understand where he was coming from, to a certain extent, but I did not always find his conclusions convincing enough, particularly in relation to a full consideration of the possible consequences of some of his conclusions…
So overall, the effect of this book on me was vaguely unsatisfying. It forced me to read up some more about the man and his philosophy, and would suggest to the interested reader to check his entry in Wikipedia, and to a much more lengthy review that I found at www.iep.utm.edu/vattimo/
And so we come to my musings on this matter, based on wider information than that presented in this book (Vattimo is still alive and writing today), which is more concerned with explicating Vattimo’s late 20th-c writings. I will start by dealing specifically with what was considered the kind of nihilistic consequences of the hard-line reasoning of the postmodernists at the time. The latter came up with the inevitable and absolute conclusion that any absolute statement or conclusion was merely interpretation, and therefore not absolute at all, and that even that statement was itself only an interpretation. Worse, this supreme paradox applied not only to philosophy, but to every possible endeavour in science, logic, history, religion, etc. — so what was the point of any of these disciplines? If everything is simply interpretation, then anything goes — everything is relative; nothing is absolute; and ultimately all our endeavours become meaningless. It meant the “death” of everything. Hello nihilism; hello despair.
Vattimo’s response is to urge thinkers to “deal” with the paradox face on. He suggests that the great paradox need not be considered negatively (so that it leads to Nihilism/Despair) but positively via his pensiero debole. It would be a mistake, however, to consider the latter as somehow softer in its approach: it simply asserts that the paradox reveals that metaphysics, science, religion and all other absolute systems have been stripped of their authority. Consequently we must eschew scientific criteria, doctrine, the demonstration of analytical proof, logic, and incontrovertible reason, and replace them by extolling instead charity and friendship, plurality, ethical edification, persuasion and dialogue, and pensiero debole respectively. It also consequently appears that, for Vattimo, philosophy should be concerned with fidelity and participation through dialogue. It thus can only be personal, linked to its place of origin, its culture, its religion, its language, its science, its arts, etc. and must necessarily proceed from these. Thus, for example, philosophy, while being something separate from science and the humanities, must also acknowledge that it is somehow intimately connected with their processes. In this sense, therefore, philosophy is “responsible” to its origins.
All this sounds and reads pleasant enough, but I am assuming I understand what it is all about. It seems to me, however, that a philosophy that stems from its geograpic space and responsive to its origins will in some way be subject to (“responsible” to) its origins. I can’t help thinking that in this case the temptation would be to use philosophy as a “justifier”, or perhaps operate as an “apologist”, for its origins — and that that would also apply to philosophies with alternative origins. Everything then relies on establishing and dealing with a multiplicity of interpretations, globally. All that this means to me is that the original paradox remains; and any attempt to “cross over” into different territories results in opposition rather than resolution.
Vattimo has become involved with politics and international issues, and has run into “trouble”: his pensiero debole approach has resuscitated a new kind of antitotalitarian Marxist communism based on his personal affinity, for example, to a Euro-centric, Roman Catholic, reinterpretation, which has been denounced (understandably) by the Vatican; and his public backing and defending of Hamas Palestinians against Zionist Jews has resulted (also understandably) with accusations of antisemitism…
Perhaps that is precisely the point: perpetual struggle in order to prevent any one specific approach in any area from ever establishing itself as a dominant force in any field of human endeavour. If so, then all one can conclude is that for the human beings caught up in these “struggles”, continuing pain, suffering, dissatisfaction and disillusionment in perpetuity can be the only result. A case of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? Who knows?
One thing appears certain to me: the paradox remains (and that, of course, is only my interpretation!) :-)
Perhaps it is best to begin with a description of the book itself, and then leave my musings about it for later:
The printing history tells us that the work was originally published in Italian in 2000, entitled Vocazione e responsibilità del filosofo (The Vocation and Responsibility of the Philosopher); the translation was copyrighted by Columbia University Press in 2010; and this edition published in 2012. The book is rather short (117 pages of main text, which comprises a 45 page Introduction (including a 9-page Postscript dated 2009) by its editor, professor Franca D’Agostini. This leaves us with a mere 72 pages of Vattimo’s writings, divided into 5 sections: Philosophy and Science; Philosophy, History, Literature; Logic in Philosophy; To speak the Truth [links to religion]; and The Vocation to Philosophy and the Responsibility of Philosophy [note here the reference to Philosoph y , whereas the title of the work relates to the Philosoph er ].
The Introduction, as such, is an attempt to explain Vattimo’s thoughts, particularly in relation to his pensiero debole (translated as “weak thought”) suggested solution, and to “place” them within the context of late 20th-c Continental European philosophising. This is all well and good, if the reader is familiar with the many references to the thoughts of individual philosophers peppered throughout. I wasn’t, so I found this aspect, while easy enough to read, almost impossible to fully comprehend.
The main text by Vattimo is easier to read, and represents his take on his re-examination of some basic principles he considers relevant (see the titles of the five headings listed above). I feel that many readers might fine these pieces gentler and more accommodating, in a philosophical kind of way. They are personal and amicable expressions of his thinking, and disarming as a result. Perhaps too disarming. I think I could understand where he was coming from, to a certain extent, but I did not always find his conclusions convincing enough, particularly in relation to a full consideration of the possible consequences of some of his conclusions…
So overall, the effect of this book on me was vaguely unsatisfying. It forced me to read up some more about the man and his philosophy, and would suggest to the interested reader to check his entry in Wikipedia, and to a much more lengthy review that I found at www.iep.utm.edu/vattimo/
And so we come to my musings on this matter, based on wider information than that presented in this book (Vattimo is still alive and writing today), which is more concerned with explicating Vattimo’s late 20th-c writings. I will start by dealing specifically with what was considered the kind of nihilistic consequences of the hard-line reasoning of the postmodernists at the time. The latter came up with the inevitable and absolute conclusion that any absolute statement or conclusion was merely interpretation, and therefore not absolute at all, and that even that statement was itself only an interpretation. Worse, this supreme paradox applied not only to philosophy, but to every possible endeavour in science, logic, history, religion, etc. — so what was the point of any of these disciplines? If everything is simply interpretation, then anything goes — everything is relative; nothing is absolute; and ultimately all our endeavours become meaningless. It meant the “death” of everything. Hello nihilism; hello despair.
Vattimo’s response is to urge thinkers to “deal” with the paradox face on. He suggests that the great paradox need not be considered negatively (so that it leads to Nihilism/Despair) but positively via his pensiero debole. It would be a mistake, however, to consider the latter as somehow softer in its approach: it simply asserts that the paradox reveals that metaphysics, science, religion and all other absolute systems have been stripped of their authority. Consequently we must eschew scientific criteria, doctrine, the demonstration of analytical proof, logic, and incontrovertible reason, and replace them by extolling instead charity and friendship, plurality, ethical edification, persuasion and dialogue, and pensiero debole respectively. It also consequently appears that, for Vattimo, philosophy should be concerned with fidelity and participation through dialogue. It thus can only be personal, linked to its place of origin, its culture, its religion, its language, its science, its arts, etc. and must necessarily proceed from these. Thus, for example, philosophy, while being something separate from science and the humanities, must also acknowledge that it is somehow intimately connected with their processes. In this sense, therefore, philosophy is “responsible” to its origins.
All this sounds and reads pleasant enough, but I am assuming I understand what it is all about. It seems to me, however, that a philosophy that stems from its geograpic space and responsive to its origins will in some way be subject to (“responsible” to) its origins. I can’t help thinking that in this case the temptation would be to use philosophy as a “justifier”, or perhaps operate as an “apologist”, for its origins — and that that would also apply to philosophies with alternative origins. Everything then relies on establishing and dealing with a multiplicity of interpretations, globally. All that this means to me is that the original paradox remains; and any attempt to “cross over” into different territories results in opposition rather than resolution.
Vattimo has become involved with politics and international issues, and has run into “trouble”: his pensiero debole approach has resuscitated a new kind of antitotalitarian Marxist communism based on his personal affinity, for example, to a Euro-centric, Roman Catholic, reinterpretation, which has been denounced (understandably) by the Vatican; and his public backing and defending of Hamas Palestinians against Zionist Jews has resulted (also understandably) with accusations of antisemitism…
Perhaps that is precisely the point: perpetual struggle in order to prevent any one specific approach in any area from ever establishing itself as a dominant force in any field of human endeavour. If so, then all one can conclude is that for the human beings caught up in these “struggles”, continuing pain, suffering, dissatisfaction and disillusionment in perpetuity can be the only result. A case of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? Who knows?
One thing appears certain to me: the paradox remains (and that, of course, is only my interpretation!) :-)
Read
July 30, 2013Gianni Vattimo writes:
In other words, the proposition “truth does not exist” is patently meant to be a descriptive, objective truth and therefore it is patently contradictory to utter it – never mind that truth does not properly “exist” or “not exist,” but is, if anything, assertible or not assertible. What does exist is a common language in which these effects of contradiction emerge, and to take that into account is what’s important. Thus it is possible for me to affirm that truth dies like God dies. And just as the death (and birth) of God in Christianity is an aspect of God, forms part of his nature, likewise this contradictory death of truth belongs to the nature of truth.
The discourse becomes completely different. There is history, the meaning of which I must understand: I must account for why it is that today the term “truth” is used differently, and why it is in a certain sense true that “we no longer possess the truth.” The history of Being is made up of incidents, things that befall, but they are not “accidents” that can be dismissed with a wave of the hand: they are events. Truth, with its history, is one of these events, and it is difficult to imagine getting rid of it.
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In other words, the proposition “truth does not exist” is patently meant to be a descriptive, objective truth and therefore it is patently contradictory to utter it – never mind that truth does not properly “exist” or “not exist,” but is, if anything, assertible or not assertible. What does exist is a common language in which these effects of contradiction emerge, and to take that into account is what’s important. Thus it is possible for me to affirm that truth dies like God dies. And just as the death (and birth) of God in Christianity is an aspect of God, forms part of his nature, likewise this contradictory death of truth belongs to the nature of truth.
The discourse becomes completely different. There is history, the meaning of which I must understand: I must account for why it is that today the term “truth” is used differently, and why it is in a certain sense true that “we no longer possess the truth.” The history of Being is made up of incidents, things that befall, but they are not “accidents” that can be dismissed with a wave of the hand: they are events. Truth, with its history, is one of these events, and it is difficult to imagine getting rid of it.
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December 31, 2014
It is a very nice book, a must read one to all young philosophers!
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews