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The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943
Two million men supported by 6,000 tanks, 35,000 guns, and 5,000 aircraft convened in Kursk--on the border of the Soviet Union--for an epic confrontation, the epitome of "total war." With unprecedented access to the journals and testimonials of the officers, soldiers, political leaders, and citizens who lived through it, Clark gives the definitive account of an epic showdown that changed the course of history.
468 pages, Hardcover
First published May 3, 2011
137 people are currently reading
875 people want to read
About the author
Lloyd Clark
20 books39 followersLloyd Clark is a senior lecturer in war studies at Great Britain's Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and he has lectured on military history around the world. His special interests are the Western Front of the First World War, the Mediterranean Front of the Second World War, and airborne warfare.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 91 reviews
October 31, 2011
In his book; “The Battle of the Tanks”, the author, Lloyd Clark, has provided the reader with an admirably told and well presented account of the climatic battle of WW2; Kursk, that occurred on the Russian steppe in July 1943.
The author has produced a well-researched, easy to read and easy to follow account of the massive clash between German and Russian forces at Kursk during Operation Zitadelle.
With the use of numerous first-hand accounts, diaries, letters and after-action reports the author’s style of writing easily puts the reader in the heart of the action, this is from the first page:
“ ..... The Tigers advanced, their engines whining as they climbed a low rise before juddering to a halt. The 100 tank Soviet wave sped towards them in an attempt to get close enough for their guns to penetrate the panzer’s armour before the powerful German 88mm guns had an opportunity to pick them off. The Tiger gunners peered down their optical sights at the olive-green armour a mile away, but even as their cross hairs settled on a target, the T-34s dipped into a gentle fold in the ground like an armada sailing on a rolling sea. A tense minute passed before the enemy rose again and now they were just half a mile away. Anticipating the breaking wave, the Tiger commanders gave the order to fire. The 63 ton beasts jerked as their high-velocity guns blasted off their armour-piecing rounds.
The T-34s were devastated. An intense white explosion stopped one dead, another slew to the right before coming to a blazing stop while a third was ripped apart and disembowelled with appalling ease. The German intercoms were alive with impassioned voices as commanders sought to break up the enemy formation and the five-man crews fought for their lives. The T-34s plunged on as the Tigers found new fire positions and unleashed more destruction. Wittmann’s skilful gunner, Helmut Graser, took rapid aim and loosed off. The round buried itself into a victim and dislodged the turret. The Tiger was re-positioned, the gun erupted, another hit.
The Soviets closed within a couple of hundred feet and returned fire on the move. Wittmann’s Tiger was hit twice – the tank, ringing like a bell, was saved by two inches of steel – and four from his company were disabled. The field was littered with burning wrecks sending plumes of black smoke into the steel grey sky. The officer of one T-34 lay dead, slumped across his hatch as flames licked around the turret and his crew screamed from within. The acid air hung heavy over the charred corpses and the broken bodies of the wounded.”
Nor does the author forget the human aspect of this gigantic struggle, this account is from a Russian soldier moving to take up a new defensive position against the advancing Germans:
“We were marching towards a river where we were to take up a defensive position in June 1942. We passed through a small non-descript place and it seems as if the entire population had crowded onto the road to stare at us. There was no cheering although one or two shouted encouragement for they knew that we were doomed. They also knew that if we were taking up positions close to their village, that they were doomed as well …. As we were leaving the village a middle-aged woman ran up to me and handed me a loaf of bread and kissed me on the cheek. She had a tear in her eye and sobbed, ‘For my son – my lovely boy’. I never saw her again but in that moment realized what terrible pain the nation was suffering as families were being torn apart. It reminded me of my family so far away. I tucked the bread into my jacket and began crying myself. I did not realize the stress that was building up in me. It was a release.”
The book is full of these personal accounts and at no stage does the narrative bog down in too much detail but just drags the reader along to the next clash of arms. This following account is one of the better descriptive accounts I have read for some time about what happens when a tank is hit:
“After an hour of fighting, the fields was covered in blazing hulks, Any survivors of the initial calamitous shell strike had just seconds to evacuate the tank before it was engulfed in flame, which threatened to ignite the fuel and ammunition. Nikolai Zheleznov was knocked to the turret floor when his T-34 was hit. The white-hot explosion had shattered his driver’s head, torn the loader’s arm from his body and sent scores of large metal shards into the gunner’s unprotected body. A fire sucked the oxygen out of the compartment and set light to Zheleznov’s uniform as he struggled to open the commander’s hatch. Eventually pushing it free as the flames leapt up around him, he fought to pull himself out of the void but his leg had been broken at the knee. Passing comrades pulled him clear of the tank just before it exploded but he sustained horrendous burns.”
Here are two accounts from the fighting that occurred during the first few days of Kursk as the German formations fought their way through the Russian defensive positions:
“At the tip of the Das Reich, for example, acting Panzer Grenadier company commander SS-Untersturmfuhrer Kruger spent six hours leading his unit in hand-to-hand fighting during which he was twice wounded. Remaining with the company, he continued to lead his men as they wrestled with several T-34s. Darting forward with a magnetic mine grasped tightly between muddy hands, Kruger was grazed by a round, which ignited a smoke grenade in his pocket and set his trousers on fire. Ripping the flaming cloth from his legs, he continued his attack on the T-34 in his underwear and succeeded in knocking out the tank.”
And the German Tiger tank again:
“ …. The Tigers, despite their lack of mobility, proved difficult for the Red Army to stop. Once again, well-aimed rounds achieved little more than shaking the tanks’ occupants, although when Obersturmfuhrer Schutzs’ Tiger took a direct hit and the driver’s glass vision block struck him in the stomach, he needed more than a couple of minutes to compose himself.”
Overall this is an excellent story, not as detailed as David Glantz’s account but still a worthy effort and should be in the library of anyone who has an interest or passion for books covering the war on the Eastern Front.
The author has produced a well-researched, easy to read and easy to follow account of the massive clash between German and Russian forces at Kursk during Operation Zitadelle.
With the use of numerous first-hand accounts, diaries, letters and after-action reports the author’s style of writing easily puts the reader in the heart of the action, this is from the first page:
“ ..... The Tigers advanced, their engines whining as they climbed a low rise before juddering to a halt. The 100 tank Soviet wave sped towards them in an attempt to get close enough for their guns to penetrate the panzer’s armour before the powerful German 88mm guns had an opportunity to pick them off. The Tiger gunners peered down their optical sights at the olive-green armour a mile away, but even as their cross hairs settled on a target, the T-34s dipped into a gentle fold in the ground like an armada sailing on a rolling sea. A tense minute passed before the enemy rose again and now they were just half a mile away. Anticipating the breaking wave, the Tiger commanders gave the order to fire. The 63 ton beasts jerked as their high-velocity guns blasted off their armour-piecing rounds.
The T-34s were devastated. An intense white explosion stopped one dead, another slew to the right before coming to a blazing stop while a third was ripped apart and disembowelled with appalling ease. The German intercoms were alive with impassioned voices as commanders sought to break up the enemy formation and the five-man crews fought for their lives. The T-34s plunged on as the Tigers found new fire positions and unleashed more destruction. Wittmann’s skilful gunner, Helmut Graser, took rapid aim and loosed off. The round buried itself into a victim and dislodged the turret. The Tiger was re-positioned, the gun erupted, another hit.
The Soviets closed within a couple of hundred feet and returned fire on the move. Wittmann’s Tiger was hit twice – the tank, ringing like a bell, was saved by two inches of steel – and four from his company were disabled. The field was littered with burning wrecks sending plumes of black smoke into the steel grey sky. The officer of one T-34 lay dead, slumped across his hatch as flames licked around the turret and his crew screamed from within. The acid air hung heavy over the charred corpses and the broken bodies of the wounded.”
Nor does the author forget the human aspect of this gigantic struggle, this account is from a Russian soldier moving to take up a new defensive position against the advancing Germans:
“We were marching towards a river where we were to take up a defensive position in June 1942. We passed through a small non-descript place and it seems as if the entire population had crowded onto the road to stare at us. There was no cheering although one or two shouted encouragement for they knew that we were doomed. They also knew that if we were taking up positions close to their village, that they were doomed as well …. As we were leaving the village a middle-aged woman ran up to me and handed me a loaf of bread and kissed me on the cheek. She had a tear in her eye and sobbed, ‘For my son – my lovely boy’. I never saw her again but in that moment realized what terrible pain the nation was suffering as families were being torn apart. It reminded me of my family so far away. I tucked the bread into my jacket and began crying myself. I did not realize the stress that was building up in me. It was a release.”
The book is full of these personal accounts and at no stage does the narrative bog down in too much detail but just drags the reader along to the next clash of arms. This following account is one of the better descriptive accounts I have read for some time about what happens when a tank is hit:
“After an hour of fighting, the fields was covered in blazing hulks, Any survivors of the initial calamitous shell strike had just seconds to evacuate the tank before it was engulfed in flame, which threatened to ignite the fuel and ammunition. Nikolai Zheleznov was knocked to the turret floor when his T-34 was hit. The white-hot explosion had shattered his driver’s head, torn the loader’s arm from his body and sent scores of large metal shards into the gunner’s unprotected body. A fire sucked the oxygen out of the compartment and set light to Zheleznov’s uniform as he struggled to open the commander’s hatch. Eventually pushing it free as the flames leapt up around him, he fought to pull himself out of the void but his leg had been broken at the knee. Passing comrades pulled him clear of the tank just before it exploded but he sustained horrendous burns.”
Here are two accounts from the fighting that occurred during the first few days of Kursk as the German formations fought their way through the Russian defensive positions:
“At the tip of the Das Reich, for example, acting Panzer Grenadier company commander SS-Untersturmfuhrer Kruger spent six hours leading his unit in hand-to-hand fighting during which he was twice wounded. Remaining with the company, he continued to lead his men as they wrestled with several T-34s. Darting forward with a magnetic mine grasped tightly between muddy hands, Kruger was grazed by a round, which ignited a smoke grenade in his pocket and set his trousers on fire. Ripping the flaming cloth from his legs, he continued his attack on the T-34 in his underwear and succeeded in knocking out the tank.”
And the German Tiger tank again:
“ …. The Tigers, despite their lack of mobility, proved difficult for the Red Army to stop. Once again, well-aimed rounds achieved little more than shaking the tanks’ occupants, although when Obersturmfuhrer Schutzs’ Tiger took a direct hit and the driver’s glass vision block struck him in the stomach, he needed more than a couple of minutes to compose himself.”
Overall this is an excellent story, not as detailed as David Glantz’s account but still a worthy effort and should be in the library of anyone who has an interest or passion for books covering the war on the Eastern Front.
September 6, 2012
First, I'd like to address those who complain that the first third of this book is not about Kursk, but in fact covers the period after WWI for both Germany and Russia, Operation Barbarossa, the Battle of Moscow, and the Battle of Stalingrad. To these people, I'd like to point out that there is a handy little thing called a "table of contents". No one is forcing you to read the bits you don't want to read.
For myself, I liked the backstory. It's backstory that I know fairly well, but it's well stated, and really is necessary to understand the true import of Kursk. Without understanding the tenuous position of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1942, following the halts at Moscow and Stalingrad, the reader doesn’t grasp how much hinged on the German assault.
The book itself is very well-written, with a great sense of drama, without being overly fictionalized. The author has a great ability to write non-fictional narrative, which can escape some historians. He uses a great deal of quotes from common soldiers, which adds to the feeling of the gritty, almost WWI-style combat.
If there is a criticism to be made, it’s in the lack of sufficient maps. Of course, you can’t expect a map on every page, but there should have been one per major action, at least. Instead, we get huge, front-encompassing maps which often don’t feature what is being mentioned at the time, and sometimes don’t show towns that are mentioned in the text at all. This is a problem when we’re dealing with a battle that isn’t set permanently into the minds of military history readers (whereas I can draw a pretty good map of the area around Gettysburg from memory). If there had been such maps, this would have been a superb book, and would have helped with the chaos of the last few days of the battle, which became, at times, overwhelmingly confusing.
All in all, a great read, and a reasonably good primer on the Eastern Front at large, for those unfamiliar with the major events.
For myself, I liked the backstory. It's backstory that I know fairly well, but it's well stated, and really is necessary to understand the true import of Kursk. Without understanding the tenuous position of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1942, following the halts at Moscow and Stalingrad, the reader doesn’t grasp how much hinged on the German assault.
The book itself is very well-written, with a great sense of drama, without being overly fictionalized. The author has a great ability to write non-fictional narrative, which can escape some historians. He uses a great deal of quotes from common soldiers, which adds to the feeling of the gritty, almost WWI-style combat.
If there is a criticism to be made, it’s in the lack of sufficient maps. Of course, you can’t expect a map on every page, but there should have been one per major action, at least. Instead, we get huge, front-encompassing maps which often don’t feature what is being mentioned at the time, and sometimes don’t show towns that are mentioned in the text at all. This is a problem when we’re dealing with a battle that isn’t set permanently into the minds of military history readers (whereas I can draw a pretty good map of the area around Gettysburg from memory). If there had been such maps, this would have been a superb book, and would have helped with the chaos of the last few days of the battle, which became, at times, overwhelmingly confusing.
All in all, a great read, and a reasonably good primer on the Eastern Front at large, for those unfamiliar with the major events.
March 22, 2025
Nem vagyok benne biztos, hogy ezt lehetséges megírni. Mert ugye itt van a kurszki csata nevezetű kozmikus ipari húsdaráló, ahová mindkét fél dühödt igyekezettel próbál meg minél több húst beleszuszakolni. No most minden csata a káosz intézményesítésére tett kísérlet – de ez Kurszkra hatványozottan igaz. Adott ugyanis két hadsereg:
1.) A Harmadik Birodalomé, ami bizony már túljutott a zenitjén. A fordulópont a ’42-es esztendő végén megtörtént, amikor kifulladtak a villámháborús tervek: El-Alameinnél Montgomerry kapta el őket, az Atlanti-óceánon is kudarcot vallottak, de ami a legfájóbb lehetett: Sztálingrád alatt az egész 6. hadseregük elpusztult, jelezve, hogy elérték teljesítőképességük végső határait. Ugyanakkor még mindig övék a technikai fölény a fegyverrendszerek terén (különösen ami a tankokat* és a légierőt illeti), és továbbra is igazi vérszomjas profik, a háború csúf művészetének Sith Nagyurai. És valószínűleg még jobbak lennének, ha az egyre elborultabb Hitler nem pofázna bele lépten-nyomon a stratégiai kérdésekbe.
2.) És hát a szovjetek. Akik baromi mélyről indultak, miután a jó Sztálin ’37-ben lefejezte a tisztikart, aztán olyan sikeresen ignorálta a német támadásról érkező híreket, hogy a Wehrmacht menetből legázolta az amúgy gigászi Vörös Hadsereget. Milliók haltak meg és estek hadifogságba, mire Koba megértette, a hadvezetés nem az ő asztala. De Hitlerrel ellentétben többé-kevésbé megértette, és átadta a pálcát Zsukovnak meg a többi szakembernek, aminek köszönhetően az orosz hadigépezet végre megindulhatott a fejlődés útján. Mondjuk az is tény, hogy Kurszk idején ennek az útnak még csak nagyjából a felén járhattak.
Ezeket a hadseregeket el lehet képzelni két vonalként, amelyből az első lefelé, a második felfelé ível. A németek célja, hogy kikeveredjenek valahogy a leszálló ágból. Érzékelik, hogy az oroszok feljövőben vannak, tehát addig kell lépniük, amíg még őriznek valamit a meglévő előnyeikből. Gondolják, erre Kurszk a legmegfelelőbb hely, mert ha oda mérnek erőteljes, váratlan csapást a maguk jól bejáratott villámháborús módszereikkel, akkor jó időre inaktivitásba taszíthatják a teljes szovjet haderőt a déli fronton. Ők abban érdekeltek, hogy világos, átlátható, gyors csatát vívjanak. Amit nem látnak, hogy az oroszok pontosan tudják, mire készülnek. És arra jutottak, akkor tudják véglegesen padlóra küldeni a nácikat, ha kivéreztetik őket. Magyarán a világos, átlátható és gyors csatából csinálnak egy zűrzavaros, kilátástalan vérmocsarat, ami elnyel embert és gépet egyaránt. Nekiállnak tehát titokban csapatokkal és védművekkel telepakolni Kurszk környékét, és várják, hogy a németek szétverjék a saját fejüket a falon. Még csak győzniük sem kell - nekik elég, ha a németek nem győznek. Számításuk racionális, még ha embertelen is: pontosan tudják, ők bármennyi embert és technikát beletölthetnek a darálóba, azt később pótolni tudják, a németek viszont nem. Simán feláldoznak hat T-34-est két német páncélosért cserébe, hisz másnap ők nyolccal pótolják, a fritzek meg örülnek, ha egyet össze tudnak kaparni. Szimpla matematika. Sztálinnak ez megéri – azokat meg, akik bennégnek a tankokban, a kutya se kérdezte. A németek pedig bekapják a csalit, besétálnak a szovjetek által kreált mesterséges káoszba, és ott vesznek.
Clarke ezt a káoszt próbálja megragadni: az átláthatatlan, felfoghatatlan csatateret, ahol járművek lángolnak, holttestek oszladoznak a napon, osztagok vánszorognak aknamező és szögesdróton át, lökések és ellenlökések találkoznak félúton, epikus kézitusákat előidézve. Talán ha világosan írná meg, hamis lenne, hisz egy ilyen csata minden, csak nem világos. Így viszont prózája, bár megragadja a káosz, de cserébe maga is helyenként kaotikus lesz. Mondjuk ezen talán lehetett volna segíteni picit pár térképmelléklettel. Mert hát az van, hogy a (különben nagyon szép) utószóban a szovjet frontveterán is elő tudja venni a térképet a kabátja zsebéből, hogy a német frontveteránnal eltémázgassanak az egykor átélt pokolról – mibe került volna Clarke-nak is szerezni egyet?
* Mondjuk a német technikai fölényt bizonyos szempontból túlértékelik. Az biztos, hogy a Pantherek és a Tigerek steril körülmények között messze túlszárnyalták a különben szintén remek T-34-eseket. De a háború nem a steril körülményekről szól – hiába volt jobb a német tankok lövege és páncélzata, ha a rendre kiestek műszaki hiba miatt, és nem tudtak megbirkózni az orosz terepkörülményekkel. Hiába múlták felül az ütközetben riválisaikat, ha az elfogadhatónál sokkal gyakrabban robbantak le még a csatamezőre jutás előtt.
November 23, 2025
Hitler's last gamble: If the Russians hadn't won the battle of Kursk in July of 1943---the largest tank battle in history---we'd all be speaking perfect German. (Which, come to think of it, might not be a bad thing.) This blow-by-blow account by an English scholar leaves little to the imagination by way of the horrors of war: death by Stuka, death by bayonet, death by artillery hell. Just by the sheer number of the enemy the Germans had to lose. What is striking about this account is the brilliance of their tactics, which could not, however, overcome Soviet anti-tank defenses. Unlike the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, the Germans lacked the element of surprise. Equally fatal to their chances, the new Panther tanks came fresh off the assembly line with grave faults. Hitler's pushing his commanders, above all Von Manstein, to launch CITADEL at the earliest possible moment actually worked against the Germans in giving them unprepared tanks, tank crews, and artillery. After Kursk, the Eastern Front was closed.
July 2, 2022
3.5 stars. Everyone knows about the horrors of the fighting on the Eastern Front in WWII. Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad all invoke the hideous nature of warfare between two totalitarian governments who will settle for nothing less than annihilation of their one-time ally. And that's just in 1941-1942! With the catastrophe that is Stalingrad, the Germans are put in a quandry to find something to turn the situation around in 1943. Their answer is Operation Zitadelle which will close the Kursk pocket, resulting in thousands of prisoners and give Germany breathing space.
Scheduled for July 5, 1943, the massive tank penetration gets off to a decent start, but in ten days time it is virtually a lost cause. This book goes into detail about what went wrong. Germany's 'blitzkrieg' is not what it once was, the Russians are better prepared and are fanatic in their defense. In fact, the Russians actually sucker the Nazis into a trap by staying on the defense until the Reich armor has felt the losses mount. Then the Soviets attack on the flanks. The war may last for two more bloody years, but as Churchill notes for Russia, 'Stalingrad was the end of the beginning; but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end.'
Scheduled for July 5, 1943, the massive tank penetration gets off to a decent start, but in ten days time it is virtually a lost cause. This book goes into detail about what went wrong. Germany's 'blitzkrieg' is not what it once was, the Russians are better prepared and are fanatic in their defense. In fact, the Russians actually sucker the Nazis into a trap by staying on the defense until the Reich armor has felt the losses mount. Then the Soviets attack on the flanks. The war may last for two more bloody years, but as Churchill notes for Russia, 'Stalingrad was the end of the beginning; but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end.'
April 18, 2012
I got this book because I wanted to learn more about the Battle of Kursk, which is one of, if not the, largest tank battle in history. I got a bit more than I bargained for since this book gives a brief overview of the rise to power of Hitler and Stalin, and the first two years of the Eastern Front of WWII. Since I did not know much about either of these, this didn't bother me too much. The author's intent was clearly to provide context on the larger political and military forces that led to this battle. That said, it wasn't completely necessary. The chapters dealing with the battle itself, were top-notch. They provided a "general's view" of the grand strategic situation, as well as numerous anecdotes from front-line soldiers and the horrors they experienced. The biggest weakness of the book was that it had few maps to aid you in understanding the positioning of units, and these were placed seemingly at random throughout the book. They were also difficult to read. I read this on my Kindle, and clarity of maps is a recurring problem in Kindle books, so it might not be the authors fault.
June 19, 2017
Very cool.
The book is engaging, on many levels. First, it gives us a brief intro to both the Nazi Germany and USSR in the years before the war. We learn about Stalin and Hitler and their style of command. Then, the author goes into succinct but colorful detail on the first 2.5 years of WWII before focusing on the great finale.
What I really liked isn't just the obvious narrative - it's balanced. You have technical details, historical facts, personal anectodes, snippets from letters and memoirs of soldiers and politicians alike, including ordinary infantrymen as well as high-ranking brass. They provide a sobering picture of how the war unfolded and how the troops viewed the campaign and their leaders. Hitler started as a calm if passionate commander who became obsessed with super weapons, lost his temper and grew utmost disdain for his military echolon, being scorned and disliked by his officers in turn. Stalin was a paranoiac with low self-esteem who slowly learned to relinquish control and let his military expert wage war, focusing on big strategy. He also successfully unified the Soviet nations under the umbrella of the Great Patriotic War and learned restraint, which did not come natural having lost so much territory and so many people and resources to the German aggression.
These dramatic events are potrayed over a period of two years, with the sieges of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad as key focus points for the good and the bad decisions. And then, we have the turn of the tide. The amateur Soviet army becomes a professional force, and it goes on an offensive against the Germans.
Another fascinating point is the German side of the war. The managed to achieve so much with limited resources, but eventually buckled when they overstretched their forces. USSR outdid Germany in military production by a factor of 4, and there was no going back from there. Throughout the war, the Soviets always lost 2-3x more troops than the Germans, even during the Kursk offensive (Operational Zitadelle), but they had a much deeper strategic depth and could afford a long battle of attrition. With each engagement, they gained more prowess, more experience and more momentum.
While the first 2/3rds are shorter on detail and cover a much longer period, the last section of the book goes into a very detailed discourse of the first two weeks of the Kursk theater, the most critical part of the battle. Again, we have testimonians from the trenches, and it's a brutal depiction of one of the most significant battles in modern history.
This is a great book, and I'm glad I've nailed so many cool titles in a row.
A must read for anyone interested in the Russo-German sphere of things in WWII.
Igor
The book is engaging, on many levels. First, it gives us a brief intro to both the Nazi Germany and USSR in the years before the war. We learn about Stalin and Hitler and their style of command. Then, the author goes into succinct but colorful detail on the first 2.5 years of WWII before focusing on the great finale.
What I really liked isn't just the obvious narrative - it's balanced. You have technical details, historical facts, personal anectodes, snippets from letters and memoirs of soldiers and politicians alike, including ordinary infantrymen as well as high-ranking brass. They provide a sobering picture of how the war unfolded and how the troops viewed the campaign and their leaders. Hitler started as a calm if passionate commander who became obsessed with super weapons, lost his temper and grew utmost disdain for his military echolon, being scorned and disliked by his officers in turn. Stalin was a paranoiac with low self-esteem who slowly learned to relinquish control and let his military expert wage war, focusing on big strategy. He also successfully unified the Soviet nations under the umbrella of the Great Patriotic War and learned restraint, which did not come natural having lost so much territory and so many people and resources to the German aggression.
These dramatic events are potrayed over a period of two years, with the sieges of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad as key focus points for the good and the bad decisions. And then, we have the turn of the tide. The amateur Soviet army becomes a professional force, and it goes on an offensive against the Germans.
Another fascinating point is the German side of the war. The managed to achieve so much with limited resources, but eventually buckled when they overstretched their forces. USSR outdid Germany in military production by a factor of 4, and there was no going back from there. Throughout the war, the Soviets always lost 2-3x more troops than the Germans, even during the Kursk offensive (Operational Zitadelle), but they had a much deeper strategic depth and could afford a long battle of attrition. With each engagement, they gained more prowess, more experience and more momentum.
While the first 2/3rds are shorter on detail and cover a much longer period, the last section of the book goes into a very detailed discourse of the first two weeks of the Kursk theater, the most critical part of the battle. Again, we have testimonians from the trenches, and it's a brutal depiction of one of the most significant battles in modern history.
This is a great book, and I'm glad I've nailed so many cool titles in a row.
A must read for anyone interested in the Russo-German sphere of things in WWII.
Igor
July 30, 2017
I single volume on Citadel. Done. Stalingrad was the end of the beginning for the German army. Kursk or Zitadelle was the beginning of the end. Russian armor was outfought, the German tactics were better, and the Luftwaffe gave more than it got. Except there were too many Soviet formations, especially tank formations. In one battle the Russians lost over 350 tanks to 50 German. Except the Russians could make up their losses easily, the Germans could not. The Soviets were and would out produce the Germans. Kursk was the last German offensive in the East. The Red Army was set for the drive to push the Germans out of Russia.
January 12, 2019
Definitely a war of attrition, especially from a Soviet standpoint. Even with larger numbers they didn’t “defeat” the Germans but stopped them in their tracks. Kursk was Hitler’s last throw of the dice where the Eastern front was concerned. Despite superior tactics and weaponry they were vastly outnumbered. It was savagely fought from both sides with little headway made by any side.
When the Allies landed in Sicily to begin the invasion of Italy, Hitler had no choice but to call a halt to the Eastern campaign
Well written with first hand accounts from both sides with plenty of maps to boot . A great read about a short campaign
When the Allies landed in Sicily to begin the invasion of Italy, Hitler had no choice but to call a halt to the Eastern campaign
Well written with first hand accounts from both sides with plenty of maps to boot . A great read about a short campaign
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 27, 2014
Battle of the Tanks is a highly accessible narrative account of the Kursk campaign in the summer of 1943 on the Russian front. It is aimed at a general reader (unlike, say, David Glantz’s densely detailed operational histories)
In Battle of the Tanks, Lloyd Clark “seeks to provide the overview that places the battle of Kursk in the context required to do justice to its pivotal position in the course of fighting on the Eastern Front” (p xviii). In other words, this is intended as much more than a narrowly focused account of the battle itself. As a consequence the book has an unusually broad scope, going all the way back to WWI, the Treaty of Versailles, covering the subsequent rise of Hitler and the Nazi party, and in the USSR back to the early days of the Revolution and the rise of Stalin and of course the military purges of the late 1930s. We also cover in considerable detail the initial invasion in June 1941, the vast encirclement battles of that summer, and the fighting in front of Moscow and Leningrad. The 1942 campaign, the Stalingrad debacle, and the recapture of Kharkov are likewise covered. Is this broad scope really necessary? It's hard for me to imagine even a casual reader who is without knowledge of the rise of Nazi Germany and the broad outlines of the first two years of Barbarossa. But no matter. The consequence, however is that coverage of the battle proper doesn't begin until page 165 with Chapter 5, "Uneasy Calm".
Let me say up front that one of the real strengths of Battle of the Tanks are the numerous first person accounts of the battle from ordinary soldiers and lower ranked officers, and which are cited extensively throughout the text. Clark has really done his homework here, and must have spent countless hours tracking down literally dozens of elderly survivors of the battle, both in Germany and Russia. He also uncovered many unpublished letters and diaries. The result in my eyes represents a major contribution to understanding the “ground level” feel of the battle by the actual participants. This in and of itself make this book worth reading.
A few comments on the oddly placement of some of the maps: Map 3: Eve of Battle, July 4th 1943 is located at the start of chapter two, which covers the period 1918-1941. Map 4: The Voronezh Front 4-8 July 1943 appears at the start of chapter three covering the initial year of Barbarossa in 1941. Why not locate them adjacent to the chapters that cover their respective subjects? But ultimately this isn’t all that important and in any book with maps is going to require a lot of page flipping back and forth regardless of where they are located. Also, there were several towns on the maps that were marked with small circles, but left unlabeled, which was sometimes frustrating. However, overall the maps were significantly above average.
One nitpick: Why do military historians who target a general audience – and this clearly includes Clark – insist on using Roman numerals to distinguish certain military formations? Sure I learned Roman numerals as a kid in school, and I can decode them readily, but having to do so acts as an obstacle to my overall enjoyment. Why not simply say 48th Panzer Corps, instead of XLVIII (or, as it appears on the maps in a format which I have never seen before, XXXXVIII, which is totally nonstandard in my experience)?
In any event, Battle of the Tanks is a fine and eminently readable effort that well merits four solid stars.
In Battle of the Tanks, Lloyd Clark “seeks to provide the overview that places the battle of Kursk in the context required to do justice to its pivotal position in the course of fighting on the Eastern Front” (p xviii). In other words, this is intended as much more than a narrowly focused account of the battle itself. As a consequence the book has an unusually broad scope, going all the way back to WWI, the Treaty of Versailles, covering the subsequent rise of Hitler and the Nazi party, and in the USSR back to the early days of the Revolution and the rise of Stalin and of course the military purges of the late 1930s. We also cover in considerable detail the initial invasion in June 1941, the vast encirclement battles of that summer, and the fighting in front of Moscow and Leningrad. The 1942 campaign, the Stalingrad debacle, and the recapture of Kharkov are likewise covered. Is this broad scope really necessary? It's hard for me to imagine even a casual reader who is without knowledge of the rise of Nazi Germany and the broad outlines of the first two years of Barbarossa. But no matter. The consequence, however is that coverage of the battle proper doesn't begin until page 165 with Chapter 5, "Uneasy Calm".
Let me say up front that one of the real strengths of Battle of the Tanks are the numerous first person accounts of the battle from ordinary soldiers and lower ranked officers, and which are cited extensively throughout the text. Clark has really done his homework here, and must have spent countless hours tracking down literally dozens of elderly survivors of the battle, both in Germany and Russia. He also uncovered many unpublished letters and diaries. The result in my eyes represents a major contribution to understanding the “ground level” feel of the battle by the actual participants. This in and of itself make this book worth reading.
A few comments on the oddly placement of some of the maps: Map 3: Eve of Battle, July 4th 1943 is located at the start of chapter two, which covers the period 1918-1941. Map 4: The Voronezh Front 4-8 July 1943 appears at the start of chapter three covering the initial year of Barbarossa in 1941. Why not locate them adjacent to the chapters that cover their respective subjects? But ultimately this isn’t all that important and in any book with maps is going to require a lot of page flipping back and forth regardless of where they are located. Also, there were several towns on the maps that were marked with small circles, but left unlabeled, which was sometimes frustrating. However, overall the maps were significantly above average.
One nitpick: Why do military historians who target a general audience – and this clearly includes Clark – insist on using Roman numerals to distinguish certain military formations? Sure I learned Roman numerals as a kid in school, and I can decode them readily, but having to do so acts as an obstacle to my overall enjoyment. Why not simply say 48th Panzer Corps, instead of XLVIII (or, as it appears on the maps in a format which I have never seen before, XXXXVIII, which is totally nonstandard in my experience)?
In any event, Battle of the Tanks is a fine and eminently readable effort that well merits four solid stars.
August 28, 2014
Excellent and insightful book with not only descriptions of the battle of Kursk and Operation Citadel, but also the "Origins of Annihilation" giving a backstory about the rise of Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Worker's Party and Lenin/Stalin's Bolshevik Revolution coupled with reasons leading to the point of the Eastern Front. Furthermore, Lloyd Clark's Battle of the Tanks also goes further into giving the backstory leading towards the death grip at Kursk through describing the initial German invasion "Operation Barbarossa" in 1941, Russian counter-offensives, and the German southern thrust "Operation Blue" in 1942, and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensive "Operation Uranus" resulting in the surrounding Fredric Paulus' Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The descriptions and details of the operation of "Operation Citadel" are unparalleled and well researched. This piece of historical literature is well written, supported by pictures and maps, and is filled with information that many historical World War II buffs would enjoy immensely. As this book not only describes Hitler's ideological short comings, it also displays how this "War of Annihilation" was operated in such a matter of ferocity and human suffering that it cannot be described in words. If you as an individual wishes to learn more about the Wehrmacht's and Red Army's failings and operational disasters on the Eastern Front and to also address the human aspect of determination and suffering, and to learn more about this theatre of World War II in general, than I would highly suggest this book for your book collection.
March 8, 2014
This is one of the better operational books of the Second World War that I have read. The battle for Kursk has always been a fascinating one for me because of the size of the armies involved and magnitude of the repercussions to the Eastern Front( there was even a CoD level :) ) For one thing the book focuses on just the one battle, which means the ground is pretty much well tramped on by the time you get through reading about the initial skirmishing. Operational books tend to be very disconcerting for the casual reader and this is a nice exception. Secondly, this one tackles the logistics of the battle pretty well - there is a good amount of discussion on the resources involved - from their initial roles in initial deployments, their tactics, the overall strategy and the armaments involved. The book also does well in trying to present first hand accounts of combatants on both sides for the same battle. The book falters a little by spending up a little too much time in setting up the road to Kursk. It quickly walks over the Battle for Moscow and sundry operations up North which might give the false impression that these battles were distractions, which they were emphatically not.
Overall though, if you are a casual reader and have never read an operational book, I cannot think of any better introduction to that genre of military non-fiction.
Overall though, if you are a casual reader and have never read an operational book, I cannot think of any better introduction to that genre of military non-fiction.
September 16, 2018
This is a book of two halves really.
I enjoyed the first half which is about the early years of the second world war in Europe and the events that led up to the battle of Kursk.
So that's the German invasion of Poland, the Ribbentrop - Molotov pact, Operation Barbarossa, Stalingrad etc.
I found the second half of the book, the actual battle of Kursk, hard to get through. It's more suited to proper Military Historians rather than someone with a passing interest.
Glad I read it but it doesn't set the world alight for me.
I enjoyed the first half which is about the early years of the second world war in Europe and the events that led up to the battle of Kursk.
So that's the German invasion of Poland, the Ribbentrop - Molotov pact, Operation Barbarossa, Stalingrad etc.
I found the second half of the book, the actual battle of Kursk, hard to get through. It's more suited to proper Military Historians rather than someone with a passing interest.
Glad I read it but it doesn't set the world alight for me.
February 12, 2021
As military histories go this is much more of a general account of Kursk, which feels more like an account of the eastern front in general, as opposed to a detailed study of one battle. That being said, Kursk does take up the majority of the content in this text, but the author does not seem to assume that the reader will be well versed with the general state of affairs of this segment of the second world war, and thus provides ample prelude on the belligerents which extends all the way to the beginning of the respective political parties in Germany and Russia, the National Socialist and Bolsheviks respectively.
Much of the material here focuses on how the unique evolution of these parties from inception to the start of conflict, and how those unique paths of development may have informed the starting state of the respective national militaries from the start of Operation Barbarossa to the Battle of Kursk. In the case of the Soviet Union, more than a decade of political purges destroyed the older cadre of military officials, with the new class of generals and their inferiors hand selected from the junior and mid-grade officer class by Stalin and the party directly. In contrast, though there were intercine political warfare even within the Nazi party especially in the early years after HItler became chancellor, the officer class and their adjuncts were effectively taken from the same Prussian military aristocracy of the first world war.
In the case of Germany, this worked to it’s advantage at the start of the war, as many innovative military thinkers from the Prussian school helped craft doctrine and organizational principles that propelled Germany beyond the reach of other European powers in terms of martial prowess. In particular, the evolution of storm-tactics (the notion of fast moving units breaching formal fronts to shock and disorganize adversarial formations) employed by Germany in the first world war, to encompass armor and some mechanized infantry, pioneered by Heinz Guaderian, and the related evolution of infantry organization and tactics by Erwin Rommel. Contrary to popular belief, German dominance in the early engagements of the war had less to do with the superiority of it’s technical equipment, which in campaigns like Case White (the invasion of Poland), and the invasion of France, were possibly in parity, or inferior, to their adversaries kit, Especially with respect to armor tonnage/potency with respect to France, but instead had to do with the excellent organizational trainings instilled in the Wehrmachts below the division level, especially in the small-squad and individual levels. This later notion was referred to as the Einheit, and the purposeful training of German units to build an intuition at much of the lower levels of operations was known as Fingerspitzengefühl. In the parlance of modern US doctrine, this is similar to the notion of “driving down command & control” (C&C), to ensure decentralized operational awareness and initiative.
For the Soviet Union, operational decision making for the C&C was preserved at the top. However, what Soviet military planners gained from their unique background was a much stronger connection between the military C&C was a stronger link between themselves and the industrial/economic planning apparatus of the Soviet Union. At least in this era of the Soviet Union, there were a good number of the nomenklatura that were functionally proficient, with professional training in industrial engineering and industrial planning, with the mathematical acumen to back decisions up with some kind of rigor. After the war, this would would later schism to include a more formal technical ‘intelligentsia’ (научно-техническая интеллигенция) which would include economic-planners and industrial organizers, and would serve under the party elites. For this era however, this tight integration between the organs of war and state afforded the Soviet Union a “strategic and economic depth” that would prove to be the ultimate ace-card for the defense of the USSR, and later prosecuting a successful offense into Germany itself. This depth would be proven first in the defense of Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, and Kursk.
The book goes into good detail on the order of battle for each side, as well as the sequence of battle, focusing on actions in the Kursk salients, or the front-line protrusions that formed “the bulge” at Kursk, which the Germans tried to cut off by overwhelming those flanks in a full pincer maneuver. From the German side, these actions include details on the movements and combat of the 2 most well-known/infamous divisions in the battle, the Wermacht’s Großdeutschland division, which included the most advanced German armor, including the Panther tank, and the Waffen SS’ Das Reich division, which like other Waffen SS which had partook is several war crimes, and crimes against humanity throughout the eastern front campaign. The Großdeutschland division also had previously engaged in war crimes with the singling out and execution of captured African French soldiers that were clearly racially motivated.
For the Soviets, the book emphasizes the preparation for the German assault, especially heavily on the Central & Voronezh front, the later commanded by Aleksandr Vasilkevsky, that would support the defense of the Kursk salient by reinforcing the the left/right flanks of the salient, and would factor heavily in the Soviet counter-offensive that eventually dislodged the Germans from the Kursk area, and start the eventual drive back to Germany.
The narrative of battle is complex, although not overly so. It’s slightly above a standard “general reader” level of details. The overarching narrative on the failure of Kursk has to do with three key moments 1. Hitler delayed the assault on Kursk for time to mass more advanced German armor to the theater 2. Intelligence leaks on German positions by Soviet forces which allowed them to anticipate and plan for the eventual assault 3. The aforementioned tight integration between industrial/economic planners and military planners that enabled the production of evermore equipment, as well as the enablement of a tight design/redesign cycle for that equipment to factor in observations on the ground
I wish the book had more details and maps to support the narrative. I found myself sometimes to struggle to understand the situation being described, especially in a battle like Kursk where there are so many “moving parts” during the sequencing of battle. The author has an interesting observation on how the extent of “Blitzkrieg” potency within the scope of that battle, which was that local unit command was indeed superior, with many Wehrmacth commanders experiencing lopsided kill-quotients of 6:1 or higher, further, German lines seemed to remain more cohesive than what one would expect under the circumstances (they were literally swamped during the counter-offensive), and this had much to do with einheit element of German training at the sub-division level.
However, despite these favorable elements, the German general staff had to defend & assault a very broad front, and despite the titanic numbers they deployed (on the order of 1 million men with 10k+ vehicles, which included close to 3k tanks, the amount of surface area, and being so far away from their supply-chain network meant that Germans lacked strategic depth when it came to the defensive phase of the operation. This lack of depth meant that if the Germans made an error, they would have no potency or slack to make up for the error. Given both the dysfunction of the OKW (German general staff/high-command) and the mediocrity of Hitler as either a tactical or strategic leader/thinker, German failure was much more likely than not. This combined with the potency of Soviet economic/military planning, and Stalin’s delegations to those staff with respect to decisions on the field, and the fact that they were much closer to their supply chain network within the eastern front possibly doomed Germany’s venture from the start (although we obviously only know this in hindsight).
Overall, the book was good. I still want to read more on this battle and the eastern front in general, especially from a more detailed and/or academic background. However, this book will suffice as an introduction to the topic. Recommended.
Much of the material here focuses on how the unique evolution of these parties from inception to the start of conflict, and how those unique paths of development may have informed the starting state of the respective national militaries from the start of Operation Barbarossa to the Battle of Kursk. In the case of the Soviet Union, more than a decade of political purges destroyed the older cadre of military officials, with the new class of generals and their inferiors hand selected from the junior and mid-grade officer class by Stalin and the party directly. In contrast, though there were intercine political warfare even within the Nazi party especially in the early years after HItler became chancellor, the officer class and their adjuncts were effectively taken from the same Prussian military aristocracy of the first world war.
In the case of Germany, this worked to it’s advantage at the start of the war, as many innovative military thinkers from the Prussian school helped craft doctrine and organizational principles that propelled Germany beyond the reach of other European powers in terms of martial prowess. In particular, the evolution of storm-tactics (the notion of fast moving units breaching formal fronts to shock and disorganize adversarial formations) employed by Germany in the first world war, to encompass armor and some mechanized infantry, pioneered by Heinz Guaderian, and the related evolution of infantry organization and tactics by Erwin Rommel. Contrary to popular belief, German dominance in the early engagements of the war had less to do with the superiority of it’s technical equipment, which in campaigns like Case White (the invasion of Poland), and the invasion of France, were possibly in parity, or inferior, to their adversaries kit, Especially with respect to armor tonnage/potency with respect to France, but instead had to do with the excellent organizational trainings instilled in the Wehrmachts below the division level, especially in the small-squad and individual levels. This later notion was referred to as the Einheit, and the purposeful training of German units to build an intuition at much of the lower levels of operations was known as Fingerspitzengefühl. In the parlance of modern US doctrine, this is similar to the notion of “driving down command & control” (C&C), to ensure decentralized operational awareness and initiative.
For the Soviet Union, operational decision making for the C&C was preserved at the top. However, what Soviet military planners gained from their unique background was a much stronger connection between the military C&C was a stronger link between themselves and the industrial/economic planning apparatus of the Soviet Union. At least in this era of the Soviet Union, there were a good number of the nomenklatura that were functionally proficient, with professional training in industrial engineering and industrial planning, with the mathematical acumen to back decisions up with some kind of rigor. After the war, this would would later schism to include a more formal technical ‘intelligentsia’ (научно-техническая интеллигенция) which would include economic-planners and industrial organizers, and would serve under the party elites. For this era however, this tight integration between the organs of war and state afforded the Soviet Union a “strategic and economic depth” that would prove to be the ultimate ace-card for the defense of the USSR, and later prosecuting a successful offense into Germany itself. This depth would be proven first in the defense of Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, and Kursk.
The book goes into good detail on the order of battle for each side, as well as the sequence of battle, focusing on actions in the Kursk salients, or the front-line protrusions that formed “the bulge” at Kursk, which the Germans tried to cut off by overwhelming those flanks in a full pincer maneuver. From the German side, these actions include details on the movements and combat of the 2 most well-known/infamous divisions in the battle, the Wermacht’s Großdeutschland division, which included the most advanced German armor, including the Panther tank, and the Waffen SS’ Das Reich division, which like other Waffen SS which had partook is several war crimes, and crimes against humanity throughout the eastern front campaign. The Großdeutschland division also had previously engaged in war crimes with the singling out and execution of captured African French soldiers that were clearly racially motivated.
For the Soviets, the book emphasizes the preparation for the German assault, especially heavily on the Central & Voronezh front, the later commanded by Aleksandr Vasilkevsky, that would support the defense of the Kursk salient by reinforcing the the left/right flanks of the salient, and would factor heavily in the Soviet counter-offensive that eventually dislodged the Germans from the Kursk area, and start the eventual drive back to Germany.
The narrative of battle is complex, although not overly so. It’s slightly above a standard “general reader” level of details. The overarching narrative on the failure of Kursk has to do with three key moments 1. Hitler delayed the assault on Kursk for time to mass more advanced German armor to the theater 2. Intelligence leaks on German positions by Soviet forces which allowed them to anticipate and plan for the eventual assault 3. The aforementioned tight integration between industrial/economic planners and military planners that enabled the production of evermore equipment, as well as the enablement of a tight design/redesign cycle for that equipment to factor in observations on the ground
I wish the book had more details and maps to support the narrative. I found myself sometimes to struggle to understand the situation being described, especially in a battle like Kursk where there are so many “moving parts” during the sequencing of battle. The author has an interesting observation on how the extent of “Blitzkrieg” potency within the scope of that battle, which was that local unit command was indeed superior, with many Wehrmacth commanders experiencing lopsided kill-quotients of 6:1 or higher, further, German lines seemed to remain more cohesive than what one would expect under the circumstances (they were literally swamped during the counter-offensive), and this had much to do with einheit element of German training at the sub-division level.
However, despite these favorable elements, the German general staff had to defend & assault a very broad front, and despite the titanic numbers they deployed (on the order of 1 million men with 10k+ vehicles, which included close to 3k tanks, the amount of surface area, and being so far away from their supply-chain network meant that Germans lacked strategic depth when it came to the defensive phase of the operation. This lack of depth meant that if the Germans made an error, they would have no potency or slack to make up for the error. Given both the dysfunction of the OKW (German general staff/high-command) and the mediocrity of Hitler as either a tactical or strategic leader/thinker, German failure was much more likely than not. This combined with the potency of Soviet economic/military planning, and Stalin’s delegations to those staff with respect to decisions on the field, and the fact that they were much closer to their supply chain network within the eastern front possibly doomed Germany’s venture from the start (although we obviously only know this in hindsight).
Overall, the book was good. I still want to read more on this battle and the eastern front in general, especially from a more detailed and/or academic background. However, this book will suffice as an introduction to the topic. Recommended.
October 11, 2021
A very good study of the battle for the Kursk salient, widely viewed as the largest, most important, tank battle in history. Especially good on the details of the reasons that led to the battle, and the 12 days of the actual fight: both a good sense of what mattered, coupled with interesting details at the level ofndividuals who fought there.
The book spends about half of the words on the Russo-German war from 1941 to 1943, in order to provide context for anyone coming to the book without a background on that. Honestly, I think it is well-intended, but could be skipped for anyone who has a good sense of the outline of the war, and who already understands the credible argument that World War II was decided on the Russia front.
I really liked the chapters on the actual battle. I've not seen it covered in this detail. He takes the time to walk the battlefield with veterans who survived, and provides a day-by-day review of events. I have looked for a book like this before, and am grateful that Clark wrote this.
The book spends about half of the words on the Russo-German war from 1941 to 1943, in order to provide context for anyone coming to the book without a background on that. Honestly, I think it is well-intended, but could be skipped for anyone who has a good sense of the outline of the war, and who already understands the credible argument that World War II was decided on the Russia front.
I really liked the chapters on the actual battle. I've not seen it covered in this detail. He takes the time to walk the battlefield with veterans who survived, and provides a day-by-day review of events. I have looked for a book like this before, and am grateful that Clark wrote this.
March 20, 2023
Kursk has been held up as an example of Deep War. This book is almost deep history, in the sense that instead of starting in 1943, it begins with the end of the Great War.
This is a bit of a problem. Although it's well written, anyone that interested in learning about a specific battle, Kursk in this case, will already have a good general knowledge of the the lead up to World War Two and the German invasion of the USSR. Hence the first half of the book is pretty pointless. Oddly for all of the attention given to the build up to Kursk, the aftermath is briefly mentioned and this is far more significant than the deep build up.
The maps are a bit disappointing.
The account of the actual battle is very good. I enjoyed reading that. The real strength comes from the accounts written by survivors. These are without fail always interesting and provide the backbone to this part.
This is a bit of a problem. Although it's well written, anyone that interested in learning about a specific battle, Kursk in this case, will already have a good general knowledge of the the lead up to World War Two and the German invasion of the USSR. Hence the first half of the book is pretty pointless. Oddly for all of the attention given to the build up to Kursk, the aftermath is briefly mentioned and this is far more significant than the deep build up.
The maps are a bit disappointing.
The account of the actual battle is very good. I enjoyed reading that. The real strength comes from the accounts written by survivors. These are without fail always interesting and provide the backbone to this part.
January 1, 2025
WAS THIS TANK BATTLE THE TURNING POINT OF WORLD WAR II?
If you read a lot about World War II, you’ll come across not one but several battles mentioned as the “turning point.” Focusing only on Europe, five events surface. Moscow (January 1942). Stalingrad (February 1943). Kursk (August 1943). Operation Bagration (August 1944). And, of course, Normandy (August 1944). The first four, and possibly the fifth, deserve consideration. But the point is academic.
It’s unreasonable to look for a single watershed moment in such a titanic global struggle. That said, there can be no question that in the Battle of Kursk, the largest battle in history, the Wehrmacht met its match, and lost. And British military historian Lloyd Clark gives Kursk its due in The Battle of the Tanks. As Winston Churchill commented, “Stalingrad was the end of the beginning; but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end.”
A COLOSSAL BATTLE VIEWED IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The Battle of the Tanks is the story, brilliantly told, of the largest battle in the history of warfare. However, it’s not a simple blow-by-blow account of a two-month-long event. Clark views the Battle of Kursk in a larger, strategic context. “It was a confrontation characterized by hideous excess and outrageous atrocities,” he writes, “involving the two largest national armies ever amassed, and fought over four years in operations stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. It concluded with Germany having incurred nearly three million military dead and the Soviet Union a staggering 10 million.”
In other words, the Battle of Kursk was an inflection point in the war on the Eastern Front. It was the prelude to Operation Bagration and the rapid march of the Red Army westward toward Berlin. And, reflecting this perspective, Clark devotes the first third of the book to reviewing the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union from its inception in June 1941 through through the conclusion of the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943.
A GRANULAR ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE
In The Battle of the Tanks, Clark cites the views of soldiers on the ground as well as those of their commanding officers and of the two contending tyrants, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. He masterfully intersperses sometimes lengthy quotes from the front with those in the words of the two supreme commanders and their field marshals. Those quotes appear throughout. They’re mixed within an account of the disposition of forces on both sides at the divisional, corps, army, and army group levels. And, if the book has a weakness for the general reader, it’s that those passages can be deadly dull. Specialists in military history might think differently.
Without detailed maps at hand and lacking the willingness to read at a snail’s pace, that granular account of the fighting didn’t work well for me. However, the book comes to life through the author’s extensive use of quotations. On every page or two the author quotes from memoirs, letters to wives and girlfriends, official unit histories, and written orders from Hitler and Stalin—and those quotes make the book worthwhile. They convey a visceral sense of the day-by-day experience on the ground. And you can appreciate that experience by skipping the long passages that detail the movement of divisions and armies by name and read only the indented quotations. That’s what I did in the book’s final chapters when my impatience got the best of me.
AN ACCOUNT REFLECTING GRAND STRATEGY
This book’s greatest strength is the strategic perspective it reflects. And that perspective is not limited to the fighting itself. As Lloyd Clark points out, “It was not by tank duels that the Battle of Kursk—or even the Second World War—was won, but by the production battle in the factories . . .” For the Soviet Union, Clark observes, “the route to victory lay in out-producing Germany.” And that’s precisely the Soviets achieved.
“In 1942,” for example, the USSR produced “24,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 127,000 guns and mortars and 25,000 aircraft. Over the same period the Germans produced 9,000 tanks, 12,000 guns and mortars and 15,000 aircraft.” And Lend-Lease from the United States, increased the advantage. “By 1943 [the American program] was providing 17 per cent of Soviet aircraft, nearly 16 per cent of guns and ammunition and 14 per cent of vehicles.”
The upshot was that in the Battle of Kursk, Germany found it impossible to continue replacing all the weapons (and men) lost on the field. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union kept bringing increasingly better-equipped and better- trained troops in enormous numbers into the fight. Despite sometimes dramatically lopsided losses by the Soviets, the disparity in manpower and production levels eventually proved decisive.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lloyd Clark is cofounder of the Centre for Army Leadership based at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and is a professor at the University of Buckingham, where he teaches Modern War Studies and Contemporary Military History. He was born in 1967 and educated in history and war studies at King’s College, University of London. Clark is the author of at least nine nonfiction books. He is also a regular media commentator and presents frequently on television. He is married with three grown children.
If you read a lot about World War II, you’ll come across not one but several battles mentioned as the “turning point.” Focusing only on Europe, five events surface. Moscow (January 1942). Stalingrad (February 1943). Kursk (August 1943). Operation Bagration (August 1944). And, of course, Normandy (August 1944). The first four, and possibly the fifth, deserve consideration. But the point is academic.
It’s unreasonable to look for a single watershed moment in such a titanic global struggle. That said, there can be no question that in the Battle of Kursk, the largest battle in history, the Wehrmacht met its match, and lost. And British military historian Lloyd Clark gives Kursk its due in The Battle of the Tanks. As Winston Churchill commented, “Stalingrad was the end of the beginning; but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end.”
A COLOSSAL BATTLE VIEWED IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The Battle of the Tanks is the story, brilliantly told, of the largest battle in the history of warfare. However, it’s not a simple blow-by-blow account of a two-month-long event. Clark views the Battle of Kursk in a larger, strategic context. “It was a confrontation characterized by hideous excess and outrageous atrocities,” he writes, “involving the two largest national armies ever amassed, and fought over four years in operations stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. It concluded with Germany having incurred nearly three million military dead and the Soviet Union a staggering 10 million.”
In other words, the Battle of Kursk was an inflection point in the war on the Eastern Front. It was the prelude to Operation Bagration and the rapid march of the Red Army westward toward Berlin. And, reflecting this perspective, Clark devotes the first third of the book to reviewing the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union from its inception in June 1941 through through the conclusion of the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943.
A GRANULAR ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE
In The Battle of the Tanks, Clark cites the views of soldiers on the ground as well as those of their commanding officers and of the two contending tyrants, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. He masterfully intersperses sometimes lengthy quotes from the front with those in the words of the two supreme commanders and their field marshals. Those quotes appear throughout. They’re mixed within an account of the disposition of forces on both sides at the divisional, corps, army, and army group levels. And, if the book has a weakness for the general reader, it’s that those passages can be deadly dull. Specialists in military history might think differently.
Without detailed maps at hand and lacking the willingness to read at a snail’s pace, that granular account of the fighting didn’t work well for me. However, the book comes to life through the author’s extensive use of quotations. On every page or two the author quotes from memoirs, letters to wives and girlfriends, official unit histories, and written orders from Hitler and Stalin—and those quotes make the book worthwhile. They convey a visceral sense of the day-by-day experience on the ground. And you can appreciate that experience by skipping the long passages that detail the movement of divisions and armies by name and read only the indented quotations. That’s what I did in the book’s final chapters when my impatience got the best of me.
AN ACCOUNT REFLECTING GRAND STRATEGY
This book’s greatest strength is the strategic perspective it reflects. And that perspective is not limited to the fighting itself. As Lloyd Clark points out, “It was not by tank duels that the Battle of Kursk—or even the Second World War—was won, but by the production battle in the factories . . .” For the Soviet Union, Clark observes, “the route to victory lay in out-producing Germany.” And that’s precisely the Soviets achieved.
“In 1942,” for example, the USSR produced “24,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 127,000 guns and mortars and 25,000 aircraft. Over the same period the Germans produced 9,000 tanks, 12,000 guns and mortars and 15,000 aircraft.” And Lend-Lease from the United States, increased the advantage. “By 1943 [the American program] was providing 17 per cent of Soviet aircraft, nearly 16 per cent of guns and ammunition and 14 per cent of vehicles.”
The upshot was that in the Battle of Kursk, Germany found it impossible to continue replacing all the weapons (and men) lost on the field. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union kept bringing increasingly better-equipped and better- trained troops in enormous numbers into the fight. Despite sometimes dramatically lopsided losses by the Soviets, the disparity in manpower and production levels eventually proved decisive.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lloyd Clark is cofounder of the Centre for Army Leadership based at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and is a professor at the University of Buckingham, where he teaches Modern War Studies and Contemporary Military History. He was born in 1967 and educated in history and war studies at King’s College, University of London. Clark is the author of at least nine nonfiction books. He is also a regular media commentator and presents frequently on television. He is married with three grown children.
March 30, 2015
I've always been a WWII reader, but I never encountered a book focusing on the Russo-German War fought during this time. The strategies, the battles, and the tanks that filled this book possibly makes this the best book on tank warfare I've ever read, to be honest. A great read!
March 19, 2023
Kursk? What's a Kursk? This battle, arguably the turning point in WWII, seems little known in the United States. Yet it was an enormous struggle and a devastating defeat for Nazi Germany. It spelled the end of the German Army's territorial expansion; after Kursk, it would be only retreat.
Churchill called the Battle of Stalingrad "the end of the beginning" of the war. Nazi Germany's relentless advance across Europe had been stopped. Six months later came the Battle of Kursk, which he called "the beginning of the end." It certainly was the beginning of the end for Hitler. And it happened in the Kursk salient a year before the American and British landing at Normandy.
Arguably, it was the Soviets who defeated Hitler. I wonder how many Americans are even aware that the USSR was our ally in the war? Josef Stalin's Communist Russia.
So this book is definitely worth reading. It is well balanced, dramatic without overdoing it, neither a blood and guts glorification nor an anti-war polemic. It certainly doesn't excessively praise the Red Army. The Soviets took a terrible beating in this battle of attrition, their losses far exceeding the Germans'. They prevailed not because their tanks or tactics were better (they weren't) but because they had far more of both, and could send in an endless stream of both.
Lloyd Clark's book presents an excellent overview of an extremely complex event, complete with personal diary entries from the front for a humanizing touch. It's fine history writing. My sole reservation is that the book ends at the turning point of Kursk, where the Germans were thrown on the defensive. In that sense, it is less the story of the Battle of Kursk than that of Operation Citadel, the failed German offensive.
Churchill called the Battle of Stalingrad "the end of the beginning" of the war. Nazi Germany's relentless advance across Europe had been stopped. Six months later came the Battle of Kursk, which he called "the beginning of the end." It certainly was the beginning of the end for Hitler. And it happened in the Kursk salient a year before the American and British landing at Normandy.
Arguably, it was the Soviets who defeated Hitler. I wonder how many Americans are even aware that the USSR was our ally in the war? Josef Stalin's Communist Russia.
So this book is definitely worth reading. It is well balanced, dramatic without overdoing it, neither a blood and guts glorification nor an anti-war polemic. It certainly doesn't excessively praise the Red Army. The Soviets took a terrible beating in this battle of attrition, their losses far exceeding the Germans'. They prevailed not because their tanks or tactics were better (they weren't) but because they had far more of both, and could send in an endless stream of both.
Lloyd Clark's book presents an excellent overview of an extremely complex event, complete with personal diary entries from the front for a humanizing touch. It's fine history writing. My sole reservation is that the book ends at the turning point of Kursk, where the Germans were thrown on the defensive. In that sense, it is less the story of the Battle of Kursk than that of Operation Citadel, the failed German offensive.
October 18, 2023
A powerful rendering of historical background and first-hand accounts of the massive Battle of Kursk, a decisive two-week tank, infantry, and air war battle that was the last major German offensive against Soviet forces. The forces arrayed made up the largest land battle in the worst war in human history.
The first third of the book establishes both the rise of Hitler's power (and his horrific destruction of German democracy and the costly inter-party purges that Joseph Stalin engaged in his paranoid delusions that those in the military and party apparatus were spies or counter-revolutionaries. From then on the narrative follows the two years of war, mass murder, and destruction on the Eastern Front that led to Kursk.
There follows a day-by-day breakdown of the battle over the two weeks of the main battle and counter-attacks that began in the early hours of July 5th 1943. One of the keys to victory for the Red Army's ability to absorb staggering losses and still somehow maintain effective fighting units.
The most compelling parts of the book come from accounts by German and Soviet troops and low-level officers who bore the brunt of the battle. It is a grim and sometimes disturbing story of human warfare that, as a grace note, opens and closes with a touching modern report of old soldiers recounting the massive battle they somehow came through.
The first third of the book establishes both the rise of Hitler's power (and his horrific destruction of German democracy and the costly inter-party purges that Joseph Stalin engaged in his paranoid delusions that those in the military and party apparatus were spies or counter-revolutionaries. From then on the narrative follows the two years of war, mass murder, and destruction on the Eastern Front that led to Kursk.
There follows a day-by-day breakdown of the battle over the two weeks of the main battle and counter-attacks that began in the early hours of July 5th 1943. One of the keys to victory for the Red Army's ability to absorb staggering losses and still somehow maintain effective fighting units.
The most compelling parts of the book come from accounts by German and Soviet troops and low-level officers who bore the brunt of the battle. It is a grim and sometimes disturbing story of human warfare that, as a grace note, opens and closes with a touching modern report of old soldiers recounting the massive battle they somehow came through.
December 23, 2022
A fascinating superb book!! Read this in 2 main chunks, firstly during a summer holiday in Norfolk mostly sat on the beach. Does a great job in drawing a dotted line from the start of Barbarossa to Moscow to Stalingrad and then to Kursk. Once the battle starts, it does a wonderful job in capturing the vast scale, utter complexity and intense savage violence of the battle. Also adds the significant flexibility on display as both sides react to an ever changing battlefield. As with most war books, it can be difficult to to follow battle but is still fascinating nevertheless, the level of attrition on display is incredible.
Only downer is that the second chunk of reading was in the days before Xmas and I think I had lost some of the momentum I had built from reading when I was on holiday…
Only downer is that the second chunk of reading was in the days before Xmas and I think I had lost some of the momentum I had built from reading when I was on holiday…
March 17, 2025
An excellent and well-researched account of the Battle of Kursk. The book actually spends most of the first half reviewing the respective rise to power of Hitler and Stalin, then reviews the first two years of war on the Eastern Front, therefore giving the battle (what Churchill would call the "beginning of the end" for the Nazis) proper context. The author gives us a broad strategic and tactical overview, but also includes plenty of excerpts from the personal accounts of infantrymen, tankers, pilots and so on from both sides. So the book gives us an understanding of the battle as a whole--but also includes plenty of glimpses of what it was like on the frontlines, surrounded by dead comrades and burning tanks, while the enemy rained more hellfire down on you.
May 24, 2021
This is an accessible narrative of the Battle of Kursk in 1943. The first 160 pages of the volume is consumed by background where the writer explains the context leading up to the titanic struggle. The writer had utilised primary sources, conducted interviews with veterans of the struggle as well as quoted secondary sources. What results is a readable narrative incorporating much of the latest thought on the Zitadelle offensive. The book is a narrative that is geared towards a general audience and is not an operational study or analysis. Lastly, what would improve this volume would be maps, more maps than the few that accompanied each chapter.
November 15, 2025
It's a highly detailed account of the Kursk offensive. Therein also lies the problem for me, it's tough to get through. It starts off with a concise but good overview of WW2 development, gradually increasing the 'resolution' through the Eastern Front Blitzkrieg, up to the Kursk offensive. Of course this is the whole point of the book, but I suppose it's not for me. Also, the maps are placed at the beginning (or end) of each chapter, but they're not relevant for that chapter per se, leading to difficulty finding the described geography.
February 4, 2019
I thought the maps could have been more numerous, and the maps that were included didn't seem to appear at the relevant chapters. But I liked the lengthy preamble to the actual offensive and the testimonials of German and Soviet participants was effective. There's plenty here to counteract the tendency of amateur military history students to fixate on weapons without looking at the bigger picture of economies, production, logistics, strategic planning, and so forth.
October 7, 2019
Fascinating story. I study a lot of WWII topics but never heard of this battle. This is a detailed military analysis of a series of complicated battles. It also covers the conditions long term that led to it. You understand why the leaders made the choices they did. I found it hard to follow in parts because the narrative refers to commanders and units so that it is hard to keep track of which side and which area he's talking about. You need a program to keep it straight.
March 25, 2022
I'm not entirely sure who this book is for... It wastes roughly 40% of the book on an overview of the war up to mid-1943 which is almost entirely unnecessary and could have been handled in a fraction of the time. But surely anyone interested in a book on a specific battle in the middle of the war ought to be expected to have a working knowledge of the war? The second half was a *decent* overview, but it just felt overshadowed by the poor use of pacing.
June 5, 2017
This is a great book that outlines the war in the east and how it came to a pivotal point at the battle for Kursk. The author does a good job of mixing 1st hand accounts and higher level strategy to give the reader a good perspective.
I also liked the conclusions that the author draws about the importance of the battle and what might have changed if it never occurred.
I also liked the conclusions that the author draws about the importance of the battle and what might have changed if it never occurred.
June 6, 2020
Refused to finish.
I was quite taken by this book until I read the name David Irving and at that point I lost ALL respect for the book, the sources used and quoted, as well as the author. David Irving is a Holocaust denier, a lover of Hitler, an a complete joke to legitimate historians. Shame on Lloyd Clark.
I was quite taken by this book until I read the name David Irving and at that point I lost ALL respect for the book, the sources used and quoted, as well as the author. David Irving is a Holocaust denier, a lover of Hitler, an a complete joke to legitimate historians. Shame on Lloyd Clark.
July 17, 2020
Superb history
This detailed account of the events leading up to and the cataclysmic battle for the Kursk salient explains how and why this was a turning point for the German and Russian armies. Following the German defeat, Russia began its inexorable drive to the final collapse of WWII Germany.
This detailed account of the events leading up to and the cataclysmic battle for the Kursk salient explains how and why this was a turning point for the German and Russian armies. Following the German defeat, Russia began its inexorable drive to the final collapse of WWII Germany.
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