What do you think?
Rate this book
Knowledge and Lotteries
Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know certain propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of things which entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a large fortune. After providing a number of specific and general characterizations of the puzzle, Hawthorne carefully examines the competing merits of candidate solutions, addressing along the way a range of central questions concerning the nature and importance of knowledge.
- GenresPhilosophy
216 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2003
4 people are currently reading
77 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
August 31, 2021
In this book, Hawthorne gives a pretty comprehensive outlook on the main contemporary contenders for knowledge theory: contextualists vs invariantists, skeptics vs non-skeptics, and many small nuances of each position, all on the background of a prominent problem in epistemology: why do we say that we know p when we say we don't know a proposition that implies p? It is typically associated with lottery betting (hence the name of the book), but it is a much more comprehensive problem in everyday reasoning, so it shouldn't be disregarded as philosophical gibberish.
The exposition style is interesting. For the most part it is very canonical: introduction of the problem, careful examination and assessment of each proposed solution in the literature. Hawthorne explicitly states he doesn't fully endorse any position, so the text is good as an introduction to the various views, but imo only for people already quite comfortable with analytical philosophy, since the arguments are very tightly logical and structured in such familiar style.
Many arguments take as relevant evidence our "intuitions" about knowledge claims. This is where I found the text a bit lacking: without x-phi (experimental philosophy) data provided (except for ONE instance) Hawthorne seems to make the mistake of thinking that what he feels intuitive is intuitive for everyone. Fortunately, the rise in popularity of x-phi has reduced the risk of this mistake being made in more recent works in the field. Also, some "intuitive" examples seem a bit ad hoc, since one could present opposite ordinary expressions to support an exact opposite view.
The final few pages are very weird for an "analytic" philosopher, but I really appreciated them. It gives the flavor of what so-called "continental" philosophers claim is lacking from their opponents' works: the existential consequences of philosophical beliefs. Really a wonderful little touch.
The exposition style is interesting. For the most part it is very canonical: introduction of the problem, careful examination and assessment of each proposed solution in the literature. Hawthorne explicitly states he doesn't fully endorse any position, so the text is good as an introduction to the various views, but imo only for people already quite comfortable with analytical philosophy, since the arguments are very tightly logical and structured in such familiar style.
Many arguments take as relevant evidence our "intuitions" about knowledge claims. This is where I found the text a bit lacking: without x-phi (experimental philosophy) data provided (except for ONE instance) Hawthorne seems to make the mistake of thinking that what he feels intuitive is intuitive for everyone. Fortunately, the rise in popularity of x-phi has reduced the risk of this mistake being made in more recent works in the field. Also, some "intuitive" examples seem a bit ad hoc, since one could present opposite ordinary expressions to support an exact opposite view.
The final few pages are very weird for an "analytic" philosopher, but I really appreciated them. It gives the flavor of what so-called "continental" philosophers claim is lacking from their opponents' works: the existential consequences of philosophical beliefs. Really a wonderful little touch.
February 5, 2022
02/04/2022 --
This book was written in the footnotes.
Jokes (and actual pages after pages of 3/4 page-long footnotes) aside, Hawthorne brings together a host of interesting issues across traditional epistemology. The footnotes are long, but they really do a lot of work. Main text could be clearer -- sometimes I found Hawthorne's points quite opaque.
I also didn't quite agree with his characterization of contextualism. I think he underestimates the extent to which contextualism can explain our ordinary use of the term "knowledge", and erroneously promotes subject-sensitive invariantism to the same level of preeminence. SSI has intractable problems which contextualism does not face; in contrast, I do see a way out of the supposed problems suffered by contextualism.
This book was written in the footnotes.
Jokes (and actual pages after pages of 3/4 page-long footnotes) aside, Hawthorne brings together a host of interesting issues across traditional epistemology. The footnotes are long, but they really do a lot of work. Main text could be clearer -- sometimes I found Hawthorne's points quite opaque.
I also didn't quite agree with his characterization of contextualism. I think he underestimates the extent to which contextualism can explain our ordinary use of the term "knowledge", and erroneously promotes subject-sensitive invariantism to the same level of preeminence. SSI has intractable problems which contextualism does not face; in contrast, I do see a way out of the supposed problems suffered by contextualism.
December 7, 2022
Detailed and nuanced terrain-mapping in contemporary epistemology.
November 10, 2013
"Oh, lottery problems aren't much of an issue, just a niche problem, right?"
Wrong. This book really shows why lottery problems (cos, as Hawthorne shows, it's a set of problems) are a broad issue and the scepticism that can follow from them. There's a lot of discussion in this of wide-ranging areas of epistemology, including closure, sensitivity, contextualism etc. and the book probably deserves more time than I gave it. Also, a bizarre but brilliant example involving 14lbs of salmon
Wrong. This book really shows why lottery problems (cos, as Hawthorne shows, it's a set of problems) are a broad issue and the scepticism that can follow from them. There's a lot of discussion in this of wide-ranging areas of epistemology, including closure, sensitivity, contextualism etc. and the book probably deserves more time than I gave it. Also, a bizarre but brilliant example involving 14lbs of salmon
April 6, 2015
Glad I finished it. Sad I'll have to read it again. Hope I'll understand it better the second time. Why do so many philosophers write so badly? Why do they insist on building walls with so few doors & windows?
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews