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Roots of Strategy: Book 3 - 3 Military Classics
Von Leeb's Defense, von Freytag-Loringhoven's The Power of Personality in War, and Erfuth's Surprise.
Paperback
First published February 1, 1991
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September 14, 2019
I have had this book for more than 20 years, but only dipped into it previously. My next research project, however, has finally led me to read one of the three classics contained within its covers - Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven's The Power of Personality in War. The effort has been well worth it.
Freytag-Loringhoven was one of Germany's leading military theorists in the years leading up to the First World War. In the classic style of the General Staff, although he focused on research and was head of the military history section in Berlin, he also undertook operational commands with the troops, commanding a corps during the war. In this book, published in 1911, he explored the issues associated with the personality and character of the commander, explicitly drawing on what Clausewitz had written on the subject. In this respect, the book stands out as very different from the vast flood of books on leadership with which we are now so familiar. Here, Freytag-Loringhoven was concerned with the way in which the individual commander maintained their resilience in the face of the responsibilities, terrors and uncertainties of warfare, and sought to take clear decisions, based on a sound assessment of the actual situation, and then stick with that decision even in the face of evidence to the contrary, but not to the extent of becoming trapped in stubborness.
The book demands a reasonable knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon and of Frederick the Great, in order to understand fully the lessons being drawn, but the translation flows and the arguments are clear. This is a classic study of a relatively overlooked aspect of military command, written by a leading practitioner and theorist. It may now be closer in time to Napoleon than to our own times, but it fully justifies the time spent reading and reflecting on the arguments made.
Freytag-Loringhoven was one of Germany's leading military theorists in the years leading up to the First World War. In the classic style of the General Staff, although he focused on research and was head of the military history section in Berlin, he also undertook operational commands with the troops, commanding a corps during the war. In this book, published in 1911, he explored the issues associated with the personality and character of the commander, explicitly drawing on what Clausewitz had written on the subject. In this respect, the book stands out as very different from the vast flood of books on leadership with which we are now so familiar. Here, Freytag-Loringhoven was concerned with the way in which the individual commander maintained their resilience in the face of the responsibilities, terrors and uncertainties of warfare, and sought to take clear decisions, based on a sound assessment of the actual situation, and then stick with that decision even in the face of evidence to the contrary, but not to the extent of becoming trapped in stubborness.
The book demands a reasonable knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon and of Frederick the Great, in order to understand fully the lessons being drawn, but the translation flows and the arguments are clear. This is a classic study of a relatively overlooked aspect of military command, written by a leading practitioner and theorist. It may now be closer in time to Napoleon than to our own times, but it fully justifies the time spent reading and reflecting on the arguments made.
Displaying 1 of 1 review