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Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order
Stunning shifts in the worldviews of states mark the modern history of international affairs: how do societies think about―and rethink―international order and security? Japan's "opening," German conquest, American internationalism, Maoist independence, and Gorbachev's "new thinking" molded international conflict and cooperation in their eras. How do we explain such momentous changes in foreign policy―and in other cases their equally surprising absence? The nature of strategic ideas, Jeffrey W. Legro argues, played a critical and overlooked role in these transformations. Big changes in foreign policies are rare because it is difficult for individuals to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities. Doing so depends on a particular nexus of policy expectations, national experience, and ready replacement ideas. In a sweeping comparative history, Legro explores the sources of strategy in the United States and Germany before and after the world wars, in Tokugawa Japan, and in the Soviet Union. He charts the likely future of American primacy and a rising China in the coming century. Rethinking the World tells us when and why we can expect changes in the way states think about the world, why some ideas win out over others, and why some leaders succeed while others fail in redirecting grand strategy.
272 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2005
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 4, 2012
Legro does an excellent job or highlighting the role that ideas play in the maintenance or change of the international system. Written, it would seem, in response to the shift in US foreign policy following 9/11 and with a view to the potential effect the rise of China will have on the international political scene, Legro's views on the role of ideas in determining the change and continuity following a significant international shocks is very relevant to the contemporary international situation.
The main thesis is that "as major powers orient their foreign policies, so too do they help constitute international politics." (p.161) This then leads to the question of how do the major powers develop and change their foreign policies.
Legro seems to suggest that when a state experiences a shock that affects it intersubjective understanding with other states it is faced with two possibilities in relation to its foreign policy, continue with the old orthodoxy or adopt a new way of thinking. How the state will choice Legro states is a matter of if the shock brought a collapse, and if it did, did the new way of thinking provide a useful, successful and effective alternative to the old orthodoxy. If there was no collapse or the alternatives are insufficiently attractive, the old orthodoxy will endure. However, if there is a collapse and a new mode of thinking offers advantages and provides promise, the state will experience change with the way in which it interacts with the international community.
Two subordinate points to Legro's thesis are of interest.
Firstly, he argues that war is not necessarily the shock that is required to bring about collapse or change. While the case of Germany in the 20th Century is a classic case study in the changing effect of war. But the examples of Japan's opening up at the the end of the Tokugawa period, and the Soviet transition in the early 1990s are both examples of significant change in the absence of violent conflict.
Secondly, although the question of foreign policy is a domestic one, transnational actors play an important role. The support of great powers in supporting the success of new thinking in post-WWII Germany was attributed as one of the reason why post-WWII Germany underwent such a successful transformation in foreign policy when compared with the attempts to change it after the defeat in WWI. Similarly, nonstate transnational actors also play a role in helping establish the validity and efficacy of new modes of thinking. (Refer p.165)
In summ: a great book that provides the evidence to an issue that, to my mind, was largely self-evident. Legro states his case with clarity and insight.
The main thesis is that "as major powers orient their foreign policies, so too do they help constitute international politics." (p.161) This then leads to the question of how do the major powers develop and change their foreign policies.
Legro seems to suggest that when a state experiences a shock that affects it intersubjective understanding with other states it is faced with two possibilities in relation to its foreign policy, continue with the old orthodoxy or adopt a new way of thinking. How the state will choice Legro states is a matter of if the shock brought a collapse, and if it did, did the new way of thinking provide a useful, successful and effective alternative to the old orthodoxy. If there was no collapse or the alternatives are insufficiently attractive, the old orthodoxy will endure. However, if there is a collapse and a new mode of thinking offers advantages and provides promise, the state will experience change with the way in which it interacts with the international community.
Two subordinate points to Legro's thesis are of interest.
Firstly, he argues that war is not necessarily the shock that is required to bring about collapse or change. While the case of Germany in the 20th Century is a classic case study in the changing effect of war. But the examples of Japan's opening up at the the end of the Tokugawa period, and the Soviet transition in the early 1990s are both examples of significant change in the absence of violent conflict.
Secondly, although the question of foreign policy is a domestic one, transnational actors play an important role. The support of great powers in supporting the success of new thinking in post-WWII Germany was attributed as one of the reason why post-WWII Germany underwent such a successful transformation in foreign policy when compared with the attempts to change it after the defeat in WWI. Similarly, nonstate transnational actors also play a role in helping establish the validity and efficacy of new modes of thinking. (Refer p.165)
In summ: a great book that provides the evidence to an issue that, to my mind, was largely self-evident. Legro states his case with clarity and insight.
January 21, 2010
A clear and decent plug for crowdsourcing as the creamy filling between policy stated and results achieved.
Legro makes a case not entirely out of the realm of the possible; not even out of the realm of the pedestrian: that it is ideas that serve as the interplay between external political forces and domestic power struggles that ultimately shape the policies of nations.
Amazingly, this hasn't really been tackled much before now. Legro indicates two schools of thought that have made the case ahead of him: strategic adaptation (realpolitik) and domestic interest politics, and he smartly veers away from trying to hoist his theories over top of them, stating instead that collective ideation works with them both to allow some ideas for change to flourish given both internal and external factors.
Perhaps the most important topic Legro tackles is around when change happens, outlining a handy "collapse and consolidation" model that he then backs up with three scenarios: Germany's Interwar period, the Tokugawa reign in Japan, and Gorbachev's "new" USSR.
The scenarios are the heart and soul of the text, and are seductive in the almost coquettish way they pose the question of the logical gap that the two earlier grand strategic theories leave wide open in each scenario. If strictly domestic politics were in play, Legro argues, why indeed would a previously isolationist US risk its collective domestic political neck trying to sell its citizens on involvement in a second continental war? And if strictly strategic ones were in play instead - why still, especially when the spoils of the first war were so slim?
The answer, you'll find, lies in ideas, in the space between collapse and consolidation, outlined sharply, but without stretching so far as to become a gimmick.
Legro makes a case not entirely out of the realm of the possible; not even out of the realm of the pedestrian: that it is ideas that serve as the interplay between external political forces and domestic power struggles that ultimately shape the policies of nations.
Amazingly, this hasn't really been tackled much before now. Legro indicates two schools of thought that have made the case ahead of him: strategic adaptation (realpolitik) and domestic interest politics, and he smartly veers away from trying to hoist his theories over top of them, stating instead that collective ideation works with them both to allow some ideas for change to flourish given both internal and external factors.
Perhaps the most important topic Legro tackles is around when change happens, outlining a handy "collapse and consolidation" model that he then backs up with three scenarios: Germany's Interwar period, the Tokugawa reign in Japan, and Gorbachev's "new" USSR.
The scenarios are the heart and soul of the text, and are seductive in the almost coquettish way they pose the question of the logical gap that the two earlier grand strategic theories leave wide open in each scenario. If strictly domestic politics were in play, Legro argues, why indeed would a previously isolationist US risk its collective domestic political neck trying to sell its citizens on involvement in a second continental war? And if strictly strategic ones were in play instead - why still, especially when the spoils of the first war were so slim?
The answer, you'll find, lies in ideas, in the space between collapse and consolidation, outlined sharply, but without stretching so far as to become a gimmick.
December 24, 2012
The best book to comprehend the contemporary international relations Constructivist approach. Extremely accurate case studies by the way...
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews