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The Causes of War
The third edition of Geoffery Blainey’s highly acclaimed study on the causes of war has been expanded and updated to include a complete discussion of World War II and the road towards nuclear war.
Analyzing all international wars since 1700, Causes of War solves the riddle of why some wars are long and some are short and demonstrates how the “outbreak of peace” offers insight into the outbreak of war.
Proving that war and peace are alternating phases of a relationship between rival nations, this widely quoted work offers a crucial, new understanding of international armed conflict.
Analyzing all international wars since 1700, Causes of War solves the riddle of why some wars are long and some are short and demonstrates how the “outbreak of peace” offers insight into the outbreak of war.
Proving that war and peace are alternating phases of a relationship between rival nations, this widely quoted work offers a crucial, new understanding of international armed conflict.
344 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1973
23 people are currently reading
1116 people want to read
About the author
Geoffrey Blainey
78 books81 followersGeoffrey Blainey, one of Australia's most eminent historians, was appointed the foundation Chancellor of the University of Ballarat (UB) in 1993 after an illustrious career at the University of Melbourne. He was installed as UB Chancellor in December 1994 and continued until 1998. The Blainey Auditorium at the Mt Helen Campus of UB is named in his honour. Blainey, always a keen exponent of libraries and the acquisition of books, has donated part of his extensive book collection to the UB library. In 2002 the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters was conferred on Blainey in recognition of his contribution to the University of Ballarat and to the community in general.
Educated at Ballarat High School, Blainey won a scholarship to Wesley College, before attending Melbourne University where he studied history. He worked as a freelance historical author writing mainly business histories such as The Peaks of Lyall; Gold and Paper; a History of the National Bank of Australasia; and Mines in the Spinifex. Blainey accepted a position at the University of Melbourne in 1962 in the Faculty of Economics and Commerce. He held the positions of Professor of Economic History (1968-77); Senior Lecturer 1962; and from 1977-1988 he occupied the Ernest Scott Chair of History at Melbourne University. Professor Blainey also held the chair of Australian studies at Harvard University.
As an economic historian, Blainey challenged the conventional view, questioning accepted contemporary understandings of European settlement of Australia as a convict nation, Aboriginal land rights, and Asian immigration. He is described as a 'courageous public intellectual, a writer with rare grace and a master storyteller'. In a reassessment of the life of Blainey, 'The Fuss that Never Ended' considers his ideas, his role in Australian history, politics and public life, and the controversies that surrounded him.
He was always popular with students. According to the Melbourne University home page 'When Geoffrey Blainey spoke to final-year students in the Friends of the Baillieu Library HSC Lectures in the 1970s, the Public Lecture Theatre was packed to capacity and his audience carried copies of his books to be signed, a tribute to what Geoffrey Bolton characterised as his "skills in interpreting technological change in admirably lucid narratives that appealed to both specialist and non-specialist audiences".
Among his most popular works are the 'The Rush that Never Ended: A History of Australian Mining'; 'The Tyranny of Distance'; 'A Shorter History of Australia'; 'A Short History of the World'; and 'The Origins of Australian Football'.
In 2000 Professor Blainey was awarded the Companion of the Order of Australia for service to academia, research and scholarship, and as a leader of public debate at the forefront of fundamental social and economic issues confronting the wider community. At that time the University's Vice-Chancellor Professor Kerry Cox said 'Geoffrey Blainey guided the new and inexperienced university through its first four years with a benevolent but firm hand. This time was challenging as the university strove to make a place for itself in higher education, grappled with funding cuts and the eventual merger with neighbouring TAFE institutes. For those at the university fortunate enough to work with Geoffrey Blainey during his time as Chancellor, they witnessed first hand his humility, and we are proud of his role in our history.'
In 2002 the degree of Doctor of Letters was conferred on Professor Blainey in recognition of his contribution to the University of Ballarat and the community in general. The same year Blainey donated a collection of material to the University of Ballarat. Included in this collection are historical books, papers and other material relating to the early history of mining and the central Victorian goldfields. A second generous donation of material was received in 2005. 'The Geoffrey Blainey Mining Collection' is l
Educated at Ballarat High School, Blainey won a scholarship to Wesley College, before attending Melbourne University where he studied history. He worked as a freelance historical author writing mainly business histories such as The Peaks of Lyall; Gold and Paper; a History of the National Bank of Australasia; and Mines in the Spinifex. Blainey accepted a position at the University of Melbourne in 1962 in the Faculty of Economics and Commerce. He held the positions of Professor of Economic History (1968-77); Senior Lecturer 1962; and from 1977-1988 he occupied the Ernest Scott Chair of History at Melbourne University. Professor Blainey also held the chair of Australian studies at Harvard University.
As an economic historian, Blainey challenged the conventional view, questioning accepted contemporary understandings of European settlement of Australia as a convict nation, Aboriginal land rights, and Asian immigration. He is described as a 'courageous public intellectual, a writer with rare grace and a master storyteller'. In a reassessment of the life of Blainey, 'The Fuss that Never Ended' considers his ideas, his role in Australian history, politics and public life, and the controversies that surrounded him.
He was always popular with students. According to the Melbourne University home page 'When Geoffrey Blainey spoke to final-year students in the Friends of the Baillieu Library HSC Lectures in the 1970s, the Public Lecture Theatre was packed to capacity and his audience carried copies of his books to be signed, a tribute to what Geoffrey Bolton characterised as his "skills in interpreting technological change in admirably lucid narratives that appealed to both specialist and non-specialist audiences".
Among his most popular works are the 'The Rush that Never Ended: A History of Australian Mining'; 'The Tyranny of Distance'; 'A Shorter History of Australia'; 'A Short History of the World'; and 'The Origins of Australian Football'.
In 2000 Professor Blainey was awarded the Companion of the Order of Australia for service to academia, research and scholarship, and as a leader of public debate at the forefront of fundamental social and economic issues confronting the wider community. At that time the University's Vice-Chancellor Professor Kerry Cox said 'Geoffrey Blainey guided the new and inexperienced university through its first four years with a benevolent but firm hand. This time was challenging as the university strove to make a place for itself in higher education, grappled with funding cuts and the eventual merger with neighbouring TAFE institutes. For those at the university fortunate enough to work with Geoffrey Blainey during his time as Chancellor, they witnessed first hand his humility, and we are proud of his role in our history.'
In 2002 the degree of Doctor of Letters was conferred on Professor Blainey in recognition of his contribution to the University of Ballarat and the community in general. The same year Blainey donated a collection of material to the University of Ballarat. Included in this collection are historical books, papers and other material relating to the early history of mining and the central Victorian goldfields. A second generous donation of material was received in 2005. 'The Geoffrey Blainey Mining Collection' is l
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
May 26, 2020
Μία άκρως ενδιαφέρουσα και διεισδυτική μάτια στα αίτια του πολέμου!
November 17, 2009
In this book, Geoffrey Blainey conducts a remarkably thorough investigation into the specific causes of war and offers several interesting conclusions. Blainey complains that different schools of academia often investigate the causes of war with a specific angle or hypothesis in mind and that due to this subjective viewpoint, frequently find conclusions that agree exactly with their predictions. In order to fully comprehend the causes of war, Blainey states, one must also examine the causes of peace. War and peace are not two separate phenomenon, but rather two parts of an ongoing cycle. While one says, "A war broke out," one doesn't say, "peace broke out," yet the reasons behind war ceasing and peace breaking out appear to be a reversal of the reasons that peace ceases and war breaks out.
Blainey calls up the work of many previous military analysts including Clausewitz, Macfie, and Henry Thomas Buckle. He puts their findings and theories to the test by analyzing all major international wars since 1700, picking out historical examples, and searching for trends and patterns. Each chapter examines a specific theory, such as the idea that capitalism and economic ties between countries decrease the likelihood of war. He also looks at the theory of scapegoat wars, war as an accident, "surprise" attacks that allegedly begin wars, and more. However, I found his most insightful finding to be that war commences when nations have 'contradictory optimism' about the probable outcome of the war. In other words, a decision to go to war only occurs when the decision makers believe that there is more to be gained from war than from peace. As Blainey says "War itself then provides the stinging ice of reality. At the end of a war those rival expectations, initially so far apart, are so close to one another that terms of peace can be agreed upon." I am curious to know what his opinion would be of the popular neoconservative theory that democracies will not go to war with one another.
At the end of the book, Blainey offers a list of conclusions, which nicely summarize his findings. Some of the more interesting among these are:
"The idea that one nation can be blamed for causing a war is as erroneous as the idea that one nation can be mainly praised for causing the end of the war. Most current explanations of war, however, rest on these errors."
"A formula for measuring international power is essential: ironically the most useful formula is warfare. Until the function of warfare is appreciated, the search for a more humane and more efficient way of measuring power is likely to be haphazard."
"It is doubtful whether any war since 1700 was begun with the belief, by both sides, that it would be a long war."
"No wars are unintended or 'accidental'. What is often unintended is the length and bloodiness of the war. Defeat too is unintended."
I could quote them all, but that would give away too much without an understanding of the rigorous analysis Blainey applies in order to come up with these conclusions. I highly recommend this book to all who are curious about peace & conflict resolution, military history, and world history.
Blainey calls up the work of many previous military analysts including Clausewitz, Macfie, and Henry Thomas Buckle. He puts their findings and theories to the test by analyzing all major international wars since 1700, picking out historical examples, and searching for trends and patterns. Each chapter examines a specific theory, such as the idea that capitalism and economic ties between countries decrease the likelihood of war. He also looks at the theory of scapegoat wars, war as an accident, "surprise" attacks that allegedly begin wars, and more. However, I found his most insightful finding to be that war commences when nations have 'contradictory optimism' about the probable outcome of the war. In other words, a decision to go to war only occurs when the decision makers believe that there is more to be gained from war than from peace. As Blainey says "War itself then provides the stinging ice of reality. At the end of a war those rival expectations, initially so far apart, are so close to one another that terms of peace can be agreed upon." I am curious to know what his opinion would be of the popular neoconservative theory that democracies will not go to war with one another.
At the end of the book, Blainey offers a list of conclusions, which nicely summarize his findings. Some of the more interesting among these are:
"The idea that one nation can be blamed for causing a war is as erroneous as the idea that one nation can be mainly praised for causing the end of the war. Most current explanations of war, however, rest on these errors."
"A formula for measuring international power is essential: ironically the most useful formula is warfare. Until the function of warfare is appreciated, the search for a more humane and more efficient way of measuring power is likely to be haphazard."
"It is doubtful whether any war since 1700 was begun with the belief, by both sides, that it would be a long war."
"No wars are unintended or 'accidental'. What is often unintended is the length and bloodiness of the war. Defeat too is unintended."
I could quote them all, but that would give away too much without an understanding of the rigorous analysis Blainey applies in order to come up with these conclusions. I highly recommend this book to all who are curious about peace & conflict resolution, military history, and world history.
July 29, 2019
A brilliant analysis of war and peace and how or why it does or does not occur. Some of his findings are confronting, but then war is about power, not morality
February 25, 2010
It is a real pleasure to pick up an author who enjoys the art of writing as much as the necessary discipline of analysis. Beginning with a chapter entitled "The Peace which Passeth Understanding," Geoffrey Blainey demonstrates his wit and his flair for historical nuance, both of which serve to illuminate and extend his simple yet controversial theory. Building upon a diverse body of historical investigation, Blainey focuses upon the insight that leaders always demonstrate optimism in making the decision for war (the subsequent conflicts always prove longer, costlier, and riskier than anticipated), Blainey makes the argument that such optimism reflects a distortion of the basic measurement of power between two nations. He observes that anything that serves to "muffle" this appreciation encourages the optimism that leads to war. Consequently, many popular beliefs and theories could, in fact, be seen as dangerously destabilizing. In particular, the traditional conception of a "balance of power" is a far less stable condition between states than a clear preponderance of power. He also argues that decisive victories produce longer and more stable periods of peace than more "moderate" victories.
August 7, 2011
An excellent survey on the causes of war and peace, it is free of prejudice and very well written.
October 18, 2025
Written by one of Australia’s most famous historians
October 14, 2023
This book tries to answer the question: Why do we go to war? The answer is elusive, and in the past, we can see why we go to war and have to. War is the opposite of peace, and therefore the book really tries to figure it out. More or less to me, this book goes through the past wars to find the answers. In a way, I didn't get my question answered, but it's a near-exhaustive look at the causes of war. The book isn't a bad read though it could have gotten to the point instead of keeping the answer a mystery. We all through modern history and the past know the answer to this question, and therefore I'm missing the point and not the book. Either way, it's a good read and if you can get a copy, maybe you'll figure it out too.
August 19, 2016
Análise muito interessante das guerras entre 1700 e 1970, não se limitando a listar datas e nomes de personagens importantes, mas sim tentando entender as razões para a guerra e para a paz e as similaridades e diferenças entre esses vários conflitos. Nunca antes li algo neste formato e gostei muito. Fico curioso agora em qual seria a visão do autor com relação ao terrorismo baseado em diferenças religiosas, comparando a situação atual (2016) com guerras do passado distante.
January 19, 2019
A broad history on the Causes of War in the modern era. Blainey's prose is excellent and it's effortless reading. Enjoyed reading it as an Army officer, but it is accessible to a wide audience. On par with the Art of War and better than On War by Clausewitz. Only downside was it was last updated in the 1980s during the Cold War, although the premise may not have changed
December 14, 2025
If you had somehow never heard of war before and picked up this book to understand what wars might be and what causes them, you would walk away with the impression that a war is simply a misalignment of expectations between countries that results in military engagements rather than diplomatic compromise. Blainey appears to be less interested in explaining why wars happen (what countries are fighting for/over) and more interested in why they would choose violence to achieve their aims. Those aims are pretty much irrelevant to understanding why countries go to war, however.
Blainey’s explanation for the causes of war is so simple it’s almost tautologically redundant. Wars happen because countries can’t figure out their problems peacefully—well, duh? There are a variety of factors that influence the type, scope, and duration of wars since the 1700s, including optimism, opportunism, the seasons, geography, industrial developments, the economy, and so on. Blainey even acknowledges the Marxist and anti-imperialist camp that blames war on capitalism, but he doesn’t really put up a convincing argument against this camp—which is kind of mystifying because he is a professor of economic history writing during the Vietnam War yet appears allergic to considering how economics might compel countries to fight each other. For example, Lenin’s interpretation of the First World War as advanced capitalist countries vying for more markets, colonies, and profits is apparently “refuted” by his decision to pull the Soviet Union out of that same war because Lenin’s aim to turn WWI into a revolutionary class war was impractical given the USSR’s current position. Perhaps it is reader error that I cannot understand how these two positions are contradictory.
There’s another moment in the book that read to me as Blainey implying the My Lai massacre was proof that the US was not actually as ruthless as it could have been because this atrocity was not “officially” approved. Allegedly, the war in Vietnam went on for as long as it did because the US (as an advanced liberal country) respected human rights too much and thus had trouble restoring order in South Vietnam. It was by this point in the book that I was mentally done with it.
Blainey’s explanation for the causes of war is so simple it’s almost tautologically redundant. Wars happen because countries can’t figure out their problems peacefully—well, duh? There are a variety of factors that influence the type, scope, and duration of wars since the 1700s, including optimism, opportunism, the seasons, geography, industrial developments, the economy, and so on. Blainey even acknowledges the Marxist and anti-imperialist camp that blames war on capitalism, but he doesn’t really put up a convincing argument against this camp—which is kind of mystifying because he is a professor of economic history writing during the Vietnam War yet appears allergic to considering how economics might compel countries to fight each other. For example, Lenin’s interpretation of the First World War as advanced capitalist countries vying for more markets, colonies, and profits is apparently “refuted” by his decision to pull the Soviet Union out of that same war because Lenin’s aim to turn WWI into a revolutionary class war was impractical given the USSR’s current position. Perhaps it is reader error that I cannot understand how these two positions are contradictory.
There’s another moment in the book that read to me as Blainey implying the My Lai massacre was proof that the US was not actually as ruthless as it could have been because this atrocity was not “officially” approved. Allegedly, the war in Vietnam went on for as long as it did because the US (as an advanced liberal country) respected human rights too much and thus had trouble restoring order in South Vietnam. It was by this point in the book that I was mentally done with it.
July 14, 2024
When I first picked up this book, I thought it was going to cover what the author himself thought was the causes of war. It was actually an aggregation of theories of the causes of war. The first third of the book mainly focused on debunking some of those theories. (Hence, reading the whole section is rather important because you find out at the end that it didn't really hold up to scrutiny. Why authors don't tell you that at the beginning of the section, is beyond me. But the problem is easily solved: just read the end of the section first, and then jump back to the beginning if it turns out to be an important theory)
The book had plenty of specific case examples (with an excellent concise background to give you enough context to follow). The book is dense in content; I could only read about 15-20 pages at a time to absorb the plethora of lessons/case studies he gives. However, towards the last third of the book, the author mainly reiterated some of his earlier points using new case studies, so it didn't take me as long to digest.
What was remarkable about the book was the breadth and depth. In a very short span, the author concisely explained the theories of war, the historical context possibly influencing the theorist, the evolution of war theories, and many real-life examples that either supported or debunked that theory.
Overall, it was one of the best aggregation of theories, a really balanced and nuanced view of potential causes of war from a social and political standpoint (and unlikely causes of war) including a brief coverage as to the economic aspects of war (e.g., financing wars, economic sanctions).
Highly recommended for those interested in conflict/war, geopolitics, and international relations.
The book had plenty of specific case examples (with an excellent concise background to give you enough context to follow). The book is dense in content; I could only read about 15-20 pages at a time to absorb the plethora of lessons/case studies he gives. However, towards the last third of the book, the author mainly reiterated some of his earlier points using new case studies, so it didn't take me as long to digest.
What was remarkable about the book was the breadth and depth. In a very short span, the author concisely explained the theories of war, the historical context possibly influencing the theorist, the evolution of war theories, and many real-life examples that either supported or debunked that theory.
Overall, it was one of the best aggregation of theories, a really balanced and nuanced view of potential causes of war from a social and political standpoint (and unlikely causes of war) including a brief coverage as to the economic aspects of war (e.g., financing wars, economic sanctions).
Highly recommended for those interested in conflict/war, geopolitics, and international relations.
December 27, 2025
Now updated to cover wars in the early 21 century. A fascinating exposition of the causes of war and peace over centuries. Not entirely encouraging given the situation in the middle east and in the South China Sea. My thoughts turned to Red China and Taiwan. Given the reasons for war discussed in the book it's possible nothing will happen. Two reasons: wars have started when one party has allies who it feels might come in on its side. Starting a war might not work out if it will cause economic damage to the agressor. Taiwan has allies who are likely to come to its aid. Red China has no allies. Such a war would cause enormous, if not crippling, damage to Red China's faltering economy.
I listened to the audio book. This was distracting and annoying. It seems the publishers thought an Australian reader would be a nice touch. It wasn't. They should have chosen a reader with a pleasant, educated accent who didn't occasionally mispronounce words. Instead we got a reader with a nasal twang that bordered on strine. Plus occasional mispronounciations, e.g., pronouncing treatise as treaties and 't' as 'ch' (an Australian weakness).
I listened to the audio book. This was distracting and annoying. It seems the publishers thought an Australian reader would be a nice touch. It wasn't. They should have chosen a reader with a pleasant, educated accent who didn't occasionally mispronounce words. Instead we got a reader with a nasal twang that bordered on strine. Plus occasional mispronounciations, e.g., pronouncing treatise as treaties and 't' as 'ch' (an Australian weakness).
December 2, 2024
A little rambly but I enjoyed it.
In summation, nations go to war when they underestimate their enemies power, or overestimate their own. This can come about for financial reasons (they think they have more/less resources) allies (they think another nation will help, and they dont. Or tech (they think their tech is better than it is.)
In summation, nations go to war when they underestimate their enemies power, or overestimate their own. This can come about for financial reasons (they think they have more/less resources) allies (they think another nation will help, and they dont. Or tech (they think their tech is better than it is.)
May 13, 2020
Very good presentation of his critiques of existing theories. Really good sections, especially the beginning and the end (and the Australian pacific war chapter). Some sections about war length and war widening failed to convince me. Overall good good read
January 30, 2018
Interesting topic well explored, but it would have been better as a TED talk
January 20, 2020
Vais descobrir que paz e guerra não são dois lados da mesma moeda, mas sim a mesma nota...
January 29, 2025
Great examples of causes of war over 200 years, looking forward to reading the latest edition
April 21, 2025
Great read. I can't add much more to what other reviewers have said, except that this is worth reading if you like history or international politics.
January 9, 2026
Aythor knows what he's talking about and is a good writer, I just could not get into the format of the content. It was way too broad.
June 12, 2014
Central proposition: War & Peace are two sides of the same coin - the causes of war are also the causes of peace. According to Blainey, things that cause war also cause peace, so if we can figure out what is causing war, we can reverse those situations in order to bring peace.
Optimism is a significant cause of war, he says, because if you don't believe you can win, you won't fight. Causes of war include economic conditions, seasons (!), ideologies, patriotism, national languages, sense of a nation's history, miscalculation, and the prospect of 3rd party intervention.
The nugget of Blainey's idea is very intriguing, but his structure is confusing.
Among the important takeaways are that an imbalance of power will lead to peace (the "ladder" of power is clear), that war is a dispute about the measurement of power (he contends it's the best way to directly measure it), and that it takes 2 to tango - interests in conflict and dispute over measurement of power lead to a situation where there is more to gain by fighting than by negotiation.
The most interesting point is that there is often a predisposition to "blame" those who fight to change the status quo (who "started" the war?), but is a desire to change the status quo by fighting any worse than to keep it by fighting? (161, 164) The bottom line here is that there are also costs to peace - if you want it, you have to suck it up and live with what you have.
Optimism is a significant cause of war, he says, because if you don't believe you can win, you won't fight. Causes of war include economic conditions, seasons (!), ideologies, patriotism, national languages, sense of a nation's history, miscalculation, and the prospect of 3rd party intervention.
The nugget of Blainey's idea is very intriguing, but his structure is confusing.
Among the important takeaways are that an imbalance of power will lead to peace (the "ladder" of power is clear), that war is a dispute about the measurement of power (he contends it's the best way to directly measure it), and that it takes 2 to tango - interests in conflict and dispute over measurement of power lead to a situation where there is more to gain by fighting than by negotiation.
The most interesting point is that there is often a predisposition to "blame" those who fight to change the status quo (who "started" the war?), but is a desire to change the status quo by fighting any worse than to keep it by fighting? (161, 164) The bottom line here is that there are also costs to peace - if you want it, you have to suck it up and live with what you have.
August 30, 2014
The author attempts to come to grips with the question of what causes diplomatic disputes to break out into war. His conclusion, as put forth in the following sentence, seems somewhat obvious to me. "War began when two countries had contradictory ideas of their own bargaining position and therefore could not solve peacefully an issue which vitally affected them."
January 25, 2008
This is a great base to see where much of the rat. choice literature on war originated and poses some interesting questions that are still being explored.
April 25, 2008
Very nice historical view of war from 1700 onwards. It's an older book, so a lot of the theory is outdated, but the anecdotes are priceless.
May 27, 2013
read the book, a few thoughts here : http://nursepastorfatherhusband.blogs...
December 21, 2013
Fascinating.
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August 28, 2017Like a fine scarf, lay over to cover up...
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews