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Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins
Song of Wrath tells the story of Classical Athens’ victorious 10 Years’ War (431–421) against grim Sparta—the 1st decade of the terrible Peloponnesian War that turned the Golden Age of Greece to lead. Historian J.E. Lendon presents a sweeping tale of pitched battles by land & sea, sieges, sacks, raids, & deeds of cruelty & guile—along with courageous acts of mercy, surprising charity, austere restraint & arrogant resistance. Recounting the rise of democratic Athens to great-power status, & the resulting fury of authoritarian Sparta, Greece’s traditional leader, Lendon portrays the causes & strategy of the war as a duel over national honor, a series of acts of revenge. A story of new pride challenging old, Song of Wrath is the 1st work of Ancient Greek history for the post-cold-war generation.
576 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
August 28, 2023
J E Lendon, professor of history at UVA, walks the well-tread ground of ancient Greek history in this recounting of the first ten years of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. This period was perhaps most notably covered in the past half century by Donald Kagan of Cornell. For the next seventeen years of the conflicts, concluding with Athens surrender, we can only hope that Lendon will continue the saga. Until then we have Kagan, who while somewhat more prosaic is nevertheless a worthy guide.
This is by no means another dry rework as have been others of recent recall. It is a labor of love, which often waxes poetic in the telling of Thucydides' history. Consider this writing: "To her neighbors, the Boetians and Copais gave their comfortable things: herbs and rushes, plump ducks and woodcocks, and above all tasty eels grown fat from nibbling beneath the green brown waters upon the inundated works of forgotten men."
From the opening passages describing a night time betrayal and attack on Sparta by Athenian avengers, the ten-year tit-for-tat war of ravage and revenge is drawn in devastating detail. Lendon describes sacrifices bled in the surf during the Eleusinian Mysteries, the wailing of newly made widows and the dramatic last minute reprieve at the siege of Mytilene, all with equal commitment.
Perhaps more importantly there is the psychological and political underpinning of the events based on honor and revenge, told with a lucidity that lays bare the stunning tragedy and madness of war. The theme may be iterated a few times too many, but it is a trifling quibble. The book is worth reading again. It is rare for a such a familiar story to be so well retold.
This is by no means another dry rework as have been others of recent recall. It is a labor of love, which often waxes poetic in the telling of Thucydides' history. Consider this writing: "To her neighbors, the Boetians and Copais gave their comfortable things: herbs and rushes, plump ducks and woodcocks, and above all tasty eels grown fat from nibbling beneath the green brown waters upon the inundated works of forgotten men."
From the opening passages describing a night time betrayal and attack on Sparta by Athenian avengers, the ten-year tit-for-tat war of ravage and revenge is drawn in devastating detail. Lendon describes sacrifices bled in the surf during the Eleusinian Mysteries, the wailing of newly made widows and the dramatic last minute reprieve at the siege of Mytilene, all with equal commitment.
Perhaps more importantly there is the psychological and political underpinning of the events based on honor and revenge, told with a lucidity that lays bare the stunning tragedy and madness of war. The theme may be iterated a few times too many, but it is a trifling quibble. The book is worth reading again. It is rare for a such a familiar story to be so well retold.
November 6, 2014
Hybris is the Greek word. A claim to rank and to worth thought not deserved or not yet earned. The concept as it concerned the Greeks went back at least as far as Achilles and Agamemnon in the opening lines of Iliad. By the time of the mid-400s BC its influence on rank had become the most important determinate of power among the Greek city-states. As J. E. Lendon informs us in Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins, it was the primary cause of the war.
The Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens and their allies lasted 27 years, 431-404 BC. Our primary source--though not the sole source--of the events of the causes and events of the war has always been The Peloponnesian War, the history by the great Athenian historian and general, Thucycides. From his history have evolved our notions of that conflict reflecting in many ways the conflicts of our time. Some of the political thinking of today and then can be mirrored. Though he limits himself to writing about the first ten years of the war, ended by the tentative but well-intentioned Peace of Nicias in 421 BC, Lendon's convincing analysis is that what was different between the modern age and the ancient, what's strange to us, and what caused the war and determined how it was fought wasn't a desire for conquest, political gain, and wealth, but instead perceptions of rank, pride, and honor, and questions of hegemony. For most of the century Sparta had been the predominant power of the Greek world. In 431 BC, probably as it had always been, divisions of power among the many city-states was well-established and universally recognized, though most likely not officially designated. It was an informal understanding. Challenges to the order were justification for armed conflict of some kind, the conduct of which wasn't the total war of our time in which we try to severely damage our enemies and limit their ability ro fight us. Greek warfare was largely demonstrations and raids, posturing and challenge. Defeat was often determined by one side or the other refusing to take the field. And wartime operations were carefully orchestrated to avoid escalation. Tit for tat. A Spartan invasion of the region around Athens to destroy crops was answered by Athenian raids along the Pelopennesian coast, but nothing more that would alter the strategic situation. So it was that in mid-century when Athens began to be a force in the region, primarily as a naval power, and acted belligerently in response to Spartan strongarm treatment of states near Athens, it was seen as a challenge to Sparta's hegemony and a bid for equal ranking--hybris--and an intolerable state of affairs for Sparta.
Lendon writes that Thucydides understood his world and conflict in these terms. However, he didn't detail the impulses for war and peace in his great history. His audience, after all, was Greek, and they understood the importance of rank, pride, and hegemony without having it spelled out. The blurring has occurred in our own interpretation of Thucydides's history because we see war and diplomacy in terms of political gain, wealth, or conquest. So this is a fascinating work and one which forms a fresh perspective on one of the most important conflicts of the ancient world. Because it took place during Greek's Golden Age, it ripples culturally all these long years down to us.
Other than the fascinating analysis and interpretation, which is what good history is, another attraction of Lendon's book is how well it's written. The language is almost Homeric, and it approaches the lyrical. I've seldom come across history written this well. If you enjoy reading good history written engagingly, and if you're interested in ancient Greece and the Peloponnesian War, this is a book for you.
The Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens and their allies lasted 27 years, 431-404 BC. Our primary source--though not the sole source--of the events of the causes and events of the war has always been The Peloponnesian War, the history by the great Athenian historian and general, Thucycides. From his history have evolved our notions of that conflict reflecting in many ways the conflicts of our time. Some of the political thinking of today and then can be mirrored. Though he limits himself to writing about the first ten years of the war, ended by the tentative but well-intentioned Peace of Nicias in 421 BC, Lendon's convincing analysis is that what was different between the modern age and the ancient, what's strange to us, and what caused the war and determined how it was fought wasn't a desire for conquest, political gain, and wealth, but instead perceptions of rank, pride, and honor, and questions of hegemony. For most of the century Sparta had been the predominant power of the Greek world. In 431 BC, probably as it had always been, divisions of power among the many city-states was well-established and universally recognized, though most likely not officially designated. It was an informal understanding. Challenges to the order were justification for armed conflict of some kind, the conduct of which wasn't the total war of our time in which we try to severely damage our enemies and limit their ability ro fight us. Greek warfare was largely demonstrations and raids, posturing and challenge. Defeat was often determined by one side or the other refusing to take the field. And wartime operations were carefully orchestrated to avoid escalation. Tit for tat. A Spartan invasion of the region around Athens to destroy crops was answered by Athenian raids along the Pelopennesian coast, but nothing more that would alter the strategic situation. So it was that in mid-century when Athens began to be a force in the region, primarily as a naval power, and acted belligerently in response to Spartan strongarm treatment of states near Athens, it was seen as a challenge to Sparta's hegemony and a bid for equal ranking--hybris--and an intolerable state of affairs for Sparta.
Lendon writes that Thucydides understood his world and conflict in these terms. However, he didn't detail the impulses for war and peace in his great history. His audience, after all, was Greek, and they understood the importance of rank, pride, and hegemony without having it spelled out. The blurring has occurred in our own interpretation of Thucydides's history because we see war and diplomacy in terms of political gain, wealth, or conquest. So this is a fascinating work and one which forms a fresh perspective on one of the most important conflicts of the ancient world. Because it took place during Greek's Golden Age, it ripples culturally all these long years down to us.
Other than the fascinating analysis and interpretation, which is what good history is, another attraction of Lendon's book is how well it's written. The language is almost Homeric, and it approaches the lyrical. I've seldom come across history written this well. If you enjoy reading good history written engagingly, and if you're interested in ancient Greece and the Peloponnesian War, this is a book for you.
October 8, 2011
The Greeks present an unequalled temptation to cheap ventriloquism, so tantalizing the apparent similarities between their world and ours. How easy to slither into the back of a Demosthenes or Epitadas and wave his long-dead hand to our modern tune. The ancients then wheeze and stammer our own thoughts back at us, and we nod and guffaw in turn. In stark contrast, the historian's art is to amplify the tenuous voice of antiquity without distorting it, so that ancient voices make themselves heard above the modern din. Song of Wrath demonstrates that J.E. Lendon is a historian of rare and exceptional craft.
Set against the canvas of the Peloponnesian War, Song of Wrath examines the Greeks as men motivated by competitive honor. Much as Herodotus sought the font of the Persian wars, Lendon aims to unravel the Gordian knot of the causes of Peloponnesian war. Acknowledging the tapestry of Greek motivation, Lendon plucks out a seemingly curious strand: a cycle of hubris, wrath, and revenge--quite alien to the modern mind--that goaded Greek men to war. That this was as true of cities as their citizens is equally foreign to our sensibility. Lendon convincingly argues that this cyclical corporate passion undergirds the war between Athens and Sparta. In particular, he narrates the carefully reciprocal series of pillage, raids, battles, and negotiations, through which Athens and Sparta sought to establish hegemony in the eyes of their fellow Greeks. The cruel calculus that ranked the Greeks makes sense of a plethora of odd details of the war: why did culpable Boetia escape the depradations of Athens so long? why did the Athenians ignore Platea in their demands after their victory at Navarino?
If its argument makes Song of Wrath an important book, the élan with which Lendon delivers it makes Song of Wrath a delightful book. Its opening passage evoking an night-time Athenian assault on Megara, its paean to the eels of Copaïs, and its account of quirky, fatal augury of the Thracians deftly season the meat of the argument. His writing marries the calm study of the historian, "in the company of his friendly circle of abstract nouns," as Lendon describes Thucydides, with an eye for image and and ear for cadence that suit the epic scope of the war as well as Homer could ask.
Near the end of his lament in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians, Lendon imagines "Tacitus, a Roman wielding a Roman pen in a Roman room, poring over and comparing the works of his Roman predecessors, here re-writing, here combining, here adding something that he has found out, here thrilling when he can finish a story he got from a predecessor with one of the brilliant sententiae his Roman audience loved." (J. E. Lendon, Historians without History: Against Roman Historiography.) Reading Song of Wrath, we must understand that Lendon's description of Tacitus applies curiously well to Lendon himself. Born out of time, he is a Greek, writing with a Greek pen, here combining, there analyzing, and all throughout delighting in his eels.
Set against the canvas of the Peloponnesian War, Song of Wrath examines the Greeks as men motivated by competitive honor. Much as Herodotus sought the font of the Persian wars, Lendon aims to unravel the Gordian knot of the causes of Peloponnesian war. Acknowledging the tapestry of Greek motivation, Lendon plucks out a seemingly curious strand: a cycle of hubris, wrath, and revenge--quite alien to the modern mind--that goaded Greek men to war. That this was as true of cities as their citizens is equally foreign to our sensibility. Lendon convincingly argues that this cyclical corporate passion undergirds the war between Athens and Sparta. In particular, he narrates the carefully reciprocal series of pillage, raids, battles, and negotiations, through which Athens and Sparta sought to establish hegemony in the eyes of their fellow Greeks. The cruel calculus that ranked the Greeks makes sense of a plethora of odd details of the war: why did culpable Boetia escape the depradations of Athens so long? why did the Athenians ignore Platea in their demands after their victory at Navarino?
If its argument makes Song of Wrath an important book, the élan with which Lendon delivers it makes Song of Wrath a delightful book. Its opening passage evoking an night-time Athenian assault on Megara, its paean to the eels of Copaïs, and its account of quirky, fatal augury of the Thracians deftly season the meat of the argument. His writing marries the calm study of the historian, "in the company of his friendly circle of abstract nouns," as Lendon describes Thucydides, with an eye for image and and ear for cadence that suit the epic scope of the war as well as Homer could ask.
Near the end of his lament in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians, Lendon imagines "Tacitus, a Roman wielding a Roman pen in a Roman room, poring over and comparing the works of his Roman predecessors, here re-writing, here combining, here adding something that he has found out, here thrilling when he can finish a story he got from a predecessor with one of the brilliant sententiae his Roman audience loved." (J. E. Lendon, Historians without History: Against Roman Historiography.) Reading Song of Wrath, we must understand that Lendon's description of Tacitus applies curiously well to Lendon himself. Born out of time, he is a Greek, writing with a Greek pen, here combining, there analyzing, and all throughout delighting in his eels.
May 3, 2021
Great look at the how's and why's of what started the Peloponnesian War and how its opening moves set it up for a long protracted slog.
March 13, 2017
this is a really impressive work with a interesting theory of a order of city-states based on timè. but the repetitiveness of explaining every battle in this way made me loose interest and put the book away for some time before reading it again.
November 5, 2011
Lendon has a hobby horse and he rides it pretty hard. Now, don't get me wrong, he has an interesting thesis (interesting especially because it is based on his understanding of the cultures involved). He should have just let the story speak for itself after laying out his argument at the beginning. It is a shame that the book becomes so repetitious. Now, perhaps the repetitiousness is due to his theory being controversial (i.e. defensiveness about it against critics)? I don't know the field enough to say.
Now, his basic thesis is that all the events and decisions of the war were based on the protagonists' efforts to reach either equality or superiority of rank. Here's a long quote that summarizes this:
“Despite changes in leadership…Athens’ strategy in the Ten Years’ War was remarkably consistent, at least in its objective: she sought a higher rank than Sparta had been willing to acknowledge before the war. To be sure, that objective was sought by different methods, and to different degrees, at different stages; under Pericles, the Athenians sought to prove their equality in rank with Sparta by reciprocal and proportionate revenge. From late 427 BC until their isolation of the Spartans on Sphacteria, they sought the same goal but abandoned the limitations of reciprocity and proportion. Once they had isolated the Spartans on Sphacteria, and even more so after they had captured the men on the island, the Athenians elevated their ambitions. They began to seek superiority in rank over the Spartans rather than mere equality, and to this end they switched to a policy of coercion, rather than merely shaming, to force Sparta to acknowledge Athenian superiority.
Athens’ coercion of Sparta, taking the form of the raids from Pylos and Cythera, was just that: coercion. It was still not intended to destroy Sparta but rather to make Sparta admit that Athens had won the war over rank. But suspecting that Sparta herself might never yield superiority, Athens// attempted to appeal to the wider Greek world in late 425 and 424 BC by embarking upon a concerted policy of emulating her glorious deeds and accomplishments in the 450s and early 440s BC. When that strategy failed at Delium in late 424 BC, Athens returned to seeking equality with Sparta, a goal she achieved in the Peace of Nicias and accompanying alliance of 421 BC.” 376-7
Now, his basic thesis is that all the events and decisions of the war were based on the protagonists' efforts to reach either equality or superiority of rank. Here's a long quote that summarizes this:
“Despite changes in leadership…Athens’ strategy in the Ten Years’ War was remarkably consistent, at least in its objective: she sought a higher rank than Sparta had been willing to acknowledge before the war. To be sure, that objective was sought by different methods, and to different degrees, at different stages; under Pericles, the Athenians sought to prove their equality in rank with Sparta by reciprocal and proportionate revenge. From late 427 BC until their isolation of the Spartans on Sphacteria, they sought the same goal but abandoned the limitations of reciprocity and proportion. Once they had isolated the Spartans on Sphacteria, and even more so after they had captured the men on the island, the Athenians elevated their ambitions. They began to seek superiority in rank over the Spartans rather than mere equality, and to this end they switched to a policy of coercion, rather than merely shaming, to force Sparta to acknowledge Athenian superiority.
Athens’ coercion of Sparta, taking the form of the raids from Pylos and Cythera, was just that: coercion. It was still not intended to destroy Sparta but rather to make Sparta admit that Athens had won the war over rank. But suspecting that Sparta herself might never yield superiority, Athens// attempted to appeal to the wider Greek world in late 425 and 424 BC by embarking upon a concerted policy of emulating her glorious deeds and accomplishments in the 450s and early 440s BC. When that strategy failed at Delium in late 424 BC, Athens returned to seeking equality with Sparta, a goal she achieved in the Peace of Nicias and accompanying alliance of 421 BC.” 376-7
May 26, 2014
J. E. Lendon's history of the Peloponnesian War differs from the usual treatments in two ways: First, instead of tackling the entire 27-year period, he (after pointing out that the "Peloponnesian War" is really four different wars traditionally grouped together) only covers the first ten years, from the outbreak of hostilities to the treaty between Athens and Sparta in 421 BC (he calls this the Ten Years War, whereas others call it the Archidamian War). And second, he challenges the traditional view of what the war was fought over (first put forward by Thucydides) in favor of one based on a study of Ancient Greek culture.
He starts with an overview of honor/glory/worth, or timē, which is how ancient Greeks ranked and competed among themselves, and by extension how the intensely competitive city-states measured themselves against each other. To have timē was to be of importance, to have importance, to have other cities look to you; to be the hegemon. Status for cities was a mix of current strength and past glories, and Sparta stood tall in both in the fifth century BC, allowing it to lead an alliance (to be the hegemon) of many of the Greek states against the Persians.
Athens' past was not considered nearly so glorious, but in the aftermath of the Persian Wars she became the head (hegemon) of the Delian League; a collection of overseas territories in the Aegean that banded together for protection against Persia. Athens slowly converted this mutual defense league into more of an empire, taking money tribute instead of the loan of naval forces, and establishing a firmer say in the internal affairs of its members. Thucydides (and most everyone follows his lead) claims that the Pelopennesian War started because of Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power.
Lendon points out that this was a controversial argument at the time, which is why Thucydides spends so much time elaborating and defending it. He believes that the war actually stemmed from an argument more readily understood by the Ancient Greeks, but more obscure to us. Athens now considered itself to be Sparta's equal in timē, and wanted Sparta to admit it (without which, convincing anyone else would be difficult).
The bulk of the rest of the book is Lendon playing connect-the-dots with what we know of the events of the Ten Years War, and interpreting them in terms of timē. He constantly refers back to this theme, as if afraid it might go somewhere without him. But since it is, at best, a very nebulous concept, this is essential, though it might have been better handled.
The major weakness of the thesis and book is that since timē is all in the minds of the people involved, it is very hard to prove that it really had the bearing on events he says it does. Even worse is the fact that it is more of a 'groupthink'; a collection of what the entire Greek world thought of the relative standings of Sparta and Athens. But, towards the end, he finally brings forth his answer to that problem. If Athens (who is the city with something to prove) can get Sparta to act like Athens is proving its point, then the rest of the Greek world will tend to follow the line of the two principles.
Despite the fact that the book is inevitably nebulous in some particulars, it really is a convincing reconstruction of events based on what we know of the culture, and I highly recommend it.
He starts with an overview of honor/glory/worth, or timē, which is how ancient Greeks ranked and competed among themselves, and by extension how the intensely competitive city-states measured themselves against each other. To have timē was to be of importance, to have importance, to have other cities look to you; to be the hegemon. Status for cities was a mix of current strength and past glories, and Sparta stood tall in both in the fifth century BC, allowing it to lead an alliance (to be the hegemon) of many of the Greek states against the Persians.
Athens' past was not considered nearly so glorious, but in the aftermath of the Persian Wars she became the head (hegemon) of the Delian League; a collection of overseas territories in the Aegean that banded together for protection against Persia. Athens slowly converted this mutual defense league into more of an empire, taking money tribute instead of the loan of naval forces, and establishing a firmer say in the internal affairs of its members. Thucydides (and most everyone follows his lead) claims that the Pelopennesian War started because of Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power.
Lendon points out that this was a controversial argument at the time, which is why Thucydides spends so much time elaborating and defending it. He believes that the war actually stemmed from an argument more readily understood by the Ancient Greeks, but more obscure to us. Athens now considered itself to be Sparta's equal in timē, and wanted Sparta to admit it (without which, convincing anyone else would be difficult).
The bulk of the rest of the book is Lendon playing connect-the-dots with what we know of the events of the Ten Years War, and interpreting them in terms of timē. He constantly refers back to this theme, as if afraid it might go somewhere without him. But since it is, at best, a very nebulous concept, this is essential, though it might have been better handled.
The major weakness of the thesis and book is that since timē is all in the minds of the people involved, it is very hard to prove that it really had the bearing on events he says it does. Even worse is the fact that it is more of a 'groupthink'; a collection of what the entire Greek world thought of the relative standings of Sparta and Athens. But, towards the end, he finally brings forth his answer to that problem. If Athens (who is the city with something to prove) can get Sparta to act like Athens is proving its point, then the rest of the Greek world will tend to follow the line of the two principles.
Despite the fact that the book is inevitably nebulous in some particulars, it really is a convincing reconstruction of events based on what we know of the culture, and I highly recommend it.
September 15, 2014
This is a very well written, albeit tendentious, review of the first half (431-421) of what we call 'The Peloponnesian War', a struggle between Athens, and its allies and subjects, against Sparta, and its allies and subjectx, which ended with a final Athenian defeat approximately seventeen years later. Of course it's much, much more complicated than that, subsidiary conflicts being all over the place and such truces and alliances (even one between Athens and Sparta following 421) as there were being punctuated by feints, subversion and occasional outright fighting.
The tendetiousness of Lendon's account is in his claim that Greek war was about honor and status first and foremost. As he has it, Sparta was vying with Argos for first place, even after the Persian war. Athens, however, wanted its place in the sun and was willing to fight for it--for at least equal status with Sparta that is. That, in Lendon's view, is what the first Peloponnesian War was virtually all about and what it in fact accomplished.
Other than the excellent writing, what I liked about this book was its partial fulfilment of the author's promise to try to get at what won't find in Thucydides, namely those things (attitudes, assumptions, 'facts') which would have been too-obvious-to-mention to his Greek readership. The business about honor and status is a case in point. I also liked the liberal use of maps throughout the text, maps which are reproduced, sometimes multiple times, when they are relevant to the narrative. it's not easy to keep track of all those myriad tiny poleis without such aids.
The tendetiousness of Lendon's account is in his claim that Greek war was about honor and status first and foremost. As he has it, Sparta was vying with Argos for first place, even after the Persian war. Athens, however, wanted its place in the sun and was willing to fight for it--for at least equal status with Sparta that is. That, in Lendon's view, is what the first Peloponnesian War was virtually all about and what it in fact accomplished.
Other than the excellent writing, what I liked about this book was its partial fulfilment of the author's promise to try to get at what won't find in Thucydides, namely those things (attitudes, assumptions, 'facts') which would have been too-obvious-to-mention to his Greek readership. The business about honor and status is a case in point. I also liked the liberal use of maps throughout the text, maps which are reproduced, sometimes multiple times, when they are relevant to the narrative. it's not easy to keep track of all those myriad tiny poleis without such aids.
October 19, 2016
Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins
J.E. Lendon
Read it in Hardcover at 566 pages including maps, chronology (480BC-421BC), Glossaries, notes, extensive bibliography, etc.
The Peloponnesian War is fascinating and the city states are diverse interesting actors that can't help fall prey to their own histories, mythology, and need to defend a sense of honor. Victims of an intense mythological rivalry that would propel and dictate behavior in a long lasting war that consequentially destabilizes and punishes the entire region. This rivalry, Hybris, is the lens in which Lendon is analyzing the history and motivations and thus Song of Wrath is not strictly a history of the war. Lendon excels at this and he's at his best when trying to comprehend the actions of the actors.
The book itself is split into nine chapters and the epilogue. Lendon sets the stage in the first two chapters before delving into the war itself. Chapters are around forty pages. Great maps, extensive bibliography and notes.
My biggest issue is that Lendon doesn't cover the entirety of the war, he stops mid stroke. He does give a few paragraphs in the epilogue but as a reader only covering the ten years outbreaks from 431-421 left me feeling a little disgruntled.
If you are interested in reading this I would suggest you already have a general idea of the Peloponnesian War. Mainly because the point of this is the examination of Hybris in the context of the war. I'm very interested in his other work, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity.
J.E. Lendon
Read it in Hardcover at 566 pages including maps, chronology (480BC-421BC), Glossaries, notes, extensive bibliography, etc.
The Peloponnesian War is fascinating and the city states are diverse interesting actors that can't help fall prey to their own histories, mythology, and need to defend a sense of honor. Victims of an intense mythological rivalry that would propel and dictate behavior in a long lasting war that consequentially destabilizes and punishes the entire region. This rivalry, Hybris, is the lens in which Lendon is analyzing the history and motivations and thus Song of Wrath is not strictly a history of the war. Lendon excels at this and he's at his best when trying to comprehend the actions of the actors.
The book itself is split into nine chapters and the epilogue. Lendon sets the stage in the first two chapters before delving into the war itself. Chapters are around forty pages. Great maps, extensive bibliography and notes.
My biggest issue is that Lendon doesn't cover the entirety of the war, he stops mid stroke. He does give a few paragraphs in the epilogue but as a reader only covering the ten years outbreaks from 431-421 left me feeling a little disgruntled.
If you are interested in reading this I would suggest you already have a general idea of the Peloponnesian War. Mainly because the point of this is the examination of Hybris in the context of the war. I'm very interested in his other work, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity.
February 5, 2021
I'm no historian, so I cannot judge the validity of Dr. Lendon's thesis or his grasp of facts. Nevertheless, I give this 5 stars because I found the book difficult to put down (and this time, it has nothing to do with adhesives). For the most part, his descriptions of battles, diplomacy, and deliberations are pithy and compelling. (I must admit he lost me a bit when he went deep into the mechanics of hoplite warfare, but this was rare.)
As entertaining as the book was, it does require complete engagement and effort, simply to keep track of the tangled web of alliances and grievances. About 3/4 of the way through, he likens Greece to a checkerboard, with each city-state being surrounded by antagonists, and the rule of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" providing alliances. This was exactly the mental map I had developed. Indeed, when the city states of Sicily come together in an alliance for peace, he treats this (tongue in cheek, I'm sure) as eerie and inscrutable, and better hastily forgotten.
Finally, as I finish up the reading, only now does it strike me that his main thesis (SPOILER ALERT!!) - the collapse of a rule-bound system of conflict around the concept of metis, or honor, into an unruly war of mutual annihilation - has relevance for our times. If I had time to read it again, I would focus on the motivations of those who chose to ignore the tit-for-tat norms that kept conflict within bounds, and opted for unbounded warfare.
Anyway, I urge you to read this book. If nothing else, it looks very impressive on the nightstand.
As entertaining as the book was, it does require complete engagement and effort, simply to keep track of the tangled web of alliances and grievances. About 3/4 of the way through, he likens Greece to a checkerboard, with each city-state being surrounded by antagonists, and the rule of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" providing alliances. This was exactly the mental map I had developed. Indeed, when the city states of Sicily come together in an alliance for peace, he treats this (tongue in cheek, I'm sure) as eerie and inscrutable, and better hastily forgotten.
Finally, as I finish up the reading, only now does it strike me that his main thesis (SPOILER ALERT!!) - the collapse of a rule-bound system of conflict around the concept of metis, or honor, into an unruly war of mutual annihilation - has relevance for our times. If I had time to read it again, I would focus on the motivations of those who chose to ignore the tit-for-tat norms that kept conflict within bounds, and opted for unbounded warfare.
Anyway, I urge you to read this book. If nothing else, it looks very impressive on the nightstand.
September 22, 2012
Lendon wrote this book for people who know nothing about the Peloponnesian War as well as those who can quote Thucydides at will. I'm definitely in the former camp. I knew of a Peloponnesian War, that it involved the Greeks, and I had some vague idea that the Spartans won eventually. Apart from that, nothing.
The book jacket will give you a summary of Lendon's thesis. Suffice it to say, I found it convincing - he really does drive his argument home, and the perhaps necessary repetition and (over?)explanation of that argument is this book's only significant weakness.
But in the scope of what Lendon has accomplished, that weakness turns out to be minor. The guy can write, first of all, which makes this excursion through what could easily have been a bewildering maze of Greek names and muddled motives an actually fun ride. He describes battles (and almost-battles) with zest and humor, and prods forth characters like the wily king Perdiccas of Macedonia, the heroic, tragic Brasidas of Sparta, and the monstrous Cleon of Athens.
And it's not all candy, either. Lendon's arguments are intellectually robust and his narrative culturally sensitive. We may tend to take for granted that the ancient Greeks were essentially like us; Lendon shows us how different they could be. When, finally, he suggests, very subtly, that there may be lessons for our own time to be found in the opening decade of an exhausting war, he turns that sense of difference inside-out.
The book jacket will give you a summary of Lendon's thesis. Suffice it to say, I found it convincing - he really does drive his argument home, and the perhaps necessary repetition and (over?)explanation of that argument is this book's only significant weakness.
But in the scope of what Lendon has accomplished, that weakness turns out to be minor. The guy can write, first of all, which makes this excursion through what could easily have been a bewildering maze of Greek names and muddled motives an actually fun ride. He describes battles (and almost-battles) with zest and humor, and prods forth characters like the wily king Perdiccas of Macedonia, the heroic, tragic Brasidas of Sparta, and the monstrous Cleon of Athens.
And it's not all candy, either. Lendon's arguments are intellectually robust and his narrative culturally sensitive. We may tend to take for granted that the ancient Greeks were essentially like us; Lendon shows us how different they could be. When, finally, he suggests, very subtly, that there may be lessons for our own time to be found in the opening decade of an exhausting war, he turns that sense of difference inside-out.
February 25, 2011
If anyone has any interest at all in the Peloponnesian War, then delve into the story by Thucydides of this epic war: Song of Wrath; whether or not the reader is wholly convinced of Lendon's arguments, the reader will come away with an enhanced understanding of what happened back in the fifth century BC. Sided with maps, an in-depth glossary, authors notes, suggestions for further reading and an extensive appendix, notes and bibliography.
A seasoned historian may not like the arguments made by Lendon chiefly emerging from the values of the ancient Greeks who cherished rank, honor and vengeance but they will still enjoy Lendon. The years missing are those of the final victory by Sparta and her allies (money) over a humiliated and devastated Athens; I suspect that those years were void of honor and respect with shame and reciprocity taking a back seat obviously mudding Lendon's perspective.
Seasoned historians aside, Lendon shows the value of a great story, told with great skill, it is learned, extremely readable, and passionate, by a talented historian and a gifted writer!
A seasoned historian may not like the arguments made by Lendon chiefly emerging from the values of the ancient Greeks who cherished rank, honor and vengeance but they will still enjoy Lendon. The years missing are those of the final victory by Sparta and her allies (money) over a humiliated and devastated Athens; I suspect that those years were void of honor and respect with shame and reciprocity taking a back seat obviously mudding Lendon's perspective.
Seasoned historians aside, Lendon shows the value of a great story, told with great skill, it is learned, extremely readable, and passionate, by a talented historian and a gifted writer!
September 16, 2014
Lacks the narrative drive and telling details of popular history, while not as dry and ponderous as academic history. Is it popular academic? Lendon does demonstrate the unflagging commitment to a thesis that marks academic history - in this case, the leading role that a kind of sports-league ranking played in governing the outlook and behaviour of classical Greece. Actions (and inactions) that seem puzzling to a modern mind accustomed to materialism and real politic become clear under the logic of status. At times, Lendon gilds the lily, overstating his case to explain too many decisions taken by Athens or Sparta. But he clearly delights in the subject matter, and the story cracks along, never bogging down in pedantry. Not recommended as an introduction to the Peloponnesian War, but a though-provoking and iconoclastic take on the conflict for enthusiasts on the subject.
August 9, 2019
Heel goed geschreven maar eens je zijn uitgangspunt door hebt wordt het bij momenten een beetje herhaling en zelfs een beetje een selffulfilling prophecy
December 30, 2010
This was an excellent and very readable account of the first ten years of warfare between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. The author discusses the role of honour, hubris, and rank and how those concepts mattered to the Ancient Greeks to the point of dictating strategy in the military and diplomatic field.
In 385 pages of text the book offers a great story of these first years of this conflict and was easy to read with numerous maps to assist placing the area of conflict discussed and following the line of action throughout. There is also over 140 pages of chronologies, glossaries (of people, things and places), notes, appendixes, suggestions for further reading and a detailed bibliography.
I really enjoyed this book, the writing style of the author is clear, concise and at times very funny and he just draws you into the acccount with some amazing stories of the Ancients. I am sure if anyone has an interest in the Peloponnesian War they will also have a great time reading this account by J. E. Lendon.
In 385 pages of text the book offers a great story of these first years of this conflict and was easy to read with numerous maps to assist placing the area of conflict discussed and following the line of action throughout. There is also over 140 pages of chronologies, glossaries (of people, things and places), notes, appendixes, suggestions for further reading and a detailed bibliography.
I really enjoyed this book, the writing style of the author is clear, concise and at times very funny and he just draws you into the acccount with some amazing stories of the Ancients. I am sure if anyone has an interest in the Peloponnesian War they will also have a great time reading this account by J. E. Lendon.
March 9, 2014
Lendon provides a different perspective on the Peloponnesian War, one that explicitly challenges Thucydides' explanation. In my (decidedly unknowledgeble) opinion, Lendon's argument that the war (particularly the Ten Years' War, which is the only part of the war he covers in detail) is best explained as a contest over status adds to my understanding of the war and the motives of the actors. However, I am not convinced that it is the primary explanation for the war - I still find Donald Kagan's account of the war, which is closer to that of Thucydides, more compelling. This book is highly readable and Lendon has a lively writing style and peppers the text with fascinating anecdotes - my favorite is his description of Brasidas' mother as "a fearsome Spartan dame of the 'come back with your shield, or on it' school."
November 2, 2015
Don't be put off by the 500+ pages. The actual body of the book is only 385 pages, and this includes frequent maps and tastefully spaced illustrations. As a novice, I certainly appreciated the frequent maps, as Greek geography is utterly bewildering to me with its spate of peninsulas, islands, gulfs, and bays. The glossary of Greek places and major players in the back of the book makes this the kind of book that I would want to own. The author is a good enough writer to place an occasional poetic turn of phrase into what might otherwise end up being the usual dry historical narrative that these books often become, yet without sacrificing clarity. It is a rare historian that can pull this off.
December 19, 2013
Lendon is obviously the most brilliant (and subtly controversial) scholar on Greek warfare, with his theory of cultural determinism taking the front and center role from the usual star of the show, the structuralism and "realism" of Thucydides (power struggles are the summum causus belli-- ok I mixed up my dead languages there) rather than Lendon's VALUES and rank and pride. The premise is plausible, but man does Lendon beat a dead horse in this one. He proves his point and then proves it way too many times. Me thinks he doth explain too much, so much that you almost start to doubt his point. I'd be interested to read a structuralist's rebuttal.
September 21, 2024
Excellent. One of the best books I've read on ancient history overall. The book starts on a high note and continues like that up until the last couple of chapters. In the end it gets a bit dense, probably because the author has to cram a lot of events in a small space, and in so doing he has to abandon his style from previous chapters. However, this is not to say that the end is bad, just to note a slight change of style.
January 7, 2013
Attempting to understand the ancient Greeks is harder than it seems. From a distance, they look reasonable; up close, they possessed an unhealthy dose of the irrational in their destructive competitiveness. Lendon writes clearly and interestingly about the ancient world, as he did in "Ghosts and Soldiers."
November 6, 2014
A great read. I like how the author actually try to understand Greeks' worldview, instead of imposing our modern mindset on them. A grim worldview Greeks had but unsurprising considering when they were living.
August 2, 2013
An epic history on the clash between Sparta and Athens and on war in Greek society during the Classical Age.
August 5, 2013
This is literally the best History I've read in years. It had a sublime sense of humor and a brilliant approach to the subject.
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