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The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
This seminal work by political philosopher C.B. Macpherson was first published by the Clarendon Press in 1962, and remains of key importance to the study of liberal-democratic theory half-a-century later. In it, Macpherson argues that the chief difficulty of the notion of individualism that underpins classical liberalism lies in what he calls its "possessive quality"--"its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them." Under such a conception, the essence of humanity becomes freedom from dependence on the wills of others; society is little more than a system of economic relations; and political society becomes a means of safeguarding private property and the system of economic relations rooted in property.
As the New Statesman "It is rare for a book to change the intellectual landscape. It is even more unusual for this to happen when the subject is one that has been thoroughly investigated by generations of historians. . . Until the appearance of Professor Macpherson's book, it seemed unlikely that anything radically new could be said about so well-worn a topic. The unexpected has happened, and the shock waves are still being absorbed."
A new introduction by Frank Cunningham puts the work in a twenty-first-century context.
As the New Statesman "It is rare for a book to change the intellectual landscape. It is even more unusual for this to happen when the subject is one that has been thoroughly investigated by generations of historians. . . Until the appearance of Professor Macpherson's book, it seemed unlikely that anything radically new could be said about so well-worn a topic. The unexpected has happened, and the shock waves are still being absorbed."
A new introduction by Frank Cunningham puts the work in a twenty-first-century context.
328 pages, Paperback
First published December 31, 1964
21 people are currently reading
784 people want to read
About the author
Crawford Brough Macpherson
16 books22 followersMacpherson was an influential Canadian political scientist who taught political theory at the University of Toronto.
Macpherson was born on 18 November 1911 in Toronto, Ontario. He graduated from the University of Toronto in 1933. After earning an MSc in economics at the London School of Economics where he studied under the supervision of Harold Laski, he joined the faculty of the University of Toronto in 1935. At that time a PhD in the social sciences was uncommon, but some twenty years later he submitted a collection of sixteen published papers to the London School of Economics and was awarded the DSc in economics. These papers were then published in 1953 edition as the book, Democracy in Alberta; the theory and practice of a quasi-party system. In 1956 he became a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Toronto.
Macpherson's best-known contribution to political philosophy is the theory of "possessive individualism", in which an individual is conceived as the sole proprietor of his or her skills and owes nothing to society for them.
Macpherson was born on 18 November 1911 in Toronto, Ontario. He graduated from the University of Toronto in 1933. After earning an MSc in economics at the London School of Economics where he studied under the supervision of Harold Laski, he joined the faculty of the University of Toronto in 1935. At that time a PhD in the social sciences was uncommon, but some twenty years later he submitted a collection of sixteen published papers to the London School of Economics and was awarded the DSc in economics. These papers were then published in 1953 edition as the book, Democracy in Alberta; the theory and practice of a quasi-party system. In 1956 he became a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Toronto.
Macpherson's best-known contribution to political philosophy is the theory of "possessive individualism", in which an individual is conceived as the sole proprietor of his or her skills and owes nothing to society for them.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
December 8, 2011
An odd blend of the irrelevance, tedium and brilliance. MacPherson's general approach to early modern political theorists is spot on: they all describe the social conditions of their time, but claim that they're describing human nature. His attention to detail is impressive, and his readings of Locke and Hobbes are compelling, if more than a bit tendentious. The irrelevance of the book is twofold: first, the chapters on Harrington and the Levellers can only be of concern to people who study the early modern period. That's a pretty minor form of irrelevance, of course, since it's relevant to some people. The problematic irrelevance is MacPherson's use of the language of class. No doubt when he was writing it looked likely that the proletariat was forming itself into a cohesive political body that would be able to undermine the 'possessive individualism' that he accurately and brilliantly describes. But... not so much. The proletariat is off buying Michael Buble albums and drinking Bud Lite, and it's not clear it was ever going to do anything else. The new proletariat (which journalists now call 'developing markets,' just to make it absolutely clear that those people have nothing going for them except their slowly thickening wallets) seems pretty keen to join in.
That would just be a sad historical irony, except that it undermines MacPherson's larger argument: that the development of class consciousness undermines the legitimacy of liberal democracies. Habermas later produced a slightly more accurate argument: the legitimacy of liberal democracies is no longer, if it ever was, reliant on freedoms or equalities. It's reliant on economic strength. The mid century liberal democracies lost legitimacy when the economy crashed in the seventies. Today's liberal democracies are losing legitimacy too. That's the way it's going to be for the foreseeable future: we'll never feel 'obliged' to our governments. We might re-elect them if they fill our fat mouths with ever-blander produce, but we're not obliged to obey them in any way. We're just paying them back for that wonderbread. Thanks, congressman. Have another term.
So it would be fatuous to write a 'philosophical' theory of political obligation today, except, of course, people keep doing it. The strangest thing about MacPherson is surely the way he holds to both a rigorous materialism (Hobbes essentially had it right, now if only we could have Hobbes plus socialism instead of Hobbes plus monarchy...) and a bizarre idealism (the main problem of states is not putting enough white bread on the table, but ensuring that they have a philosophical theory of their own legitimacy). Good-oh. Hope that works out for you!
That would just be a sad historical irony, except that it undermines MacPherson's larger argument: that the development of class consciousness undermines the legitimacy of liberal democracies. Habermas later produced a slightly more accurate argument: the legitimacy of liberal democracies is no longer, if it ever was, reliant on freedoms or equalities. It's reliant on economic strength. The mid century liberal democracies lost legitimacy when the economy crashed in the seventies. Today's liberal democracies are losing legitimacy too. That's the way it's going to be for the foreseeable future: we'll never feel 'obliged' to our governments. We might re-elect them if they fill our fat mouths with ever-blander produce, but we're not obliged to obey them in any way. We're just paying them back for that wonderbread. Thanks, congressman. Have another term.
So it would be fatuous to write a 'philosophical' theory of political obligation today, except, of course, people keep doing it. The strangest thing about MacPherson is surely the way he holds to both a rigorous materialism (Hobbes essentially had it right, now if only we could have Hobbes plus socialism instead of Hobbes plus monarchy...) and a bizarre idealism (the main problem of states is not putting enough white bread on the table, but ensuring that they have a philosophical theory of their own legitimacy). Good-oh. Hope that works out for you!
August 17, 2015
The classic evaluation of English political theory that helps make the case that Locke was "the confused man's Hobbes."
August 26, 2012
Possessive individualism was, for MacPherson, the defining characteristic of the bourgeoisie. It was a concept of the relationship between human beings and the natural world that united all of its ideologues during the period when the class detached itself from preceding social relationships rooted in custom and hierarchical obligation, with the trajectory between the brutal and coarse views of Thomas Hobbes and the classical liberal viewpoint of John Locke illustrating this point.
Hobbes commenced the process by radically rethinking the status of the individual human being and constituting each as a complete identity prior to entering society. The power to influence society was regarded as a commodity - something offered for exchange within the context of a market. Power itself was the greater ability of some individuals to influence society over and above others. For some people the drive for power is innate, and in others merely a defensive reaction triggered by the need for protection against those with power-driven natures. This suggests a stalemate, with the defensive power checking the expansion of the aggressive, and Hobbes concluded that power could not be taken anyway from any individual “except by his own consent.”
MacPherson saw Hobbes as arguing from the standpoint of a materialist conception of equality between human beings, with values and rights not bestowed on individuals by God or other external forces, but by the need that each has to maintain ‘motion’ in the world, which is a basic condition of al life. But the motion of every individual had to be considered to be in conflict with the motion of others, with the danger of collision being ever present.
If this is the case then how can a concept of justice arise between human beings – determining in specific circumstances when one person’s rights have precedence over others? MacPherson argues that these are determined “by the actual competitive relationship between the powers of individuals.”
“If the determination of values and rights by the market is accepted as justice by all members of the society, there is a sufficient basis for rational obligation, binding all men, to an authority which could maintain and enforce the market system.” (p.86)
Hobbes’s line of reasoning therefore took him from an understanding of human beings as radically-constituted individuals in inevitable conflict with one another because of their need to maintain their ‘motion’. This supported their essential equality, but one which could be transcended because, being the possess of their own powers, the individual could trade their exercise in either aggressive or defensive directions for other outcomes considered more valuable than the exercise of power. The arena for this trade was the market and the outcome being pursued was greater security.
Macpherson then moves the argument through a succeeding line of philosophical standpoints which have generally being considered more congenial to liberal outlooks. The first of these is the Leveller current which represented itself during the course of the English Civil War. Less prepared than Hobbes to accept the authority of a supreme sovereign – a king acting with unlimited authority – as the sole power capable of sustaining the market which he considered necessary for his materialist moral order, the Levellers looked to democracy, and a sovereign parliament, as sufficient authority to maintain order.
The problem was determining who might participate in the political processes which sustained this democratic order. During the Putney debates the leaders of the Leveller’s Rainsborough and co., argued against Cromwell and Ireton for a franchise which bestowed the right to vote on all ‘free men’, who were conceived of a individual in possession of their power to labour and who had not disposed of this freedom by entering into a relationship as a ‘servant’ (waged labourer) of another. Hobbes’s generalised ownership of ‘power’ became in this version of possessive individualism ownership of the power to labour on terms which served the interests of the individual himself.
MacPherson argues that the Leveller’s had no quarrel with Ireton’s conception of the foundation of liberty as “those who chose the law-makers shall be men freed from dependence on others.” (p128). The free individual was a person who had property in his own person and capacities, able to enjoy them exclusively and exclude others from this enjoyment. “What makes a man human is his freedom from other men.” (p142)
A further link in the chain of bourgeois thought is provided by James Harrington, the author of The Commonwealth of Oceana, which set out the constitution of a republican state. In his thinking Harrington strove for a ‘balance’ between the interests of the gentry and other classes which would be expressed in the legal form of a constitution. Harrington’s views appear to have required a more detailed consideration of the economic relations between the classes than his other early bourgeois thinkers, and the notion of an ‘equal agrarian’ – a constitution arrangement aimed at balancing the power of landowners and others – was central to his ideas. He differed in seeing class interests as being more important than the undifferentiated interests of all individuals to acquire security. “This was why you could not make kings (or commonwealths) merely by constructing a geometry of men’s wills without constructing an anatomy of their property.” (p191). Without contradicting the premise of other thinkers that the powers of individuals to act in the world could be construed as ‘property’ Harrington moved away from the idea that, being property, obtaining justice could be left to the relations of a market. As MacPherson sees it, Harrington was an early proponent of an ‘opportunity’ or welfare state.
Finally onto to Locke. Seen as the exemplar of what anyone could want from a modern liberal democrat – government by consent, majority rule, minority rights, moral supremacy of the individual, and sanctity of individual property. He achieves this by a line of reasoning which shows that, in the early ages human beings replaced the drive towards endless expansion into wilderness as a means to secure subsistence by a system which sought to increase the amount of trade that went on between communities. The invention of money, the critical element driving trade, marked the border between primitive and civilised societies.
Working with money as a theme, Locke takes a different view of the question of wage earning. Other early liberal thinkers had seen it as the point in which external authority was reasserted over the individual and made him (always him) the subject of power and lost to the realm of liberty. For Locke, the money component of wage labour allows the worker to increase his productivity. Not only is the capacity to labour a property, the duty to alienate it in the market is a duty he owes to civil society.
“God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his condition also required it of him. God and his Reason commanded him t subdue the Earth, ie to improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay something upon it that was his own, his labour.” (Quote p233).
As MacPherson puts it, Locke reads back into nature a natural propensity on the part of man to accumulate, and the only check that there had been upon it had been the absence of money and commerce.
In finding the root of this state of affairs in nature, and the bearer of its historical truth the position of the individual, a continuum exists across 17th century English philosophy which allowed it to move from its initially unpalatable finding that a unrestrained Leviathan state was required to foster the forces of the market within which human beings were required to act, to, by stages the more democratic viewpoint of constitutionalism, which allowed citizens to relate to each other and regulate their mutual behaviour through a system of law. But it nevertheless presumed that the social condition that that was to be brought about was one in which one part of society placed its productive power at the disposal of the other. As MacPherson concludes, this produced “the great tragedy” of 17th century English society, that its assertion that the free rational individual was the criteria of a good society, but that this required “the denial of individualism to half the nation.” (p262)
Hobbes commenced the process by radically rethinking the status of the individual human being and constituting each as a complete identity prior to entering society. The power to influence society was regarded as a commodity - something offered for exchange within the context of a market. Power itself was the greater ability of some individuals to influence society over and above others. For some people the drive for power is innate, and in others merely a defensive reaction triggered by the need for protection against those with power-driven natures. This suggests a stalemate, with the defensive power checking the expansion of the aggressive, and Hobbes concluded that power could not be taken anyway from any individual “except by his own consent.”
MacPherson saw Hobbes as arguing from the standpoint of a materialist conception of equality between human beings, with values and rights not bestowed on individuals by God or other external forces, but by the need that each has to maintain ‘motion’ in the world, which is a basic condition of al life. But the motion of every individual had to be considered to be in conflict with the motion of others, with the danger of collision being ever present.
If this is the case then how can a concept of justice arise between human beings – determining in specific circumstances when one person’s rights have precedence over others? MacPherson argues that these are determined “by the actual competitive relationship between the powers of individuals.”
“If the determination of values and rights by the market is accepted as justice by all members of the society, there is a sufficient basis for rational obligation, binding all men, to an authority which could maintain and enforce the market system.” (p.86)
Hobbes’s line of reasoning therefore took him from an understanding of human beings as radically-constituted individuals in inevitable conflict with one another because of their need to maintain their ‘motion’. This supported their essential equality, but one which could be transcended because, being the possess of their own powers, the individual could trade their exercise in either aggressive or defensive directions for other outcomes considered more valuable than the exercise of power. The arena for this trade was the market and the outcome being pursued was greater security.
Macpherson then moves the argument through a succeeding line of philosophical standpoints which have generally being considered more congenial to liberal outlooks. The first of these is the Leveller current which represented itself during the course of the English Civil War. Less prepared than Hobbes to accept the authority of a supreme sovereign – a king acting with unlimited authority – as the sole power capable of sustaining the market which he considered necessary for his materialist moral order, the Levellers looked to democracy, and a sovereign parliament, as sufficient authority to maintain order.
The problem was determining who might participate in the political processes which sustained this democratic order. During the Putney debates the leaders of the Leveller’s Rainsborough and co., argued against Cromwell and Ireton for a franchise which bestowed the right to vote on all ‘free men’, who were conceived of a individual in possession of their power to labour and who had not disposed of this freedom by entering into a relationship as a ‘servant’ (waged labourer) of another. Hobbes’s generalised ownership of ‘power’ became in this version of possessive individualism ownership of the power to labour on terms which served the interests of the individual himself.
MacPherson argues that the Leveller’s had no quarrel with Ireton’s conception of the foundation of liberty as “those who chose the law-makers shall be men freed from dependence on others.” (p128). The free individual was a person who had property in his own person and capacities, able to enjoy them exclusively and exclude others from this enjoyment. “What makes a man human is his freedom from other men.” (p142)
A further link in the chain of bourgeois thought is provided by James Harrington, the author of The Commonwealth of Oceana, which set out the constitution of a republican state. In his thinking Harrington strove for a ‘balance’ between the interests of the gentry and other classes which would be expressed in the legal form of a constitution. Harrington’s views appear to have required a more detailed consideration of the economic relations between the classes than his other early bourgeois thinkers, and the notion of an ‘equal agrarian’ – a constitution arrangement aimed at balancing the power of landowners and others – was central to his ideas. He differed in seeing class interests as being more important than the undifferentiated interests of all individuals to acquire security. “This was why you could not make kings (or commonwealths) merely by constructing a geometry of men’s wills without constructing an anatomy of their property.” (p191). Without contradicting the premise of other thinkers that the powers of individuals to act in the world could be construed as ‘property’ Harrington moved away from the idea that, being property, obtaining justice could be left to the relations of a market. As MacPherson sees it, Harrington was an early proponent of an ‘opportunity’ or welfare state.
Finally onto to Locke. Seen as the exemplar of what anyone could want from a modern liberal democrat – government by consent, majority rule, minority rights, moral supremacy of the individual, and sanctity of individual property. He achieves this by a line of reasoning which shows that, in the early ages human beings replaced the drive towards endless expansion into wilderness as a means to secure subsistence by a system which sought to increase the amount of trade that went on between communities. The invention of money, the critical element driving trade, marked the border between primitive and civilised societies.
Working with money as a theme, Locke takes a different view of the question of wage earning. Other early liberal thinkers had seen it as the point in which external authority was reasserted over the individual and made him (always him) the subject of power and lost to the realm of liberty. For Locke, the money component of wage labour allows the worker to increase his productivity. Not only is the capacity to labour a property, the duty to alienate it in the market is a duty he owes to civil society.
“God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his condition also required it of him. God and his Reason commanded him t subdue the Earth, ie to improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay something upon it that was his own, his labour.” (Quote p233).
As MacPherson puts it, Locke reads back into nature a natural propensity on the part of man to accumulate, and the only check that there had been upon it had been the absence of money and commerce.
In finding the root of this state of affairs in nature, and the bearer of its historical truth the position of the individual, a continuum exists across 17th century English philosophy which allowed it to move from its initially unpalatable finding that a unrestrained Leviathan state was required to foster the forces of the market within which human beings were required to act, to, by stages the more democratic viewpoint of constitutionalism, which allowed citizens to relate to each other and regulate their mutual behaviour through a system of law. But it nevertheless presumed that the social condition that that was to be brought about was one in which one part of society placed its productive power at the disposal of the other. As MacPherson concludes, this produced “the great tragedy” of 17th century English society, that its assertion that the free rational individual was the criteria of a good society, but that this required “the denial of individualism to half the nation.” (p262)
February 16, 2022
A very tough high level political philosophy book arguing against john locke and ultimately the faults of private property
March 30, 2016
If like me one had read only Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Two Treatises on Government, one will gain breadth and social context from reading C.B. Macpherson's book. Whether his core premise convinces is less certain, but it is clearly written. I was persuaded by his statements about Hobbes' implicit assumptions, and how they shaped his political philosophy. But his arguments about the Levelers and Harrington seemed forced. They took on a quality found in apologies in that the author tried to mend the inconsistency and ambiguity of the original texts by bringing in social context—the unstated prejudices and presumptions of the times. The author’s introduction and conclusion makes it clear he is no fan possessive individualism and thus I see an irony in his patching over the weaknesses in theories that relay on possessive individualism, even though I understand why he did so.
I hesitate to lay out what he means by possessive individualism for fear of misstatement but I’ll give it a go. Briefly the theory states that humans are owners of themselves and their labor, and this ownership is not derivative; that their labor is consensually alienable; and market transactions govern the interactions of humans.
The unexpressed unifying elements he saw through the 17th century English thinkers was the incomplete inclusion of workers—those who had alienated their labor—in political society; they consented to be governed but could not be among the governors. This is because the point of government was to protect property.
Beyond the historical theme of the book, C.B. Macpherson argues that the rise of working class ‘articulation’ and their inclusion in parliaments has vitiated the needed cohesion that the property-protectors had when they were the sole governors. Since the material facts of possessive individualism remain, he says that there is now a contradiction between the former ethical underpinnings of liberal democracy and the interests of the mixed group that now governs. I find the implication unconvincing.
I hesitate to lay out what he means by possessive individualism for fear of misstatement but I’ll give it a go. Briefly the theory states that humans are owners of themselves and their labor, and this ownership is not derivative; that their labor is consensually alienable; and market transactions govern the interactions of humans.
The unexpressed unifying elements he saw through the 17th century English thinkers was the incomplete inclusion of workers—those who had alienated their labor—in political society; they consented to be governed but could not be among the governors. This is because the point of government was to protect property.
Beyond the historical theme of the book, C.B. Macpherson argues that the rise of working class ‘articulation’ and their inclusion in parliaments has vitiated the needed cohesion that the property-protectors had when they were the sole governors. Since the material facts of possessive individualism remain, he says that there is now a contradiction between the former ethical underpinnings of liberal democracy and the interests of the mixed group that now governs. I find the implication unconvincing.
December 19, 2018
A great reading to flesh out 17th century political theory. Seems to reveal a lot in the theories of Hobbes, the Levellers and Locke which were confusing or appeared contradictory. This is done with what appear to be reasonable inferences from their writings and the ideas of the time. It has the surprising outcome of actually pulling together a lot of similarities among those theories, to the point that Locke seems fairly similar to Hobbes, but without a self-perpetuating sovereign, since Hobbes thought market systems couldn't have overriding class cohesion as Locke understood. The Levellers also appear closer to both, since it seems they wanted to exclude wage labourers and beggars from the franchise. Basically, this does a lot to help get away from overly simplified depictions of those 17th century thinkers.
I thought the last section on interpreting these theories in the light of the 20th century to be really fascinating. It's short, and there's a lot packed in there, so it's hard for me to completely buy it. But Macpherson argues that foundational liberal theories have failed, and perhaps the way to amend them is through the cohesion of insecurity we all share due to the threat of nuclear war. This makes sense for a book published in the year of the Cuban missile crisis, and I'm glad to see he doesn't ignore it. Of course his point makes even more sense now in light of another species threat, climate change, being added to that earlier one. I think Macpherson sees some sort of global government as maybe the only solution. That seems unlikely in the near term, but maybe international agreements through the UN, like the Paris Accord, are a step in that direction. Regardless, his final conclusion is worth thinking about today, as it's only gained relevance.
I thought the last section on interpreting these theories in the light of the 20th century to be really fascinating. It's short, and there's a lot packed in there, so it's hard for me to completely buy it. But Macpherson argues that foundational liberal theories have failed, and perhaps the way to amend them is through the cohesion of insecurity we all share due to the threat of nuclear war. This makes sense for a book published in the year of the Cuban missile crisis, and I'm glad to see he doesn't ignore it. Of course his point makes even more sense now in light of another species threat, climate change, being added to that earlier one. I think Macpherson sees some sort of global government as maybe the only solution. That seems unlikely in the near term, but maybe international agreements through the UN, like the Paris Accord, are a step in that direction. Regardless, his final conclusion is worth thinking about today, as it's only gained relevance.
June 15, 2025
A classic. Historicizes theories of political economy and democracy in the formative period of the English revolution. I thought the chapters on the major figures (Hobbes, Harrington, Locke) stronger than the one on the Levellers.
But: for someone (like me) who does not know English property holding gradations (copy holder, lease holder, servant et al) it can be hard to follow the details.
But: for someone (like me) who does not know English property holding gradations (copy holder, lease holder, servant et al) it can be hard to follow the details.
September 17, 2025
Clear and concise writing on political theory, specifically on Hobbes and Locke, and how market based assumptions and a possessive individualism were implicit and sometimes explicit in their theory of civil society, natural law, and moral obligations.
September 9, 2018
Reasonable idea, but wrong
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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April 23, 2020Completely wrong about Hobbes. Makes sense in terms of Locke. But isn't that obvious...
May 20, 2025
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- Chapter Six
- Chapter Six
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December 29, 2015I finished reading The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism this evening. I probably agree with about one-third of Macpherson's book, probably disagree with another third, and am very much unsure about the remaining third. Accordingly, I am unable to rate the book at this time. That said, Macpherson has a very interesting and in-depth discussion of Locke as well as of Hobbes, the Levellers, and Harrington. His approach, albeit somewhat reductive, is quite thought-provoking and bears further study and reflection. He suggests in the concluding two pages (276-77) that the possessive individualism regime can be overcome only by amending Hobbes, "this time more clearly than he was by Locke," in the face of the "new equality of insecurity" caused by twentieth-century technology. He was obviously referring to the threat of thermonuclear war, which was very much on everyone's mind when he published this book in 1962. He suggested that the people of the world could somehow unite into a world state (p. 276). This, of course, was even more of a utopian fantasy during the height of the Cold War (the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962) than it is today. I have ordered two of his later books: The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Essays (1985; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). It will be interesting to see whether he sets forth more realistic proposals in these subsequently published books.
But although I look forward to reading Macpherson's other books as well as studying further the modern philosophers, I need a break from modernity. I'm going back to Plato for awhile—to a philosopher who considered reason to be an end in itself and not just a means to the satisfaction of human needs, wants, and passions.
August 13, 2016
Macpherson's analysis of Hobbes and Locke is quite brilliant. The middle part of the book is more uneven; I found the chapter on the Levellers a bit tedious, though still interesting both in itself as well as in this context. It gets a lot more intriguing when he writes about Harrington, a theorist I didn't know much about, and this was as great an introduction to him as I could have wished for. Macpherson goes to the root of the underlying assumptions behind the seeming inconsistencies in Hobbes, Harrington and Locke, and shows very convincingly how their theories nevertheless for the most part hold together in view of the emerging market society - and market morality - of the 17th century. --- We here go from Hobbes to Locke and back again... - As Macpherson puts it towards the end of the book: "Hobbes, as amended by Locke in the matter of the self-perpetuating sovereign... provided the main structure for English liberal theory."
July 12, 2010
An intriguing argument. The debate between ndividualism and communitarianism continues. Macpherson argues that (Page 3) ". . .the difficulties of modern liberal-democratic theory lie deeper than had been thought, that the original seventeenth-century theory individualism contained the central difficulty, which lay in its possessive quality. Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them."
This, of course, is a central concern of American liberalism. Does it take a community to raise a child? Or not? Macpherson's argument is cogent, whether or not one agree with it, and calls for a dialogue bwteen advocateas and opponents. The result of that dialogue should advance discourse. . . .
This, of course, is a central concern of American liberalism. Does it take a community to raise a child? Or not? Macpherson's argument is cogent, whether or not one agree with it, and calls for a dialogue bwteen advocateas and opponents. The result of that dialogue should advance discourse. . . .
to-read-in-part
July 7, 2016...es el mercado el fundamento de los valores de la reproducción social.
Imperio Pág.69
Historia de las Ideas de la Modernidad. Unidad 1.
Imperio Pág.69
Historia de las Ideas de la Modernidad. Unidad 1.
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September 28, 2014i want to read this book
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