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Point/Counterpoint
Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?
“Given the stature of its two protagonists, this book will become something of an instant classic, occupying a unique and special place in the literature on this topic, and enjoying wide and long-lasting readership and usefulness as a supplementary text.”
— Gary Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
“This engaging little book treats key issues of chance and design in the science-religion dialogue. It would be appropriate for courses in the philosophy of religion, religion and culture, and science and religion. I would be highly likely to adopt the book in my philosophy of science course because it us brief, clear, and to the point.”
— Michael L. Peterson, Asbury College
One of today's most controversial and heated issues is whether or not the conflict between science and religion can be reconciled. In Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?, renowned philosophers Daniel C. Dennett and Alvin Plantinga expand upon the arguments that they presented in an exciting live debate held at the 2009 American Philosophical Association Central Division conference.
An enlightening discussion that will motivate students to think critically, Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? opens with Plantinga's assertion that Christianity is compatible with evolutionary theory because Christians believe that God created the living world, and it is entirely possible that God did so by using a process of evolution. Dennett vigorously rejects this argument, provoking a reply from Plantinga, another response from Dennett, and final statements from both sides. As philosophers, the authors possess expert skills in critical analysis; their arguments provide a model of dialogue between those who strongly disagree. Ideal for courses in philosophy of religion, science and religion, and philosophy of science, Science and Religion is also captivating reading for general readers.
About the Authors
Daniel C. Dennett is the Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies, University Professor, and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006), Freedom Evolves (2003), and Consciousness Explained (1991).
Alvin Plantinga is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame and author of Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality (OUP, 2003) and Warranted Christian Belief (OUP, 2000).
— Gary Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
“This engaging little book treats key issues of chance and design in the science-religion dialogue. It would be appropriate for courses in the philosophy of religion, religion and culture, and science and religion. I would be highly likely to adopt the book in my philosophy of science course because it us brief, clear, and to the point.”
— Michael L. Peterson, Asbury College
One of today's most controversial and heated issues is whether or not the conflict between science and religion can be reconciled. In Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?, renowned philosophers Daniel C. Dennett and Alvin Plantinga expand upon the arguments that they presented in an exciting live debate held at the 2009 American Philosophical Association Central Division conference.
An enlightening discussion that will motivate students to think critically, Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? opens with Plantinga's assertion that Christianity is compatible with evolutionary theory because Christians believe that God created the living world, and it is entirely possible that God did so by using a process of evolution. Dennett vigorously rejects this argument, provoking a reply from Plantinga, another response from Dennett, and final statements from both sides. As philosophers, the authors possess expert skills in critical analysis; their arguments provide a model of dialogue between those who strongly disagree. Ideal for courses in philosophy of religion, science and religion, and philosophy of science, Science and Religion is also captivating reading for general readers.
About the Authors
Daniel C. Dennett is the Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies, University Professor, and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006), Freedom Evolves (2003), and Consciousness Explained (1991).
Alvin Plantinga is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame and author of Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality (OUP, 2003) and Warranted Christian Belief (OUP, 2000).
96 pages, Paperback
First published September 10, 2010
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About the author
Daniel C. Dennett
82 books3,070 followersDaniel Clement Dennett III was a prominent philosopher whose research centered on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He was the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett was a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 36 reviews
May 24, 2020
ENGLISH: A typical debate between a philosopher who believes in God (Alvin Plantinga) and a "radical atheist" (Daniel Dennett).
In such debates, atheists always try to keep the last word. To do this, they leave the first contribution to their opponent; thus, as both are allowed the same number of participations, the last part of the debate automatically falls back on the atheist. I have noticed the same thing in other debates of this type, such as ¿Dios o la Materia? between Soler Gil and López Corredoira. My advise is that the person who believes in God should always try to be the second (and therefore the last) participant in the debate.
In this debate, Dennett proves his incapacity to answer reasonable arguments by resorting to sarcasm and ridicule against Plantinga's arguments for God's existence, such as accusing his opponent of believing in Superman, or the space spaghetti, which is clearly nonsense. By resorting to this kind of arguments (a form of the ad hominem fallacy) Dennett shows he has no reasonable arguments, and therefore loses the debate.
ESPAÑOL: Un debate típico entre un filósofo que cree en Dios (Alvin Plantinga) y un "ateo radical" (Daniel Dennett).
En tales debates, los ateos siempre intentan tener la última palabra. Para conseguirlo, dejan a su oponente la primera contribución al debate; así, como a ambos se les otorga el mismo número de participaciones, la última parte del debate recae automáticamente en el ateo. He notado lo mismo en otros debates de este tipo, como ¿Dios o la Materia? entre Soler Gil y López Corredoira. Mi consejo es que la persona que cree en Dios debe siempre tratar de ser el segundo (y, por lo tanto, el último) participante en el debate.
En este debate, Dennett demuestra su incapacidad para responder a argumentos razonables, pues recurre al sarcasmo y al ridículo contra los argumentos de Plantinga a favor de la existencia de Dios, acusando a su oponente de creer en Superman, o en el espagueti espacial, lo cual es claramente absurdo. Al recurrir a este tipo de argumentos (una forma de la falacia ad hominem) se ve que Dennett no tiene argumentos razonables y, por lo tanto, pierde el debate.
In such debates, atheists always try to keep the last word. To do this, they leave the first contribution to their opponent; thus, as both are allowed the same number of participations, the last part of the debate automatically falls back on the atheist. I have noticed the same thing in other debates of this type, such as ¿Dios o la Materia? between Soler Gil and López Corredoira. My advise is that the person who believes in God should always try to be the second (and therefore the last) participant in the debate.
In this debate, Dennett proves his incapacity to answer reasonable arguments by resorting to sarcasm and ridicule against Plantinga's arguments for God's existence, such as accusing his opponent of believing in Superman, or the space spaghetti, which is clearly nonsense. By resorting to this kind of arguments (a form of the ad hominem fallacy) Dennett shows he has no reasonable arguments, and therefore loses the debate.
ESPAÑOL: Un debate típico entre un filósofo que cree en Dios (Alvin Plantinga) y un "ateo radical" (Daniel Dennett).
En tales debates, los ateos siempre intentan tener la última palabra. Para conseguirlo, dejan a su oponente la primera contribución al debate; así, como a ambos se les otorga el mismo número de participaciones, la última parte del debate recae automáticamente en el ateo. He notado lo mismo en otros debates de este tipo, como ¿Dios o la Materia? entre Soler Gil y López Corredoira. Mi consejo es que la persona que cree en Dios debe siempre tratar de ser el segundo (y, por lo tanto, el último) participante en el debate.
En este debate, Dennett demuestra su incapacidad para responder a argumentos razonables, pues recurre al sarcasmo y al ridículo contra los argumentos de Plantinga a favor de la existencia de Dios, acusando a su oponente de creer en Superman, o en el espagueti espacial, lo cual es claramente absurdo. Al recurrir a este tipo de argumentos (una forma de la falacia ad hominem) se ve que Dennett no tiene argumentos razonables y, por lo tanto, pierde el debate.
October 29, 2013
A very brief and ultimately frustrating book (77 pages). Denett's response's to Plantinga's essays reduce to ridicule of theism and hand waving with respect to EAAN .
October 24, 2012
This has to be one of the most frustrating texts I have read in a long time! I've never read anything by Plantinga before, but my thoughts of him after reading this are not very high... Dennett is again and again clearly and carefully laying out the obvious facts of the matter without directly arguing against the existence of god, which would be besides the point in this debate, or rather, any strong arguments against god's existence would render the debate meaningless since religious beliefs means beliefs in the existence of god and belief in things the existence of which can be argued against rationally are certainly in conflict with science which, at a very minimum, requires the belief only in claims which can not be rationally falsified. But maybe this is at the very core of the debate? In any case, this is not the line of reasoning pursued here. Instead, Plantinga spends all of his time making rather silly claims about the supposed impossibility of unguided evolution generating minds capable of tracking truth, despite Dennett's insistent claims that this is exactly what brains do, tracking truth is what differentiates a "good" brain from a "bad" one (at least from the perspective of natural selection), there might be other adaptive properties of brains, but this is definitely one of the principal ones. Plantinga completely ignores this point until the very end of the book, in which he briefly mentions this argument (without really countering Dennett in his presentation of it) and immediately dismisses it for a ridiculous reason that seems to consist in the simple fact that not all parts of the brains of all species of animals host beliefs (which seemingly in Plantinga's mind are needed to host truth). His "argument" here is something along the lines of: "Frogs don't have beliefs about flies, they merely have indicators of flies which they act upon. The adaptability here concerns the reliability of the indicator". The obvious thing that Plantinga misses is that truth is essential here! The indicators of reliable if the proposition corresponding to the thing they are indicating is true, which means that the indicators indicate facts, rather than non-facts. We don't talk about beliefs until we come to humans who are capable of articulating their thoughts about subjects, but beliefs correspond to facts in the same way as indicators do, good, adaptive beliefs correspond to truths about the world, facts just as good, adaptive indicators correspond to facts. We have evolved to a high enough level that we can formulate beliefs about the world as opposed to just act upon our indicators, but the same basic fact about the adaptability of our brains' properties remain: they need to track truths if they are to be reliable, therefore, good truth tracking equals high adaptability. Plantinga does not seem to want to believe this and it seems clear from this part of the book and indeed most of the rest of his presentations that he prefers to start out with his pre-established beliefs about god (as being all-knowing, all-powerful, good, the source of our abilities whether those be truth tracking or ability to "know" god, whatever that means...) and to spend all the time remaining after enumerating his mantras in showing how god must have had a hand in it all.
Perhaps the most damning thing for Plantinga in this debate is that he insists on again and again presenting Behe as am authority or at the least a reasonable person (or at the very least a person that should be references by someone wishing to be taken seriously) without taking any consideration of the simple fact that Behe is someone who is universally rejected as a kook by the scientific community (Dennett refers us to a couple of devout Christians who agree with that assessment). When you refer to a person writing about a subject (in this case evolution) because his views "seem reasonable" to you (which is basically all Plantinga says about Behe), and hold your intuitive layman, religiously motivated opinion of him above that of the informed opinion of the community of scientific experts, you have crossed so far over the line that you should have to do a hell of lot of repair to your reputation before anyone ever considers your opinion on that particular subject every again. In fact, I'll go ever further: dismissing the universally accepted opinion on a scientific subject by the scientific community as a layman in that subject shows that you are incompetent in speaking about science at all, you simply have not understood its methodology!
There are many, many more points to comment upon but I'm tired and not a tiny bit pissed off at Plantinga's complete inability to understand Dennett's line of argumentation. This book has made my blood boil like few others... Do read it though, Dennett is brilliant and has the patience of a saint! (Figuratively speaking of course...)
Perhaps the most damning thing for Plantinga in this debate is that he insists on again and again presenting Behe as am authority or at the least a reasonable person (or at the very least a person that should be references by someone wishing to be taken seriously) without taking any consideration of the simple fact that Behe is someone who is universally rejected as a kook by the scientific community (Dennett refers us to a couple of devout Christians who agree with that assessment). When you refer to a person writing about a subject (in this case evolution) because his views "seem reasonable" to you (which is basically all Plantinga says about Behe), and hold your intuitive layman, religiously motivated opinion of him above that of the informed opinion of the community of scientific experts, you have crossed so far over the line that you should have to do a hell of lot of repair to your reputation before anyone ever considers your opinion on that particular subject every again. In fact, I'll go ever further: dismissing the universally accepted opinion on a scientific subject by the scientific community as a layman in that subject shows that you are incompetent in speaking about science at all, you simply have not understood its methodology!
There are many, many more points to comment upon but I'm tired and not a tiny bit pissed off at Plantinga's complete inability to understand Dennett's line of argumentation. This book has made my blood boil like few others... Do read it though, Dennett is brilliant and has the patience of a saint! (Figuratively speaking of course...)
December 27, 2024
O livro consiste em um debate entre aquele que talvez seja o maior filósofo analítico cristão ainda vivo e um dos mais importantes filósofos ateus contemporâneos. A linguagem dos autores é bastante acessível e a tradução para o português é excelente, resultando em uma leitura muito fluida. Além disso, várias notas de rodapé auxiliam o leitor não especializado a entender os termos e as nuances na argumentação.
Em termos de conteúdo, um ponto forte é a apresentação de alguns temas centrais ao debate sobre ciência e religião, como a compatibilidade da teoria da evolução com a fé cristã, o problema do mal associado à evolução, as diferentes formas de naturalismo e materialismo, a relação entre crenças e e indicadores, e o argumento do design.
Um ponto fraco, em geral, são as respostas de Dennett, que deixam a desejar. Dennett cria diversos espantalhos e recorre à chacota, mas não emprega rigor lógico e evidências, extrapolando muitas vezes o cuidado esperado em um debate sério. Muitas vezes, porém, essa abordagem pode ser atribuída à sua retórica acida, à qual Plantinga também recorre em alguns momentos; como em qualquer obra de filosofia, cabe ao leitor reconstruir, cuidadosamente, a argumentação dos filósofos em suas nuances, e avaliar a plausibilidade dos argumentos.
Trata-se, enfim, de uma boa introdução ao estudo da filosofia da religião e ao debate filosófico sobre ciência e religião, principalmente aos leigos em filosofia analítica. Juntamente com o livro, a editora está disponibilizando alguns recursos adicionais, como um guia de estudos e um minicurso, que poderão servir tanto para estudos individuais como em grupo, tornando a leitura ainda mais acessível ao público em geral.
Em termos de conteúdo, um ponto forte é a apresentação de alguns temas centrais ao debate sobre ciência e religião, como a compatibilidade da teoria da evolução com a fé cristã, o problema do mal associado à evolução, as diferentes formas de naturalismo e materialismo, a relação entre crenças e e indicadores, e o argumento do design.
Um ponto fraco, em geral, são as respostas de Dennett, que deixam a desejar. Dennett cria diversos espantalhos e recorre à chacota, mas não emprega rigor lógico e evidências, extrapolando muitas vezes o cuidado esperado em um debate sério. Muitas vezes, porém, essa abordagem pode ser atribuída à sua retórica acida, à qual Plantinga também recorre em alguns momentos; como em qualquer obra de filosofia, cabe ao leitor reconstruir, cuidadosamente, a argumentação dos filósofos em suas nuances, e avaliar a plausibilidade dos argumentos.
Trata-se, enfim, de uma boa introdução ao estudo da filosofia da religião e ao debate filosófico sobre ciência e religião, principalmente aos leigos em filosofia analítica. Juntamente com o livro, a editora está disponibilizando alguns recursos adicionais, como um guia de estudos e um minicurso, que poderão servir tanto para estudos individuais como em grupo, tornando a leitura ainda mais acessível ao público em geral.
April 16, 2024
Five stars for Dennett mopping the floor with Plantinga. One star for Plantinga's Gish Gallop of fallacies, falsehoods, misleading half-truths, and gratuitous thesaurus flexing (when you have nothing to say, say it in Latin to make yourself sound smart). Since the publishers were kind enough to intelligent readers to give Dennett the last word, four stars overall.
Although Dennett did a masterful job of whack-a-mole on a selected subset of Plantinga's pathological positions, anyone with a smattering of scientific or philosphical reading could write an additional book on everything else Plantinga gets partly or wholly wrong. (How is Plantinga a professor at a somewhat respected university? Oh yeah, it's run by the same organization that brought genocide to the Americas, burned people in defense of geocentrism, nearly depopulated what is now Germany with the Thirty Years' War against upstart Protestantism, and more recently stacked the Supreme Court to do the Pope's bidding by helping to elect a civilly adjudicated rapist, fraudster, insurrectionist, and quadruply-indicted criminal defendant to be the 45th President of the United States. This is the kind of thinking Thomas Jefferson said we needed education to protect against.)
Plantinga's promotion of Michael Behe makes it impossible to take him seriously. Is he just having us on? It's hard to tell as he never breaks character. Although the book is somewhat old (2011 publication year, based on a formal debate that took place in 2009), even by that time Behe was thoroughly discredited, and yet Plantinga was still refusing to get off the sinking Titanic.
It was simultaneously hilarious and appalling, if that's possible, to read Plantinga denying that The Problem of Evil is really a problem, and insinuating that atheists are the ones making it up - clearly Plantinga has never pastored a church, where a large part of the pastor's time is spent trying to comfort congregants in crisis when Jesus won't lift a finger to help them. While evil itself is a problem for everybody, it's a double problem for people burdened by fraudulent religions that give their marks the false impression that they are somehow immune - and often subtly implying it's your fault for having insufficient faith. I'd like to see Plantinga spend some time in a front-line trench in Ukraine, or on the Gaza Strip, where wars are once again being fought between theists, and tell us again how getting the stuff blown out of oneself is 100% compatible with his belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving God. For some sanity and empathy on this issue, as opposed to Plantinga's near-psychopathic denialism, I recommend God and Horrendous Suffering (2021) by John W. Loftus.
Plantinga will need to do more than slap a fancy Latin label on his nonsense rationalization. Felix culpa indeed! The notion that God uses misfortune to somehow produce a greater good (although this is never demonstrated, by Plantinga nor anyone else), is just a tacit admission that the rationalizer doesn't understand the word "omnipotence." Plantinga is projecting his own human limitations onto God, or hoping that the hearer will be dumb enough to do that. An omnipotent God doesn't need to go through any process to accomplish anything - the omnipotent God can just will the final result into being, and make it identical in every respect to the result of following any elaborate process, including if necessary implanting any memories or lessons learned. Thus if there actually is an omnipotent being of some sort, any evil that happens on its watch is entirely gratuitous. The only way for suffering to be "meaningful" is for such a God to not exist! In a universe with no omnipotent being(s) in it, then we might actually have to suffer now and then to get something better to happen. However, the vast majority of human suffering doesn't even accomplish this much. How does anything improve for example when a child dies a painful death from incurable cancer, or another Russian drone strikes a maternity hospital?
And why does Plantinga's all-powerful God allow feeble humans to eliminate some whole categories of suffering, like smallpox? Was all that smallpox occurring for no reason previously? Did humans somehow learn whatever lesson we were meant to learn from smallpox, that we no longer need to suffer from it? Or are we, on Plantinga's reasoning, actually worse off on balance now that we impetuously overruled God's perfect plan of giving us smallpox?
For some additional reading I recommend Faith Versus Fact: Why Science and Religion Are Incompatible (2015) by Jerry A. Coyne. Also see the articles:
* "Naturalism Is Not an Axiom of the Sciences but a Conclusion of Them" (2020) by Richard C. Carrier
* "In defense of naturalism" (2011) by Gregory W. Dawes
Although Dennett did a masterful job of whack-a-mole on a selected subset of Plantinga's pathological positions, anyone with a smattering of scientific or philosphical reading could write an additional book on everything else Plantinga gets partly or wholly wrong. (How is Plantinga a professor at a somewhat respected university? Oh yeah, it's run by the same organization that brought genocide to the Americas, burned people in defense of geocentrism, nearly depopulated what is now Germany with the Thirty Years' War against upstart Protestantism, and more recently stacked the Supreme Court to do the Pope's bidding by helping to elect a civilly adjudicated rapist, fraudster, insurrectionist, and quadruply-indicted criminal defendant to be the 45th President of the United States. This is the kind of thinking Thomas Jefferson said we needed education to protect against.)
Plantinga's promotion of Michael Behe makes it impossible to take him seriously. Is he just having us on? It's hard to tell as he never breaks character. Although the book is somewhat old (2011 publication year, based on a formal debate that took place in 2009), even by that time Behe was thoroughly discredited, and yet Plantinga was still refusing to get off the sinking Titanic.
It was simultaneously hilarious and appalling, if that's possible, to read Plantinga denying that The Problem of Evil is really a problem, and insinuating that atheists are the ones making it up - clearly Plantinga has never pastored a church, where a large part of the pastor's time is spent trying to comfort congregants in crisis when Jesus won't lift a finger to help them. While evil itself is a problem for everybody, it's a double problem for people burdened by fraudulent religions that give their marks the false impression that they are somehow immune - and often subtly implying it's your fault for having insufficient faith. I'd like to see Plantinga spend some time in a front-line trench in Ukraine, or on the Gaza Strip, where wars are once again being fought between theists, and tell us again how getting the stuff blown out of oneself is 100% compatible with his belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving God. For some sanity and empathy on this issue, as opposed to Plantinga's near-psychopathic denialism, I recommend God and Horrendous Suffering (2021) by John W. Loftus.
Plantinga will need to do more than slap a fancy Latin label on his nonsense rationalization. Felix culpa indeed! The notion that God uses misfortune to somehow produce a greater good (although this is never demonstrated, by Plantinga nor anyone else), is just a tacit admission that the rationalizer doesn't understand the word "omnipotence." Plantinga is projecting his own human limitations onto God, or hoping that the hearer will be dumb enough to do that. An omnipotent God doesn't need to go through any process to accomplish anything - the omnipotent God can just will the final result into being, and make it identical in every respect to the result of following any elaborate process, including if necessary implanting any memories or lessons learned. Thus if there actually is an omnipotent being of some sort, any evil that happens on its watch is entirely gratuitous. The only way for suffering to be "meaningful" is for such a God to not exist! In a universe with no omnipotent being(s) in it, then we might actually have to suffer now and then to get something better to happen. However, the vast majority of human suffering doesn't even accomplish this much. How does anything improve for example when a child dies a painful death from incurable cancer, or another Russian drone strikes a maternity hospital?
And why does Plantinga's all-powerful God allow feeble humans to eliminate some whole categories of suffering, like smallpox? Was all that smallpox occurring for no reason previously? Did humans somehow learn whatever lesson we were meant to learn from smallpox, that we no longer need to suffer from it? Or are we, on Plantinga's reasoning, actually worse off on balance now that we impetuously overruled God's perfect plan of giving us smallpox?
For some additional reading I recommend Faith Versus Fact: Why Science and Religion Are Incompatible (2015) by Jerry A. Coyne. Also see the articles:
* "Naturalism Is Not an Axiom of the Sciences but a Conclusion of Them" (2020) by Richard C. Carrier
* "In defense of naturalism" (2011) by Gregory W. Dawes
November 25, 2011
Deep epistemology. Definitely better in a book form than on a tape due to some of the technical language that requires more than a teaspoon of brains to understand. Like many other atheists, Dennet does not understand Plantinga's arguments.
March 14, 2023
Why are atheists so eager to slam down anything religion-based? Out of fear that they might be wrong? I read this book as a request and I could read between the lines how based Dennett was and the ferocity he used in this talk with Plantinga (although he stated otherwise). Science and Religion should go hand-in-hand if we want to reach exact conclusions to specific problems, but some problems are better left to everyone's imagination. :)
January 2, 2015
Although I have known of him for some time, this was my first encounter with the writings and ideas of Alvin Plantinga. I could not help but notice he tries to validate his assumed conclusions with formal logic that really only amounts to GIGO--garbage in/garbage out. I thought it was interesting that Dennett conceded that religion and science are compatible, but realize the point he was driving at is that science works with or without the assumption of religion. Ultimately I found Dennett to be the more compelling of the two.
Plantinga places the cart before the horse. He has everything backward. It doesn't make sense to phrase the questions such that God has not intervened in evolution. How does God get justifiable placed in the equation in the first place? Plantinga assumes this conclusion, and then attempts to define himself as correct for having done so. He also seems to special plead when he asserts that God won't mess up an experiment, but he will intervene to answer prayers. This is a kind of doublethink that Dennett dismantles with his rebuttal essays. I didn't find Plantinga to be compelling, nor did I find his appeals to Michael Behe particularly convincing. I would think that after the 2005 Dover decision people with high academic credentials would not still be seriously invoking Behe as an authority.
So do I think Religion and Science are compatible? It's like Dennett says in his opening essay: sure they are compatible, just like any fictional-mythical story is compatible with science because it works with or without the assumption. Science has nothing to say on things that exist outside the natural world. It can say nothing about supernatural happenings. Science is based on what can be tested, reproduced, verified, and falsified. The theist position is none of those things, so it's existence is equivalent to its nonexistence. With or without the assumption, everything still works the same. I don't find it particularly productive to assume that invisible angels pull the planets in their orbits around the sun, and I don't think it adds to the discussion to say that God guides the process of natural selection, for how could we possible determine that? No amount of armchair philosophy, or formalization of logical proofs is going to change that.
Plantinga places the cart before the horse. He has everything backward. It doesn't make sense to phrase the questions such that God has not intervened in evolution. How does God get justifiable placed in the equation in the first place? Plantinga assumes this conclusion, and then attempts to define himself as correct for having done so. He also seems to special plead when he asserts that God won't mess up an experiment, but he will intervene to answer prayers. This is a kind of doublethink that Dennett dismantles with his rebuttal essays. I didn't find Plantinga to be compelling, nor did I find his appeals to Michael Behe particularly convincing. I would think that after the 2005 Dover decision people with high academic credentials would not still be seriously invoking Behe as an authority.
So do I think Religion and Science are compatible? It's like Dennett says in his opening essay: sure they are compatible, just like any fictional-mythical story is compatible with science because it works with or without the assumption. Science has nothing to say on things that exist outside the natural world. It can say nothing about supernatural happenings. Science is based on what can be tested, reproduced, verified, and falsified. The theist position is none of those things, so it's existence is equivalent to its nonexistence. With or without the assumption, everything still works the same. I don't find it particularly productive to assume that invisible angels pull the planets in their orbits around the sun, and I don't think it adds to the discussion to say that God guides the process of natural selection, for how could we possible determine that? No amount of armchair philosophy, or formalization of logical proofs is going to change that.
July 30, 2012
An interesting exchange between Dan Dennett and Alvin Plantinga. A lot of the time they seemed to be talking past each other (especially with regard to the definition of naturalism). Also, as the essays progressed, civility began to slowly break down and pettiness began to take hold of these two distinguished academics. It's all very amusing.
February 24, 2021
The most interesting question addressed is EAAN (the evolutionary argument against naturalism) regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties given naturalism and evolution. Unfortunately, like most every other topic in the book, they seem to talk past each other. Ultimately, the book is just too short to offer much of real value.
March 27, 2017
Short, and thin. Dennett is patronising and supercilious; Plantinga is fixed on how evolution needs to be guided to get to us and seems to think this is an inevitable theistic position. Not very satisfactory either way. More heat than light.
Read
April 8, 2023A bit anticlimactic given the stature of the debaters. Mostly, hair-splitting and reductio ad abdurdum. There were a couple of gems on each side, but, overall, if you’re familiar with Plantinga and Dennett at all, you’ve heard the main premises and rejoinders featured here.
January 25, 2015
Plantinga ....always so good
December 22, 2019
Nihil novi sub sole.
Stan zwarć teistów z ateistami jest jak sytuacja w okopach Verdun. Obie strony tkwią uzbrojone w swoje racje, a szans na zawieszenie broni nie ma. "Nauka i religia. Czy można je pogodzić?" jest niewielką książką stanowiącą spisane wystąpienia Daniela Dennetta i Alvina Plantingi ze zjazdu filozofów w 2009 roku. Zebrane eseje są kilkuetapową konfrontacją przekonań obu filozofów na temat relacji nauki i religii.
Po lekturze tak krótkiej publikacji, trudno oczekiwać nowych przemyśleń i poczucia wyczerpania tematu, szczególnie że całość skupiała się na argumentach dotyczących niemal wyłącznie neo-darwinizmu.
Plantinga skupił się na dwóch tezach obrony religii, które stanowiły oś debaty:
• ewolucja biologiczna w wyniku doboru naturalnego nie wyklucza istnienia nakierowanego planu (sprawczej boskości)
• dołączenie do darwinizmu naturalizmu (rozumianego, jako założenie nieistnienia boskości) prowadzi do sprzeczności
Nudny i kompletnie niewiarygodny jest główny wywód Plantingi wykazujący jakoby językiem rachunku zdań, że ewolucja sterowana jest bardziej prawdopodobna od tej niesterowanej (czyli odbywającej się na gruncie założeń naturalizmu). Żadną miarą nie można zaprezentowanemu wnioskowaniu przypisać głębszej wartości, poza potwierdzeniem przekonań jej autora.
Po raz kolejny zdumiewa mnie stosowany przez zwolenników sprawczej roli trenscendencji na przebieg procesów przyrodniczych mechanizm, że można założyć pewne przymioty i cele Bogu, a następnie na ich podstawie wykazywać konsekwencje tego domniemania. To nieuczciwe intelektualnie i rozbieżne z zasadami nauki. Stąd NOMA Goulda (zasada o nienachodzących na siebie magisteriach nauki i religii) jest raczej mało konkluzywna. Napięcia są nieredukowalne, szczególnie jeśli całość wywodu sprowadza się do niezrozumienia zasady, że 'brak dowodu nie jest dowodem braku'. W stosowaniu tej klauzuli obie strony nie mają symetrycznych praw. Nauka tłumaczy cierpliwie różne tajemnice świata, bez odwoływania się do transcendencji, ale nie oznacza to, że aktualne dziury w wiedzy prowadzą jednoznacznie do założenia istnienia boskiego planu wobec świata.
Miałem wrażenie, że Dennett bez większego zaangażowania zbijał argumenty interlokutora. Co prawda zastawił pułapkę intelektualną na Plantingę, który w nią wpadł, ale zrobił niewiele więcej. Właściwie główna linia obrony kognitywisty polegała na wykazywaniu, że słowo MUSI należy zamienić na MOŻE (w przypadku tez Plantingi) i argumentowaniu, że naturalizm jest niewypowiedzianym założeniem metody naukowej, co w efekcie nie daje prawa teistom do jednoznacznych wniosków uzasadniających wyznawane przekonania.
"Nauka i religia" to lektura, która pozostawia bez oczekiwanej satysfakcji. Zawężenie nauki do biologii, to poważny błąd i utrata części istotnej perspektywy. Wciąż pozostaję w zakłopotaniu zastanawiając się nad potrzebami części wierzących, by usankcjonować naukowo ich wiarę. Ona jest raczej 'niedowiedliwa' i chyba lepiej, żeby taka została. Bo mogłoby się okazać, że przedmiot wiary większości Ziemian jest nieadekwatny w świetle tak unaocznionych faktów.
Polecam tylko wytrwałym.
MOŻE BYĆ - 6/10
Stan zwarć teistów z ateistami jest jak sytuacja w okopach Verdun. Obie strony tkwią uzbrojone w swoje racje, a szans na zawieszenie broni nie ma. "Nauka i religia. Czy można je pogodzić?" jest niewielką książką stanowiącą spisane wystąpienia Daniela Dennetta i Alvina Plantingi ze zjazdu filozofów w 2009 roku. Zebrane eseje są kilkuetapową konfrontacją przekonań obu filozofów na temat relacji nauki i religii.
Po lekturze tak krótkiej publikacji, trudno oczekiwać nowych przemyśleń i poczucia wyczerpania tematu, szczególnie że całość skupiała się na argumentach dotyczących niemal wyłącznie neo-darwinizmu.
Plantinga skupił się na dwóch tezach obrony religii, które stanowiły oś debaty:
• ewolucja biologiczna w wyniku doboru naturalnego nie wyklucza istnienia nakierowanego planu (sprawczej boskości)
• dołączenie do darwinizmu naturalizmu (rozumianego, jako założenie nieistnienia boskości) prowadzi do sprzeczności
Nudny i kompletnie niewiarygodny jest główny wywód Plantingi wykazujący jakoby językiem rachunku zdań, że ewolucja sterowana jest bardziej prawdopodobna od tej niesterowanej (czyli odbywającej się na gruncie założeń naturalizmu). Żadną miarą nie można zaprezentowanemu wnioskowaniu przypisać głębszej wartości, poza potwierdzeniem przekonań jej autora.
Po raz kolejny zdumiewa mnie stosowany przez zwolenników sprawczej roli trenscendencji na przebieg procesów przyrodniczych mechanizm, że można założyć pewne przymioty i cele Bogu, a następnie na ich podstawie wykazywać konsekwencje tego domniemania. To nieuczciwe intelektualnie i rozbieżne z zasadami nauki. Stąd NOMA Goulda (zasada o nienachodzących na siebie magisteriach nauki i religii) jest raczej mało konkluzywna. Napięcia są nieredukowalne, szczególnie jeśli całość wywodu sprowadza się do niezrozumienia zasady, że 'brak dowodu nie jest dowodem braku'. W stosowaniu tej klauzuli obie strony nie mają symetrycznych praw. Nauka tłumaczy cierpliwie różne tajemnice świata, bez odwoływania się do transcendencji, ale nie oznacza to, że aktualne dziury w wiedzy prowadzą jednoznacznie do założenia istnienia boskiego planu wobec świata.
Miałem wrażenie, że Dennett bez większego zaangażowania zbijał argumenty interlokutora. Co prawda zastawił pułapkę intelektualną na Plantingę, który w nią wpadł, ale zrobił niewiele więcej. Właściwie główna linia obrony kognitywisty polegała na wykazywaniu, że słowo MUSI należy zamienić na MOŻE (w przypadku tez Plantingi) i argumentowaniu, że naturalizm jest niewypowiedzianym założeniem metody naukowej, co w efekcie nie daje prawa teistom do jednoznacznych wniosków uzasadniających wyznawane przekonania.
"Nauka i religia" to lektura, która pozostawia bez oczekiwanej satysfakcji. Zawężenie nauki do biologii, to poważny błąd i utrata części istotnej perspektywy. Wciąż pozostaję w zakłopotaniu zastanawiając się nad potrzebami części wierzących, by usankcjonować naukowo ich wiarę. Ona jest raczej 'niedowiedliwa' i chyba lepiej, żeby taka została. Bo mogłoby się okazać, że przedmiot wiary większości Ziemian jest nieadekwatny w świetle tak unaocznionych faktów.
Polecam tylko wytrwałym.
MOŻE BYĆ - 6/10
July 15, 2024
Difícil avaliar esse livro. A parte Filosófica ficou apenas com Plantinga. Dennett parece que não consegue interpretar os argumentos de Plantinga e não responde a nada. Apenas faz ataques pessoais e usa retórica ácida. Na sua última parte, Plantinga também fica perceptivelmente mais ácido, mas claramente foi o único filósofo do debate que fez filosofia. O Dannett tem algum problema pessoal com Behe que precisa constantemente atacar esse cara só porque Plantinga o mencionou quase como um argumento secundário. As constantes menções a Behe são absolutamente irrelevantes pro debate e Plantinga claramente ignora.
Enfim, dei nota 3 para o livro por que, como um todo, esperava mais, principalmente do filósofo ateu.
Enfim, dei nota 3 para o livro por que, como um todo, esperava mais, principalmente do filósofo ateu.
March 20, 2024
I enjoyed reading this back-and-forth series of essays (based off a debate) by Alvin Plantinga and Daniel Dennet, two philosophers engaged in a discussion of the compatibility of theism and evolutionary science. The lively discussion was entertaining and sometimes a bit frustrating. There was a bit of talking past each other at times, and I found Plantinga's stances to be almost entirely unconvincing.
Nonetheless, I enjoyed the read and would not hesitate to recommend it to anyone interested in such topics!
Nonetheless, I enjoyed the read and would not hesitate to recommend it to anyone interested in such topics!
September 2, 2018
This book clearly does not convince to read more of Plantinga works, though I hope this is not his intelectual peak. Dennett, as always, chapeau bas for clear judgements and accurate anegdotes and though experiments.
March 4, 2023
A quick back and forth with a few relatively interesting ideas. Most arguments seem to be refined forms of older ones. Points were scored fairly evenly but nothing convinced me to abandon an agnostic stance.
June 17, 2024
The book is a bit underwhelming. Platinga mostly tries to claim 'possibilities' of God's existence while Law shows that if we are just looking at possibilities then any kind of supernatural being like 'Superman' can be claimed to be responsible for our existence.
January 22, 2023
There was a lot more talk about Superman than I was expecting there to be. Also a third of this book flew straight over my head. Why can't these fellas ever dumb it down for the working class
November 17, 2024
3.5 stars
November 19, 2024
Plantinga laid out a logical argument, and Dennett attempted to address it.
October 27, 2025
If an exchange of two cats arching their backs and hissing, ready to brawl, was ever written in a book.
April 14, 2014
As with most science-faith debates, this one eventually devolves into the two representatives talking past each other. In this case, each seems unable to grasp the third way between their arguments. Plantinga has made the unfortunate choice to jump into the "irreducible complexity" boat with Behe and other Intelligent Designers, thus claiming that evolution could not have been an unguided process – as a theist, Plantinga clearly opposes ontological naturalism, which can't be proven one way or another, but his line of argument here also sets him against methodological naturalism, a much harder row to hoe.
Dennett, meanwhile, is happy to accept Plantinga's ill-advised conflation of ontological and methodological naturalism and makes no effort to separate them – and why should he, since Dennett, being an atheist, advocates both?
It would have been in Plantinga's interests to chart a third path. He seems so invested in 1. refusing to cede ground to the forces of ontological naturalism, and 2. maintaining to the death his pet theory of the sensus divinitatis, that he is unable to accept methodological naturalism (despite a throwaway mention in a footnote in his final essay), and as a result really fails to engage in what could have been a much more fruitful discussion about teleological evidences for design (we still get some of that anyway with the hand calculators analogy).
Still a terrific little book. Great fun to read, and both men bring clear writing, good arguments and a little bit of wit – if not some sarcasm – to the discussion. Alas, it was always destined to end the way these debates always do, with neither side giving ground and a good deal of talking past the other's arguments.
Dennett, meanwhile, is happy to accept Plantinga's ill-advised conflation of ontological and methodological naturalism and makes no effort to separate them – and why should he, since Dennett, being an atheist, advocates both?
It would have been in Plantinga's interests to chart a third path. He seems so invested in 1. refusing to cede ground to the forces of ontological naturalism, and 2. maintaining to the death his pet theory of the sensus divinitatis, that he is unable to accept methodological naturalism (despite a throwaway mention in a footnote in his final essay), and as a result really fails to engage in what could have been a much more fruitful discussion about teleological evidences for design (we still get some of that anyway with the hand calculators analogy).
Still a terrific little book. Great fun to read, and both men bring clear writing, good arguments and a little bit of wit – if not some sarcasm – to the discussion. Alas, it was always destined to end the way these debates always do, with neither side giving ground and a good deal of talking past the other's arguments.
September 25, 2011
Two strands of discussion going on: one in which Plantinga, just like almost every theist thinker, repeatedly fails to see that naturalism is the null hypothesis (as Dennett explicitly states on p49), and one where he fails, despite Dennett's efforts, to acknowledge why the first premise of his "evolutionary argument against naturalism" is an invalid one.
The one thing that I took away from the book is a refreshed surprise at how confused people can get when trying to reconcile reason (science, logic, etc) and religion: they can indeed go so far as to devise twisted argumentations concluding that the real conflict is not between evolution and religion, but between evolution and naturalism! (Plus, they make it look good with probability notation!) (http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/...)
But again, this is exactly why I love to read/listen to such people: I "like to know what mistakes people are making". (House MD, 6.15)
The one thing that I took away from the book is a refreshed surprise at how confused people can get when trying to reconcile reason (science, logic, etc) and religion: they can indeed go so far as to devise twisted argumentations concluding that the real conflict is not between evolution and religion, but between evolution and naturalism! (Plus, they make it look good with probability notation!) (http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/...)
But again, this is exactly why I love to read/listen to such people: I "like to know what mistakes people are making". (House MD, 6.15)
April 26, 2012
Before I began to read this book, I had thought that a debater, even if he was studying theology, could have minimum knowledge about science and logic which were necessary for a discussion like the theme "science and Religion."This booklet is only 77 pages. Usually I read such a book within a few days. I had to read Prof. Plantinga's part several times, because his "opinion" is so complicated or vacant to understand. Therefore I have to spend more than a week. Now I feel I lost money and time. Prof. Dennett's part was clear and very much understandable. I enjoyed his argument. It is very difficult to recommend this book unless you are fervent theist who is seeking some kind of "theoretical ground" to refute science, even if it is nonsense.
April 20, 2020
Instead of being, as the back cover puts it, "a model of dialogue between those who strongly disagree," this book could be more accurately pitched as a "model of professional pettiness." Dennett wins the day, not only because of the fact that Plantinga's arguments are for all intents and purposes filler philosophy but also because nothing makes a more compelling case for the incompatibility of science and religion than Plantinga's presumably-religion-induced inability to grasp even the most basic of scientific principles.
January 9, 2013
The format was excellent, giving both sides space to lay out the debate. I wish the atheist had taken more time with his final response; I thought it felt a bit rushed. Well worth reading. I especially liked Plantinga's last chapter, and his insistence that evolution doesn't automatically mean naturalism.
January 25, 2011
This extended debate bring up a few interesting and up to date approaches to this question, but sadly devolves into a published bitch fight between these two respected philosophers. It is a quick read though and, thanks to the fight, occasionally funny.
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