The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

by MacGregor Knox, Williamson Murray

The Dynamics of Military Revolution bridges a major gap in the emerging literature on revolutions in military affairs. It suggests that two very different phenomena have been at work over the past centuries: "military revolutions," which are driven by vast social and political changes, and "revolutions in military affairs," which military institutions have directed, although usually with great difficulty and ambiguous results. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray provide a conceptual framework and historical context for understanding the patterns of change, innovation, and adaptation that have marked war in the Western world since the fourteenth century beginning with Edward III's revolution in medieval warfare, through the development of modern military institutions in seventeenth century France, to the military impact of mass politics in the French Revolution, the cataclysmic military industrial struggle of 1914 1918, and the German Blitzkrieg victories of 1940. Case studies and a conceptual overview offer an indispensible introduction to revolutionary military change, which is as inevitable as it is difficult to predict. Macgregor Knox is the Stevenson Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Common Destiny (Cambridge, 2000) and Hitler's Italian Allies (Cambridge, 2000). Knox and Murray are co editors of Making of Strategy (Cambridge, 1996). Willamson Murray is Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analysis. He is the co editor of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, 1996) and author of A War to Be Won (Harvard University Press, 2000).

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Military History, War, Nonfiction, Reference, Renaissance

203 pages, Hardcover

First published August 1, 2001

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 2 out of 5]

This collection of 10 essays on military history was interesting if not a bit dry. Of course those not interested in military history, specifically the inquiries into what we can learn from such history and what implications we may draw from such inquiries, are unlikely to even pick this book up! The authors provide a concise outline for the major innovations in western warfare from 1300 to the present. They draw a distinction between "revolutions in military affairs" RMA - major changes in technology or tactics that change the way we fight wars and "military revolutions" - major societal changes that shift all of society as well as how wars are waged. Exmples of RMA's usually involved technological or organizational innovations that revolutionized western warfare such as the Prusso-German RMA in the 1840-60's wherin Moltke reorganized the small unit organizations within the Prussian army to take advantage of the "needle gun" a new kind of rifle that fired a cartridge and could be reloaded and fired much more quickly than previous muskets. He also utilized the new railroad technology to move troops and equipment much more quickly allowing his armies to mobilize and deploy to trouble spots much more quickly than marching. Military revolutions are gargantuan, civilization changing societal changes such as the creation of the modern nation state in the 17th century, the french revolution which merged mass politics and warfare, and the industrial revolution.

As an Army officer, this stuff is very interesting and even applicable in my more esoteric and strategic musings. Anyone else interested in the development of our western culture and warfare that have helped shape it may also find much to enjoy in this book.

[Tim]

1. Thinking about revolutions in warfare - Murray and Knox
2. "As if a new sun had arisen": England's 14th century RMA - Rogers
3. Forging the Western Army in 17th century France - Lynn
4. Mass politics and nationalism as military revolution: The French Revolution and after - Knox
-Before the Revolution
---Before 1648 hierarchical societies which can be traced to Middle Ages
------Except Republics (Dutch and Holy Roman Empire) and Parliamentary Regimes (England)
---Warfare that required efforts or summoned risks to International Order were rare (exceptions Charles XII and Fredrick the Great)
---Limited Aims
---Limits were not technological, but from social and mil-organizational bottlenecks in the recruitement, nature, and motivation of the individual soldier on the one hand and the system of C2 on the other (Knox, 60)
---Lowest order made up Army "These are the armies of government not those of nations." (Guibert, Essai general de tactique 13-14)
---4 Factors frustrated attempts to assemble and move en masse
------1. High and Middle classes exempt from service due to need for taxes. This results in no talent in the Army
------2. Prevailing tactical and disciplinary system (fear officers > fear enemy) restricted numbers
------3. Tendency of the troops to desert if unsupervised by officers or NCOs restricted the size and mobility of armies
------4. Absence of divisional organization and of adequate staffs for the theater CDR further reinforced logistical constraints on operations
---Limited aims, expensive of armies, long training times did not warrant risks of whole armies
---Logistical restraints
---No decisions @ tactical level
------fear of desertion and control-mania
---------no skirmishers or reconnaissance
---------no broken terrain attacks
---------no night attacks
---For these reasons restraints on what Clausewitz called war's true nature were social, political, and organizational rather than technological
---With exception of Gribeuval cannon of 1770, the wars of 1792-1815 were fought with the technology of the wars of Fredrick the Great
---What changed was ideas and politics
-The Revolution at War
---Monarch's downfall due to military and fiscal incompetence
------Prestige never recovered from defeat at Rossbach in 1757 to Fredrick the Great
------Finances never recovered from Seven Years War and American Revolution
---War was foreign and domestic as well as "indispensable for consummating the revolution" (Brissot, 1792)
---Revolutionary government aimed at world revolution
---"The passing of the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm in 1794 had no moderating effect, and Bonaparte's growing thirst for universal domination after 1799 was simply a personalization in the name of a shared Patrie of the revolutionaries' mission of saving the human race through sacred violence by the French nation." (Knox, 65)
---New politics abolished all theoretical limits on the state's actions
------Individual lives and property @ the nation's service
---Revolution abolished limits on warfare
------Higher class of soldiers
------Less discretion
---------didn't matter lots of soldiers and cheap
------officers based on talent
---------"Almost 1/2 of the officer corps of summer 1794 had not served even as private soldiers under the Old Regime" (Lynn, Bayonets, p 75)
---Unlimited aims and growing means demanded destruction of the enemy army by battle
---cohesion meant greater risks could be taken
------logistics of plunder
---------could change speed and direction while bypassing enemy strong points
------Tactically
---------dispersed individuals replaced close order formations
------------1792-95 skirmishers
---------------ordre-mixte
------------mobile Gribeauval artillery
-Napoleonic Synthesis, Prussian Response
---Revolution transforms war and war transforms revolution
------prestige of victory and delights of plunder made army not politicians the motor of French expansion and embodiment of French nationalism
---Bonaparte privileged artillery, perfected divisional system, created corps, created staff system, and HQ
---Conscription and resulting numbers also key to success
---Soldiers fought for France, their units, leaders, emperor, and for honors and rewards
---Lasting achievement (1) to make the French army the army of the nation on a permanent basis, and militarize the same nation
------Sought to make officer corps the French elite and thus lure French nobles to it
---------Lavish pay and prerequisites, military precedence
---Prussia transformed following less @ Jena-Averstadt in October 1806
------Literary movement around hating the French
------King Frederick William III turns toward
---------Heinrich von und zum Stein for civilians
---------Army - Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von Gneiseau, Hermann von Boyen, Karl von Grolman, and (as Schornhorst assistant) Carl von Clausewitz
------------Gave two advices
---------------Universal military service = thinking combatant
---------------Thinking officer corps and staff system honed by Bildung-systematic professional study and the cultivation of decision making skills.
-Conclusion: To 1941 and Beyond
---Couldn't uninvent mass politics or mass warfare
---German nationalim's peculiarly violent character and limitless aspirations combined with the newly won military staff assurance of the German people to carry strategic-ideological lunacy far behind the high standards that the Girondins, Jacobins, and Bonaparte had set.
5. Surviving military revolution: The US Civil War - Grimsley (p. 74-91)
---"The best strategy is always to be very strong." - Clausewitz
---Advantages are fleeting
---"It's political, social, and economic changes that most readily revolutionize war, from tactics and weapons, to methods of raising manpower, to the fundamental purposes the state pursues through war." (74)
---Different from RMAs
---No one controls MRs, they merely seek to survive them
---U.S. Civil War = Military Revolution
------Combined Passion and Politics of French Revolution w/technology, capacity, and managerial style of Industrial Revolution
------Total War - both sides pitted full destructive powers against the other
- Dynamics: Weapons
---Range - 116 yds avg = incremental improvement not a revolution
---Breachload - only north employed
------Warships, steam, telegram, and rail transport
---Key but since both sides possessed, not really a RMA
------large-scale destruction of resources
---not new or more destructive than others
---Real protean factors
------Volatile politics of mass democracy
------Corporatist order (symbiosis of private enterprise and public administration)
- Overland Campaign (1864)
---Contracts from 1861 set to expire
---Political Election year
------Grant forced to keep his army between Lee and Washington D.C. to prevent raids from having a political impact.
------New Strategy - take advantage of # of troops
---------simultaneous attacks across all theaters
------Grant appointed two Generals for two offenses
---------Franz Sigel - Shenandoah Valley - to secure the German immigrant vote
---------Benjamin Butler - Bermuda Hundred - b/c Butler had political aspirations and this would keep him out of running
------Grant hoped to bleed/starve Lee out at Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House while Sigel and Butler pressed the attack on Richmond
---------Both political Generals failed
------Grant tries to turn Lee's flank for 3rd and 4th time requires an SPOD which requires manpower reserves - the real asymmetric advantage of the north
---------ability to use material resources w/o ruinous political and economic consequences
--- Page 84, 2nd paragraph
---North could not pay for war @ 1st but developed a "fiscal-military revolution" based on a sophisticated balance between loans, currency, and taxes.
---South could not pay for war and suffered huge inflation
------Confederate $0.91 in May 1861 and $.05 in 1864
6. The Prusso-German RMA, 1840-1871 - Showalter
7. The battlefleet revolution, 1885-1914 - Herwig
8. The 1st World War and the birth of modern warfare - Bailey
9. May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA - Murray
10. Conclusion: The future behind us - Murray and Knox

[Rich · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although much has been said about Military Revolutions (MR), and especially of Revolutions of Military Affairs (RMA), this is an extremely well edited offering from MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. This insightful, yet brief, volume offers essays that place MRs and RMAs within a larger historical context. Generally, the theme of this work is that RMAs are truly rare, and MRs are exceptionally so. So, if ahistorical wonkery is a concern of yours, you'll not find it here.

Often confused for one another, Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) are less influential than the societal-military “earthquaking” Military Revolutions (MR). Rather than concern ourselves with the latter here, this post will be focused upon the former.

Military organizations embark upon an RMA by devising new ways of destroying their opponents. To do so, they must come to grips with fundamental changes in the social, political, and military landscapes; in some cases they must anticipate those changes. Revolutions in military affairs require the assembly of a complex mix of tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations in order to implement a new conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized sub-branch of warfare.

There are several important considerations of RMAs here for the military professional. First, they are rarely predicted. In the 1990s, most immediately following Operation Desert Storm, RMAs became the topic of much discussion that was, on the whole, largely ahistorical and ineffectual. The most stillborn of RMA ideas was that new tactical and technological dyads would usher in certain success at the operational and/or strategic levels of war in a new era of warfare. In contrast, Knox & Murray’s edition effectively and repeatedly emphasizes that the lessons of history are inconsistent with the idea of technological supremacy as a key to victory. Equally, we should also observe here, that the edition is not opposed to technological advancements—although it notes that in some cases technology becomes irrelevant sooner than other cases. Blind obsession with technological acquisition is just as imprudent as those stubborn advocates who suggest that archaic weapons are sufficient for future success.

Second, if RMAs provide an asymmetric advantage at all depends on timing and context, but these advantages are almost always extremely short-lived. “Belligerents adopt innovations with a conviction proportionate to their fear,” Mark Grimsley suggests, where “new developments spread so swiftly that battlefield imbalances are usually brief.” We should note that where these advantages are provided their impacts are probabilistic and typically non-linear. Whether to embark on reducing the asymmetry or alternatively seek a different path of advantage is another matter of risk that must be considered.

Finally, RMAs are nothing if not for the people who will employ them. Wars are a human interaction; Clausewitz’s metaphor of a duel was quite apt. The tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological changes are nothing for want of a developed mind. “American analysts have in consequence defined revolutions in military affairs as technological-organizational asymmetries between combatants,” Dennis Showalter explains, however the “fate of French armor in 1940 and of the Arab air forces in 1967 demonstrates the uselessness of hardware without appropriate concepts for its use and competent personnel effectively organized to implement those concepts.”

The professional Sailor, Soldier, Marine, and Airman must consider these three concepts from Knox and Murray’s work as they trudge through the massive amounts of misinformation and data related to counterinsurgency doctrine, unmanned aerial vehicle (or “drones” as the vulgar vernacular of these times may ascribe) operation, cyberspace operations, or even the technological and doctrinal aspects of the Joint Operational Access Concept. We are especially warned of any ahistorical predispositions of a technological “way of war,” which by any other name are just technological epiphenomena. A right-founded historical-based perspective on Revolutions in Military Affairs, as provided in Knox and Murray’s “Dynamics of Military Revolution”, will serve you well in the next offering of doctrinal snake oil or technological marvel.

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Written before 9-11 and the ensuing conflicts the book is still well worth your time. Basically it put to rest any notion that RMA is synonymous with technological advancement. In a wide variety of well selected examples the influence of cultural, economic, doctrinal, leadership factors in inspiring and driving RMA's are documented.

[Laura · Rating 2 out of 5]

Meh. This was dry. This could have been a little more exciting. It's full of info but was just boring.

[Keith Schnell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Full disclosure: this is the only one of three required reading books for the U.S. Army DL ILE H-100 course that I actually read all the way through, cover to cover. Can't say the same for On War.

For a collection clearly aimed at the military professional or accomplished history student, this spends an inordinate amount of time in what is really a rather thin book going over the general historical facts underlying its case studies. This can make for some dull reading if, for instance, you already have a pretty good idea of what happened in France in 1940, although I suppose that for some readers these may serve to dispel common misconceptions (never fired, dropped once &c.). Its central thesis, outlining a qualitative difference between Military Revolutions, which are changes in paradigm at the level of entire societies, and Revolutions in Military Affairs, which are transformative but ultimately subordinate innovations in military technology and technique, is reductive to some extent, but useful in providing clarity of thought when looking at apparent changes in warfare in recent years. Likewise, its analysis of the ways that military systems interact and work to accomplish state goals in different environments is a refreshing change in a genera that all too often limits its discussion to tactics or, worse, weapons technology. The widespread adoption of the Revolution in Military Affairs term in the Rumsfeld-ere DoD is indicative of this book's lasting influence.

[Mannix Nyiam ii · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is definitely a book for policy makers and military officers who have ever been in doubt about Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA). It is also recommended for military history enthusiasts. The book is a collection of 10 essays that use a historical approach to set the contexts for differentiating between Military Revolutions (triggered by socio-political changes) and RMA (triggered by deliberate innovations by the military high command). Though I found the book interesting, some of the historical discourses were unnecessary (I felt). If you read read the first and last chapters you'll get the message the authors are trying to put across. But feel free to read the entire book if you want to know all the evidences that led to their conclusions.

[Bryan J. Pitchford, MFA · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a mandatory read on the list for United States Army Command & General Staff College. We were assigned passages from the book rather than being required to read it cover to cover. I am interested in History and this was one of the few enjoyable blocks in the Army course. However, I graduated from the American public school system several years ago and I was not immediately invested in reading mandatory material. The U.S. Army has a specific definition of "military revolution" compared to a "revolution in military affairs". Covering 700 years is no small feat and with only 194 pages of actual text, this book ends up somewhat generic and glossed-over in several key points in history.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Chapter 10 has perhaps the best rundown of innovation and future force development

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a staple of the CGSC and a good historical works. I found it powerful. The focus upon tactics and the"how" of fighting over technology was refreshing and insightful.

[Dennis Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300 - 2050 edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray is an interesting and engaging read. There are a series of chapters organized by chronological order that engages with different revolutions in military affairs centered in different parts around the world. The point of the book is that too often military thinkers have a bias towards the present, rarely learn from past defeats, and possess too great a trust in advancements in military technologies, as if one goes to war by spreadsheet. Each chapter, written by a different author, references the importance of technological change, but stresses changes in organization structure, military culture, and doctrine.

[Luis Delgado · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2....

Es un enfoque interesante sobre la necesidad de que los ejércitos mantenga actualizado su doctrina militar. Me gustó aunque hubiera encontrado referencia sobre las guerras árabe - israelí.

[Aaron Warren · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a concise book about the revolutions that have changed modern military operations. The book also does a good job of differentiating between Military Revolutions and Revolution in Military Affairs. If history and military interest you this is a good book.

[Chris Hall · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sometimes dry, but a comprehensive and clear review of past military revolutions, with dozens of parallels to current struggles to innovate in military bureaucracies.

[Brenden Siekman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the introduction, Knox and Murray define a military revolution as "a fundamental change in the nature of warfare brought about by the adoption of new technologies, operational concepts, or organizational structures." They argue that military revolutions are not simply technological developments, but rather are driven by a complex interplay of social, political, and economic factors.

Chapter 2: The Military Revolution of the Fourteenth Century

The second chapter examines the military revolution that took place in Europe during the fourteenth century. This revolution was driven by a number of factors, including the rise of gunpowder weapons, the development of new military tactics, and the increased size and complexity of armies. The result of this revolution was a dramatic increase in the destructive power of warfare.

Chapter 3: The Military Revolution of the Sixteenth Century

The third chapter examines the military revolution that took place in Europe during the sixteenth century. This revolution was driven by a number of factors, including the development of new firearms, the rise of professional armies, and the increased use of artillery. The result of this revolution was a dramatic increase in the lethality of warfare.

Chapter 4: The Military Revolution of the Seventeenth Century

The fourth chapter examines the military revolution that took place in Europe during the seventeenth century. This revolution was driven by a number of factors, including the development of new fortifications, the rise of linear tactics, and the increased use of cavalry. The result of this revolution was a dramatic increase in the cost of warfare.

Chapter 5: The Military Revolution of the Eighteenth Century

The fifth chapter examines the military revolution that took place in Europe during the eighteenth century. This revolution was driven by a number of factors, including the development of new weapons and tactics, the rise of mass conscription, and the increased use of logistics. The result of this revolution was a dramatic increase in the size and complexity of armies.

Chapter 6: The Military Revolution of the Nineteenth Century

The sixth chapter examines the military revolution that took place in Europe during the nineteenth century. This revolution was driven by a number of factors, including the development of new weapons and tactics, the rise of railroads and steamships, and the increased use of industrial production. The result of this revolution was a dramatic increase in the speed and mobility of warfare.

Chapter 7: The Military Revolution of the Twentieth Century

The seventh chapter examines the military revolution that took place in Europe during the twentieth century. This revolution was driven by a number of factors, including the development of new weapons and tactics, the rise of air power and nuclear weapons, and the increased use of information technology. The result of this revolution was a dramatic increase in the destructive power of warfare.

Chapter 8: The Future of Military Revolutions

The eighth chapter examines the future of military revolutions. The authors argue that the pace of technological change is accelerating, and that this will lead to new and more destructive forms of warfare. They also argue that the increasing complexity of warfare will make it more difficult for any one country to maintain a dominant position.

Conclusion

In the conclusion, Knox and Murray argue that military revolutions are a recurring phenomenon in history. They also argue that military revolutions are not always beneficial, and that they can lead to increased violence and instability. However, they also argue that military revolutions can be a force for good, and that they can lead to new and more efficient ways of waging war.

Overall, "The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050" is an important book that provides a comprehensive overview of the history of military revolutions. The book is well-researched and well-written, and it is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of warfare.

[Elaad Yair · Rating 3 out of 5]

As happens quite often in books written by numerous authors, the style and quality of each chapter in The Dynamics of Military Revolution varies significantly.
Whilst one can learn a few things from the book by reading some interesting analyses of famous European wars, most of the chapters seem to be a poorly written summary of some random historical events.
And the whole book leads to a final chapter on the present lack of preparation of the US armed forces to the next war. This could be written by any newspaper columnist without creating a false impression of a careful analysis, which this book tries to create.
Nonetheless, I would recommend the book to people who must read every item about military strategy. Otherwise, give it a miss.

[Christopher · Rating 2 out of 5]

An academic read that lays out the distinction between revolutions in military affairs (RMA) and military revolutions. The former is led by a military at the confluence of several developments while in the latter, the military follows a larger change in the social or political order. The chapters are stand alone essays but the introduction and conclusion provide excellent bookends. In the end, both explain changes in war that are grouped with the benefit of hindsight. A topic worth understanding, this book is helpful likely to provide most an entry level explanation.

[Dharma Agastia · Rating 3 out of 5]

Knox and Murray provide their version of the Revolution in Military Affairs, which is divided into larger Military Revolutions and smaller Revolutions in Military Affairs. The rest of the book is mostly case studies in medieval Britain and modern war history in which the framework can be applied.