For almost a decade, the tyrannical Ngo Dinh Diem governed South Vietnam as a one-party police state while the U.S. financed his tyranny. In this new book, Seth Jacobs traces the history of American support for Diem from his first appearance in Washington as a penniless expatriate in 1950 to his murder by South Vietnamese soldiers on the outskirts of Saigon in 1963.
Drawing on recent scholarship and newly available primary sources, Cold War Mandarin explores how Diem became America's bastion against a communist South Vietnam, and why the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations kept his regime afloat. Finally, Jacobs examines the brilliantly organized public-relations campaign by Saigon's Buddhists that persuaded Washington to collude in the overthrow—and assassination—of its longtime ally.
In this clear and succinct analysis, Jacobs details the "Diem experiment," and makes it clear how America's policy of "sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem" ultimately drew the country into the longest war in its history.
A balanced and comprehensive history of Diem’s relationship with the US, mostly from the American side. The book is more a study of this relationship than a study of Diem as a leader.
Jacobs is careful and evenhanded in his treatment of Diem but ultimately judges him to be a failure, as well as America’s most damaging Cold War partner. “Diem may have been the most effective president South Vietnam ever had, but he was still a dictator who did little to generate enthusiasm for his regime.” Jacobs notes how narrow Diem’s base of support was in South Vietnam, and how often he alienated the Vietnamese people, the Americans and the French. He ably describes how he failed to build a healthy democratic society, how eagerly he eliminated his rivals (even though it cost him more support), and how he turned to US military support to make up for it. Jacobs argues that the US decision to back Diem was the most important one in the history of US involvement, as well as the worst.
Jacobs also ably shows how willing Diem was to resist US pressure. “None of America’s Cold War allies worked harder than Diem to demonstrate that acceptance of American aid did not entail submission to American demands.” He explains how “No Third World leader found the label ‘puppet’ as repugnant as Diem did, and none worked harder to prove his nationalist credentials,” and how “none of America’s Cold War allies did more to undermine the power and reputation of the United States than Ngo Dinh Diem.”
The narrative is well-organized and readable. Still, Jacobs uses generalizations at times, and the writing can get a little breezy. He also dismisses the ARVN as incompetent, although this seems too generalized. There also could have been some more coverage of Diem’s own diplomacy with other anticommunist governments in the region, and on the NLF’s role in Diem’s misfortunes.
Little is written on Ngo Dinh Diem, as history is written by the winners. However, even among the losers we find sparse accounts on the man that would shape the conflict in Vietnam, triggering America's involvement. Jacobs is clear that he doesn't hold Diem in high regard, as most do not, save a handful of contrarians such as Moyer, and a small minority of Vietnamese.
The book examines Diem, and how the American government saw him as the ideal man to lead the South of Vietnam as an alternative to the communist north. It is more than coincidence that Diem was a Catholic, much like other American backed Asian anti-communist leaders such as Chiang Kai-Shek and Syngman Rhee. It also highlights the ignorance the American government had on Indochina, best exemplified with Mike Mansfield, the "expert" on Southeast Asia in reality was only versed in Chinese and Indian knowledge. Not exactly a great book, but it covers an area of history that is much neglected.
there has been many argument in history about how the Vietnam war started was it because of three men fighting for control, or was it the result of an American conspiracy that went horribly wrong. Seth Jacobs book discuses how American forces attempted to use Ngo Dinh Diem as a type of puppet leader. however what the U.S. did not take into account is Diem's lust for power and his goal to in essence become the ruler of south Vietnam. Jacobs book focuses on how the U.S. helped to bring about the beginning of the war and how in essence the U.S. was responsible for the assassination of Diem. Cold war Mandarin brings new insights in to how the American war in Vietnam began and how it might have been different had the U.S. not pulled it support of Diem at the last minuet.
I read this book for the first time my spring semester in college. Reading it the first time, it was shocking and disturbing. But reading it the second time, I'm not surprised why the relationship between Ngo Dinh Diem and the United States was un utter disaster from the start. But at the same time, it is more nuanced, gray, and complicated than black and white. Diem and the South Vietnamese government had a huge credibility gap with it's people as well as the United States had it credibility gap with it's people regarding Vietnam. But one lesson is clear here, by getting rid of Diem, the United States failed in it's attempt to keep a free South Vietnam; and would eventually lose it's credibility with it's actions once US service men and women landed on Vietnam's shores in 1965.
The beginning and the end were the most engaging and well researched. I got a little lost in the middle chapters. That being said, it is SO aggravating to see if we just paid attention to history and learned the lessons we should have from Vietnam, we'd be in a much different place as a country. But, wasn't meant to be.
I liked the focus on Diem. I think it is a part of the US's Vietnam War history that is not properly taught and considered. Professor Jacobs has devoted a fair amount of time and scholarship to this specific perspective on Vietnam - it was good to see some of what seems to be the genesis here.
I skimmed through some parts of it as I did my work for a Southeast Asian studies course. This book gives a nuanced look into the rise and fall of the infamous Ngo Dinh Diem, first and longest in-office President of South Vietnam; and the complications of Vietnam War intertwined with Cold War.
This is not a balanced account of Ngo Dinh Diem. The book does reveal the miscalculations of the U.S. government and its failure to develop any goals and objectives in the Vietnam War.
I liked this book a lot! It gives an in-depth look into the ways in which the US employed the "sunk cost falacy" to keep Diem in power even though outsiders were telling them it was a mistake to have such a polarizing premier as leader of a newly founded country. I will recommend this to anybody who wants to get a more in-depth look into the US' foreign policies before the escalation in Vietnam, which would signal the beginning of the US-Vietnam war.
An adequate introduction to the early history of U.S. involvement with the Republic of Vietnam under President Diệm, though lacking much of the depth and insight that made Jacobs' earlier work America's Miracle Man in Vietnam a 5-star title in my opinion.