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Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
For the last five years philosopher Galen Strawson has provoked a mixture of shock and scepticism with his carefully argued case that physicalism (the view that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is physical) entails panpsychism (the view that the existence of every real concrete thing involves experiential being). In this book Strawson provides the fullest and most careful statement of his position to date, throwing down the gauntlet to his critics ― including Peter Carruthers, Frank Jackson, David Rosenthal and J.J.C. Smart ― by inviting them to respond in print. The book concludes with Strawson's response to his commentators. Galen Strawson's books include Mental Reality, The Self? and Freedom and Belief.
285 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2006
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About the author
Galen Strawson
20 books76 followersGalen John Strawson is a British professor of philosopher and literary critic primarily workin the fields of mind, metaphysics, and free will.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
August 20, 2013
One of the few philosophical monographs to change my life. I opened it as an orthodox physicalist, and now I'm writing a thesis about panpsychism under Professor Strawson himself.
July 7, 2020
An elegant and bold case for panpsychism; a view that "all energy is an experience-involving phenomenon".
For better or worse, I'll try to make a rough summary of Strawson's basic argument:
1. (Premise) Conscious experience is a real and concrete phenomenon. There's nothing more certain than the reality of experience; the fact that "there is something it is like" to be a living organism. To deny this would be absurd.
2. (Premise) Naturalism is true: there is only one kind of fundamental "stuff" in the universe, and we might as well call it "physical" stuff, be it whatever it may - matter, energy, or whatever.
3. (Premise) Radical emergence cannot be true: experiential being cannot arise from wholly non-experiential being. In other words, conscious experience cannot arise from wholly non-conscious physical stuff (Strawson argues that this would be a miracle, and there are no true miracles in nature).
4. (Conclusion) If all the premises are true, it must be the case that "all energy is an experience-involving phenomenon". I.e. panpsychism is true. Or to put differently: if you want to be (1) a realist about experience, and (2) a naturalist at the same time, it follows that you cannot escape panpsychism (unless you believe in radical emergence).
All in all: In case you're serious about the mind-body problem but find both dualism and standard physicalism unsatisfying (like I do), I wholeheartedly recommend taking a look at Strawson's position. He managed to convince me that panpsychism is not as crazy as it might first sound, and could indeed be the most plausible ontological solution to the mind-body problem.
For better or worse, I'll try to make a rough summary of Strawson's basic argument:
1. (Premise) Conscious experience is a real and concrete phenomenon. There's nothing more certain than the reality of experience; the fact that "there is something it is like" to be a living organism. To deny this would be absurd.
2. (Premise) Naturalism is true: there is only one kind of fundamental "stuff" in the universe, and we might as well call it "physical" stuff, be it whatever it may - matter, energy, or whatever.
3. (Premise) Radical emergence cannot be true: experiential being cannot arise from wholly non-experiential being. In other words, conscious experience cannot arise from wholly non-conscious physical stuff (Strawson argues that this would be a miracle, and there are no true miracles in nature).
4. (Conclusion) If all the premises are true, it must be the case that "all energy is an experience-involving phenomenon". I.e. panpsychism is true. Or to put differently: if you want to be (1) a realist about experience, and (2) a naturalist at the same time, it follows that you cannot escape panpsychism (unless you believe in radical emergence).
All in all: In case you're serious about the mind-body problem but find both dualism and standard physicalism unsatisfying (like I do), I wholeheartedly recommend taking a look at Strawson's position. He managed to convince me that panpsychism is not as crazy as it might first sound, and could indeed be the most plausible ontological solution to the mind-body problem.
September 4, 2008
This is a very controversial book in the neuroscience and philosophy field since it takes on the common consensus concerning the brain. Anyone who thinks Dennett and company are where its at had better look at Strawson's critique.
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August 29, 2012I should stop reading academic books. I don't really have the concentration span or indeed the intellect to follow very technical stuff. But Galen Strawson has written his target paper here in quite a straightforward and conversational style, which meant I was quite proud to (I think) understand his argument.
Which seemed fairly convincing, but then I was convinced by most of the counter-argument essays as I was reading them. Gahh. I should probably accept that no one is going to solve the hard question (consciousness - WTF???!??).
Not giving any stars because I skimmed the counter-arguments, so it wouldn't be fair, and I know how important GoodReads reviews are to philosophy professors choosing their reading lists.
Which seemed fairly convincing, but then I was convinced by most of the counter-argument essays as I was reading them. Gahh. I should probably accept that no one is going to solve the hard question (consciousness - WTF???!??).
Not giving any stars because I skimmed the counter-arguments, so it wouldn't be fair, and I know how important GoodReads reviews are to philosophy professors choosing their reading lists.
June 23, 2024
AN ESSAY, FOLLOWED BY COMMENTARIES BY OTHERS, AND A REJOINDER
Galen John Strawson (born 1952; he is the son of P.F. Strawson) is a British analytic philosopher who teaches Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin, and previously taught at the University of Reading, City University of New York, and Oxford University.
He wrote in the opening essay (about which all the subsequent essays are based), “I take physicalism to be the view that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is… physical… I am going to assume that it is true… What is it to be a REALISTIC physicalist[?]… You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist… if you deny existence of the phenomenon whose existence is more certain then the existence of anything else: experience, ‘consciousness,’ conscious experience… feeling, sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at almost every waking moment.” (Pg. 3)
He continues, “As a real physicalist… I hold that the mental/experiential is physical, and I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is ‘really just neurons firing’… But when I say these words I mean something completely different from what many physicalists have apparently meant by them. I certainly don’t mean that all of the characteristics of what is going on… can be described by physics and neurophysiology… That idea is crazy… My claim is… that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record… No one who disagrees with this is a real physicalist, in my terms.” (Pg. 7) He goes on, “something akin to panpsychism is not merely on possible form of realistic physicalism… but the only possible form.” (Pg. 9)
He states, “Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving. They must at least embrace ‘micropsychism’… it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an ‘inference to the best explanation.’ … Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential. But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the … admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential.” (Pg. 25)
P. Carruthers and E. Schechter counter, “[Strawson] might instead have proposed a metaphysics according to which the physical ultimates of this world aren’t conscious subjects, but rather have feel—properties attached to them. On this version of panpsychism, the ultimates are experiential entities in the sense that they possess irreducible properties of experience, or qualia, but are not themselves subjects of experience. We believe that the version of panpsychism Strawson advocates… lays itself open to a greater number of objections.” (Pg. 36) They conclude, “Even if the ultimates of the universe are experiential in nature, the explanatory gap remains untouched. It is better, then, to remain an old-fashioned (non-panpsychic) physicalist, and to accommodate … the explanatory gap that we mentioned earlier by other means.” (Pg. 39)
Philip Goff states, “Unfortunately, panpsychism is also committee to a kind of brute emergence which is arguably just as unintelligible as the emergence of the experiential from non-experiential: the emergence of novel ‘macroexperiential phenomena’ from ‘microexperiential phenomena.’” (Pg. 53)
Frank Jackson suggests, “One way to resist panpsychism while agreeing with [Strawson’s] rejection of brute emergence is to hole that consciousness a priori supervenes on items that are wholly non-conscious… there is another way… It is to insist that consciousness does not emerge in the relevant sense. Items which are conscious are more than mere aggregations of the non-conscious.” (Pg. 63)
Colin McGinn asserts, “Panpsychism is surely one of the loveliest and most tempting views of reality ever devised… There are good arguments for it, and it would be wonderful if it were true---theoretically, aesthetically, humanly… It’s almost as good as pantheism! The trouble is that it’s a complete myth, a comforting piece of utter balderdash… (and isn’t there something vaguely hippyish, i.e. stoned, about the doctrine?).” (Pg. 93)
David Papineau says, “I see nothing wrong with explaining the ‘emergence’ of consciousness from non-experiential physical simples. If the property of being conscious is identical to some straightforward physical property, there can be no barrier to such an explanation. We are only driven towards panpsychism if we posit a radical divide between the experiential and non-experiential realms. Straightforward physicalism rejects any such divide. Those who … ignore brute intuition, can thus steer clear of panpsychism.” (Pg. 109)
David M. Rosenthal points out, “There is compelling empirical evidence that qualitative states do occur without being conscious. Priming experiments show that non-conscious perceptual states have qualitative character., since such states prime for subsequent perceptual recognition in ways that reflect differences in color… we can determine the qualitative character of those non-conscious states by reference to which conscious qualitative character apart from the way the relevant individual is conscious of it.” (Pg. 119-120)
H.P. Stapp observes, “Strawson’s solution is close to being just a word game: the ‘physical’ is asserted to encompass our experiences but physics and neurophysiology do not. So Strawson hangs on to ‘physicalism’ by allowing what he calls ‘the physical’ to go---by virtue of a contravention of both the traditional and natural meaning of this word---beyond physics and neurophysiology. But the resolution of these problems provided by quantum mechanics is not just a shuffling of the meanings of words. It is an explicit conceptual structure that combines aspects that are described in physical terms… with aspects of reality that are described in psychological terms, in such a way as to produce very accurate and useful predictions about future experiences from knowledge derived from past experiences.” (Pg. 169)
Strawson comments on his reviewers: “My characterization of panpsychism … was intentionally imprecise… I am happy to solidify it by fusing it with Nagel’s characterization… Let me stress that I make---find---no distinction between panpsychism and panexperientialism… the word ‘panpsychism’ doesn’t in itself imply that there are subjects of experience in addition to experiential reality, or indeed that everything that exists involves the existence of a subject of experience in addition to the existence of experiential reality.” (Pg. 189) He concludes, “There is, I feel sure, a fundamental sense in which monism is true, a fundamental sense in which there is only one kind of stuff in the universe. Plainly, though, we don’t fully understand the nature of this stuff, and I don’t suppose we ever will---even if we can develop a way of apprehending things that transcends discursive forms of thought.” (Pg. 274)
This book will be of keen interest to the philosophically-minded who are studying consciousness and related topics.
Galen John Strawson (born 1952; he is the son of P.F. Strawson) is a British analytic philosopher who teaches Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin, and previously taught at the University of Reading, City University of New York, and Oxford University.
He wrote in the opening essay (about which all the subsequent essays are based), “I take physicalism to be the view that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is… physical… I am going to assume that it is true… What is it to be a REALISTIC physicalist[?]… You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist… if you deny existence of the phenomenon whose existence is more certain then the existence of anything else: experience, ‘consciousness,’ conscious experience… feeling, sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at almost every waking moment.” (Pg. 3)
He continues, “As a real physicalist… I hold that the mental/experiential is physical, and I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is ‘really just neurons firing’… But when I say these words I mean something completely different from what many physicalists have apparently meant by them. I certainly don’t mean that all of the characteristics of what is going on… can be described by physics and neurophysiology… That idea is crazy… My claim is… that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record… No one who disagrees with this is a real physicalist, in my terms.” (Pg. 7) He goes on, “something akin to panpsychism is not merely on possible form of realistic physicalism… but the only possible form.” (Pg. 9)
He states, “Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving. They must at least embrace ‘micropsychism’… it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an ‘inference to the best explanation.’ … Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential. But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the … admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential.” (Pg. 25)
P. Carruthers and E. Schechter counter, “[Strawson] might instead have proposed a metaphysics according to which the physical ultimates of this world aren’t conscious subjects, but rather have feel—properties attached to them. On this version of panpsychism, the ultimates are experiential entities in the sense that they possess irreducible properties of experience, or qualia, but are not themselves subjects of experience. We believe that the version of panpsychism Strawson advocates… lays itself open to a greater number of objections.” (Pg. 36) They conclude, “Even if the ultimates of the universe are experiential in nature, the explanatory gap remains untouched. It is better, then, to remain an old-fashioned (non-panpsychic) physicalist, and to accommodate … the explanatory gap that we mentioned earlier by other means.” (Pg. 39)
Philip Goff states, “Unfortunately, panpsychism is also committee to a kind of brute emergence which is arguably just as unintelligible as the emergence of the experiential from non-experiential: the emergence of novel ‘macroexperiential phenomena’ from ‘microexperiential phenomena.’” (Pg. 53)
Frank Jackson suggests, “One way to resist panpsychism while agreeing with [Strawson’s] rejection of brute emergence is to hole that consciousness a priori supervenes on items that are wholly non-conscious… there is another way… It is to insist that consciousness does not emerge in the relevant sense. Items which are conscious are more than mere aggregations of the non-conscious.” (Pg. 63)
Colin McGinn asserts, “Panpsychism is surely one of the loveliest and most tempting views of reality ever devised… There are good arguments for it, and it would be wonderful if it were true---theoretically, aesthetically, humanly… It’s almost as good as pantheism! The trouble is that it’s a complete myth, a comforting piece of utter balderdash… (and isn’t there something vaguely hippyish, i.e. stoned, about the doctrine?).” (Pg. 93)
David Papineau says, “I see nothing wrong with explaining the ‘emergence’ of consciousness from non-experiential physical simples. If the property of being conscious is identical to some straightforward physical property, there can be no barrier to such an explanation. We are only driven towards panpsychism if we posit a radical divide between the experiential and non-experiential realms. Straightforward physicalism rejects any such divide. Those who … ignore brute intuition, can thus steer clear of panpsychism.” (Pg. 109)
David M. Rosenthal points out, “There is compelling empirical evidence that qualitative states do occur without being conscious. Priming experiments show that non-conscious perceptual states have qualitative character., since such states prime for subsequent perceptual recognition in ways that reflect differences in color… we can determine the qualitative character of those non-conscious states by reference to which conscious qualitative character apart from the way the relevant individual is conscious of it.” (Pg. 119-120)
H.P. Stapp observes, “Strawson’s solution is close to being just a word game: the ‘physical’ is asserted to encompass our experiences but physics and neurophysiology do not. So Strawson hangs on to ‘physicalism’ by allowing what he calls ‘the physical’ to go---by virtue of a contravention of both the traditional and natural meaning of this word---beyond physics and neurophysiology. But the resolution of these problems provided by quantum mechanics is not just a shuffling of the meanings of words. It is an explicit conceptual structure that combines aspects that are described in physical terms… with aspects of reality that are described in psychological terms, in such a way as to produce very accurate and useful predictions about future experiences from knowledge derived from past experiences.” (Pg. 169)
Strawson comments on his reviewers: “My characterization of panpsychism … was intentionally imprecise… I am happy to solidify it by fusing it with Nagel’s characterization… Let me stress that I make---find---no distinction between panpsychism and panexperientialism… the word ‘panpsychism’ doesn’t in itself imply that there are subjects of experience in addition to experiential reality, or indeed that everything that exists involves the existence of a subject of experience in addition to the existence of experiential reality.” (Pg. 189) He concludes, “There is, I feel sure, a fundamental sense in which monism is true, a fundamental sense in which there is only one kind of stuff in the universe. Plainly, though, we don’t fully understand the nature of this stuff, and I don’t suppose we ever will---even if we can develop a way of apprehending things that transcends discursive forms of thought.” (Pg. 274)
This book will be of keen interest to the philosophically-minded who are studying consciousness and related topics.
October 31, 2013
This has to be the most entertaining book I've read in a long time. The back and forth enriches the debate, and a lot of issues are discussed. This is a must read for anybody interested in panpsychism or the philosophy of mind in a broader sense. While I'm ultimately unpersuaded by Strawson's argument, I'm still impressed by its subtlety. In the end, I think Daniel Stoljar and Peter Carruthers provided knock down objections to Strawson's argument. Orthodox a posteriori physicalism doesn't entail panpsychism.
July 31, 2021
The responses are of varying levels of quality and relevance but Strawson's papers - especially the second one - are a fantastic case for panpsychism.
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