The Second World War, Volume VI: Triumph and Tragedy

The Second World War #6

by Winston S. Churchill

The final volume of Winston Churchill's six-volume history of World War II, this account covers the events leading to the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Winston Churchill's history of the cataclysm that swept the world remains the definitive history of the Second World War. Lucid, dramatic, remarkable both for its breadth and sweep and for its sense of personal involvement, it is universally acknowledged as a magnificent reconstruction and is an enduring, compelling work that led to his being awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature.

Triumph and Tragedy recounts the dramatic months as the war drew to a close—the Normandy landings, the liberation of Western Europe, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the surrender of Germany and Japan.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, War, Military Fiction, Military History, Biography

760 pages, Paperback

First published November 30, 1953

About the author

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, politician and writer, as prime minister from 1940 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1955 led Great Britain, published several works, including The Second World War from 1948 to 1953, and then won the Nobel Prize for literature.

William Maxwell Aitken, first baron Beaverbrook, held many cabinet positions during the 1940s as a confidant of Churchill.

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill, KG, OM, CH, TD, FRS, PC (Can), served the United Kingdom again. A noted statesman, orator and strategist, Churchill also served as an officer in the Army. This prolific author "for his mastery of historical and biographical description as well as for brilliant oratory in defending exalted human values."

Out of respect for Winston_Churchill, the well-known American author, Winston S. Churchill offered to use his middle initial as an author.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston...

Reviews

[Manny · Rating 4 out of 5]

The final volume of Churchill's incredible history of WW II. There's absolutely nothing else like it, and he turns in another masterpiece. The things people quote most often are his bitterness about being voted out of office just as the war is ending, and Stalin's bare-faced lies concerning the atom bomb. He claimed to know nothing about it, which Churchill believed, but it later turned out that he'd had a spy in place who'd passed out all the secrets.

But here's the bit that made the greatest impression on me. The British strategy has finally come to fruition. Way back in Volume II, Churchill made an brilliantly prescient decision: rather than going into a defensive huddle and putting everything into defending Britain from the impending German invasion, he diverted resources to hold Egypt. He wanted the possibility of counter-attacking later on. We did indeed win the Battle of Britain, and we also kept Egypt. Then we marched across North Africa, won the Battle of El Alamein in Volume IV, took Tunis, and invaded Sicily. After that, we fought all the way up Italy and finally forced the remnants of the Axis forces to surrender there in late April, 1945.

Simultaneously, Germany was falling to a combined onslaught from Soviet, US and British forces. It was clear that the end was very near there too. The question was what to do with the newly victorious army that was sitting at the top of Italy. Churchill argued that they should turn East. He could already see that Eastern Europe was going to be carved up between Soviet and Anglo-American forces, and he wanted to get as large a slice as possible. But Eisenhower didn't like this. He felt that it sent a bad signal to our Soviet allies, and he decided to go West instead, to mop up the last pockets of resistance in Southern France. It turned out that this was the wrong call. As Churchill bitterly complains, if only they had taken his advice then a substantial amount of Eastern Europe would have avoided becoming Soviet satellite states for the next 50 years.

With hindsight, it's clear that Stalin would never stay allied to the US and Britain longer than necessary. As soon as Germany, their common enemy, was out of the picture, he had no reason to do so. Loyalty wasn't an important concept to him. Unfortunately, this wasn't obvious at the time.

It's very difficult to understand that your key ally is just about to become your enemy and will ruthlessly exploit your naive trust. Tragedy indeed.

[Leah · Rating 5 out of 5]

This sixth and final volume in Churchill’s massive history of the Second World War covers the period from the Normandy Landings – D-Day, 6th June 1944 – to Churchill’s unexpected landslide defeat in the 1945 General Election and subsequent resignation from office on 26th July 1945. During that period, France was liberated, Germany was defeated, and arrangements were being finalised to use atomic bombs to end the war with Japan. The plans for a World Instrument to prevent future wars – what would become the United Nations – were nearing agreement. The divisions in the Grand Alliance were growing as the scramble to draw post-war borders heated up. Stalin was placing puppet regimes in the nations the Soviets had ‘liberated’ from the Germans, including Poland – the country in whose defence Britain had initially declared war. Churchill feared that while the Allies had won the war, Europe was about to lose the peace. And with Roosevelt dead, Truman at best disinterested and at worst antagonistic to Britain, and Stalin ready to bring down the Iron Curtain, it seems Churchill may have felt that, once again, Britain was standing alone.

Theme of the Volume

HOW THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES
TRIUMPHED,
AND SO WERE ABLE TO RESUME
THE FOLLIES
WHICH HAD SO NEARLY
COST THEM THEIR
LIFE

There is a different tone to this volume, partly because victory was so tainted by the huge casualty figures, the impoverishment of Europe, and the fear of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union; but also, it seems, because Churchill is writing from a place of exhaustion and pessimism. This was published in 1953, by which time Churchill’s health was deteriorating – he had already suffered a series of minor strokes. Perhaps this affected his writing style, but whatever the reason, there’s less of his usual bluster and ebullience. His exasperation with both Roosevelt’s and then Truman’s refusal to recognise that Stalin was on the way to being as dangerous as Hitler is palpable, and it feels as if he still has the intellectual heft but perhaps no longer the energy to fight for his position as doggedly as he would have at the beginning of the war. I was unable to decide how much of this impression of exhaustion and depression came from his contemporaneous notes taken during the period he’s discussing, and how much it had been affected by his failing health afterwards.

By the time of writing, he had also seen his fears realised. The Soviet Union had shown itself to be a huge threat to Western Europe and, indeed, the US, and Churchill, while he can’t resist an element of I-told-you-so, is too generous and too genuinely concerned for the welfare of all Europe, even our erstwhile enemies, to take pleasure in being proved right.

As he has done all the way through, Churchill mainly concentrates on those theatres in which British and Empire troops were heavily involved. This leads to occasional surprising omissions. For example, there is no description of the liberation of Paris, where the Americans played the major role. The campaign is explained in depth, but without the personal anecdotes that brought some of the earlier victories so vividly to life. Having long assumed that the liberation of France was inevitable, he is far more interested in the uncertainties around the Balkans and in the countries most likely to fall under Soviet control. Germany, by this stage, is defeated, he feels – Hitler just won’t admit it. But Greece, for example, could go either way – Western democracy or Soviet communism – and so he’s politically and militarily far more absorbed by that question. And Poland is never far from his thoughts. He is horrified that having been saved from Hitler’s frying-pan, they are now about to be tossed into Stalin’s fire. He never stops believing that the Italian campaign is necessary in itself as a method of deterring a Soviet takeover of the Balkans, and also as a means of drawing German firepower away from the Normandy landings, and he is deeply frustrated that neither Roosevelt nor Eisenhower share this view.

Again, in the Pacific theatre, we learn far more about Burma, where British and Empire troops carried the bulk of the load, than we do about the Americans’ naval defeat of the Japanese fleet. In that sense, the picture we get of this late stage of the war, where the Americans were playing a bigger role in general, is rather patchier than in the earlier years, when Britain was in the vanguard.

I conceived an admiration for him as a statesman, a man of affairs, and a war leader. I felt the utmost confidence in his upright, inspiring character and outlook, and a personal regard – affection I must say – for him beyond my power to express today. His love of his own country, his respect for its constitution, his power of gauging the tides and currents of its mobile public opinion, were always evident, but added to these were the beatings of that generous heart which was always stirred to anger and to action by spectacles of aggression and oppression by the strong against the weak. It is, indeed, a loss, a bitter loss to humanity that those heartbeats are stilled forever.

~ From Churchill’s address to the House of Commons on the death of Roosevelt

One other omission struck me. There is no mention of Bletchley Park and Enigma, reminding me that it was decades before these were declassified and made public. Churchill talks about the successes of the code-breakers frequently, and shows how their work was vital. For example, they had been able to provide locations of German radar and jamming stations, which were then destroyed. This meant that, despite the huge and lengthy build-up of troops and vessels, the Allies still managed to maintain an element of surprise over the precise time and location of the first wave of the Normandy landings. But naturally, Churchill doesn’t give details of how they achieved this. He does, however, enjoy telling tales of high and low tech trickery – my favourite being how the Allies dropped thousands of strips of tinfoil which German radar could not distinguish from aircraft, thus hindering their ability to target Allied planes from the ground.

Churchill’s abrupt exit from the war in July, ’45, means that he was not involved in the final peace agreements and decisions about borders. It’s clear he felt that the Soviets were given too much, and that the Allies should have fought harder to hold Poland in the orbit of the West, providing a bulwark against Soviet expansion. He feared too that Germany would be left with millions of displaced people, no industry to provide wealth, and no way to feed itself – on both humanitarian and strategic grounds, Churchill believed that Germany should be kept intact and helped to revive its economy. But it’s clear that he realised, too, that much of this was inevitable. Europe was exhausted, hungry and poor, and didn’t have the heart or the strength to fight new battles, either militarily or politically. And on a personal level, he clearly felt deeply hurt at his rejection by a British electorate desperate to leave the war behind and embrace a new future.

Although the tone is more subdued, this volume is, as always, excellent, giving a clear picture of the end of the war and the tentative beginnings of peace. It is not peace as Churchill wanted it, and for many of the peoples of Eastern Europe it was soon to turn dark indeed. But it is a peace that has substantially endured, in large part because of the political and defensive framework put in place by Roosevelt and Churchill – what became NATO and the UN. Both institutions crumbling now, of course, as bombs fall in Europe once again.

www.fictionfanblog.wordpress.com

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the last volume in Winston Churchill’s war memoirs. It begins with the D-Day Normandy landings. The two chapters on D-Day are almost desultory constituting of only 33 pages. He writes more on the intervention in Greece at Christmas, 1944 (almost 44 pages) where Britain wanted to prevent the ascendancy of the communist party.

Page 181 (my book)

Communism raised its head behind the thundering Russian battlefront. Russia was the delivery, and Communism the gospel she brought.

This volume is brilliant on the origins of the Cold War.

It all started in August 1944, when Stalin withheld his troops from “liberating” Warsaw. He let the Germans to the dirty work and they ruthlessly eliminated the Warsaw Polish resistance – so that Stalin’s troops would have no opposition. This was the first indicator of Stalin’s real intentions in Eastern Europe. Churchill (and Roosevelt’s) letters to Stalin to intervene and help the Polish resistance were ignored.

After the Yalta Agreements in February 1945, Churchill pleads passionately for the Soviet Union and Stalin to adhere to them, particularly for Poland, but to no avail. After all Stalin had millions of troops in Eastern Europe and verbal pressure from his two Allies was not going to deter him. Stalin, in violation of Yalta, was going to appoint his own stooges to the Polish Government (and to those in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria...) and was certainly never going to allow free and unfettered elections to take place. He never permitted British or U.S. representatives to roam freely in Eastern Europe.


Still the Yalta Agreements led to the formation of the United Nations and, importantly at the time, a promise from Stalin to attack Japan once the Germans had surrendered. Churchill, with his constant bickering with Stalin over the fait accompli in Poland seemed to overlook this Soviet pledge. The U.S. saw only years of bitter and bloody struggle with the proposed Japanese invasion – the first successful atomic bomb test only occurred in New Mexico in July, 1945. Prior to this the Allies needed Soviet military participation to overthrow Japan.

Having now read these six volumes (over 4,000 pages) one does gain insights into this man Churchill. Significantly the writing can be majestic, for example in this last volume his tribute on the death of Franklin Roosevelt and his victory speech at war’s end on May 13, 1945. The prose is filled with passion and there is no dryness to speak of. Someone mentioned that there are probably thousands of pictures of Churchill and in not one does he seemed bored with life. His writings reflect that.

Other observations:

Churchill brought a scientific and statistical approach to government. He wanted statistics constantly. He was able to use these for clarifications to pronounce and to judge.

He was a man of detail and would drill down to the source to determine the root of a problem. Also he was not beholden to protocol; obstacles and standard procedures could and would be removed.

Also in every volume Churchill writes page after page on the importance of Turkey in the war effort, and there were meetings with emissaries and government leaders – but nothing came of this.

He professed friendship and admiration for Franklin Roosevelt but I didn’t buy into this. Churchill needed U.S. might and production to win the war, more so after the fall of France. And he knew the U.S., having read its history and he had travelled there several times before the war. He felt the common ground between Britain and the U.S. – for language, democracy, personal freedom...


But Churchill and Roosevelt were two very different personalities and governed in divergent ways. Roosevelt was more politically astute – with Churchill it was more emotional and upfront. Roosevelt was more opaque and wouldn’t reveal all the cards in the deck. I could never see Roosevelt going into the details that Churchill would do almost on a daily basis; Roosevelt was much better at delegating. I would assume for example that Churchill wrote far more letters to Eisenhower then Roosevelt. The written word was far more important to Churchill. And Roosevelt was pragmatic, he knew at wars’ end that “the game” was to be between the U.S. and the Soviet Union – and Britain relegated to becoming a junior player. I don’t think Churchill wanted to acknowledge this new position.

However both were magnanimous and would not hold recriminations. And also both could be very flexible – if something didn’t work, try something else.

These six volumes constitute a magnum opus of the Second World War. They provide a very important and impassioned portrayal of those tumultuous years.

[GoldGato · Rating 4 out of 5]

Our strength, which had overcome so many storms, would no longer continue in the sunshine.

With that sentence, Churchill neatly summed up this last volume of his massive WWII collection...the coming victory of the Allies would mean the end of office for the Great Lion, the man who stayed true from beginning to end. The theme of this book is How The Great Democracies Triumphed, and so Were Able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life . Unlike the previous volumes, this one is more centered on politics as the post-war world began to come into play. The conniving Soviets, the bankrupt Brits, the still-don't-get-it French, and the we-pretty-much-trust-everyone Yanks all start divvying up the goods.

We cannot go running round into every German slum and argue with every German that it is his duty to surrender or we will shoot him.

It's been said that Churchill was the greatest civilian war leader of all time. His writing echoes that thought. When he is discussing the last gasps of Hitler's brood or, even better, taking the reader through the island-by-island battles of the Americans versus the Japanese in the Pacific theatre, it's almost impossible to stop reading. However, when Churchill goes off into the devious world of politics, it's a bit harder to pay attention.

Only just in time did the Allied armies blast the viper in his nest.

Decades later, hindsight has proven Winston Churchill correct in his view that the Americans had the chance to stop the Soviets before they raised the Iron Curtain. But unlike Churchill and his British subjects, the Yanks clearly were still newbies and still full of that heartland farmer trust which meant Roosevelt and Truman and Eisenhower were naive about the Soviets and the Chinese. The reader doesn't need to read between the lines here, as Churchill's frustration flows through. His bitterness is there, also. It's a bit hard to blame him, after all. His nation suffered, his nation became bankrupt, his nation lost its empire, and his nation was pushed aside by the Yanks and Soviets. When they discovered the progress the Nazis had made with missile science and what was in store for Great Britain had the war continued, one feels the fatigue. It all must have hurt him greatly.

In these great matters failing to gain one's way is no escape from the responsibility for an inferior solution.

As usual, the appendix section is outstanding. I could barely wait to get there, as here be the jewels in each of the six volumes. Churchill discusses women
("Women ought not to be treated the same as men"),

and Ireland
("we left the Dublin government to frolic with the Germans and the Japanese representatives to their hearts' content"),

the wrongs of the Versailles Treaty of WWI
("there would have been no Hitler"),

and the need for food for his own people
("we need another three or four thousand tons of fish, to help us through the hard years which are coming").

His letters and memos are magnificent.



While this wasn't my favourite volume of Churchill's WWII set, it resonated more than the others. Certainly, my respect for this man increased a hundredfold. Defy Hitler, hold back Stalin, partner with Roosevelt, withstand the destructive bombs, win the war...and get voted out of office. How the heck did he manage to survive all the stress?

Forward, unflinching, unswerving, indomitable, till the whole task is done and the whole world is safe and clean.

Book Season = Year Round (you shall not pass)

[Mervyn Whyte · Rating 5 out of 5]

And so, the end… and what a glorious end it is. Yes, the fate of Poland and the other Eastern European countries that vanished behind the Iron Curtain cast a shadow over the Allied victory (for the British to care so little for those poor, benighted countries...). So too did the half-hearted efforts to bring German and Japanese war criminals to justice. Churchill’s defeat in the 1945 General Election marked another blemish on the post-war landscape (for Churchill and the Conservatives, at least — for Britain, it was a stroke of luck: we gained the great reforming government of Clement Attlee). And Roosevelt's death just before final victory was a shame. But overall, the story ends well. The right side won — and the world was a far better place because of it. Churchill played a huge part in the Allied victory, of course, and he deserved the praise and thanks of the world. Even without these memoirs, his contribution will always be remembered. But he left us these thoughts as well—and what a fine legacy these books are. Authoritative, penetrating, and well-written, they offer both historians and the general reader a deep and wide-ranging overview of the events. Yes, there’s plenty that’s self-serving, and Churchill does have a tendency to be verbose. But—Poland aside—their detail and insight are rarely dull. It might seem like I took an age to finish this last volume. But I read a couple of other books alongside it. A quick shoutout to Folio, who have done a typically fine job with the printing and presentation — the paper quality, typesetting, and binding make it a pleasure to read and treasure. I think in due course I shall start the multi-volume biography of Churchill, which was initiated by his son Randolph and completed by Sir Martin Gilbert. But first, back to Rumpole and She Who Must Be Obeyed — even Churchill probably would’ve had to answer to her now and then.

[Kathy · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is the last of Churchill's volumes on WWII. This one had a different tone than the other ones. Perhaps because the issues in this volume had not been resolved at the time of writing, or perhaps because Churchill himself was disappointed at how things ultimately turned out (apart from winning the war that is). The theme of this volume is telling:

How the great democracies triumphed, and so were able to resume the follies which had so nearly cost them their life.

Not bitter about being kicked out of office as soon as the war was over, is he?
Because this book opened with D-Day, Hitler was soon reduced to a paper villain, unimportant because his fall was inevitable. The real evil of the time was Stalin. Even if you add all the fatalities of WWII at Hitler's feet, Stalin still killed more people. He was shrewd, cunning and a virtuoso at public appearances. He could lie to your face and smile. He openly called for the underground of Warsaw to rebel against the Germans, then left his armies 10 miles away until they had all been slaughtered to enter the city. Though it trivializes the war a bit, the image that keeps coming to mind is Hitler's Count Dooku to Stalin's Darth Sidious.
The present ineffectual design of the United Nations is the result of maneuvering to get Russia to join it. Field Marshall Smuts, who was tasked with finding a compromise that Russia would accept in forming the UN, optimistically wrote to Churchill,

The principle of unanimity will at the worse only have the effect of a veto, or stopping action where it may be wise, or even necessary. Its effect will be negative; it will retard action. But it will also render it impossible for Russia to embark on courses not approved of by the USA and the United Kingdom.

Russia soon proved that it would do as it liked and operated through its proxy states, even as early as before the Germans capitulated. Marshall Tito nearly got into open combat with Allied soldiers over the Italian port of Trieste, even though they were supposedly on the same side. When Churchill asked Stalin to reign in his underling, Stalin denied he had any influence over Tito at all.
It didn't help that France was actively empire-building and resisting all calls to free Syria and other held possessions and Greece was close to anarchy, with only British troops able to keep the peace. I think Churchill felt the war had only been paused and forsaw a rapid decline into anarchy with Russia a vulture, eager to devour the spoils.
Though the death of Roosevelt and Churchill's loss of political power enabled Stalin to set up puppet states all through eastern Europe, the Iron Curtain (Churchill coined the phrase) did not result in another world war. I think Churchill would have been surprised that the ideological conflict between democracy and communism never erupted into more than regional conflicts.
Through all of his distrust of Stalin, he was still as swayed by the dictator's personal magnetism as any. At the meeting where Truman told Stalin of the atomic bomb, Churchill reports, "I was certain that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the united States and Britain had been engaged for so long." We know now that Stalin knew all about it. He had a spy at Los Alamos for years.
It is intriguing to think what would have happened if during the post-war negotiations, the Conservative party had stayed in office. The animosity between the US and USSR that developed would have been shared more equally by Great Britain it is almost certain.

[Allison · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love Winston and he fully deserved his Noble prize for writing. However, I don't know how a person can write a 6 volume tactical account of WWII and not once mention a concentration camp or what Hitler was doing to the Jews. How's that even possible?!

[Doreen Petersen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great read with lots of details about the ending of WWII. I would recommend this one.

[Stephanie Weisgerber · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mood: Unflinching, Resolute, Tedious
Theme: "How the Great Democracies triumphed, and so were able to resume the follies which had so nearly cost them their life."
Pace: Slow, thorough
Writing Quality: Eloquent, poetic, exhaustingly detailed and descriptive
Length: 676 pages

When I first found out that Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, had written a 6 volume personal historical account of WW2, I was shocked that I had never heard this in school. We focus so much on Hitler during studies of WW2 that we forget to examine the Allies (United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) who ignored their differences and came together to fight tyranny.
The monumental task that lay before them all is really brought to life in Churchill's account. The courage and creative warfare strategies that were at play in all theaters of the war were exceptional.
Desperate times called for desperate measures and Churchill was a bulldog when it came to protecting freedom. We owe much to him and his insight and wisdom navigating this minefield of evil.
These 6 volumes were incredibly thorough and detailed. He gives a brief preface of what will be covered prior to each and every chapter. He also gives hundreds of telegrams, personal letters, and other correspondence peppered throughout his narratives, which gives credibility and insight into all angles of what was happening during this time period. He frequently reminds the reader that they were making historic decisions at the time with limited knowledge. History often judges things with hindsight being 20/20 as they say, and in all fairness we need reminded that they did the best with what they knew at the time.
I especially enjoyed reading the friendly letters between Churchill and FDR and the terse and complicated correspondence between them both and Stalin.
I was very curious to hear how these leaders felt when they found out about the atrocities of the concentration camps, and shockingly this is never mentioned. It's as if the world really had no idea of how the Jewish people and others they deemed inferior, were being treated in the camps. This is stunningly omitted from the books, which leaves the reader left to wonder why. The atomic bomb is focused on in great suspense during this last volume. The Japanese menace was also explored in much more detail than we are ever told about anywhere else. Then the Yalta agreement and Polish problem are largely explained in this volume. They had much to argue over when it came to how to deal with Germany after the war and the creation of the United Nations as a buffer to evil emperors.
I thoroughly enjoyed these 6 volumes and highly recommend them to any student of history.

[Rob Melich · Rating 5 out of 5]

The last of Churchill’s amazing reflection on WW2.
The entire six volumes are detailed, complex, and brilliantly written. This volume unlike the others drifts into policy challenges as the war ends.
What’s obvious in the reading of these volumes and the Schlesinger Roosevelt series is how lucky the world was to have these two men in extended leadership positions.
Churchill worked his ass off and then turned over his role peacefully!!!
Stalin was masterful and evil. I wouldn’t play poker with Uncle Joe.
(Note: hard to imagine the former president and felon knowing what to do with the multi variant complexities of WW2. Glad we’ll never know. )

Question for other readers. I found no reference or mention of the concentration camps or the killing of Jews Slavs and Roma. Did you? In the Appendices?

[John Boyne · Rating 5 out of 5]

The final volume of Churchill's masterpiece on World War II concludes with the surrender of Germany and the rising menace of Soviet Russia. Churchill continues to enthralling narrative with his personal accounts and messages that shaped the postwar world and inaugurated the Cold War. History is full of what ifs and the question of how the world would have looked if Churchill won his reelection in 1945 is one in need of ponder. Yet, providence was against this and Churchill had to take what is considered a premature bow from the world stage during the waning days of the war. This volume focuses primarily on the new European order after the end of Nazi Germany. Full of negotiations and intrigue with Churchill right in the middle of it all. This whole series is a requirement for WWII and British history fans. I greatly enjoyed reading the entire series!

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Battle of Italy, the Mediterranean conflicts, Normandy, and the division of Europe between the Soviet Union and the other Allies.

Why I started this book: While only the second book of the series was on the Navy's Recommended Reading list, I couldn't just read that one. I was eager to finish this series.

Why I finished it: My American prejudices prevented me from fully enjoying the last installment. I was frustrated by Churchill's insistence that it was American lack of foresight that let the U.S.S.R. gobble up Eastern Europe, especially Austria, and Yugoslavia; it was our selfishness that kept the atomic bomb research from the British; and mostly that it was his personal relationship with Stalin that could have worked out these issues if the Americans had only followed his lead. Followed by the idea that they should have flown a showcase bomber across Russia to demonstrate just how easy it was to bring a nuclear weapon to their former friend... cause that would have definitely calmed the Cold War tensions. Stalin is the definition of "does not play well with others" and I don't think that Churchill could have negotiated more favorable terms. Granted it's easier to be critical of Churchill's opinions because I know that the Iron Curtain fell without bloodshed just 40 years after it went up.

Read along: The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany for the German perstpective and An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 for the American perspective close to 60 years after.

Side note: Churchill's history of the Second World War was originally published in six volumes:
1. The Gathering Storm
2. Their Finest Hour
3. The Grand Alliance
4. The Hinge of Fate
5. Closing the Ring
6. Triumph and Tragedy
Churchill then condensed these into four volumes, which have since been released as one, rather hefty, publication. The audio version of the unabridged recordings of Churchill's condensed volume, divided into four parts, as follows:
1. The Second World War: Milestones to Disaster
2. Alone: The Second World War (Condensed) Series, Book 2
3. The Grand Alliance
4. Triumph and Tragedy

[Ed · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the final volume in Churchill’s diaries of the Second World War. As per my earlier review of the previous volume, it provides an impressive account of both the events at the end of the war together with his personal thoughts and actions related to these. Whilst the history of that time is no doubt well documented elsewhere, this volume highlights how, with victory in sight, Churchill remained concerned about the future state of the world order. The friendship he had fostered with Stalin during their meetings through the conflict sours as it becomes apparent that his their politics do not align over the fate of the liberated countries east of Germany, and particularly Poland. Churchill foresees the splitting of Europe by an ‘Iron Curtain’.

What makes his writing so interesting are the many little things that he involves himself in off the world stage such as ensuring a sufficient supply of beer was provided to the armed forces and planning the civilian building programme using prefabricated houses after the war. Despite his conservative background he gives the impression that he was aware of the needs of the common man and recognised these needed to be addressed post conflict. That he was unable to follow things through was no doubt a great disappointment to him albeit he seemed to be quite sanguine about the outcome of the 1945 election.

Overall an interesting read providing an insight into political leadership during conflict. Arguably some of those in power now might learn something from his diaries about how better they might conduct themselves on the world stage.

[David Rubin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This volume concludes Winston Churchill's six-volume history of World War II. As previously noted, this is a highly personalized history, closely revolving around the Prime Minister's own participation in the military and political activities during the war. The book is constructed of two interwoven approaches: a narrative, chronological history of the war and a set of source material composed of telegrams, letters, and notes sent and received during the course of the action. Much of the latter involved Churchill's communications with President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin. Churchill successfully recorded his perspective of the military and political struggles for future generations.

The importance of this final volume for American readers is that we gain a perspective on the British activity during the war, with particular emphasis on the military campaigns in Italy and Greece; Great Britain's efforts against the Communist partisans in Greece; and, Churchill's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to create an independent, post-war Poland. As to the latter, Churchill's efforts take on a rather quixotic quality; England was clearly not powerful enough in 1945 to put any military pressure against Stalin's Russian juggernaut in Poland and the United States did not have the political will to oppose the Soviets. Yet, Churchill continually fought for Polish independence, ultimately to no avail. He was turned out of office by the British voters and this effectively ended his ability to tilt his lance at the Polish windmill.

The book ends very abruptly with the close of the Potsdam conference which determined the fate of Eastern Europe and and the allies role in post-war Germany. We would like to have learned more about England's post-war recovery and the fate of the German state from the British perspective.

[Ishmael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Can somebody get this guy some f*cking landing craft please?

[Damir Antunovic · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was on my list for years and years, but I was always intimidated by the volume. I finally decided to give it a go when I found the audio version. It's read by Christian Rodska, who manages to sound close to what he sounded like. Haven't heard anything else from him so not sure if that's his normal speaking voice or if he was trying to channel him. In any case, a fine performance.

Not sure what to say that hasn't already been said, and by better reviewers than me...

Required reading if you are even remotely interested in the WWII, but also quite interesting from the standpoint of effective team building and leadership. Many good lessons to be had there.

Looking back, it's pretty obvious that almost any other person in that role at the time would have been less effective than Churchill was, due to his pre-war reputation of correctly seeing Hitler and his intentions, which provided him a lot of goodwill in the first few years when they were catching up with regard to war effort. He used that capital in the best way possible though, proving to be up to the impossibly large task given to him.
On the other hand, one must always be aware who the author is, and that some of the stuff, while it may not be a lie, is probably stretched to make the UK and Churchill himself look better in hindsight.

(I was expecting the Enigma and the code-breaking angle to come up, but it never did, I assume it was still classified at the time of writing.)

His writing is crisp and clear, with great flow. Not surprising from a Nobel laureate and the writer of some of the best political speeches of the last 200-300 years.

All in all, a great work from a great man. Highly recommended.
A quote from another book series that I love comes to mind:
"I don't confuse greatness with perfection. To be great anyhow is…the higher achievement."

[Jeff Elliott · Rating 3 out of 5]

The final of Churchill's volumes comes to an abrupt end with his surprising election loss immediately at the end of the war. I have been several years reading through these and, as always, Winston never is at a loss for words or opinions. Still convinced that every opinion he had was the best, we should give him credit for acceding to the demands of others as often as he did. He is quick to point out the error of thinking diverging from his own. I believe I will return to these often when seeking the proper words to confront enemies, encourage friends or communicate hard truth--Churchill was the master of all.

[Andrew Canfield · Rating 5 out of 5]

Triumph and Tragedy is the final installment in Winston Churchill’s remembrances of the second World War. The title of this book is derived from Churchill’s view that the war’s outcome, as much of a triumph as it was, ended up being squandered by the onset of the Cold War.

Triumph and Tragedy opens with the Allied landings on the beaches of Normandy before going on to detail the final year of World War Two. Churchill describes the re-invasion of France before veering off into discussion of Hitler’s own plans for forcing an early end to the war: the V1 “doodle bug” or “buzz bomb” missile. It comes across like a prehistoric version of a drone or cruise missile, and is used to rain wanton destruction on England. The terror caused by the V1s is followed up by further aerial pilotless attacks on British cities with V2s.

Yet the tide-changing potential of these pale in comparison with the Manhattan Project’s ultimate outcome. The U.S.-led research project is touched on in the most rudimentary way during this British-perspective based book. The decision of how to break news of the atomic bomb’s creation to Stalin creates almost comedic awkwardness between FDR, Churchill, and the Russian leader.

The push from the western coast of France toward the Meuse River and finally past the Rhine are assisted by Operation Dragoon (the Allied invasion of Southern France) end up taking on a feeling of inevitability when it comes to Germany’s collapse. Battles in late 1944 against the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Army, including near Marche, underscored just how desperate the Wehrmacht attempts to stave off the push into Germany was. The relentless push forward by men like Generals Omar Bradley, George Patton, and Bernard Montgomery-all under the aegis of Dwight Eisenhower-end up breaking Germany’s Panzer, infantry, and Luftwaffe resistance.

Churchill is effusive in his praise of just how efficiently the American and British militaries worked together toward victory.

The tragedy aspect of the book oftentimes takes precedence over the triumph portion. Even before V-E day officially occurs, Churchill makes clear his concern about the rate at which eastern European territory is being gobbled up by the Soviet Union. At times it seems as if there is a race toward Berlin from the west and south (on the part of the Anglo-American alliance) and from the east (on the part of Russia).

Of particular concern to the Prime Minister is the country whose invasion allegedly sparked their entry into the war in the first place: Poland.

There is much talk about the drawing of its borders (whether or not the Curzon line should serve as the eastern Polish border as well as which cities in the west should fall under Poland sovereignty) and British concerns that Russia was attempting to install a puppet Polish government. Stalin backs the Lublin Committee as the rightful leaders of liberated Poland, while Churchill and the Americans’ loyalties lie (until the Poles can decide for themselves at the ballot box) with the exiled Polish Government in London.

Stalin seems to justify his obsession with obtaining a pro-Soviet government in Poland by pointing to its proximity to his country and its history as being a launching point for invasions into Russia. At one point he tells the Anglo-American allies they should give each other a free hand in how they set up the post-war governments in liberated countries near their borders.

Russian efforts to seemingly block election monitors in Poland-monitors Stalin explains away as unnecessary and whose very presence he claims would be an insult-are a bridge too far for Churchill. He describes the descent of an Iron Curtain over Europe even before the war has drawn to a close, lamenting that the vision of the world’s future entertained by Russia was drastically different than the one envisioned by FDR (then Truman) and himself.

According to Churchill, “It must be remembered that Britain and the United States are united at this time upon the same ideologies, namely, freedom, and the principles set out in the American Constitution and humbly reproduced with modern variation in the Atlantic Charter. The Soviet government have a different philosophy namely, Communism, and use to the full the methods of police government, which they are applying in every State which has fallen victim to their liberating arms.” These words sum up the Prime Minister’s view of the future threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Churchill notes the irony (the book was written several years after the war’s conclusion) that at one point during the war he felt the U.S. governmental establishment was not taking the Soviet threat seriously enough, a view which obviously evolved in the years after 1945.

The final major negotiating between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin takes place at Yalta. Diplomats like Vyacheslov Molotov, Averell Harriman and Anthony Eden join Churchill at the conference, an event where Russia telegraphs their intention to join in the War in the Pacific “two or three months after Germany’s surrender.” The reader gets the sense this news was at first welcomed by the Americans before being a possible cause for concern when nefarious Soviet intentions became more readily apparent.

During the Yalta meeting Stalin appears to take offense when he hears the “Uncle Joe” moniker used aloud by Roosevelt, only to be calmed down upon hearing the in America “Uncle Sam” was an accepted nickname. But these moments of levity obscure the deep and growing distrust between the Soviet Union and the West during the war’s final year, a dire situation brought to the forefront over Stalin’s paranoia that the Anglo-American Allies were negotiating an early, separate end to the war with the Nazis so as to push further into Germany (thereby claiming more land which could have been Russia’s) before the war’s end.

The tense relationship between the British/U.S. governments and Marshal Josep Tito in Yugoslavia were a foreshadowing of the type of bedfellows with either Western or Communist sympathies the upcoming Cold War would produce.

The death of FDR on April 12, 1945 produces a stirring tribute from Churchill. He regretted that he was unable to travel to the U.S. for the funeral, but delivers a eulogy from Britain that makes clear how close the two men became during the war. Churchill stated, “I conceived an admiration for him as a statesman, a man of affairs, and a war leader, I felt the utmost confidence in his upright, inspiring character and outlook, and a personal regard-affection, I must say-for him beyond my power to express today. Not one man in ten millions, stricken and crippled as he was, would have attempted to plunge into a life of physical and mental exertion and of hard, ceaseless political controversy.” These words give a taste of the high level of esteem in which he held the U.S. president.

The ascension of Harry Truman onto the job, though unexpected, ends up being met with mostly positively reviews by Churchill. Although he expresses surprise at how little was done to prepare Truman for the possibility of his assuming the presidency, admiration is expressed for his resolve and for how quickly he gets up to speed on the complex world situation.

It is regrettable to Churchill that FDR does not live to see the war’s victorious conclusion. The Rhine River is crossed and the Ruhr region is circled by the Allies. The First, Ninth, and Third Armies (U.S.) move in on Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Bayreuth; the crossing of the Elbe River in April 1945 places Berlin barely sixty miles away. It is around this same time that Prague is liberated by the Third Army. The Russians capture Vienna that same spring, and their actions to form a Provisional Austrian Government-over British objections to take it slower-alert Churchill that they are trying to “organise” Austria prior to the arrival of the other Allied armies from the west.

The final days of the Nazi government are briskly recounted. The fate met by its top leadership as the Soviet troops close in on Berlin close the chapter on a dark time in world history.

The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such earth-changing events, are touched on only sparingly by Churchill. Given the U.S.-centric nature of the campaign through the Japanese-held Pacific islands, it is understandable that Churchill devotes the vast majority of these six volumes to the European theater. He does, however, take some time to delve into the setup of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Considering his background in naval affairs, it is no surprise Churchill takes at least some opportunities to analyze sea-based fighting against Japan. But when the fighting against Japan is discussed, it deals mostly with areas like Singapore and mainland China. He expresses no second thoughts on the part of the U.S. or himself when it comes to dropping the nuclear weapons.

After the war draws to a close, Churchill loses his prime minister post following a failed effort to hold together the British coalition government of right and left for a little while longer. This offer was flatly rejected by Labour leader Clement Attlee.

Churchill expresses his concern that isolationist elements in the U.S. would once again push for a withdrawal from European affairs, a situation he viewed as highly undesirable given the U.S.S.R.’s expansionist aims. He has a strong desire to see the United Nations succeed as an instrument to keep tyrants in check going forward.

This book is a strong final entry.

It delves much more into the issues of postwar frontiers than the volumes before it, laying out for readers just how the U.S., Great Britain, and Russia jockeyed for position in a post-World War Two world. Churchill’s distaste for the tactics and philosophy of Stalin’s Russia are clear; despite his efforts to try to find common ground, the aggressive actions employed in the cities liberated by the Soviet Union only further degrade faith in their intentions.

Triumph and Tragedy does not finish these memoirs on the sort of high note readers might have expected or hoped for. The Prime Minister’s disappointment in how the postwar world began to shape up is apparent, and he does not hide this to bask in the glory of victory in Europe and the Pacific.

This book is a truthful recounting of the personal point of view of a man in a position of high power during a consequential time. For this it deserves recognition as a valuable piece of writing for anyone seeking an understanding of the Second World War from a British point of view.

-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado

[Alex Elemans · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ik trof een oude uitgave in een minibib. Kwestie wordt nog met een q geschreven. Maar wat frist Churchill het slot van WOII en het tijdbeeld op. De wereldmacht die GB met zijn dominions toen nog was en de positie die dat gaf. Frankrijk klust nog bij in Syrië.
De tijdlijn van het boek gaat langs een uitputtende reeks van vaak onthullende telegrammen. Communicatie tijdens een wereldcrisis! En de wereldleiders reizen deels per boot. Hoe dan? Geweldig voor die tijd het gebruik van foto's.
Churchill heeft scherpe geo-politieke inzichten en blijft invloed aanwenden (tot het drammerige toe) om een duurzame wereldvrede en wereldorganisatie en democratisch Europa te bereiken. Maar legt het telkens af tegen de strategie van de VS, wiens belang op dat moment veel meer in de Pacific ligt. En hoewel de alliantie (met Stalin) tegen Hitler dan goed werkt (vooral op basis van pragmatisme en relaties), voorvoelt hij al het latere ijzeren gordijn en ontglipt een democratisch Polen, waarvoor de Britten de oorlog zijn ingegaan. Al vrij snel ziet hij Stalins dubbele agenda uitgevoerd worden in het oostblok en door Tito op de balkan. Verbluffende gelijkenissen met hoe de Russen het spel 80 jaar later nog spelen. Interessant te lezen over de bijna vanzelfsprekende inzet van de atoombom, die net klaar is, wat dan weer buiten de Russen om gerommeld wordt. Verder de impact van het overlijden van Roosevelt aan het einde van de oorlog. En opmerkelijk dat Churchill als leider van een stabiel oorlogskabinet direct na de oorlog de verkiezingen verliest.

[David Campton · Rating 4 out of 5]

This completes my reading this entire 6 volume series, year by year in line with the 80th anniversary of each year in question (having originally bought the series a mere 50 years after the onset of the War). This volume runs from the eve of D-Day until Churchill's eviction from No.10 shortly before the end of the war in the Pacific, but is sub-divided onto two books, with the first essentially covering 1944, so I stopped for the time being at that point and resumed Book 2 at the beginning of January 2025. The entire series is the epitome of Churchill's claim that history would be kind to him because he intended to write it. But in this volume it is increasingly self-justifying, as the diplomatic and strategic tensions between Churchill's reactionary British Imperialism and the naivety of US foreign policy are coming to the fore with victory looming. In book 1 there is a sense of "I told you so" re his narration of the reluctance of the US to get involved in the Balkans, giving "Uncle Joe" free reign, and especially the concluding Greek crisis, which I was not fully aware of ahead of this. Some of the approaches advocated by Churchill here clearly primed the pump for British military responses to "insurrection" in the post-colonial world, leading to the well documented (but frequently overlooked) atrocities in Malaya, Kenya and ultimately my own NI. The emphasis on this period meant that others, including the ill-concieved Market Garden/Goodwood debacle, which brought little credit to the British military were skirted over. The Ardennes offensive received better coverage, although it was largely aimed at and repulsed by the Americans, and he is, at least magnanimous in his reference to this. This was then amplified in Book 2 with the unresolved tensions around the Polish borders at Tehran and Potsdam, exacerbated by Roosevelt's sudden death and the lack of relationship between his succesor Truman and the author. But it ends precipitously after Churchill's defeat in the General Election, giving the lie to this being a comprehensive account of the Second World War. This is essentially a self-justifying exercise on the part of the author, leaving me better informed about certain things, and impressed by some of Churchill's prescience, but all in all leaving me with a sense of his pettiness in the face of defeat.

[Dale · Rating 5 out of 5]

This volume clearly reflects the chief thinking from military strategy to political strategy. What would the Allies wish to make of Europe after Germany's defeat? They chiefly wanted countries near and abutting the Soviet Union to have the freedom to establish the type of government the people of these countries wanted. Unfortunately, that really only happened in Greece. Other countries in eastern Europe became puppets of the Soviet Union. Thus Churchill described the "Iron Curtain" for the first time, leading to the very long Cold War struggles.

Churchill clearly lamented this, especially for Poland, whose invasion was the reason Great Britain entered the war in 1939. And then the "insult" to "injury" occurred. Between VE Day and VJ day, the Socialist Party defeated the Conservative Party and Churchill tendered his resignation to the King. He left with a military victory but with no means to significantly shape its political results.

[Sshelline · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having read the entire six-volumes series over the last few months, it was chilling to read about the missed opportunities, appeasement and general unwillingness to confront the looming Soviet threat that would take nearly four decades to undo.

With a recalcitrant Iran and a distracted Europe, this series is a powerful warning that our generation faces similar choices to those that confronted Churchill and the West in the years before WW2. I have little faith that today's leaders in Europe and the U.S. have the same courage and conviction as Churchill, which makes the inevitability of avoidable bloodshed all the more disturbing.

[Seth Peters · Rating 5 out of 5]

4 stars because Churchill clearly just wanted to end the series. He flies through the Potsdam conference and has just a single paragraph about losing the election, for which he is rightfully very salty about, but it made this epic series end on a very soft note which I think could have been more formidable

[Emily · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the final volume in Churchill's memoirs on the second world war. He focuses more on the political implications of the end of the war than on the military side, but it is important to see this aspect of the war as well. I wish he had fleshed out his relationship with Truman a bit more. Truman seems to only have a bit part and Churchill doesn't really state his observations about him or his character one way or the other. Maybe he didn't want to prejudice any future American relations. Anyway, the most important part of this book is the epilogue. Many of Churchill's observations are just as relevant today as when they were penned over 70 years ago. This section should be required reading to all British school children of a certain age, at least if taking a History GCSE. Here are my musings on this volume:

The war was won partially because of air superiority. Then the atomic bomb changed the balance of power. Churchill gives a good description of how the bomb can render obsolete more traditional forms of defence. But the description of the implications of the bomb and how the west sought to protect against the worst excesses of it is informative. I do feel that America shafted the British in the development of the bomb, taking their expertise and denying them access afterwards, but Churchill is ever diplomatic.

As mentioned in another review, it is puzzling that he doesn't mention the Holocaust. I wonder if it is because he doesn't want a repeat of the Treaty of Versailles, making Germany pay, because that just leads to war in the future. He talks about preventing retribution. Also, his main worries seem to be about those countries that fell to Soviet influence, especially Poland. I think he regretted that most of all. It's as if he sees the loss of Poland as a personal failure.

In building up the Soviet sphere of influence, Stalin was trying to protect against the threat of invasion. Not only did Germany invade recently, Russia suffered during the first world war and from an invasion by Napoleon. It's easy from a distance to forget about these historical realities. But this has relevance today as Putin, nominally or not, tries to protect his borders by controlling those countries within his sphere of influence. He came undone with Ukraine but he didn't head Churchill's other observation, that countries held under totalitarian rule can not be held forever. They will eventually seek to become free. I quote directly, "Stalin tried not only to shield the Soviet Republics behind an iron curtain, military, political, and cultural. He also attempted to construct an outpost line of satellite states, deep in Central Europe, harshly controlled from Moscow, subservient to the economic needs of the Soviet Union and forbidden all contact or communion with the free world, or even with each other. No one can believe that this will last forever...Nations will continue to rebel against the Soviet Colonial Empire, not because it is Communist, but because it is alien and oppressive." I believe that still holds true today as it did 70+ years ago.

In a way, world war two was only partially won. The yoke of Nazi tyranny was overthrown in western Europe but not in the East, except for Greece. But without Russian support, would Germany have been defeated? Did the Allies accept that they were dealing with the devil, so to speak? I think Churchill knew that he was stuck. The Americans on the other hand seem a bit naïve, especially after the war when they were more concerned with being seen to be impartial between Russia and Britain. Churchill did have a negative view of Russia, not without good reason. He had been a Cassandra before the war to the horrors of Soviet Russia. There are those even today that gloss over Soviet atrocities to praise the communist system.

As well, Britain may have won the war from a moral standpoint but they lost the war from an economic one. Again, I feel that America let down her allies by putting European reconstruction ahead of any consideration for what Britain too had suffered. But again, Churchill is very pragmatic.

When Churchill talks about a European Union, he compares it to the British Commonwealth, not a federal style government such as the USA. When talking of bringing the German troops into foreign uniform, he said that it wouldn't work. Speaking of the Commonwealth, anyone who considers Churchill to be racist should consider the importance he placed on the Commonwealth. When it came to India and Pakistan, I think he was regretful of the way things turn out, especially regarding the religious strife. He may not have always gotten things right and he even admits that himself. He was a man of his time, but he felt that freedom would raise all men up, not just Europeans.

He also talked about the weaknesses of the United Nations, although that doesn't mean that he didn't think it should happen.

Finishing off, I am glad that I listened to his histories. Churchill is an engaging writer and a deep thinker. He has given me a different perspective on Europe and the world really. He was a man of his time and not always right, but he was willing to be persuaded and willing to admit to being wrong. He was an honourable man and I admire him for the stand he took against tyranny.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting insight. Amazing how he, just like before the war started, could so well predict what was to come. How might the world have been different if he had been listened to.

[Alex Nagler · Rating 5 out of 5]

And finished!

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE FINAL VOLUME (OF SIX) OF CHURCHILL’S FASCINATING HISTORY OF THE WAR

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (1874-1965) was a British statesman who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1940 to 1945, and then again from 1951 to 1955. He won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953 for his historical works. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to the 683-page paperback edition.]

He wrote in the Preface to this 1953 book, “This volume concludes my personal narrative of the Second World War. Between the Anglo-American landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944, and the surrender of all our enemies fourteen months later, tremendous events struck the civilized world. Nazi Germany was crushed, partitioned, and occupied; Soviet Russia established herself in the heart of Western Europe; Japan was defeated; the first atomic bombs were cast… I have told the story as I knew it and experienced it as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Great Britain… I have called this Volume ‘Triumph and Tragedy because the overwhelming victory of the Grand Alliance has failed so far to bring general peace to our anxious world.”

After finishing a visit to General Montgomery’s headquarters, “my aeroplane… awaited me. I was about to go on board when, to my surprise, Eisenhower arrived. He had flown from London to his advanced headquarters, and, hearing of my movements, intercepted me. He had not yet taken over the actual command of the army in the field from Montgomery; but he supervised everything with a vigilant eye, and no one knew better than he how to stand close to a tremendous event without impairing the authority he had delegated to others.” (Ch. 2, pg. 27)

He records, “The long-awaited assault on England by unmanned missiles now began: the target was Greater London… The Flying Bomb, as we came to call it, was named ‘V1’ by Hitler, since he hoped---with some reason---that it was only the first of a series of terror weapons which German research would provide. To Londoners, the new weapon was soon known as the ‘doodlebug’ or ‘buzz bomb’ from the strident sound of its engine… This new form of attack imposed upon the people of London a burden perhaps even heavier than the aid-raids of 1940 and 1941. Suspense and strain were more prolonged. Dawn brought no relief, and cloud no comfort. The man going home in the evening never knew what he would find: his wife, alone all day or with the children, could not be certain of his safe return. The blind impersonal nature of the missile made the individual on the ground feel helpless. There was little that he could do, no human enemy that he could see shot down.” (Ch. 3, pg. 34)

He adds, however, “We now know that Hitler had thought that the new weapon would be ‘decisive’ in fashioning his own distorted version of peace… But neither London nor the Government flinched, and I had been able to assure General Eisenhower… that we would bear the ordeal to the end, asking for no change in his strategy in France.” (Ch. 3, pg. 39) He continues, “we must not forget that Belgium suffered with equal bitterness when the Germans attempted to use the same vindictive weapons against its liberated cities. We did not allow the German attack to go unparried. Our bombing of German production centers, and other targets, happily reduced the scale of effort against Belgium as much as against ourselves… The people of Belgium bore this senseless bombardment in a spirit equal to our own.” (Ch. 3, pg. 47)

He sent a communication to his Chiefs of Staff on September 8, 1944, which included the statement, “‘No one can tell what the future may bring forth…. Will the Germans withdraw from Italy? In which case they will greatly strengthen their internal position…. The fortifying and consolidating effect of a stand on the frontier of the native soil should not be underrated. It is at least as likely that Hitler will be fighting on January 1 as that he will collapse before then. If he does collapse before then, the reasons will be political rather than purely military.’ My view was unhappily to be justified.” (Ch. 13, pg. 170)

Of discussions of a post-war United Nations, he comments, “The discussions had revealed many differences between the three Great Allies… The Kremlin had no intention of joining an international body on which they would be outvoted by a host of small Powers… I felt sure we could only reach good decisions with Russian while he had the comradeship of a common foe for a bond. Hitler and Hitlerism were doomed; but after Hitler what?” (Ch. 14, pg. 182)

Of Stalin, he observed, “There is no doubt that in our narrow circle we talked with an ease, freedom, and cordiality never before attained between our two countries. Stalin made several expressions of personal regard which I feel sure were sincere. But I became even more convinced that he was by no means alone.” (Ch. 15, pg. 206)

Of the Battle of the Ardennes, he said to the House of Commons on January 18, 1945, “I have seen it suggested that the terrific battle which has been proceeding since December 16 on the American front is an Anglo-American battle. In fact however the United States troops have done almost all of the fighting, and have suffered almost all of the losses… I never hesitate… to stand up for our own soldiers when their achievements have been cold-shouldered or neglected or overshadowed, as they sometimes are, but we must not forget that it is to America that the telegrams of personal losses and anxiety have been going during the past month…” (Ch. 27, pg. 243)

He recalls, “There was another occasion during our stay at Yalta when things had not gone so smoothly. Mr. Roosevelt, who was host at a luncheon, said that he and I always referred to Stalin in our secret telegrams as ‘Uncle Joe.’ I had suggested that he should tell him this privately, but instead the President made it into a jocular statement to the company. This led to a difficult moment. Stalin took offense. ‘When can I leave this table?’ he asked in anger. Mr. [James] Byrnes saved the situation with an apt remark. ‘After all,’ he said, ‘you do not mind talking about Uncle Sam, so why should Uncle Joe be so bad?’ At this the Marshal subsided, and Molotov later assured me that he understood the joke.” (Bk. 2, Ch. 4, pg. 337)

When dining with a Middle Eastern host, he recollects, “A number of social problems arose. I had been told that neither smoking nor alcoholic beverages were allowed in the Royal Presence. As I was host at luncheon I raised the matter at once, and said to the interpreter that if it was the religion of His Majesty to deprive himself of smoking and alcohol I must point out that my rule of life prescribed as an absolutely sacred rite smoking cigars and also the drinking of alcohol before, after, and if need be during all means and in the intervals between them. The King graciously accepted the position.” (Ch. 4, pg. 341)

He points out, “It is easy, after the Germans are beaten, to condemn those who did their best to hearten the Russian military effort and to keep in harmonious contact with our great Ally, who had suffered so frightfully. What would have happened if we had quarreled with Russia while the Germans still had two or three hundred divisions on the fighting front? Our hopeful assumptions were soon to be falsified. Still, they were the only ones possible at the time.” (Ch. 4, pg. 345)

He observes, “The destruction of German military power had brought with it a fundamental change in the relations between Communist Russia and the Western democracies. They had lost their common enemy, which was almost their sole bond of union. Henceforward Russian imperialism and the Communist creed saw and set no bounds to their progress and ultimate dominion, and more than two years were to pass before they were confronted again with an equal will-power…” (Ch. 8, pg. 391)

He laments, “it may be said that Roosevelt died at the supreme climax of the war, and at the moment when his authority was most needed to guide the policy of the United States. When I received these tidings early in the morning of Friday, the 13th, I felt as if I had been struck a physical blow. My relations with this shining personality had played so large a part in the long, terrible years we have worked together. Now they had come to an end, and I was overpowered by a sense of deep and irreparable loss. I went down to the House of Commons… and in a few sentences proposed that we should pay our respects to the memory of our great friend by immediately adjourning. This unprecedented step on the occasion of the death of the head of a foreign State was in accordance with the unanimous wish of the Members…” (Ch. 9, pg. 403)

In an April 17 address to Parliament, he noted, “at Yalta, I noticed that the President was ailing. His captivating smile, his gay and charming manner, had not deserted him, but his face had a transparency, an air of purification, and often there was a far-away look in his eyes. When I took my leave of him in Alexandria harbor I must confess that I had an indefinable sense of fear that his health and his strength were on the ebb. But nothing altered his inflexible sense of duty. To the end he faced his innumerable tasks unflinching… What an enviable death was his! He had brought his country through the worst of its perils and the heaviest of its toils. Victory had cast its sure and steady beam upon him.” (Ch. 9, pg. 407-409)

He states, “Hitler’s Germany was doomed and he himself about to perish… The whole relationship of Russia with the Western allies was in flux. Every question about the future was unsettled between us. The understandings and agreements at Yalta, such as they were, had already been broken or brushed aside by the triumphant Kremlin. New perils, perhaps as terrible as those we had surmounted, loomed and glared upon the torn and harassed world.” (Ch. 11, pg. 437)

He exults, “The unconditional surrender of our enemies was the signal for the greatest outburst of joy in the history of mankind. The Second World War had indeed been fought to the bitter end in Europe. The vanquished as well as the victors felt inexpressible relief. But for us in Britain and the British Empire, who had alone been in the struggle from the first day to the last and staked our existence on the result, there was a meaning beyond even what our most powerful ad valiant Allies could fee. Weary and worn, impoverished but undaunted and now triumphant, we had a moment that was sublime. We gave thanks to God for the noblest of all His blessings, the sense that we had done out duty.” (Ch. 13, pg. 469)

He summarizes, “How stands the scene after eight years have passed? The Russian occupation line in Europe runs from Lübeck to Linz... Our armies are gone, and it will be a long time before even sixty divisions can be once again assembled opposite Russian forces… Only the atom bomb stretches its sinister shield before us. The danger of a Third World War, under conditions at the outset of grave disadvantage except in this new terrible weapon, casts its lurid shadow over the free nations of the world. Thus in the moment of victory was our best, and what might prove to have been our last, chance of durable world peace allowed composedly to fade away.” (Ch. 17, pg. 514)

He suggests, “It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell, and was brought about by overwhelming maritime power. This alone had made it possible to seize ocean bases from which to launch the final attack and force her metropolitan Army to capitulate without striking a blow… We, an island Power, equally dependent on the sea, can read the lesson and understand our own fate had we failed to master the U-boats.” (Ch. 19, pg. 552)

Of losing the 1945 election, he says, “The power to shape the future would be denied me. The knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish. I was discontented at the prospect… At luncheon my wife said to me, ‘It may well be a blessing in disguise.’ I replied, ‘At the moment it seems quite effectively disguised.’” (Ch. 21, pg. 577)

Whether one reads it as history, or literature, this series will be absolute “must reading” for anyone even marginally interested in the Second World War. (At the very least, one should read an abridgement, such as Memoirs of the Second World War).

[Michael Reilly · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have been reading this six-volume series over the last four years. It is the story of Winston Churchill's Second World War. This is the last volume.

This volume covers the winning of the war with the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. It is, surprisingly, a melancholy story. As the title makes clear, Churchill believed that the world left in the wake of the war was tragic. The Communist takeover of Eastern Europe was a disaster. In his opinion the final collapse of the English Empire was also a terrible development.

There is a good argument that Stalin outmaneuvered Churchill and Roosevelt. Churchill had been a vehement anti-communist before the war. He had no illusions about what communist rule meant. He was also insistent that Hitler had to be stopped and that an alliance with Russia was the only way to do that. The first five volumes show Churchill continually working to maintain good relationships with Stalin and Russia.

When it came to post-war settlements, Churchill and Roosevelt believed that they could negotiate fairly with Stalin. In September of 1944 Churchill wanted to meet with Stalin in person because Stalin was someone 'with whom I always considered one could talk to as one human being to another."

In February of 1945, Churchill was trying to convince Parliament to approve the agreements reached at the Yalta conference. He told Parliament that, "I feel that their (the Russians) word is their bond. I know of no government which stand to is obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government."

Churchill outlines how Stalin broke promise after promise about letting the nations liberated from the Germans select a democratic government. Soviet dictatorial governments were imposed by the Russian army as they pushed the Germans out. Stalin simply ignored his agreement in Poland and Yugoslavia, for example.

This volume starts right after the Normandy invasion. Churchill traces the battles through France and into Germany. He gives some cursory attention to the great Pacific naval battles, but he gives more attention of the battles in Burma which were fought by primarily English soldiers.

Through all of these books Churchill always did what he could to put England's soldiers and generals in high profile roles. He never missed a chance to support General Montgomery. He pushed for the invasion of Italy. It was primarily an English led campaign. The Allied soldiers slogged very slowly up the Italian peninsula. The Germans fought a brilliant slow retreat.

Eisenhower and Rosevelt supported taking soldiers from Italy and using them for a second invasion in the south of France. Churchill opposed the idea. The invasion was eventually made at Avignon in Southern France. It was later and smaller than planned because, in great part, of Churchill's resistant. It dd not accomplish much and it further slowed the advance in Italy. Churchill spends much energy showing that he was right all along.

The war was basically taken over by the Americans after the Normandy invasion. Churchill seems frustrated because his influence is diminished.

The book ends on a bittersweet note. Churchill's party loses the general election. Just as he is about to see the victory he has fought for so valiantly over the last ten years, he is ousted from office.

My favorite part of these six volumes is the appendix. In each volume Churchill includes a selection of the memos and letters he wrote during that period. Churchill followed everything. He fired off long letters and notes on the most monumental issues in the war and he sent memos on the smallest matters that he had questions about. For example;

Oct 28, 1944, to the Minister of War Transport. "Could you give me a report on bus queues, which as far as I can see, have been getting longer, and make your proposals for alleviating conditions."

Nov. 20, 1944, to the Secretary of State for War. "Make sure that the beer-four pints a week-goes to the troops under fire from the enemy before any of the parties in the rear get a drop."

Feb 20, 1945, to General Hollis. Discussing the need to show the sacrifices made by the English and Londoners in particular. "The death rate (from the war) for Londoners was 1 in 130, and for England 1 in 165. Next came New Zealand with 1 in 175. The other Dominions averaged 1 in 372 and the United States averaged 1 in 775."

April 3, 1945, to the Minister of Agriculture. Discussing reductions in crop plantings, "On no account reduce the barley for whiskey. This takes years to produce and is an invaluable export and dollar producer......It would be improvident not to preserve this characteristic British element of ascendency."

April 4, 1945, to the Foreign Office. "Attention should be drawn to the misspelling of "inadmissible". I have noticed this several times before in Foreign Office telegrams."

[Rob Markley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Churchill's magnificent personal tale of his leadership in WW2 comes to an end with an apt title. The only thing is - he underplays the tragedy. The overt meaning is the takeover of half of Europe by the soviets, but there may be other meanings - there is also Churchill's eclipse as world (perhaps even national) leader by Roosevelt then Truman along with Stalin, there is Churchill's defeat in 1945 election, the eclipse of Britain herself as a world power; and there are all the missed opportunities and missteps in the last 12 months leading up to victory.

In all these tragedies Churchill himself must bear some blame no matter how excusable. Stalin and the system he fronted was worst even than Hitler and while Chamberlain declared war only on Germany when Hitler along with Stalin invaded Poland, even in the hour of peril Churchill need not have sold USSR as 'noble Russia' in order to make common cause against the immediate threat. Churchill was not blind to the duplicity that is inherent in communism, because he sees clearly how the domestic left worked against both Britain and indeed France in the days when Stalin was allied with Hitler. What Churchill probably did not fully grasp was the depth traitors would go in their treachery, nor that depth of penetration of their duplicity - which would only emerge with Philby, Burgess et al. However much of the truth of, for example what was going on in Poland, was being hidden from him. Nevertheless make a deal with the devil and you will pay the consequences in the end.

To the very end Churchill believes that personal relationship with Stalin would move communism to act honorably and honestly - never! However Churchill also sells Roosevelt on this view. If Churchill spoken his hidden fears overtly he would have risked coming across as neurotic and being marginalised by the Americans like 'the boy who cried wolf' in fact. Being able to say 'I told you so' after it's too late serves nobody. So instead Churchill prevaricates and hedges; thus losing his vision, reputation and power and the end result is still the same. The Americans don't even keep him abreast of the nuclear question.

The problem he deals with is, that Roosevelt though a great friend, is no incisive strategic thinker and Eisenhower no military genius. Therefore Churchill comes across as constantly harping on about what are seemingly petty tactical or political matters; and time and time again the Americans miss the strategic issue at stake and miss the future implications. In particular we see the failure to burst out of Italy into Austria (or indeed the Balkans) in time. Then when Truman takes over there is the naivety of the new chum on the block to deal with, and while in time Truman's America will act correctly it is too late again.

Churchill increasingly is spending time abroad and is tired; and it seems he is letting things slip domestically - all the time being betrayed by the socialists in his coalition government. Hints to all this that emerge, is a comment how long it was since Churchill had addressed the British people, how certain decisions seemingly occur outside Churchill's approval (dismantling the Canadian commonwealth air training establishment); how the labour party had stayed at home to organise production (and corrupt society) while the conservatives had gone to fight. No one expected Churchill to lose the election but in these things lay the seeds - although I wonder whether there might also be a hidden element of election fraud too? The left know no bounds!

This volume is more so, even than the other volumes, Churchill's personal story of the war rather than a true history. Far too often things are suddenly mentioned by way of Churchill's response while the topic had never come up before. The San Fransisco conference and other steps towards forming the UN are an example of this.

Was Churchill a spent force by 1945? This volume suggests maybe so, but all the same had he been given another term in power what a difference it would have meant to Britain.

[Nathan Casebolt · Rating 4 out of 5]

The sixth and final volume of Churchill’s memoirs of the Second World War opens with the D-Day assault on Normandy and closes with the collapse of Nazi Germany, the opening moves of the Cold War, and the electoral defeat of Churchill’s Conservative Party. Churchill’s tenure as Prime Minister ended two weeks before the atomic bombings of Japan, and this is where the series ends – before the final defeat of Japan. This would be a very strange place to end a history of a war, but it makes sense given Churchill’s purpose: to record his memories and craft his place in history as British Prime Minister during the war. His memoirs end at the point his leadership of the nation ended.

Churchill’s frustration with the conclusion of the war is palpable. By the time Hitler died and the Germans surrendered, the American military dominated the war effort, giving American aims and ideology a dominant role in the evolving collapse of relations with Stalin’s Soviet Union. As the Germans were crushed ever deeper into their homeland within the Allied vice, Churchill portrays himself as waging a desperate but futile battle to awaken the Americans to the Communist threat. He repeatedly mourns the diversion of force from the Italian campaign to the ancillary invasion of southern France, and effort which doomed his hopes of a quick victory in northern Italy that would’ve allowed the western allies to swing north and east into Central Europe, forestalling a Stalinist entrenchment in the heart of the continent.

It’s hard to fully accept Churchill’s unsubtle blaming of America given his agreement with Stalin to divide eastern Europe into spheres of influence. Granted, there wasn’t much else the West could’ve done. The Russians were militarily dominant in Romania and Bulgaria, and extracting Stalin’s promise not to meddle in Greece – a promise which Stalin surprisingly kept – was probably the best one could hope for. Still, American generals and politicians no doubt had their own constraints of realpolitik, and I suspect Churchill could’ve been more fair to the Americans had he not been so concerned to paint himself in the best possible light.

Still, this is an invaluable insight into the mind of one of history’s greatest leaders. While acknowledging his imperialist and colonialist mindset which is no longer in fashion today, a mindset tinged with more than a hint of racial prejudice and British chauvinism, there should be no doubt that he was the right man for his time and place. He recognized Hitler’s threat far sooner than most, held his nation to the sticking point when she stood virtually alone against the dark master of Europe, and helped forge one of the greatest multicultural alliances in human history to defeat a monster bent on global tyranny and worldwide genocide. Winston Churchill deserves his place in the sun, and this final volume is a fitting conclusion to the memoirs of a remarkable man who, when his country most needed him, rose to the challenge with nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat.