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The Wealth and Poverty of Nations
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations is David S. Landes's acclaimed, best-selling exploration of one of the most contentious and hotly debated questions of our Why do some nations achieve economic success while others remain mired in poverty? The answer, as Landes definitively illustrates, is a complex interplay of cultural mores and historical circumstance. Rich with anecdotal evidence, piercing analysis, and a truly astonishing range of erudition, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations is a "picture of enormous sweep and brilliant insight" (Kenneth Arrow) as well as one of the most audaciously ambitious works of history in decades.For the paperback edition, Landes has written a new epilogue, in which he takes account of Asian financial crisises and the international tension between overconfidence and reality.
650 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1998
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About the author
David S. Landes
27 books101 followersDavid S. Landes was a professor emeritus of economics at Harvard University and retired professor of history at George Washington University. He is the author of Revolution in Time, The Unbound Prometheus, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, and Dynasties. Such works have received both praise for detailed retelling of economic history, as well as scorn on charges of blatant Eurocentrism, a charge he embraces explicitly, arguing that an explanation for an economic miracle that happened originally only in Europe must of necessity be a Eurocentric analysis.
Landes earned a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1953 and an A.B. from City College of New York in 1942.
-Wikipedia
Landes earned a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1953 and an A.B. from City College of New York in 1942.
-Wikipedia
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 267 reviews
April 8, 2018
I had problems with this book. I drowned under Uberprofessor Landes' unceasing high-pressure hosepipe of facts and robust opinion like I was a stubborn fire he was trying to put out. Okay, I’m out. And feeling soggy too. Is there anything, anywhere, you don’t know or can’t fit into your book, Professor Landes? Huh? Okay, I thought not. I felt like a country mouse who’d wandered into Canterbury Cathedral. I felt like a pinball slamming around from Paraguay to the Ming Dynasty to the Spice Islands to the east End of London to the Meiji Restoration - gimme a break already. I'm exhausted!
I did like his very clear and no-nonsense “geography is destiny” chapter :
It [geography] tells an unpleasant truth, namely, that nature like life is unfair, unequal in its favours; further, that nature’s unfairness is not easily remedied.
So, pages about how human beings find it really difficult to live reasonably well in tropical climates, because of all the horrible diseases, and because it’s so bloody hot all the time. I think this stuff gets him labelled as politically incorrect but it seemed right to me. If the tsetse-tsetse fly wrecks all your attempts at animal husbandry, such that the only way of moving goods around is by human porters, then I’m sorry, mate, but you’re stuffed.
Yet it would be a mistake to see geography as destiny. (p15)
What? You just proved to me it was...!
Okay so this bugged me : David Landes has a theory that one of the main reasons Europe was able to generate the energies required to fuel its continual desire for improvement and learning, which co-habited with its lust for empire, was its weak central government. The idea is that if the local barons and later the local squires have a great degree of autonomy they see that effort and enterprise will benefit themselves and the overlord will not be able to steal any new wealth they create, and this is very good. They see a point in making an effort. However, to take the example of South America, the long succession of profoundly weak and unstable central governments had the opposite effect it seems, chilling and draining all innovation. Ah well, there is an explanation of course – you have to have the right kind of weak central government presiding over the right kind of pre-capitalist economy. Ah I see. (No I don’t). I know that if you have three economists in a room you will get four opinions on any given topic and all will be argued vociferously.
Do these explanations actually explain anything unless you have actually mastered every fact about the economies and histories you are making these bold generalisations about?
But alas, what killed this book which many people would probably admire all to hell and which is clearly worth four of anyone's stars is that I just read two books which I actually liked and I realised tell pretty much the same story - The first book was Civilisation : The West and the Rest by Niall Ferguson The Hyperactive Historian (watch him cram 55 facts into a paragraph you thought could only hold 12) – and the second was Destiny Disrupted by Tamim Answary which is the whole shebang from a Muslim perspective, an essential alternative view and is also vast and fast.
So here I am readin this one and singin "Stuck Inside of Mobile with the Memphis Blues Again" to myself :
And here I sit so patiently
Waiting to find out the price
You have to pay to get out of
Going through all these things twice
Or three times in my case. Why do I need this book? It occurred to me that I …. didn’t. Sorry David Landes. It was my mistake. This is a book I slunk away from.
I did like his very clear and no-nonsense “geography is destiny” chapter :
It [geography] tells an unpleasant truth, namely, that nature like life is unfair, unequal in its favours; further, that nature’s unfairness is not easily remedied.
So, pages about how human beings find it really difficult to live reasonably well in tropical climates, because of all the horrible diseases, and because it’s so bloody hot all the time. I think this stuff gets him labelled as politically incorrect but it seemed right to me. If the tsetse-tsetse fly wrecks all your attempts at animal husbandry, such that the only way of moving goods around is by human porters, then I’m sorry, mate, but you’re stuffed.
Yet it would be a mistake to see geography as destiny. (p15)
What? You just proved to me it was...!
Okay so this bugged me : David Landes has a theory that one of the main reasons Europe was able to generate the energies required to fuel its continual desire for improvement and learning, which co-habited with its lust for empire, was its weak central government. The idea is that if the local barons and later the local squires have a great degree of autonomy they see that effort and enterprise will benefit themselves and the overlord will not be able to steal any new wealth they create, and this is very good. They see a point in making an effort. However, to take the example of South America, the long succession of profoundly weak and unstable central governments had the opposite effect it seems, chilling and draining all innovation. Ah well, there is an explanation of course – you have to have the right kind of weak central government presiding over the right kind of pre-capitalist economy. Ah I see. (No I don’t). I know that if you have three economists in a room you will get four opinions on any given topic and all will be argued vociferously.
Do these explanations actually explain anything unless you have actually mastered every fact about the economies and histories you are making these bold generalisations about?
But alas, what killed this book which many people would probably admire all to hell and which is clearly worth four of anyone's stars is that I just read two books which I actually liked and I realised tell pretty much the same story - The first book was Civilisation : The West and the Rest by Niall Ferguson The Hyperactive Historian (watch him cram 55 facts into a paragraph you thought could only hold 12) – and the second was Destiny Disrupted by Tamim Answary which is the whole shebang from a Muslim perspective, an essential alternative view and is also vast and fast.
So here I am readin this one and singin "Stuck Inside of Mobile with the Memphis Blues Again" to myself :
And here I sit so patiently
Waiting to find out the price
You have to pay to get out of
Going through all these things twice
Or three times in my case. Why do I need this book? It occurred to me that I …. didn’t. Sorry David Landes. It was my mistake. This is a book I slunk away from.
Read
October 21, 2024I am an enthusiastic supporter of outspoken, blunt opinions, even if they are expressed in very polemical terms. This is what David Landes does in this 600-page-doorstopper: without detours he formulates his views and insights, and when necessary he even outright spanks his opponents (especially anthropologists, multiculturalists, dependency theorists and supporters of the Third World in general).
The field in which he does this is that of global history, departing from the really big question: how is it that some countries have become so rich and others remain poor? And Landes' explanation is quite simple: through its intrinsic qualities (especially openness and inquisitiveness) and a bold, even audacious approach the West (Europe and later America, Australia, Japan) succeeded to get rich and then to conquer the world. The time of the great Western empires may be over, but the Western model has since been adopted by other regions, with almost equal success, all according to Landes.
Now, that's daring in a time when eurocentrism is widely condemned and the West's success is dismissed as a coincidence and in any case a very temporary phenomenon. Landes calls this tendency for hyper compensation ( "political correctness") just false: the facts are what they are, the West has brought progress and prosperity to the whole world, if you like it or not. And about the terrible side effects (the eradication of Latin American Indians, the social exploitation by Industrial Capitalism, the horrors of colonization regimes, the environmental degradation, and so on): well, says Landes, eventually everyone did this, so no moralizing!
I think it is good that Landes has pointed to the indisputable fact that the Western world from 1800/1850 to 1950/2000 was richer than the rest of the planet and also dominated it, because indeed, in the whole “Great Divergence”-debate this is often ignored. But Landes’ story has some great flaws in its own. Foremost: he forgets to prove his blunt statements. Landes tells the classic chronological story of the economic rise of the West, with as crucial episodes the colonization of America and the Industrial Revolution. He goes into length about all this and offers a lot of “petite histoire”. That gives his overview a somewhat anecdotal flavor, without elaborating his line of thought. It's as if his story should be sufficient (the how is enough to explain the why); but this bogs down his argument often in circular reasoning (Japan was eager to learn and therefore the country has made it, thus curiosity is essential to modernize and become rich).
With his heavy focus on Europe and Northern America Landes really neglects developments in other parts of the world. He scorns those who claim that the East Asian trade and economy between 1500 and 1800 was much larger than the Western (according to dozen of respectable studies this was so), but he gives no convincing evidence to the contrary. His analysis of the Muslim world is downright incorrect (he claims that after the 12th century it went just downhill, while on the contrary the Muslim empires between the 13th and the 17th century were spectacularly growing and almost dominated half of the known world). In the last part of his book he pays more attention to other regions, but only to zoom in on how they dealt with the Western heritage.
Another gap (pointed out by the great William H. McNeill in a review) is Landes’ exclusive focus on urban economies, and thus complete blindness for what was happening in the countryside and in the agricultural sector (until half a century ago the place where 4/5 of humanity lived). And also the large demographic movements (and their connection with the growth or decline of wealth) or the great influence of wars remain out of the picture.
On the positive side there’s his stress on culture: according to Landes cultural factors are just as important as geographical, political or technological ( "culture can make all the difference"). Culture here refers to both inner values and attitudes, as to formative cultural factors such as religion (but his handling of religions as Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, etc. is really too simplistic). Landes has been called a new Max Weber, and rightly so, but also in this respect he often exaggerates, and ignores the complex interaction between cultural and other factors.
One more valuable insight: nothing is forever. What at one time is an advantage, in the other becomes a disadvantage; comparative advantages are always temporary, and universal laws, especially in the economy are simply nonsense. Hence his call for pragmatism: "The one lesson that emerges is the need to keep trying. No miracles. No perfection. No millennium. No apocalypse. We must cultivate a skeptical faith, avoid dogma, listen and watch well, try to clarify and define ends, the better to chose the means "(p 524)
Despite its flaws, this book is downright impressive, encyclopedic in scope and content, and based on a vast erudition and academic experience (you literally are blown away by the list of conferences and academic contacts in the prologue).
(rating 3.5 stars)
The field in which he does this is that of global history, departing from the really big question: how is it that some countries have become so rich and others remain poor? And Landes' explanation is quite simple: through its intrinsic qualities (especially openness and inquisitiveness) and a bold, even audacious approach the West (Europe and later America, Australia, Japan) succeeded to get rich and then to conquer the world. The time of the great Western empires may be over, but the Western model has since been adopted by other regions, with almost equal success, all according to Landes.
Now, that's daring in a time when eurocentrism is widely condemned and the West's success is dismissed as a coincidence and in any case a very temporary phenomenon. Landes calls this tendency for hyper compensation ( "political correctness") just false: the facts are what they are, the West has brought progress and prosperity to the whole world, if you like it or not. And about the terrible side effects (the eradication of Latin American Indians, the social exploitation by Industrial Capitalism, the horrors of colonization regimes, the environmental degradation, and so on): well, says Landes, eventually everyone did this, so no moralizing!
I think it is good that Landes has pointed to the indisputable fact that the Western world from 1800/1850 to 1950/2000 was richer than the rest of the planet and also dominated it, because indeed, in the whole “Great Divergence”-debate this is often ignored. But Landes’ story has some great flaws in its own. Foremost: he forgets to prove his blunt statements. Landes tells the classic chronological story of the economic rise of the West, with as crucial episodes the colonization of America and the Industrial Revolution. He goes into length about all this and offers a lot of “petite histoire”. That gives his overview a somewhat anecdotal flavor, without elaborating his line of thought. It's as if his story should be sufficient (the how is enough to explain the why); but this bogs down his argument often in circular reasoning (Japan was eager to learn and therefore the country has made it, thus curiosity is essential to modernize and become rich).
With his heavy focus on Europe and Northern America Landes really neglects developments in other parts of the world. He scorns those who claim that the East Asian trade and economy between 1500 and 1800 was much larger than the Western (according to dozen of respectable studies this was so), but he gives no convincing evidence to the contrary. His analysis of the Muslim world is downright incorrect (he claims that after the 12th century it went just downhill, while on the contrary the Muslim empires between the 13th and the 17th century were spectacularly growing and almost dominated half of the known world). In the last part of his book he pays more attention to other regions, but only to zoom in on how they dealt with the Western heritage.
Another gap (pointed out by the great William H. McNeill in a review) is Landes’ exclusive focus on urban economies, and thus complete blindness for what was happening in the countryside and in the agricultural sector (until half a century ago the place where 4/5 of humanity lived). And also the large demographic movements (and their connection with the growth or decline of wealth) or the great influence of wars remain out of the picture.
On the positive side there’s his stress on culture: according to Landes cultural factors are just as important as geographical, political or technological ( "culture can make all the difference"). Culture here refers to both inner values and attitudes, as to formative cultural factors such as religion (but his handling of religions as Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, etc. is really too simplistic). Landes has been called a new Max Weber, and rightly so, but also in this respect he often exaggerates, and ignores the complex interaction between cultural and other factors.
One more valuable insight: nothing is forever. What at one time is an advantage, in the other becomes a disadvantage; comparative advantages are always temporary, and universal laws, especially in the economy are simply nonsense. Hence his call for pragmatism: "The one lesson that emerges is the need to keep trying. No miracles. No perfection. No millennium. No apocalypse. We must cultivate a skeptical faith, avoid dogma, listen and watch well, try to clarify and define ends, the better to chose the means "(p 524)
Despite its flaws, this book is downright impressive, encyclopedic in scope and content, and based on a vast erudition and academic experience (you literally are blown away by the list of conferences and academic contacts in the prologue).
(rating 3.5 stars)
March 16, 2010
Read this book in one stint during a stay at the sea. It appealed to me on a very fundamental, nerdy level as it went deep into historic details, uprooting information that was new to me. The reader spends equal time in the main text as in the footnotes - while being challenged and entertained.
'Guns, Germs and Steel' by Jared Diamond tries to explain history by looking at environmental factors and resulting positive feedback loops. Landes agrees basically that environmental factors contribute, but places at least equal value on factors like Weber's 'Protestant Work Ethic'. Don't be mislead by the 'Protestant' bit, Landes sees the influence of organized religion on science and politics as a major hindering factor in the development of civilization.
Be honest, study hard, work hard.
Societies build upon this principles perform better than quasi-feudal ones. Hard work must pay off, dishonesty must be punished.
Landes' theory resonates with me, which is an emotional factor and completely unscientific. So maybe I just felt good that someone reinforced my personal take on the world. Still, I have travelled quite a bit through areas mentioned by him and experienced the exact cultural differences. Try to do work in Mexico and then in South Korea. Take a walk through slums in Beijing and then Sao Paulo (actually forget doing it in Sao Paulo, you will die).
Coherent review this is not, but shucks, I've tried.
'Guns, Germs and Steel' by Jared Diamond tries to explain history by looking at environmental factors and resulting positive feedback loops. Landes agrees basically that environmental factors contribute, but places at least equal value on factors like Weber's 'Protestant Work Ethic'. Don't be mislead by the 'Protestant' bit, Landes sees the influence of organized religion on science and politics as a major hindering factor in the development of civilization.
Be honest, study hard, work hard.
Societies build upon this principles perform better than quasi-feudal ones. Hard work must pay off, dishonesty must be punished.
Landes' theory resonates with me, which is an emotional factor and completely unscientific. So maybe I just felt good that someone reinforced my personal take on the world. Still, I have travelled quite a bit through areas mentioned by him and experienced the exact cultural differences. Try to do work in Mexico and then in South Korea. Take a walk through slums in Beijing and then Sao Paulo (actually forget doing it in Sao Paulo, you will die).
Coherent review this is not, but shucks, I've tried.
June 24, 2007
David Landes is trying to answer a similar question to that posed by Jared Diamond: Why are some countries so rich and other countries so poor? Landes comes to a much more complex answer than Diamond, and because of that I find his explanations somewhat more plausible. Landes concludes that prosperity is the result of a complicated interplay between culture, policital instituitions, and geography. Even if you disagree with any of his final explanations, I can promise that you will learn a great deal by reading this fascinating book.
September 19, 2012
Despite the title, this isn't a book about why, say Botswana is doing so much better than Zimbabwe these days due to such and such a policy or Germany versus Greece or practical advice on how the poor countries can turn things around and the rich countries help them. It's more descriptive than prescriptive. Rather it's a world economic history that deals with forces centuries, even millennium old. I appreciated that Landes wasn't afraid to be controversial; he takes dead aim at all forms of political correctness, multiculturalist cant, and such theories as those found in Said's Orientalism. Looking at other reviews, some complain Landes is too Eurocentric. Given the theme of the book, the wealth and poverty of nations, I can't blame him much. It's like that old joke about robbing banks--you go where the money is. Mind you, he seems to me to be not just Eurocentric but Anglocentric--although again, it does tie into his theory given Britain was arguably ground zero for the Industrial Revolution. And that is definitely at the center of his answer to the question posed in his subtitle concerning nations: why some are so rich and some so poor.
The book did leave me with questions. Landes begins with an analysis of geography. On the North/South axis, Landes believes the difference between tropical and temperate regions are crucial. But if that's so, why didn't North America develop a technologically sophisticated culture before contact with the West? Why then would the most impressive indigenous civilizations in the Americas rise out of jungles, such as the Mayans and the Incas? It's not a question asked in the book, which doesn't deal with the Americas until the era of exploration and colonization. Though to give Landes his due, Eurocentric doesn't mean triumphalist or apologist. If for whatever reason, you're ignorant of the atrocities committed by Europeans in the Americas or of the savagery of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Landes will certainly provide an education. (Especially when it comes to the Spanish Conquistadors. Landes is not kind to Catholicism or Islam, which he sees as stultifying upholders of dogma.) When Landes comes to examine the East/West axis, he sees as crucial the differences in property rights and development of markets. I'd be the last person to dismiss such factors out of hand, yet Landes' thesis as to the definitive factor that gave rise to the differences did raise both eyebrows:
Europe's great good fortune lay in the fall of Rome and the weakness and division that ensued. (So much for the lamentations of generations of classicists and Latin teachers.) The Roman dream of unity, authority, and order (the pax Romana) remained, indeed has persisted to the present.... [yet] fragmentation was the strongest brake on wilful, oppressive behavior. Political rivalry and the right of exit made all the difference.
Really? Because I do find it hard to believe the fall of Rome wasn't a tragedy for the West. Ancient Rome at its height is estimated to have had a population of one million. After its fall, no city, in Europe at least, would hit that threshold until London in 1811. Trade, literacy, urbanization all collapsed in the former Western Empire and arguably wouldn't fully recover for nearly a millennium. I do get Landes' point that authoritarian empires could do much to cripple technological and economic progress, but that still seemed a rather breathtaking claim. It is key to his theory however. Because if for Landes the key to the wealth of nations is the Industrial Revolution, the key to the Industrial Revolution is a culture of scientific inquiry and invention spurred on by a rivalry between nations, allowed room to breathe by a fragmented authority and fostered by a strong work ethic. (He sees this fragmented authority and work ethic as crucial in the rise of an industrial Japan as well.) In the end, geography isn't destiny, for according to Landes it's "not resources" that made the difference between nations but what "lay inside--culture, values, initiative." (And a constant related thread--the importance to growth and development of the "status and role of women" and the rights of minorities--Jews in history often being the canary in the coal mine.)
This work is erudite, entertaining, thought-provoking and written with style. (The kind of book that stretches vocabularies so have a dictionary handy.) The author is apparently an American, but he has a dry, at times acid, often deadpan humor I associate with the British. It's also hard not to respect a book that garners praise, as seen in the blurbs, from such celebrated yet ideologically diverse economists as John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Solow. Landes himself, for all that he stresses the importance of property rights, is far from free market--he made frequent stabs, if not arguments, at free traders. I saw one reviewer that claimed this book was taught as an example of flawed historiography. Maybe so, but it's not evident to me. I appreciated that Landes often related the various controversies in the field, and there are extensive notes and bibliography. It seemed sound and told a great story. So many of the connections Landes made are fascinating; the breath of the technological and social details he presented and global scope he took in was impressive. It's a book well worth reading and thinking about.
The book did leave me with questions. Landes begins with an analysis of geography. On the North/South axis, Landes believes the difference between tropical and temperate regions are crucial. But if that's so, why didn't North America develop a technologically sophisticated culture before contact with the West? Why then would the most impressive indigenous civilizations in the Americas rise out of jungles, such as the Mayans and the Incas? It's not a question asked in the book, which doesn't deal with the Americas until the era of exploration and colonization. Though to give Landes his due, Eurocentric doesn't mean triumphalist or apologist. If for whatever reason, you're ignorant of the atrocities committed by Europeans in the Americas or of the savagery of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Landes will certainly provide an education. (Especially when it comes to the Spanish Conquistadors. Landes is not kind to Catholicism or Islam, which he sees as stultifying upholders of dogma.) When Landes comes to examine the East/West axis, he sees as crucial the differences in property rights and development of markets. I'd be the last person to dismiss such factors out of hand, yet Landes' thesis as to the definitive factor that gave rise to the differences did raise both eyebrows:
Europe's great good fortune lay in the fall of Rome and the weakness and division that ensued. (So much for the lamentations of generations of classicists and Latin teachers.) The Roman dream of unity, authority, and order (the pax Romana) remained, indeed has persisted to the present.... [yet] fragmentation was the strongest brake on wilful, oppressive behavior. Political rivalry and the right of exit made all the difference.
Really? Because I do find it hard to believe the fall of Rome wasn't a tragedy for the West. Ancient Rome at its height is estimated to have had a population of one million. After its fall, no city, in Europe at least, would hit that threshold until London in 1811. Trade, literacy, urbanization all collapsed in the former Western Empire and arguably wouldn't fully recover for nearly a millennium. I do get Landes' point that authoritarian empires could do much to cripple technological and economic progress, but that still seemed a rather breathtaking claim. It is key to his theory however. Because if for Landes the key to the wealth of nations is the Industrial Revolution, the key to the Industrial Revolution is a culture of scientific inquiry and invention spurred on by a rivalry between nations, allowed room to breathe by a fragmented authority and fostered by a strong work ethic. (He sees this fragmented authority and work ethic as crucial in the rise of an industrial Japan as well.) In the end, geography isn't destiny, for according to Landes it's "not resources" that made the difference between nations but what "lay inside--culture, values, initiative." (And a constant related thread--the importance to growth and development of the "status and role of women" and the rights of minorities--Jews in history often being the canary in the coal mine.)
This work is erudite, entertaining, thought-provoking and written with style. (The kind of book that stretches vocabularies so have a dictionary handy.) The author is apparently an American, but he has a dry, at times acid, often deadpan humor I associate with the British. It's also hard not to respect a book that garners praise, as seen in the blurbs, from such celebrated yet ideologically diverse economists as John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Solow. Landes himself, for all that he stresses the importance of property rights, is far from free market--he made frequent stabs, if not arguments, at free traders. I saw one reviewer that claimed this book was taught as an example of flawed historiography. Maybe so, but it's not evident to me. I appreciated that Landes often related the various controversies in the field, and there are extensive notes and bibliography. It seemed sound and told a great story. So many of the connections Landes made are fascinating; the breath of the technological and social details he presented and global scope he took in was impressive. It's a book well worth reading and thinking about.
December 5, 2024
#Preparatory books for another Degree:
David S. Landes’s The Wealth and Poverty of Nations is a comprehensive, go-getting, and punctiliously researched exploration of the factors that have fashioned the economic inequalities among nations over the past 500 years. Landes, a historian with a flair for storytelling, tackles the precarious question of why some countries flourish while others falter, presenting an argument that interweaves history, culture, geography, and politics. Landes challenges naive explanations for economic success, such as geography or colonial legacy, offering instead a polygonal perspective. He underscores the significance of cultural attitudes toward work, innovation, and risk-taking as drivers of sustained growth. His primary thesis suggests that industrialization, supported by cultural and institutional frameworks, is the pivotal force behind wealth creation. European nations, and particularly Britain, are portrayed as the leaders of modern economic growth because of their adoption of a rational, experimental, and forward-looking mindset, combined with technological innovation and institutional constancy. Landes argues that these attributes were not as prevalent in other regions, which explains their slower economic trajectories. Landes’s narrative spans centuries, offering a global viewpoint. He competently assimilates anecdotes, case studies, and comparative analysis, making the book as engaging as it is informative. The emphasis on cultural factors is refreshing in a field often subjugated by economic determinism. Landes argues convincingly for the role of values, attitudes, and social standards in shaping economic consequences. While acknowledging the importance of geography and colonial histories, Landes avoids reducing his argument to these factors alone. Instead, he provides a nuanced understanding of their interplay with culture and innovation. As regards the flipside, while Landes celebrates the attainments of Western nations, his narrative often leans toward Eurocentrism. Critics might find his depiction of non-Western cultures and their economic systems reductive or exaggeratedly critical. Some readers may feel that the book downplays the enduring impact of colonial exploitation, slavery, and global power dynamics on the wealth divide. Although culture is undeniably vital, Landes’s heavy dependence on this factor risks overgeneralizing complex economic phenomena. To conclude, we can safely say that this tome is an intellectual tour de force that succeeds in raising vital questions about economic development. While it may not provide definitive answers to all its inquiries, it offers a convincing outline for understanding why some nations flourish while others struggle. Readers fascinated by history, economics, and global development will find this book both stimulating and informative.
David S. Landes’s The Wealth and Poverty of Nations is a comprehensive, go-getting, and punctiliously researched exploration of the factors that have fashioned the economic inequalities among nations over the past 500 years. Landes, a historian with a flair for storytelling, tackles the precarious question of why some countries flourish while others falter, presenting an argument that interweaves history, culture, geography, and politics. Landes challenges naive explanations for economic success, such as geography or colonial legacy, offering instead a polygonal perspective. He underscores the significance of cultural attitudes toward work, innovation, and risk-taking as drivers of sustained growth. His primary thesis suggests that industrialization, supported by cultural and institutional frameworks, is the pivotal force behind wealth creation. European nations, and particularly Britain, are portrayed as the leaders of modern economic growth because of their adoption of a rational, experimental, and forward-looking mindset, combined with technological innovation and institutional constancy. Landes argues that these attributes were not as prevalent in other regions, which explains their slower economic trajectories. Landes’s narrative spans centuries, offering a global viewpoint. He competently assimilates anecdotes, case studies, and comparative analysis, making the book as engaging as it is informative. The emphasis on cultural factors is refreshing in a field often subjugated by economic determinism. Landes argues convincingly for the role of values, attitudes, and social standards in shaping economic consequences. While acknowledging the importance of geography and colonial histories, Landes avoids reducing his argument to these factors alone. Instead, he provides a nuanced understanding of their interplay with culture and innovation. As regards the flipside, while Landes celebrates the attainments of Western nations, his narrative often leans toward Eurocentrism. Critics might find his depiction of non-Western cultures and their economic systems reductive or exaggeratedly critical. Some readers may feel that the book downplays the enduring impact of colonial exploitation, slavery, and global power dynamics on the wealth divide. Although culture is undeniably vital, Landes’s heavy dependence on this factor risks overgeneralizing complex economic phenomena. To conclude, we can safely say that this tome is an intellectual tour de force that succeeds in raising vital questions about economic development. While it may not provide definitive answers to all its inquiries, it offers a convincing outline for understanding why some nations flourish while others struggle. Readers fascinated by history, economics, and global development will find this book both stimulating and informative.
September 5, 2020
Unapologetically Eurocentric Treatise on the Cultural Factors that Fueled the Industrial Revolution in England and the Dominance of Europe Until WWII, and the Reasons Why This Has Not Happened in Some Other Nations
This is a big, ambitious, opinionated, contentious, erudite, and detail-filled book. It's a spiritual successor to that seminal work by Adam Smith back in 1776, in many ways a modern sequel that seeks to drill down and understand why it is that there are such stark gaps in economic, political, and cultural development around the world, and how geography, scientific inquiry, religious dogma, the 'Protestant' work ethic (or lack of it), cultural chauvinism, imperialism, colonialism, commerce, greed, ambition, indolence, curiosity (or lack of it), and drive to betterment have combined throughout history to shape the complex and deeply unequal global society of today (actually, the book was written over two decades ago in 1998, so it is fascinating to see how things have progressed since then, and what affect that may have on his thesis).
I could try to write a massive review that covers the fountain of ideas, examples, and historical events he writes about with a dry, acerbic wit and keen intellect that seems very British (but in fact he is American). But that is a task far beyond my review-writing energy levels these days. Rather I was drawn to the book as a different approach to the same question posed by Jared Diamond in his excellent book "Guns, Germs, and Steel". Whereas Diamond's main thesis is that environment has had a huge and hereunto unacknowledged influence on the development of societies over the past millennia, leading to a revision of the prior assumption that European countries have dominated the world due to innate superiority in the past few centuries, Landes accepts that basic concept but then dives into the far more contentious subject of the role of cultures and religions on development and stagnation, leading to such diverse outcomes as we see today.
He gleefully goes against the politically-correct trend of attacking Western imperialism and exploitation and cultural chauvinism (White Man's Burden, Manifest Destiny) not by denying the wrong-doings of the past, but by re-examining the view that the West has exploited much of the developing world for its own benefit, while smugly justifying itself by claiming to be bettering the lot of those colonial subjects. He concludes this aspect is absolutely undeniable, so he is no apologist for Western imperialism, providing copious examples of the condescending and exploitive attitude Europeans have had towards Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Asia as they expanded their economic and political spheres of influence through empire-building.
However, and this is the crux of the book, many of the ideas that took root in modern Western countries also deserve credit for fueling their rise in economic and political power, not to mention promotion of less oppressive political systems than in the pre-industrial world, and though Western nations were often happy to celebrate enlightened intellectual and cultural ideas in their own societies while withholding them from their vassal states, these innovations did in fact improve the lot of millions of people that would potentially have remained trapped in feudal and religiously oppressive regimes for many more centuries without that disruptive Western interference and domination.
Does that make Western Imperialism justified, if the end-outcomes were positive? That would be far too simplistic a conclusion, as there is plenty of morally-dubious claims at play, but Landes goes to great lengths to show how British rule in India, for example, led over time to rapid political and social and economic development there that would almost certainly not have happened under Mughal or native rule (though we'll never know of course, this being an intellectual exercise). But I really respect his unflinching examination of the casual arrogance and superiority of the British colonial regimes and civil workers, along with the well-meaning urge to bring the 'light of civilization' and Christian ethics to dark continents, as they might have seen themselves. We can certainly decry this cultural chauvinism in our modern, global, and diverse society, but there are undeniable economic and political benefits that were bestowed through example from the British rule of many of its colonies, self-serving and exploitive though it may have been.
He then explores what has happened in so many former colonies and nations once they have been freed of the yoke of Western imperial rule, and sadly the outcomes have not all been positive, which some continue to blame on the Western powers exploitive treatment, half a century after gaining independence. While it's undeniable that much of the debt and political instability can be blamed on sudden independence following WWII, the contrasting the economic emergence of the biggest losers of the war becoming the biggest economic winners (Germany and Japan) and the Asia Tigers with the stagnation, instability, civil wars, corruption, and religious fundamentalism seen in the Middle East, Africa, and South America since gaining independence and self-agency can be firmly attributed to cultural values that discourage innovation, impose religious dogmas, suppress the role of women, reward cronyism, protect a corrupt elite, and encourage dysfunctional socialist political systems. Given today's atmosphere of political correctness and the taboo of criticising any non-Western culture, and blaming it all on the West, I thought this was a refreshingly brash and unapologetic view and provided much food for thought.
This is a big, ambitious, opinionated, contentious, erudite, and detail-filled book. It's a spiritual successor to that seminal work by Adam Smith back in 1776, in many ways a modern sequel that seeks to drill down and understand why it is that there are such stark gaps in economic, political, and cultural development around the world, and how geography, scientific inquiry, religious dogma, the 'Protestant' work ethic (or lack of it), cultural chauvinism, imperialism, colonialism, commerce, greed, ambition, indolence, curiosity (or lack of it), and drive to betterment have combined throughout history to shape the complex and deeply unequal global society of today (actually, the book was written over two decades ago in 1998, so it is fascinating to see how things have progressed since then, and what affect that may have on his thesis).
I could try to write a massive review that covers the fountain of ideas, examples, and historical events he writes about with a dry, acerbic wit and keen intellect that seems very British (but in fact he is American). But that is a task far beyond my review-writing energy levels these days. Rather I was drawn to the book as a different approach to the same question posed by Jared Diamond in his excellent book "Guns, Germs, and Steel". Whereas Diamond's main thesis is that environment has had a huge and hereunto unacknowledged influence on the development of societies over the past millennia, leading to a revision of the prior assumption that European countries have dominated the world due to innate superiority in the past few centuries, Landes accepts that basic concept but then dives into the far more contentious subject of the role of cultures and religions on development and stagnation, leading to such diverse outcomes as we see today.
He gleefully goes against the politically-correct trend of attacking Western imperialism and exploitation and cultural chauvinism (White Man's Burden, Manifest Destiny) not by denying the wrong-doings of the past, but by re-examining the view that the West has exploited much of the developing world for its own benefit, while smugly justifying itself by claiming to be bettering the lot of those colonial subjects. He concludes this aspect is absolutely undeniable, so he is no apologist for Western imperialism, providing copious examples of the condescending and exploitive attitude Europeans have had towards Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Asia as they expanded their economic and political spheres of influence through empire-building.
However, and this is the crux of the book, many of the ideas that took root in modern Western countries also deserve credit for fueling their rise in economic and political power, not to mention promotion of less oppressive political systems than in the pre-industrial world, and though Western nations were often happy to celebrate enlightened intellectual and cultural ideas in their own societies while withholding them from their vassal states, these innovations did in fact improve the lot of millions of people that would potentially have remained trapped in feudal and religiously oppressive regimes for many more centuries without that disruptive Western interference and domination.
Does that make Western Imperialism justified, if the end-outcomes were positive? That would be far too simplistic a conclusion, as there is plenty of morally-dubious claims at play, but Landes goes to great lengths to show how British rule in India, for example, led over time to rapid political and social and economic development there that would almost certainly not have happened under Mughal or native rule (though we'll never know of course, this being an intellectual exercise). But I really respect his unflinching examination of the casual arrogance and superiority of the British colonial regimes and civil workers, along with the well-meaning urge to bring the 'light of civilization' and Christian ethics to dark continents, as they might have seen themselves. We can certainly decry this cultural chauvinism in our modern, global, and diverse society, but there are undeniable economic and political benefits that were bestowed through example from the British rule of many of its colonies, self-serving and exploitive though it may have been.
He then explores what has happened in so many former colonies and nations once they have been freed of the yoke of Western imperial rule, and sadly the outcomes have not all been positive, which some continue to blame on the Western powers exploitive treatment, half a century after gaining independence. While it's undeniable that much of the debt and political instability can be blamed on sudden independence following WWII, the contrasting the economic emergence of the biggest losers of the war becoming the biggest economic winners (Germany and Japan) and the Asia Tigers with the stagnation, instability, civil wars, corruption, and religious fundamentalism seen in the Middle East, Africa, and South America since gaining independence and self-agency can be firmly attributed to cultural values that discourage innovation, impose religious dogmas, suppress the role of women, reward cronyism, protect a corrupt elite, and encourage dysfunctional socialist political systems. Given today's atmosphere of political correctness and the taboo of criticising any non-Western culture, and blaming it all on the West, I thought this was a refreshingly brash and unapologetic view and provided much food for thought.
December 21, 2019
This was a great read, though I am aware of the controversial content of this book, in view of the "Great Divergence"-debate. See my elaborate review in my Sense-of-History-account: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
April 17, 2013
Culture plays a significant role in the success or failure of civilizations. Interesting thesis, right? One that might not seem so objectionable until you state it in concrete historical terms: Western civilizations have dominated the world for the last 200 years largely because of their culture. Culture is personal, so people take things like this personally: you're saying Europeans are intrinsically superior to other people? Eurocentrist! Bigot! Racist!
David Landes has been called a Eurocentrist, and probably meaner things too, but the author present in this book is clearly not prejudiced. He's distinctly postjudiced. He probably knows more about non-European cultures than you do, and extolls many of their virtues, but after thinking about a huge range of history, he finds themes in Western culture that he believes were critical to its success. I think that's a totally legitimate opinion, and I admire Landes for exploring a touchy subject in a world of haters.
However, as legitimate as it may be, it's still an opinion, which brings us to this book's first failing: arrogance. The very title is absurdly presumptuous in its scope, as if a satisfying explanation existed for the inequality of nations, but titles are meant to be provocative. What bugged me was the fact that the importance of culture in the behavior of groups is exquisitely difficult to prove in the present, under semi-controlled conditions, with relatively small numbers of people. Does Google outperform Yahoo because they have a superior culture? Or because they have better tech, better recruiters, better spies, better something else? That's very tough thing to prove, and if you wanted to try you would have to perform extensive surveying, interviews, and qualitative observation to convince any self-respecting sociologist. Scale that up to civilizations and restrain yourself to the scant anecdotal evidence history provides us and you really have to start injecting some first person quid pro quos, e.g. a lot of "I think"s and "In my opinion"s, something Landes rarely does. I guess this is a critique of history as a discipline more than of this book in particular, but the scale of the claims being made here, and the fact that there are specific interpretations being presented, just irritated the scientist in me. I suppose history, like so many branches of inquiry in which deduction is a practical impossibility, has a tendency to overstate its explanatory power.
The anal informaticist in me was also repeatedly incensed by some seriously un-cited passages, like one in which he explains that printing never caught on in China because ideographs are intrinsically hard to set in type, and that ideographs dissuade literacy: "one may learn the characters as a child, but if one does not keep using them, one forgets how to read" (p. 51). Perhaps he thought the challenges ideographs presented to printing are common knowledge or obvious, but I disagree. You have to cite facts! Granted I am a citation Nazi, but come on, he's a historian!
Speaking of historians, are there any histories that don't include numerous pointless tangents in which the historian lays out the factual history of pet interest X, regardless of whether X has any relevance to the overall thesis? Frankly I enjoyed most of the tangents in this book, but they really just muddy the waters. State hypothesis, present evidence, recapitulate hypothesis, analyze, repeat. Stay on target.
In the end, I enjoyed reading this, but I would only recommend it as a source for further reading material. I didn't find the largely secondary, anecdotal, and correlational evidence he presented convincing. I would very much mistrust any work that cites this book as a source of anything other than opinion. I am, however, interested in reading some of Landes's work on the historical importance of timekeeping.
WORDS
edulcoration (n): purification (p. 34)
condign (adj): fitting, appropriate (p. 144)
cliometrics (n): application mathematical economic techniques to history (p. 165)
gravamen (n): part of an argument that carries the most weight, or any accusation. Perhaps also the name of my future metal band. Currently vying with "One Great Black Woolfe of a More Than Ordinarie Bigness, Which Is Like to Be More Feirce and Bould Than the Rest, and So Occasions the More Hurt." Definitely wins for brevity.
contumacy (n): stubbornness (p. 181)
cui bono (L): for whose benefit? (p. 225)
suzerainty (n): basically lordship. A suzerain was a French feudal lord. (p. 430)
irredentism (n): belief in annexing some other place to your own holdings b/c the people there share something in common with you. Pretty arcane. (p. 435)
FUTURE
The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia
- cited a lot in the first chapter, a Eurocentric antecedent to Landes
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/12...
- published after Landes, but on the same theme, and solidly in the culture camp
- Acemoglu wrote that interesting paper on disease and resulting societal structures
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/17...
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/63...
- founding text of tacit knowledge
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/56...
- history of Japan giving up firearms prior to Perry
David Landes has been called a Eurocentrist, and probably meaner things too, but the author present in this book is clearly not prejudiced. He's distinctly postjudiced. He probably knows more about non-European cultures than you do, and extolls many of their virtues, but after thinking about a huge range of history, he finds themes in Western culture that he believes were critical to its success. I think that's a totally legitimate opinion, and I admire Landes for exploring a touchy subject in a world of haters.
However, as legitimate as it may be, it's still an opinion, which brings us to this book's first failing: arrogance. The very title is absurdly presumptuous in its scope, as if a satisfying explanation existed for the inequality of nations, but titles are meant to be provocative. What bugged me was the fact that the importance of culture in the behavior of groups is exquisitely difficult to prove in the present, under semi-controlled conditions, with relatively small numbers of people. Does Google outperform Yahoo because they have a superior culture? Or because they have better tech, better recruiters, better spies, better something else? That's very tough thing to prove, and if you wanted to try you would have to perform extensive surveying, interviews, and qualitative observation to convince any self-respecting sociologist. Scale that up to civilizations and restrain yourself to the scant anecdotal evidence history provides us and you really have to start injecting some first person quid pro quos, e.g. a lot of "I think"s and "In my opinion"s, something Landes rarely does. I guess this is a critique of history as a discipline more than of this book in particular, but the scale of the claims being made here, and the fact that there are specific interpretations being presented, just irritated the scientist in me. I suppose history, like so many branches of inquiry in which deduction is a practical impossibility, has a tendency to overstate its explanatory power.
The anal informaticist in me was also repeatedly incensed by some seriously un-cited passages, like one in which he explains that printing never caught on in China because ideographs are intrinsically hard to set in type, and that ideographs dissuade literacy: "one may learn the characters as a child, but if one does not keep using them, one forgets how to read" (p. 51). Perhaps he thought the challenges ideographs presented to printing are common knowledge or obvious, but I disagree. You have to cite facts! Granted I am a citation Nazi, but come on, he's a historian!
Speaking of historians, are there any histories that don't include numerous pointless tangents in which the historian lays out the factual history of pet interest X, regardless of whether X has any relevance to the overall thesis? Frankly I enjoyed most of the tangents in this book, but they really just muddy the waters. State hypothesis, present evidence, recapitulate hypothesis, analyze, repeat. Stay on target.
In the end, I enjoyed reading this, but I would only recommend it as a source for further reading material. I didn't find the largely secondary, anecdotal, and correlational evidence he presented convincing. I would very much mistrust any work that cites this book as a source of anything other than opinion. I am, however, interested in reading some of Landes's work on the historical importance of timekeeping.
WORDS
edulcoration (n): purification (p. 34)
condign (adj): fitting, appropriate (p. 144)
cliometrics (n): application mathematical economic techniques to history (p. 165)
gravamen (n): part of an argument that carries the most weight, or any accusation. Perhaps also the name of my future metal band. Currently vying with "One Great Black Woolfe of a More Than Ordinarie Bigness, Which Is Like to Be More Feirce and Bould Than the Rest, and So Occasions the More Hurt." Definitely wins for brevity.
contumacy (n): stubbornness (p. 181)
cui bono (L): for whose benefit? (p. 225)
suzerainty (n): basically lordship. A suzerain was a French feudal lord. (p. 430)
irredentism (n): belief in annexing some other place to your own holdings b/c the people there share something in common with you. Pretty arcane. (p. 435)
FUTURE
The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia
- cited a lot in the first chapter, a Eurocentric antecedent to Landes
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/12...
- published after Landes, but on the same theme, and solidly in the culture camp
- Acemoglu wrote that interesting paper on disease and resulting societal structures
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/17...
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/63...
- founding text of tacit knowledge
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/56...
- history of Japan giving up firearms prior to Perry
May 17, 2022
Disgusting! Such a biased book. Really can’t believe that it has such high ratings on Goodreads. If you’re West European or a descendant , and you have right wing views, then I guess you will enjoy reading this book. The rest of us should not waste our time.
November 5, 2012
I took me 8 years to read this book. That's right, 8 years. I picked it up in 2004 because it was at the top of the suggested reading list for the foreign service exam. Since then, I have been plodding through it, sometimes starting over and re-reading.
So, it must have sucked to have gone through that long undertaking, right? And I mean, would a book on world economics and political systems that came out in 1999 even be relevant anymore? Plus, I bet it was boring as hell.
Au contraire to all of the above (as the five stars rating hopefully tipped you off). It was worth every hour and re-read and spot of whatever dish I was eating at a restaurant all over the pages. (8 years of dishes is impressive.) Sure the ending of this wide historical and economical survey pinpointed in the IMF crisis in 1999 of the East Asian countries - something I got to experience a year later _ and barely touches on the driving forces in the Middle East that have become more center stage since 2001. But he gets there. He is also dead on re: China and Russia. He's like an awesome fortune teller, and his tongue in cheek, and darkly humorous footnotes are appreciated and really pick up the pace.
In sum, Landes has written a beautiful summary of how we are all greedy assholes, that life will probably never be fair and wealth will never be distributed according to just merit, but always advantage - but hey, there are things to do to mitigate that if we decide we want to. I appreciated his self-deprecation, wit, and gosh darnit poetic flow of words. I hope it will not take you eight years to read this book - but if it does, it wil be worth it.
So, it must have sucked to have gone through that long undertaking, right? And I mean, would a book on world economics and political systems that came out in 1999 even be relevant anymore? Plus, I bet it was boring as hell.
Au contraire to all of the above (as the five stars rating hopefully tipped you off). It was worth every hour and re-read and spot of whatever dish I was eating at a restaurant all over the pages. (8 years of dishes is impressive.) Sure the ending of this wide historical and economical survey pinpointed in the IMF crisis in 1999 of the East Asian countries - something I got to experience a year later _ and barely touches on the driving forces in the Middle East that have become more center stage since 2001. But he gets there. He is also dead on re: China and Russia. He's like an awesome fortune teller, and his tongue in cheek, and darkly humorous footnotes are appreciated and really pick up the pace.
In sum, Landes has written a beautiful summary of how we are all greedy assholes, that life will probably never be fair and wealth will never be distributed according to just merit, but always advantage - but hey, there are things to do to mitigate that if we decide we want to. I appreciated his self-deprecation, wit, and gosh darnit poetic flow of words. I hope it will not take you eight years to read this book - but if it does, it wil be worth it.
June 30, 2018
Scatter-brained and distracted. A third of the way in and I had no idea what his argument was, if he had any, or if the book was anything more than an excuse to show off his accumulation of trivia.
November 10, 2020
Một quyển sách đồ sộ về quá trình phát triển của nhân loại. Một quyển sách thú vị về sự thịnh suy và nguyên nhân đằng sau nó của các quốc gia. Tác giả tập trung giải thích vì sao các nước ôn đới thành công hơn các nước nhiệt đới, phương Tây thành công hơn phương Đông, Tin Lành thành công hơn Thiên Chúa giáo ...
Mình thích cách giải thích của tác giả về vấn đề văn hóa trong sự thịnh suy của các quốc gia. Một quốc gia có nền tảng kỉ luật, uy tín và cởi mở để học hỏi cũng như hiểu chính mình thì dù đi sau vẫn có khả năng phát triển thành công. Ngược lại một nước ngủ quên trên chiến thắng và bảo thủ thì dù có đóng vàng trong tủ cũng sẽ thất bại. Những chương về Tây Ban Nha cũng nhiên Nam Mỹ là những chương thú vị nhất đối với mình. Tây Ban Nha từng chiếm được Nam Mỹ, trở thành quốc gia giàu nhất Châu Âu. Tuy nhiên khi giàu có họ tập trung hưởng thụ, đuổi các nhà khoa học trí thức ra khỏi quốc gia, sống khép kín ... để rồi họ bị Hà Lan, Anh, và Mỹ lần lượt vượt qua. Di sản họ để lại cho các thuộc địa Nam Mỹ của mình cũng giải thích vì sao các nước đó khó trở thành một nước phát triển.
Quyển sách này ra đời khá lâu, cuối những năm 90, do đó có nhiều chỗ cũng đã lạc hậu. Tiêu biểu là tác gia tập trung chỉ trích Trung Quốc do nước này vào thời điểm ấy vẫn còn nghèo do di sản từ thời phong kiến và thuộc địa. Bên cạnh đó tác giả cũng đề cao phương Tây và khí hậu ôn đới hơi quá. Tác phẩm này cũng bỏ đi nhiều những mâu thuẫn xã hội, địa lý ... trong sự phát triển các quốc gia.
Tuy nhiên đây vẫn là một tác phẩm hay để tham khảo. Suy cho cùng, thật khó để có 1 tác phẩm có thể bao trùm tất cả các yếu tố, hehe.
Mình thích cách giải thích của tác giả về vấn đề văn hóa trong sự thịnh suy của các quốc gia. Một quốc gia có nền tảng kỉ luật, uy tín và cởi mở để học hỏi cũng như hiểu chính mình thì dù đi sau vẫn có khả năng phát triển thành công. Ngược lại một nước ngủ quên trên chiến thắng và bảo thủ thì dù có đóng vàng trong tủ cũng sẽ thất bại. Những chương về Tây Ban Nha cũng nhiên Nam Mỹ là những chương thú vị nhất đối với mình. Tây Ban Nha từng chiếm được Nam Mỹ, trở thành quốc gia giàu nhất Châu Âu. Tuy nhiên khi giàu có họ tập trung hưởng thụ, đuổi các nhà khoa học trí thức ra khỏi quốc gia, sống khép kín ... để rồi họ bị Hà Lan, Anh, và Mỹ lần lượt vượt qua. Di sản họ để lại cho các thuộc địa Nam Mỹ của mình cũng giải thích vì sao các nước đó khó trở thành một nước phát triển.
Quyển sách này ra đời khá lâu, cuối những năm 90, do đó có nhiều chỗ cũng đã lạc hậu. Tiêu biểu là tác gia tập trung chỉ trích Trung Quốc do nước này vào thời điểm ấy vẫn còn nghèo do di sản từ thời phong kiến và thuộc địa. Bên cạnh đó tác giả cũng đề cao phương Tây và khí hậu ôn đới hơi quá. Tác phẩm này cũng bỏ đi nhiều những mâu thuẫn xã hội, địa lý ... trong sự phát triển các quốc gia.
Tuy nhiên đây vẫn là một tác phẩm hay để tham khảo. Suy cho cùng, thật khó để có 1 tác phẩm có thể bao trùm tất cả các yếu tố, hehe.
March 18, 2021
As a child, I used to read the Economist eagerly. They were my primary source of information and analysis about what was going around the world, especially the more culturally distant parts: LatAm, Africa etc. Then one day, they published something about Nepal (where I was born/lived). As I read the article, I started getting uncomfortable - it rang completely untrue. The analysis was shallow; something that was seemingly written after chatting to 5 people over drinks in the capital; a Western, elite, non-nuanced view of affairs. I was disappointed, but also learnt that one must understand where the writer stands and his/her own biases as you read someone.
Something similar with this Euro-centric book. With its take on Japan's story since the Meiji restoration, has a 1980s feel to it. In general, I have trouble with books that claim to be about the world but spend little time on China and South Asia, which have ~50% of the world's population. I don't think this book would be able to explain China's economic success, or India's resurgence. Post-facto rationalizations are easy and perfectly fine for dinner-table conversations; not so much for a 700 page book.
Something similar with this Euro-centric book. With its take on Japan's story since the Meiji restoration, has a 1980s feel to it. In general, I have trouble with books that claim to be about the world but spend little time on China and South Asia, which have ~50% of the world's population. I don't think this book would be able to explain China's economic success, or India's resurgence. Post-facto rationalizations are easy and perfectly fine for dinner-table conversations; not so much for a 700 page book.
June 20, 2023
full of unexamined liberal demoncratic assumption ... not buying the analysis at all
April 16, 2015
Tutti i matrimoni felici si assomigliano; ogni matrimonio infelice è infelice a modo suo
Una sorta di prosecuzione/risposta ad “Armi, acciaio e malattie” di J. Diamond, che individuava le condizioni necessarie per la nascita di una civilta’ e la cui mancanza costituisce un limite allo sviluppo. Senza negare tale assunto, questo testo sottolinea che in ogni caso intorno all’anno mille perlomeno tre civilizzazioni – europea, islamica e cinese - presentavano vitalita’ analoghe, e che solo con l’evoluzione nell’occidente europeo delle citta’ e la conseguente affermazione del principio di legalita’ e di forme di proto-liberismo laicizzante, tali potenzialita’ si sono potute sviluppare appieno, grazie allo stimolo all’iniziativa, autonomia e personalita’ individuale* (con l’aiuto di interventi dirigisti e forme di protezionismo secondo i tempi e le necessita’, aggiungo io).
Non si puo’ non convenire che tra le cause del successo della civilta’ occidentale - perlomeno tra quelle riconducibili all’azione dell’Uomo e quindi ulteriori rispetto al semplice possesso degli agenti materiali dello sviluppo - quelle individuate dall’A. abbiano avuto un ruolo determinante. Se non altro nel consentire il “sorpasso” nei confronti di quelle civilta’ che avevano acquisito un grado di sviluppo tecnologico pari se non superiore a quello europeo, ma che non si sono incamminate sullo stesso percorso.
D’altra parte, ritengo che le cause della poverta’ siano tante, e diverse per ogni poverta’ (in termini sociologici, la poverta’ e’ sovradeterminata). In altre parole, in un mondo globalizzato esistono tanti modi di fare male una cosa, ma sostanzialmente uno solo di farla bene, nella limitata accezione in cui “bene” significa “capace di avere successo in una competizione spietata”. E infatti Landes analizza in profondita’ le cause della ricchezza, ma non altrettanto quelle della poverta’, quasi a dire che queste vanno semplicemente identificate nel non aver seguito (nei modi piu’ diversi) il cammino virtuoso delle nazioni ricche. Coerentemente, l’A. individua - forse con una certa forzatura - caratteristiche analoghe a quelle occidentali ed analoghe virtu’ weberiane nel Giappone pre-industriale, che si e’ affermato sostanzialmente per aver seguito la ricetta europea.
Nonostante le immancabili generalizzazioni, quindi, il libro e’ affascinante sotto molti aspetti, anche se molto viziato da impostazioni “ideologiche” di stampo germanico-anglosassone (tra Adam Smith e Max Weber, per intenderci) – caratteristica fortemente criticata da molti.
E’ anche un testo politicamente molto scorretto, in cui non c’e’ posto per visioni alternative, per il punto di vista degli sconfitti: la realta’ e’ realta’, il che equivale un po’ al brenniano “vae victis”.
Le analisi spaziano dalla geografia all’economia, dalla storia alla sociologia, anche se in maniera a volte poco coordinata e con digressioni spesso non fondamentali per l’oggetto ed il fine dello studio.
Molto interessante la disamina – per quanto per linee generali - delle varie forme di colonialismo.
Prezzo e mole possono spaventare, ma pensate che ogni pagina (esclusa la bibliografia) costa circa 80 lire, quando libercoli come “la sovrana lettrice” (nessuno me ne voglia, e’ solo un esempio) costano 300 lire a pagina scritta. E contrariamente a quelli, qui ogni 80 lire spese accrescono molto.
Divagazioni:
La storia - come l’economia – serve a capire cosa e’ successo, non a fare predizioni (al contrario della scienza), essenzialmente perche’ i comportamenti umani non sono retti da leggi ineludibili, e tantomeno logiche. Tecnicamente, quindi, non esiste una “storia del mondo”, ma solo una storia di uomini e donne. Generalizzare e’ consentito (e’ inevitabile) solo in ristretti ambiti (non credo nei Continenti: non sono che un complotto di cartografi). Ritengo effimero parlare – ad esempio - delle cause del sottosviluppo dell’Africa: il disastro dello Zimbabwe e’ molto diverso dal fallimento della Somalia. La stessa storia dell’Europa non e’ che la somma e l’interazione delle storie dei singoli Paesi, nella variabile misura in cui essi esistono realmente. Landes viene accusato di eurocentrismo, ma in realta’ mi sembra semmai viziato da preconcetti di derivazione weberiana: glorifica non tanto l’Europa (che nei fatti si e’ imposta, nella misura in cui esiste una cosa chiamata “Europa”), ma quelle nazioni che in Europa hanno abbracciato il protestantesimo (ed i loro eredi ed epigoni).
La nascita e lo sviluppo delle citta’ in Europa occidentale hanno senza dubbio svolto un ruolo decisivo. Peccato che in Italia non si sia riusciti a fare il passo successivo e si sia forzatamente rimasti indietro in una globalizzazione che ha avuto inizio gia’ nel XVI secolo. Weber sara’ pure superato, ma qualche ragione ce l’ha…
*Iniziativa, autonomia e personalita’ individuale: in una parola abbandono del timore reverenziale verso qualsiasi autorita’ che manchi di autorevolezza, ossia verso la verita’ non supportata da ragione e verifiche empiriche. Purtroppo assistiamo ad una regressione di due segni distinti: il ritorno al timore reverenziale verso forme di autorita’ ben poco autorevoli (i media) ed il disconoscimento del valore assoluto della ragione (ed in forme estreme di relativismo persino della realta’ empirica/scientifica). L’una segno di cessione di autonomia, l’altra di estremizzazione della personalita’. La prima e’ inescusabile; la seconda confonde realta’ e ragione con dogmatismo, ma ha una sua dignita’, sinche’ non confligge con il dovuto pragmatismo.
Una sorta di prosecuzione/risposta ad “Armi, acciaio e malattie” di J. Diamond, che individuava le condizioni necessarie per la nascita di una civilta’ e la cui mancanza costituisce un limite allo sviluppo. Senza negare tale assunto, questo testo sottolinea che in ogni caso intorno all’anno mille perlomeno tre civilizzazioni – europea, islamica e cinese - presentavano vitalita’ analoghe, e che solo con l’evoluzione nell’occidente europeo delle citta’ e la conseguente affermazione del principio di legalita’ e di forme di proto-liberismo laicizzante, tali potenzialita’ si sono potute sviluppare appieno, grazie allo stimolo all’iniziativa, autonomia e personalita’ individuale* (con l’aiuto di interventi dirigisti e forme di protezionismo secondo i tempi e le necessita’, aggiungo io).
Non si puo’ non convenire che tra le cause del successo della civilta’ occidentale - perlomeno tra quelle riconducibili all’azione dell’Uomo e quindi ulteriori rispetto al semplice possesso degli agenti materiali dello sviluppo - quelle individuate dall’A. abbiano avuto un ruolo determinante. Se non altro nel consentire il “sorpasso” nei confronti di quelle civilta’ che avevano acquisito un grado di sviluppo tecnologico pari se non superiore a quello europeo, ma che non si sono incamminate sullo stesso percorso.
D’altra parte, ritengo che le cause della poverta’ siano tante, e diverse per ogni poverta’ (in termini sociologici, la poverta’ e’ sovradeterminata). In altre parole, in un mondo globalizzato esistono tanti modi di fare male una cosa, ma sostanzialmente uno solo di farla bene, nella limitata accezione in cui “bene” significa “capace di avere successo in una competizione spietata”. E infatti Landes analizza in profondita’ le cause della ricchezza, ma non altrettanto quelle della poverta’, quasi a dire che queste vanno semplicemente identificate nel non aver seguito (nei modi piu’ diversi) il cammino virtuoso delle nazioni ricche. Coerentemente, l’A. individua - forse con una certa forzatura - caratteristiche analoghe a quelle occidentali ed analoghe virtu’ weberiane nel Giappone pre-industriale, che si e’ affermato sostanzialmente per aver seguito la ricetta europea.
Nonostante le immancabili generalizzazioni, quindi, il libro e’ affascinante sotto molti aspetti, anche se molto viziato da impostazioni “ideologiche” di stampo germanico-anglosassone (tra Adam Smith e Max Weber, per intenderci) – caratteristica fortemente criticata da molti.
E’ anche un testo politicamente molto scorretto, in cui non c’e’ posto per visioni alternative, per il punto di vista degli sconfitti: la realta’ e’ realta’, il che equivale un po’ al brenniano “vae victis”.
Le analisi spaziano dalla geografia all’economia, dalla storia alla sociologia, anche se in maniera a volte poco coordinata e con digressioni spesso non fondamentali per l’oggetto ed il fine dello studio.
Molto interessante la disamina – per quanto per linee generali - delle varie forme di colonialismo.
Prezzo e mole possono spaventare, ma pensate che ogni pagina (esclusa la bibliografia) costa circa 80 lire, quando libercoli come “la sovrana lettrice” (nessuno me ne voglia, e’ solo un esempio) costano 300 lire a pagina scritta. E contrariamente a quelli, qui ogni 80 lire spese accrescono molto.
Divagazioni:
La storia - come l’economia – serve a capire cosa e’ successo, non a fare predizioni (al contrario della scienza), essenzialmente perche’ i comportamenti umani non sono retti da leggi ineludibili, e tantomeno logiche. Tecnicamente, quindi, non esiste una “storia del mondo”, ma solo una storia di uomini e donne. Generalizzare e’ consentito (e’ inevitabile) solo in ristretti ambiti (non credo nei Continenti: non sono che un complotto di cartografi). Ritengo effimero parlare – ad esempio - delle cause del sottosviluppo dell’Africa: il disastro dello Zimbabwe e’ molto diverso dal fallimento della Somalia. La stessa storia dell’Europa non e’ che la somma e l’interazione delle storie dei singoli Paesi, nella variabile misura in cui essi esistono realmente. Landes viene accusato di eurocentrismo, ma in realta’ mi sembra semmai viziato da preconcetti di derivazione weberiana: glorifica non tanto l’Europa (che nei fatti si e’ imposta, nella misura in cui esiste una cosa chiamata “Europa”), ma quelle nazioni che in Europa hanno abbracciato il protestantesimo (ed i loro eredi ed epigoni).
La nascita e lo sviluppo delle citta’ in Europa occidentale hanno senza dubbio svolto un ruolo decisivo. Peccato che in Italia non si sia riusciti a fare il passo successivo e si sia forzatamente rimasti indietro in una globalizzazione che ha avuto inizio gia’ nel XVI secolo. Weber sara’ pure superato, ma qualche ragione ce l’ha…
*Iniziativa, autonomia e personalita’ individuale: in una parola abbandono del timore reverenziale verso qualsiasi autorita’ che manchi di autorevolezza, ossia verso la verita’ non supportata da ragione e verifiche empiriche. Purtroppo assistiamo ad una regressione di due segni distinti: il ritorno al timore reverenziale verso forme di autorita’ ben poco autorevoli (i media) ed il disconoscimento del valore assoluto della ragione (ed in forme estreme di relativismo persino della realta’ empirica/scientifica). L’una segno di cessione di autonomia, l’altra di estremizzazione della personalita’. La prima e’ inescusabile; la seconda confonde realta’ e ragione con dogmatismo, ma ha una sua dignita’, sinche’ non confligge con il dovuto pragmatismo.
November 4, 2024
6.5-7/10
Tackling why some nations are more prosperous is a pretty ambitious task. After reading Acemoglu and Robinson's book Why Nations Fail earlier this summer, I wanted to explore the subject more in-depth. Since Landes' book Wealth and Poverty of Nations is referenced in Acemoglu and Robinson's work, I decided to read it.
I had very high hopes for this book. Although the book didn't fall short for me regarding ideas (albeit I'm afraid I have to disagree with some of Landes' arguments), it did fall short regarding writing and execution. Landes is a prime example of an Author with the right idea but frequently goes off tangent when concluding. For this reason, I found myself not only lost while reading his book (often asking myself, "Where is he going with this?") but, at some points, bored.
For example, one factor Landes discusses that can play a role in the lack of economic development is culture, particularly religion. To illustrate this point, in the chapter titled "History Gone Wrong," Landes writes about how Arab men, particularly Muslim Arab men, impeded their own nation's ability to grow economically by not embracing education, innovation, allowing women to join the workforce, etc. (he also makes this same argument about Catholics vs. Protestants when comparing Portugal to England).
Although this chapter garnered a few eyebrow raises from me, what I found particularly interesting was Landes's extreme dislike of Edward Said and his work on Orientalism. Landes is so passionate that he dedicated 3-4 pages to explaining his disagreement with Edward Said. However, the issue isn't whether Landes likes or dislikes Said. The real problem is that Landes does not effectively connect the concept of Orientalism to his argument that religion can often lead to economic stagnation and a lack of innovation. In other words, Landes goes on a 3-page think-tangent to discuss something completely unrelated to his thesis. And that's just one small example in a book, approx. 700 pages long.
If you want to learn more about economic history and developmental economics, I recommend reading Why Nations Fail by Acemoglu and Robinson over The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. WNF is newer, better written, more engaging, and offers real-world solutions to helping poorer nations prosper through better economic and political institutions.
Tackling why some nations are more prosperous is a pretty ambitious task. After reading Acemoglu and Robinson's book Why Nations Fail earlier this summer, I wanted to explore the subject more in-depth. Since Landes' book Wealth and Poverty of Nations is referenced in Acemoglu and Robinson's work, I decided to read it.
I had very high hopes for this book. Although the book didn't fall short for me regarding ideas (albeit I'm afraid I have to disagree with some of Landes' arguments), it did fall short regarding writing and execution. Landes is a prime example of an Author with the right idea but frequently goes off tangent when concluding. For this reason, I found myself not only lost while reading his book (often asking myself, "Where is he going with this?") but, at some points, bored.
For example, one factor Landes discusses that can play a role in the lack of economic development is culture, particularly religion. To illustrate this point, in the chapter titled "History Gone Wrong," Landes writes about how Arab men, particularly Muslim Arab men, impeded their own nation's ability to grow economically by not embracing education, innovation, allowing women to join the workforce, etc. (he also makes this same argument about Catholics vs. Protestants when comparing Portugal to England).
Although this chapter garnered a few eyebrow raises from me, what I found particularly interesting was Landes's extreme dislike of Edward Said and his work on Orientalism. Landes is so passionate that he dedicated 3-4 pages to explaining his disagreement with Edward Said. However, the issue isn't whether Landes likes or dislikes Said. The real problem is that Landes does not effectively connect the concept of Orientalism to his argument that religion can often lead to economic stagnation and a lack of innovation. In other words, Landes goes on a 3-page think-tangent to discuss something completely unrelated to his thesis. And that's just one small example in a book, approx. 700 pages long.
If you want to learn more about economic history and developmental economics, I recommend reading Why Nations Fail by Acemoglu and Robinson over The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. WNF is newer, better written, more engaging, and offers real-world solutions to helping poorer nations prosper through better economic and political institutions.
January 21, 2013
I was disappointed by this book. It relies a lot on anecdotical evidence and fails to reach any conclusion. After closing, I could not tell what is the main points developed by the author, the reasons why some countries are rich and others poor.
Even if sources are well documented, I also had the impression that facts have been selected to confirm the views of the author. The views developed a number of historical events seemed very partial to me.
As far as style is concerned, the book is easy and pleasant to read, even if I was annoyed by side comments (humour ?) that Landes makes regularly.
To sum up, I would not advise to read this book.
Even if sources are well documented, I also had the impression that facts have been selected to confirm the views of the author. The views developed a number of historical events seemed very partial to me.
As far as style is concerned, the book is easy and pleasant to read, even if I was annoyed by side comments (humour ?) that Landes makes regularly.
To sum up, I would not advise to read this book.
June 10, 2016
A trash book. I only read bits of it, but after finding out he gives Europe all the credit for the mechanical clock, while giving China none, and then uses that to make China seem backwards, I knew that reading further was a waste of time.
January 10, 2015
Makes sweeping generalizations. The writer's authorial air is one of cockiness, not confidence.
I think there is a way to tie his arguments into a more coherent thesis that can better be defended.
I think there is a way to tie his arguments into a more coherent thesis that can better be defended.
June 26, 2015
I have no idea what this book was trying to be, but something went wrong on the way.
December 18, 2021
This is a languid swim across economic history, that is unfortunately burdened with a misleading title. Amidst its 400-odd page length, it deals with the minutiae of economic development across the globe, focusing particularly on Europe; but the central thesis it purports to answer viz. 'Why Some are so rich, and some are so poor' is not so much a structuring mechanism, as it is the existence of a few carelessly tossed pieces of lumber by the side of the building. In this vein, it is conspicuously different from other 'big history' tomes like 'Why the West Rules for Now', or even Jared Diamond's 'Guns, Germs and Steel'.
For those who are willing to accompany the author throughout this journey - a journey that one can't help but suspect he is undertaking for his own indulgence and amusement - it is possible to piece together what is he trying to say. In sum, the argument boils down to this: The Industrial Revolution - the historical break point that from then on would separate the globe into 'developed' and 'developing' - was a unique creation of the European genius. Therefore, any inquiry as to why some nations are rich and why some are poor must deal with the nature of the Industrial Revolution - and, since this Revolution was uniquely a product of Europe, the question becomes the interrogation of this genius.
The first factor that sets Europe apart is climate. The author approvingly quotes Galbraith : 'All the developed countries lie in the temperate regions, while life in the tropics is nasty, brutish and short.' The first chapters highlight the importance of a temperate climate to human economic productivity - a temperate climate guarantees evenly-spaced and adequate rainfall (leading to healthier crops and livestock), allows for energetic and productive labor (as opposed to the lethargy of tropical labor) and prevents biological warzones that threaten human health and productivity (for pests and predators thrive on heat; witness the fate of Africa)
The crucial point that the author stresses is that, the primordial choice of settlement for the earliest human communities was not a one-off decision; rather, the initial choice of geography and climate laid the pattern for that community's economic striving or lack thereof. Discussions of riverine civilizations, oriental despotisms, the attitudes towards manual labor - all of these arise as immediate products of geography and climate, but eventually colossally compound into modern day economic failures.
So far, the author follows a fairly determinist position with regards to national prosperity, ala Diamond. It is his emphasis on culture though - that dreaded 'c' word - that separates his work from more politically-correct and insistently objective accounts. The other key factor in the Industrial Revolution is what he terms as 'intellectual autonomy'. Europe was no stranger to fanatic religiosity and the accompany specter of thought control - he points to Spain and Portugal's eventual failure to keep up with Western Europe as stemming from the Inquisition. But Europe never had a monopoly on correct thought - unlike, say, Islam in the Middle East - and the entire edifice gradually began to shake with the beginnings of the Protestant Revolution. Religion was brought down to the masses, independent inquiry found its first uncertain footing, and a new continent of thought announced itself to the lay public. This was the first flower of intellectual autonomy, and the rush of philosophers to fill this void laid the basis for the new objectivity that sought to master the world - first, abstractly in thought, and then for profit.
The very notion of profit is inseparable from the concept of citizenship - the author's point here seems to be that the West engendered a unique relationship between its peoples and the states that represented them; and that, this in turn, engendered a feeling of belonging and investment in the collective; and that, further, this fundamental phenomenon of citizenship was unique to Europe. The historical process of citizenship was further fostered by the fractured polity that was medieval Europe, as well as the aforementioned breakdown of hegemonic thought-control. The citizen belonged to a nation, and the author avers that in this sense, Britain was the first modern, self-conscious nation. It was the citizen, sure of himself and his place in the cosmos, who inevitably began to hunger for the riches were his birthright as a free man. The increasing improvement of transport - again, the result of intellectual autonomy, here manifest as the replicable scientific method - perfectly dovetailed with this new ambition, and the European man conquered the seas. His booty was slaves, raw materials, and the twisting into shape of a unified mass market perfectly poised to buy goods from Europe's proliferating mass production factories.
The author also poses the question, apropos of highlighting his central thesis, of why non-European countries failed to prosper similarly. While he discusses a number of rival civilizations, he settles on the example of China - simply because, the Chinese had shown evidence of mechanical and scientific ingenuity before the Europeans left the pack behind. The analysis of Chinese failure serves as a microcosm of the central argument of the book - Chinese civilization was self-consciously static, faithfully zealous in eradicating new technologies that could threaten the status quo, and similarly deeply suspicious of individual initiative and private enterprise. Nothing that would threaten the eternal stability of the Middle Kingdom was allowed to take root, even if it meant that China would suffer a humiliating backward slide in technological and economic capability, and an eventual reversal of political fortune.
In sum, while I found the book to be pleasant reading (the author is quite liberal with quasi-ironic bon mots, and amusing recontextualization of cliches), it remains the fact that this is not a coherent thesis that is supported from underneath, as it were, by economic history. Rather, it is a fairly horizontal romp through economic history of the last 500 years or so; and any attempt to withdraw an overarching theme must rely on the patience of the reader. As it is, economic history is a subject that tends to dullness, and if it is unsupported by a conscious thesis/aim, then the book becomes a gradual process of drudgery, snatches of humour notwithstanding.
January 30, 2020
"Żyj po to by pracować, a szczęście uzyskiwać jako produkt uboczny".
Dlaczego jedne narody się bogacą, a inne toną w długach? Napisano na ten temat setki, jeśli nie tysiące prac. Nad przyczynami dysproporcji dywagowali czołowi ekonomiści świata. Dokonywano masy eksperymentów na żywej tkance z rewolucją październikową na czele. Odpowiedzi jak nie było, tak nie ma.
Autor "Bogactwa i nędzy narodów" pochylił się nad tym odwiecznym pytaniem dręczącym ludzkość z niecodziennej perspektywy. Analiza, którą przedstawił jest zaskakująca. Co łączy bowiem bogactwo z chorobami pasożytniczymi, okularami, drukiem, etosem pracy, rewolucją naukową (wynalezieniem wynalazku) i bawełną? Wywód przeprowadzony przez Landesa otwiera oczy na to jak i wiele innych kwestii. Pozwala również poznać drogę jaką pokonali bogaci i biedni, by stanąć w obecnym punkcie. To nie tylko historia ekonomiczna Wielkiej Brytanii czy Japonii, ale i Paragwaju, który w wojnie sprzed niespełna 150 lat stracił 90 procent ludności kraju.
Nie obyło się i bez wad. Autorowi można zarzucić zbytni europocentryzm. Kwestionować można niektóre wskazane przez niego zalety kolonializmu czy szerzej imperializmu. Momentami Landes również zbytnio filozofuje, czym burzy usystematyzowany wywód.
Polecam, pomimo że trudno zastosować się do motta - żyj by pracować.
Dlaczego jedne narody się bogacą, a inne toną w długach? Napisano na ten temat setki, jeśli nie tysiące prac. Nad przyczynami dysproporcji dywagowali czołowi ekonomiści świata. Dokonywano masy eksperymentów na żywej tkance z rewolucją październikową na czele. Odpowiedzi jak nie było, tak nie ma.
Autor "Bogactwa i nędzy narodów" pochylił się nad tym odwiecznym pytaniem dręczącym ludzkość z niecodziennej perspektywy. Analiza, którą przedstawił jest zaskakująca. Co łączy bowiem bogactwo z chorobami pasożytniczymi, okularami, drukiem, etosem pracy, rewolucją naukową (wynalezieniem wynalazku) i bawełną? Wywód przeprowadzony przez Landesa otwiera oczy na to jak i wiele innych kwestii. Pozwala również poznać drogę jaką pokonali bogaci i biedni, by stanąć w obecnym punkcie. To nie tylko historia ekonomiczna Wielkiej Brytanii czy Japonii, ale i Paragwaju, który w wojnie sprzed niespełna 150 lat stracił 90 procent ludności kraju.
Nie obyło się i bez wad. Autorowi można zarzucić zbytni europocentryzm. Kwestionować można niektóre wskazane przez niego zalety kolonializmu czy szerzej imperializmu. Momentami Landes również zbytnio filozofuje, czym burzy usystematyzowany wywód.
Polecam, pomimo że trudno zastosować się do motta - żyj by pracować.
December 13, 2022
finally called it on this book at 45%. i've been reading it since i first read some excerpts in my imperialism seminar at pitt. it's quite readable - landes knows how to put this stuff together - but this is all well-trod territory if you've got a halfway decent grounding in world/transatlantic/imperial historiography (or some other categories some professors have bunched together and given a label). given what else is on the table (a number of thick tomes), i deemed it wise to put a pin in this one. still, if you want the conventional, pro-western take on his, here you go. it's all here.
February 3, 2021
In his introduction Landes explains he is a historian and not an economist. Still one of the best books I've read in economics. It would have been great to sit in one of his Harvard classes.
I will say I am one of those ardent globalists he was critical of throughout the book. I would disagree with him on issues. For example, on page 121 he makes the statement, "But without slavery, the industry would have developed more slowly." Complete nonsense. In later chapters he explains feudalism and peasantry held Europe back until it could be escaped. Later he explains that serfdom held Russia back from development. Everyone in economics would agree with this. Yet, Africans in slavery somehow made the world better off. No. We know slavery destroys wealth and human capital. The question is not how much did slavery advance the world or create wealth for Europe? Answer: NONE. The real question is how much human development and prosperity was destroyed by slavery? How many artists, musicians, carpenters, engineers were forced to spend a life picking cotton? Or some other useless task they were not called to do? How much productivity was squandered by those who could have been productive but instead were involved in running the slave trade? (Making others less productive.) How much more productive are free farmers than slaves? How many Darwins, Teslas, Einsteins, Musks, died in transit on slave ships? Slavery built nothing, it only destroyed. The world got richer from the abolition of slavery, not slavery. Industry would have developed faster without slavery. Future engineers are better in universities, not starving being forced to pick cotton for someone else.
Towards the end of the book he writes, "Other things equal, it is the rich who poison the Earth." Almost as wrong as claiming slavery somehow improved the world. Economics is the study of improving lives. One of those areas is defending the environment. Improving health has always been one of the major goals of economics. When people get richer they begin to worry less about their next meal and start worrying about more cool things. Like developing national parks, creating an EPA, implementing environmental protections, inventing alternative energy. Rich nations fight fewer wars. As nations fight fewer wars and violence in all forms fall they grow wealthier. Wealth is not the enemy of the environment, poverty is.
This book was written in the late 1990s. Very good book for what it was. But economics got so much more exciting after year 2000. The entire world is now linked and development is global. When insulin is discovered in Toronto (granted this is old news) one does not have to move to Canada to live. Every human gets to live longer. When you don't die of some preventable disease at 10 you get to have a 40 year career and you're more productive. Your family has a higher quality of life. The entire world is therefore better off. This is not a national thing. This is global.
I will say I am one of those ardent globalists he was critical of throughout the book. I would disagree with him on issues. For example, on page 121 he makes the statement, "But without slavery, the industry would have developed more slowly." Complete nonsense. In later chapters he explains feudalism and peasantry held Europe back until it could be escaped. Later he explains that serfdom held Russia back from development. Everyone in economics would agree with this. Yet, Africans in slavery somehow made the world better off. No. We know slavery destroys wealth and human capital. The question is not how much did slavery advance the world or create wealth for Europe? Answer: NONE. The real question is how much human development and prosperity was destroyed by slavery? How many artists, musicians, carpenters, engineers were forced to spend a life picking cotton? Or some other useless task they were not called to do? How much productivity was squandered by those who could have been productive but instead were involved in running the slave trade? (Making others less productive.) How much more productive are free farmers than slaves? How many Darwins, Teslas, Einsteins, Musks, died in transit on slave ships? Slavery built nothing, it only destroyed. The world got richer from the abolition of slavery, not slavery. Industry would have developed faster without slavery. Future engineers are better in universities, not starving being forced to pick cotton for someone else.
Towards the end of the book he writes, "Other things equal, it is the rich who poison the Earth." Almost as wrong as claiming slavery somehow improved the world. Economics is the study of improving lives. One of those areas is defending the environment. Improving health has always been one of the major goals of economics. When people get richer they begin to worry less about their next meal and start worrying about more cool things. Like developing national parks, creating an EPA, implementing environmental protections, inventing alternative energy. Rich nations fight fewer wars. As nations fight fewer wars and violence in all forms fall they grow wealthier. Wealth is not the enemy of the environment, poverty is.
This book was written in the late 1990s. Very good book for what it was. But economics got so much more exciting after year 2000. The entire world is now linked and development is global. When insulin is discovered in Toronto (granted this is old news) one does not have to move to Canada to live. Every human gets to live longer. When you don't die of some preventable disease at 10 you get to have a 40 year career and you're more productive. Your family has a higher quality of life. The entire world is therefore better off. This is not a national thing. This is global.
April 10, 2025
I was assigned this book for a class on the Industrial Revolution I (thankfully) dropped, and I gave up on this book too halfway. It is, without a doubt, one of the most vile pieces of historical malpractice I have ever read. It's a shame this remains well-known when so many other groundbreaking books exist since the only way to describe it is as an embarrassment to the discipline.
-First, this book is unapologetically Eurocentric, spending a good deal of its book touting Europe (and England specifically) while genuinely using the phrase "Third World backwardness." His takes on Islam (he falls for the trope of making everything in the Islamic world attributable to Islam, something we would never do for Europe), Asia (he takes shots at Edward Said while simultaneously explaining the Great Divergence through "Oriental despotism") and Africa (people, in his view, weren't meant to live there and spent all of history isolated, which is dead wrong) are absolutely atrocious, and I couldn't even make it to the parts where he talks about colonization. Are these arguments problematic? Yes, but they are also completely wrong, something most historians knew by the time this book was written.
-Similarly, Landes sidesteps any actual reckoning with colonialism, which is well-documented to be the root of Anglo/European wealth and power. Instead, he mercilessly labels anything attempting to challenge WASPs as "political correctness" and avoids any good-faith engagement with scholars (it's worth repeating that he calls scholars of colonialism "experts in Third World backwardness"). Instead, he makes disingenuous claims to impartiality—which any genuine historian would recognize as bullshit—while advancing fundamentally political contentions.
-This Eurocentrism speaks to Landes' fundamental lack of imagination since he frames all of world history along the line of European nation-states inevitably coming to dominate the rest of the underdeveloped world, without taking the time to think about the individual actors involved who made choices to violently expropriate land and resources and enslave Africans to build the modern world. In turn, he denies agency and the status of historical actor to anyone outside his narrow range of focus.
-Also, as petty as it might be, Landes is just a bad writer. He spends far too much time making pithy little comments meant to show off his range of factual knowledge, and in turn belittle his opponents, the Global South, or anyone who isn't stuck in an antiquated mode of doing history.
-That point speaks to my most ardent gripe with this book—that Landes misunderstands what it means to be a historian. His snarky asides and complete disregard for substantively engaging with historiography reveal that he sees this book purely as an exercise in ego. It seems that to him, history is not about people, their stories, or understanding the world, but rather showing off (which could also be said for Yuval Noah Harari, Jared Diamond, et al) and proving a point by whitewashing global history.
-First, this book is unapologetically Eurocentric, spending a good deal of its book touting Europe (and England specifically) while genuinely using the phrase "Third World backwardness." His takes on Islam (he falls for the trope of making everything in the Islamic world attributable to Islam, something we would never do for Europe), Asia (he takes shots at Edward Said while simultaneously explaining the Great Divergence through "Oriental despotism") and Africa (people, in his view, weren't meant to live there and spent all of history isolated, which is dead wrong) are absolutely atrocious, and I couldn't even make it to the parts where he talks about colonization. Are these arguments problematic? Yes, but they are also completely wrong, something most historians knew by the time this book was written.
-Similarly, Landes sidesteps any actual reckoning with colonialism, which is well-documented to be the root of Anglo/European wealth and power. Instead, he mercilessly labels anything attempting to challenge WASPs as "political correctness" and avoids any good-faith engagement with scholars (it's worth repeating that he calls scholars of colonialism "experts in Third World backwardness"). Instead, he makes disingenuous claims to impartiality—which any genuine historian would recognize as bullshit—while advancing fundamentally political contentions.
-This Eurocentrism speaks to Landes' fundamental lack of imagination since he frames all of world history along the line of European nation-states inevitably coming to dominate the rest of the underdeveloped world, without taking the time to think about the individual actors involved who made choices to violently expropriate land and resources and enslave Africans to build the modern world. In turn, he denies agency and the status of historical actor to anyone outside his narrow range of focus.
-Also, as petty as it might be, Landes is just a bad writer. He spends far too much time making pithy little comments meant to show off his range of factual knowledge, and in turn belittle his opponents, the Global South, or anyone who isn't stuck in an antiquated mode of doing history.
-That point speaks to my most ardent gripe with this book—that Landes misunderstands what it means to be a historian. His snarky asides and complete disregard for substantively engaging with historiography reveal that he sees this book purely as an exercise in ego. It seems that to him, history is not about people, their stories, or understanding the world, but rather showing off (which could also be said for Yuval Noah Harari, Jared Diamond, et al) and proving a point by whitewashing global history.
June 9, 2011
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor
by David S. Landes
672 pages
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor is a book written on the history and progression of economics. This book covers six centuries long of economic analysis for dozens of countries. This book is excruciating in the amount of information you have to process in your head. I never knew the history of economics could be so stressful on the mind. There are so many different variables a person has to take in account when talking about the wealth or poverty of a nation. The environment, not just the geography but the environment created by a society, and negative factors such as natural disasters are some of the reasons why there is a huge gap between rich and poorer nations.
Landes does a good job of explaining why the West is so much better off than the rest of the world. His belief is that because the West focused more on science and math and less on religon post-renaissance several European nations were able to come out of the woodwork and emerge as world powers. These countries were more open to change and either created superior technology or were able to get their hands on new technology like the compass or astrolabe from a distant place. These Western nations constantly competed among each each other, constantly adapting to the changing world scene, and building up wealthy economies in the process. Eventually these wealthier nations were prepared enough to exploit other poorer nations who were unable to keep up and establish a system of mercantilism where the mother country gains all the raw materials. As a result of this economic system the richer nations kept getting richer while the poorer nations were stripped of natural resources and built up a dependence on these wealthier nations. Another way a nation got wealthier was conquering new land and enslaving its people to work in colonies as seen in the Americas. It's the same cycle over and over with the wealthy nation always profiting.
Landes talks of so many different ways the gap between rich and poor nations widened but I just don't have the time or room to explain all these methods. This book is an encyclopedia of terms, places, and events. This book is very compact. Anyway the basic format of this book is comparing and contrasting wealthy and poor nations of different time periods and explaining reasons for each nation's outcome. A question is asked, then investigated, and finally answered with a conclusion. I recommend this book to anyone interested in economics and is able to process more than half a millennium of history,
by David S. Landes
672 pages
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor is a book written on the history and progression of economics. This book covers six centuries long of economic analysis for dozens of countries. This book is excruciating in the amount of information you have to process in your head. I never knew the history of economics could be so stressful on the mind. There are so many different variables a person has to take in account when talking about the wealth or poverty of a nation. The environment, not just the geography but the environment created by a society, and negative factors such as natural disasters are some of the reasons why there is a huge gap between rich and poorer nations.
Landes does a good job of explaining why the West is so much better off than the rest of the world. His belief is that because the West focused more on science and math and less on religon post-renaissance several European nations were able to come out of the woodwork and emerge as world powers. These countries were more open to change and either created superior technology or were able to get their hands on new technology like the compass or astrolabe from a distant place. These Western nations constantly competed among each each other, constantly adapting to the changing world scene, and building up wealthy economies in the process. Eventually these wealthier nations were prepared enough to exploit other poorer nations who were unable to keep up and establish a system of mercantilism where the mother country gains all the raw materials. As a result of this economic system the richer nations kept getting richer while the poorer nations were stripped of natural resources and built up a dependence on these wealthier nations. Another way a nation got wealthier was conquering new land and enslaving its people to work in colonies as seen in the Americas. It's the same cycle over and over with the wealthy nation always profiting.
Landes talks of so many different ways the gap between rich and poor nations widened but I just don't have the time or room to explain all these methods. This book is an encyclopedia of terms, places, and events. This book is very compact. Anyway the basic format of this book is comparing and contrasting wealthy and poor nations of different time periods and explaining reasons for each nation's outcome. A question is asked, then investigated, and finally answered with a conclusion. I recommend this book to anyone interested in economics and is able to process more than half a millennium of history,
December 16, 2020
Hundley, a reviewer on Amazon, who says that Landes is not racist, summarizes Landes as follows:
<"In a nutshell Landes argues that cultural values like honesty, thrift, initiative, respect for property rights, and openness to new ideas are the key determinants of whether nations succeed or fail economically.">
In other words, we in Asia fell behind because, we are dishonest, spendthrifts, lazy, freely steal others property (unlike the imperialists, who had a lot of respect for our property), and close and narrow-minded -- opposites of the good properties of the good nations. But no, let us not use the ugly "R" word for this idea. How about calling it just a wee bit "Eurocentric"? This is what Blaut, J. M. (2000) Eight Eurocentric Historians , has done in his critique of Landes and other popular historians with similar ideas.
As a non-Eurocentric alternative, I recommend Hoffman, P. T. (2012). "Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?". Journal of Economic History, 72(3), 601, who develops the thesis that it was a European comparative advantage in violence which led to this result. Another insightful explanation, especially in conjunction with Hoffman, is both simple and illuminating. Stavrianos in Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age argues that development and underdevelopment are opposite sides of the same coin. The West became rich because they captured the resources of the colonized world, while the colonies became poor as part of the same process.
<"In a nutshell Landes argues that cultural values like honesty, thrift, initiative, respect for property rights, and openness to new ideas are the key determinants of whether nations succeed or fail economically.">
In other words, we in Asia fell behind because, we are dishonest, spendthrifts, lazy, freely steal others property (unlike the imperialists, who had a lot of respect for our property), and close and narrow-minded -- opposites of the good properties of the good nations. But no, let us not use the ugly "R" word for this idea. How about calling it just a wee bit "Eurocentric"? This is what Blaut, J. M. (2000) Eight Eurocentric Historians , has done in his critique of Landes and other popular historians with similar ideas.
As a non-Eurocentric alternative, I recommend Hoffman, P. T. (2012). "Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?". Journal of Economic History, 72(3), 601, who develops the thesis that it was a European comparative advantage in violence which led to this result. Another insightful explanation, especially in conjunction with Hoffman, is both simple and illuminating. Stavrianos in Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age argues that development and underdevelopment are opposite sides of the same coin. The West became rich because they captured the resources of the colonized world, while the colonies became poor as part of the same process.
March 17, 2016
This book is without a doubt well written, has interesting anecdotes, facts and figures and a humorous tone at times, which I greatly appreciated. Unlike others have stated, I did not feel drowned in a sea of numbers. For sure, there are many of them, but they tend to support an argument, rather than being an arugment in and of themselves.
My two biggest criticisms would be as follows:
1. I often joke with friends about people who will talk of Africa as if it's a country. But this book tends to do it as well. Though he identifies a few cases in individual countries on the continent, there as more used to demonstrate his points in regards to the situation in Africa. (Exception with Algeria though, which has a section of focus in the book).
2. Not exactly a criticism of the book itself, but when I bought it, the sub-title (Why some are so rich and some so poor) led me to believe this book would be more geared towards economic theory than economic history. Which was fine, it just ended up being not exactly what I was hoping for.
On those two facts, I almost gave it a rating of two stars, but the writing itself was more than good enough and kept me entertained enough to warrant a third.
My two biggest criticisms would be as follows:
1. I often joke with friends about people who will talk of Africa as if it's a country. But this book tends to do it as well. Though he identifies a few cases in individual countries on the continent, there as more used to demonstrate his points in regards to the situation in Africa. (Exception with Algeria though, which has a section of focus in the book).
2. Not exactly a criticism of the book itself, but when I bought it, the sub-title (Why some are so rich and some so poor) led me to believe this book would be more geared towards economic theory than economic history. Which was fine, it just ended up being not exactly what I was hoping for.
On those two facts, I almost gave it a rating of two stars, but the writing itself was more than good enough and kept me entertained enough to warrant a third.
July 17, 2012
David S. Landes tells the long, fascinating story of wealth and power throughout the world: the creation of wealth, the paths of winners and losers, the rise and fall of nations.
He studies history as a process, attempting to understand how the world's cultures lead to - or retard - economic and military success and material achievement.
Countries of the West, Landes asserts, prospered early through the interplay of a vital, open society focused on work and knowledge, which led to increased productivity, the creation of new technologies, and the pursuit of change. Europe's key advantage lay in invention and know-how, as applied in war, transportation, generation of power, and skill in metalwork.
Even such now banal inventions as eyeglasses and the clock were, in their day, powerful levers that tipped the balance of world economic power. Today's new economic winners are following much the same roads to power, while the laggards have somehow failed to duplicate this crucial formula for success. The key to relieving much of the world's poverty lies in understanding the lessons history has to teach us
He studies history as a process, attempting to understand how the world's cultures lead to - or retard - economic and military success and material achievement.
Countries of the West, Landes asserts, prospered early through the interplay of a vital, open society focused on work and knowledge, which led to increased productivity, the creation of new technologies, and the pursuit of change. Europe's key advantage lay in invention and know-how, as applied in war, transportation, generation of power, and skill in metalwork.
Even such now banal inventions as eyeglasses and the clock were, in their day, powerful levers that tipped the balance of world economic power. Today's new economic winners are following much the same roads to power, while the laggards have somehow failed to duplicate this crucial formula for success. The key to relieving much of the world's poverty lies in understanding the lessons history has to teach us
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