This is a good book. Like many of its sort it is not a great book but a good book, well worth reading by anybody interested in the topic, that Battalion or that war. It is undoubtedly true, accurate and comprehensive. The author is the founding Colonel of the Battalion; he led it through much of the Second World War including the parachute drop into Holland and the famous battle at the bridge in Arnhem. His skill, discipline and tenacity helped the allies hold that bridge days longer than planned and days longer than most other commanders could. He wrote the book on “A Bridge too Far”. In my opinion there are two areas where the book could have done better. First, the author misses virtually any sort of context. He does a good job of identifying the intelligence the battalion staff had available when planning the various battles. He also mentions what is found to have been the case after the battles are complete. This is true certainly to the battlefield and the theatre but also largely nationally, and internationally also. To be fair, he used the words United Nations, I recall twice, and devoted at least one paragraph to how the newspaper readers were putting pressure onto politicians. What he did not deal with was why there was so many unexpected Argentines in certain locations or why the British air effort seemed so thin to those in the battalion, or even why the navy seemed thin where this unit was fighting. All these issues have a rational: good or bad. It would be very interesting to the reader to know, at least at a high level, what the rational was. When it comes to decisions impacting the capability of the battalion, the author explained at length what happened. For instance, footwear was an issue that was discussed two or three times. Given the temperatures and what the army knew about the terrain, the army decided to dress the battalion in winter boots. The problem was that the landing craft in use could not “beach”; the troops had to debark into a meter of water or more in the dark and then walk three or four kilometers to a defensible location. The terrain was not dry. It had a much larger component of wet than expected that was difficult to see. The troops went three or four days before they could dry their feet. This caused casualties, some serious enough to be medivac’d. The second area, where an editor could have helped, was that the author could not resist the use of acronyms. They were all defined in the rear however several were used infrequently. I find these merely painful. They may be simplifying when used frequently in speech, but they are not helpful when used only occasionally and in writing. if the book is planned to be sold to a wider audience, the text has to be easily read. This is a good book. I rate it on the weak side of: Four stars.
Written immediately after the war, based on the battalion’s war diary, the book was an important initial history. Written by the ‘father’ of 2 PARA who commanded them for most of WW2, including at Arnhem. I had the enormous privilege of meeting him as a boy - a truly great man.
I read this book quiet some time ago, before I joined the army as a boy. I found it really good. After reading it once again as a more seasoned former soldier, I must upgrade my first thoughts to excellent. Of all the people to write this book, John Frost certainly has the kudos behind him to put pen to paper. A former commander of the battalion in question, who led the epic struggle at the northern end of Arnhem bridge all them years ago.
Sadly no longer with us, I would have certainly have bought the man a drink if I was to pass him in the street. A legend, a man amongst men. Every man an Emperor.