The Battle of Britain could not stop Operation Sealion, the planned German invasion. The historians got it wrong. This is a big claim to make, yet the reasoning behind it is remarkably straightforward. In Invasion 1940, author Derek Robinson asks why historians have dovetailed the Battle of Britain with Operation Sealion. Military experts say the Battle prevented an invasion, but they don't exactly explain how. Why is it taken for granted that an air battle could halt an assault from the sea? The skill and courage of the RAF pilots isn't in question, but did the Luftwaffe's failure to destroy them, plus bad weather, really persuade Hitler to cancel Sealion? That's what Hitler said, and Churchill claimed a great victory for 'The Few'. The Battle of Britain ended; Sealion died. One followed the other, so the first must have caused the second. But Derek Robinson challenges that assumption and reaches a startling conclusion. The real obstacle to invasion was a force that both Churchill and Hitler failed to acknowledge. In this fascinating reexamination, Robinson doesn't seek to downplay the heroism and achievements of the RAF; rather, he wants the true picture of that brilliant moment in history--Invasion, 1940-- to emerge.
Derek Robinson is a British author best known for his military aviation novels full of black humour. He has also written several books on some of the more sordid events in the history of Bristol, his home town, as well as guides to rugby. He was nominated for the Booker Prize in 1971 for his first novel, 'Goshawk Squadron.'
After attending Cotham Grammar School, Robinson served in the Royal Air Force as a fighter plotter, during his National Service. He has a History degree from Cambridge University, where he attended Downing College, has worked in advertising in the UK and the US and as a broadcaster on radio and television. He was a qualified rugby referee for over thirty years and is a life member of Bristol Society of Rugby Referees. He was married in 1964
This book was overall deserving a Four star rating, and mainly because it presented a great case: The battle of Britain was not won solely by the RAF, but also by the Royal Navy. The fact this book gave me a compelling argument, debunks some misconceptions, and gave me an insight to Operation Sealion I had not received before is what made me give it 4-stars. The book talks about the battle of Britain, how the Germans wasted away several months in the hopes Britain would make a peace deal like France. It then talks about how the Luftwaffe eventually managed to achieve control of southeast England by September of 1940, but Hitler thought that by bombing London, he could lower their morale and force them to sue for peace. This book talks about the air-war, and gives a background to the build up of events, but the main focus was to dispel the idea that the RAF was the main reason Germany shelved it's invasion plans, it was the Royal Navy (and Hitler's ambitions to attack Russia). While I think the work is compelling, I will look at it Objectively, because History is about looking at both sides of the coin.
This all makes perfect sense. Sealion could never have happened simply because the Royal Navy would have swamped any invasion fleet of low-hulled unpowered (towed) river barges (which would likely sink in anything stronger than a Force 1 zephyr) even in the absence of RAF night-time air cover. Machine-gunning Spitfires and Hurricanes were never going to damage these barges but a 36-knot travelling destroyer’s bow wave and cable cutting speed would have been lethal even before a shot was fired. The RN Home Fleet was 10 times the size of the German Navy. All this without the terrible conditions that the Wehrmacht and their horses (!) would have faced while bobbing about on the beautiful briny sea and the indifference with which the heads of the German navy, Lufwaffe and Army treated each other.
Robinson has taken a convincing revisionist view of Operation Sealion, and backed it with some impressive research and analysis. Two main points: the RAF couldn't, and didn't, stop Sealion; the overwhelming Royal Navy overmatch vs. the Kriegsmarine was the first major factor. The second was that, according to the author, Hitler never really wanted to invade England for various reasons and excuses. Robinson details the huge build-up, the unsuitability of the vessels in that build-up for a channel crossing, and the string of delays of that D-Day before its eventual death. The intense and bitter interservice rivalries between the Kriegsmarine, Wehrmacht (Heer), and Luftwaffe made preparations for the invasion disjointed and inadequate, while the heads of each branch lied to Hitler (who lied back at them and everyone) about preparedness. Robinson provides a "what-if" scenario if the invasion had proceeded. The RAF would have played a minor role against the fleets (fighters' machine guns were .303 rifle calibre, and bombers were not that effective against smallish vessels and barges), though obviously it would have played the major role countering the Luftwaffe's air cover. His description, however, of the RN's barreling in from both sides on the four German invasion fleets with vast numerical and vessel size advantages. Add the challenges of the English Channel's tides, weather, and subsurface obstacles for fleets of river barges gives a convincing argument that the invasion would have been severely hobbled or doomed.
Easy reading book that captures an overall picture of the many reasons why Germany was unable to conquer Britain during the Battle of Britain. Somewhat disappointing if you were expecting details on dogfights or particular aerial warfare tales (as I was), however you will gain a greater understanding of the deceit/deception of two militaries and political figures during the whole of this battle.
This book is a factual account of the strength of both Great Britain and Germany. Very well thought out and well written, not the authurs usual humorus self.
It's a story that pops up in the British papers every few years, usually with a headline like 'How the Royal Navy won the Battle of Britain'. Perhaps a more actuate description would be 'The RAF won the Battle of Britain, if the Battle of the English Channel had ever happened, it would most likely have been won by the Royal Navy'.
This book looks at this in more technical detail, particularly the difficulty that the German Army and Navy would have add assembling and landing the invasion force (unlike the Allies later in the war, the Germans had no specialised landed ships), how quickly the Royal Navy could have been at the landing beaches in overwhelming strength (200 ships in 48 hours, by the author's calculations) and how effectively the German Navy and Air Force could have protected the transports (which in the end seems to come down to the sheer numbers of British warships that would have been attacking).
There has been plenty written on the RAF, and how well the Home Guard and remains of the British Army would have faired against a German invasion, but this is a look at the one part of the Battle of Britain that never gets much attention: Getting the invasion force over the English Channel.
Well worth a read.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
I was expecting something a bit more unusual than that the real reason behind the cancelling of Operation SeaLion was However, this was a book worth reading as the author does present a number of very interesting views on related topics (sub-plots, if you will) such as the role of radar, the pre-war fear of bombing, German dysfunctional planning hierarchy etc.
An interesting take on the Battle of Britain and its importance in preventing the German invasion of Great Britain in 1940. I admit I get caught up in the Churchillian claims of "so much owed by so many to so few" and the ineptitude of German planning. I did however overlook the most obvious reason, as most historians have: the Royal Navy. How did the Germans plan on getting past the Royal Navy? The answer is they never really knew. The author does a good job of analyzing every aspect of the invasion that he can.
Entertaining and well written. A very nice look at the possibility of invasion from several points of view. The author does raise a straw man of sorts, saying there is no way the RAF could have stopped the invasion once begun. I don't think anyone believes that - what they credit the RAF with is denying Germany air supremacy, which the author readily admits.
A basic book that states that the Royal navy could easily destroys even without RAF support a n improvised invasion fleet consisted if towed river barges and a handfull of torpedo boats
Excellent argument that the British navy is what ensured the ballon never went up on Operation Sea Lion. The Battle of Britain was important, hard-fought, and a very near thing indeed. It was also lucky the Luftwaffe was led by Goering; he was delusional like Hitler and never admitted--and was never called to account for the fact--that he had failed in his promise to crush the RAF.