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First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
While America held its breath in the days immediately following 9/11, a small but determined group of CIA agents covertly began to change history. This is the riveting first-person account of the treacherous top-secret mission inside Afghanistan to set the stage for the defeat of the Taliban and launch the war on terror.
As thrilling as any novel, First In is a uniquely intimate look at a mission that began the U.S. retaliation against terrorism–and reclaimed the country of Afghanistan for its people.
As thrilling as any novel, First In is a uniquely intimate look at a mission that began the U.S. retaliation against terrorism–and reclaimed the country of Afghanistan for its people.
379 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2005
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews
March 1, 2012
A very interesting account of how CIA paramilitary operatives work in the field. I had read Jawbreaker in sixth grade first, and came upon the title in the footnotes. I never got around to buying it until ninth grade.
I had first read about Schroen himself in Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, which also provides intersting tidbits on Schroen's career. I would have expected Schroen to include his account of the Islamabad embassy siege of 1979 in this book, but I guess he thought his account in "Ghost Wars" was enough.
The main chunk of this book only covers Schroen's 2001 mission into Afghanistan, and he describes his career in sparing detail, which is a shame.
It has some historical errors though
On page 26, he writes that the level of violence in Tajikistan's capital in the 1990s prevented CIA visits there, but it was pretty quiet in the capital.
Ben B. is obviously Ben Bonk and Hank C. obviously Henry Crumpton. John R. was John Reagan. Gary 2 is Gary Berntsen.
On page 48, he says Rabbani was the head of Hezb-i Islami, but it was actually Jamat-i Islami.
On page 52, he says Hekmatyar was foreign minister, but it was actually some guy named Ghafurzai.
On page 115, he mentions that Sayyaf was agraduate of al-Ansar University, but it was al-Azhar University.
On page 165, he writes that the Taliban had several Stinger missiles, which is hilariously wrong. The CIA had bought all the Stingers back, in a program that Schroen himself was involved in.
On page 219 he says mazar-e Sharif was an area of traditional Tajik control, but it was more Pashtun-Uzbek
On page 247, he says Dostum had established a militia in the last couple of days, but he actually had since April
On page 320 he writes that Karshi-Khanabad, in Uzbekistan, is about 100 miles north of Tashkent, but his directions put you in Kazakhstan.
On page 357 he writes that Fahim had "Panjshiri tribals" but there are no tribes in the Panjshir or any Tajik population.
Schroen's treatment of Abdul Rashid Dostum is ill-informed. Furthermore, Schroen was in the Panjshir, which was without a local chapter of the Dostum fan club.
Schroen portrays Fahim as incapable, bit it's doubtful Massoud would have made him de facto second-in-command if he was.
He misspells GPS as GSP a few times...
Any way, now that I've made myself sound like a nerd...
I had first read about Schroen himself in Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, which also provides intersting tidbits on Schroen's career. I would have expected Schroen to include his account of the Islamabad embassy siege of 1979 in this book, but I guess he thought his account in "Ghost Wars" was enough.
The main chunk of this book only covers Schroen's 2001 mission into Afghanistan, and he describes his career in sparing detail, which is a shame.
It has some historical errors though
On page 26, he writes that the level of violence in Tajikistan's capital in the 1990s prevented CIA visits there, but it was pretty quiet in the capital.
Ben B. is obviously Ben Bonk and Hank C. obviously Henry Crumpton. John R. was John Reagan. Gary 2 is Gary Berntsen.
On page 48, he says Rabbani was the head of Hezb-i Islami, but it was actually Jamat-i Islami.
On page 52, he says Hekmatyar was foreign minister, but it was actually some guy named Ghafurzai.
On page 115, he mentions that Sayyaf was agraduate of al-Ansar University, but it was al-Azhar University.
On page 165, he writes that the Taliban had several Stinger missiles, which is hilariously wrong. The CIA had bought all the Stingers back, in a program that Schroen himself was involved in.
On page 219 he says mazar-e Sharif was an area of traditional Tajik control, but it was more Pashtun-Uzbek
On page 247, he says Dostum had established a militia in the last couple of days, but he actually had since April
On page 320 he writes that Karshi-Khanabad, in Uzbekistan, is about 100 miles north of Tashkent, but his directions put you in Kazakhstan.
On page 357 he writes that Fahim had "Panjshiri tribals" but there are no tribes in the Panjshir or any Tajik population.
Schroen's treatment of Abdul Rashid Dostum is ill-informed. Furthermore, Schroen was in the Panjshir, which was without a local chapter of the Dostum fan club.
Schroen portrays Fahim as incapable, bit it's doubtful Massoud would have made him de facto second-in-command if he was.
He misspells GPS as GSP a few times...
Any way, now that I've made myself sound like a nerd...
June 30, 2019
“You cannot buy an Afghan’s loyalty, but you can rent it.”
MISSION OF THE AUTHOR’S TEAM
- “Gary, I want you to take a small team of CIA officers into Afghanistan. You will link up with the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley, and your job is to convince them to cooperate fully with the CIA and the U.S. military as we go after bin Ladin and the al-Qa’ida. You will also evaluate their military capabilities and recommend steps we can take to bring the Northern Alliance forces to a state of readiness so they can effectively take on the Taliban forces, opening the way for our efforts against UBL.”
- the CIA was not authorized to conduct laser targeting operations—that was restricted to U.S. military personnel
JAWBREAKER
- One last thing was required—the team needed a name. I suggested that we call ourselves the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT), which was the formal NE Division name for earlier teams dispatched into northern Afghanistan. However, our code name would be JAWBREAKER.
“U.S.A.! U.S.A.!”
- As we moved toward the helicopter, I was admiring the new paint job. Then I saw the registration number. There in bold black paint on a light green background was 9-11-01.
INITIALLY HAD NO SPECIAL OPS PERSONNEL
- The bottom line was that no SpecOps personnel would accompany JAWBREAKER into Afghanistan. The official reason given was that without SAR capability, the mission was considered “too dangerous” for U.S. military personnel.
EASIER TO GET IN DUE TO PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIPS
- The door to future cooperation with Masood and the Northern Alliance was again open, and the CIA’s efforts over the next five years would keep that door open. This proved critical in making it possible for my team to enter Afghanistan on 26 September 2001
WHAT A LITTLE MONEY CAN DO...
- In the forty days I was in the Panjshir Valley, I spent $ 5 million, the vast majority passed to our Afghan allies for their use, with only a small amount used as payment for essential supplies and equipment that the team required. That is a lot of money, but when measured against what the money helped achieve—the collapse of the Taliban as a military force, the disruption of the al-Qa’ida organization, and the denial of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism—it was money well spent.
AUTHOR SPENT LOTS OF TIME ON THE POTTY
- I squatted there in pain and shame, embarrassed and hurting. I was feverish and dehydrated, and my bowels were locked in spasms. I had soiled myself and the floor, and I knew it was not going to get any better that night. It was a great start to my time in Afghanistan.
AFGHAN MACGYVER
- Late that afternoon, Jan Mohammad came to Rick and me with word that, if we wanted, he could arrange to have a TV satellite dish installed in the compound that would allow us to receive CNN and BBC news broadcasts. We were incredulous. Satellite TV, here in the Panjshir? Oh, yes, it was possible, Jan Mohammad explained. The dish was made locally, from what turned out to be sheets of misprinted aluminum beer can stock imported from the Far East, and thin iron construction rebar bent to form the dish frame. The electronics were imported from Tajikistan. These electronic components were not easy to come by and were expensive, but Jan Mohammad had located two complete sets. The satellite dish could be up and running within a few hours.
CLOSE CALL
- The Predator is looking at an SUV parked on the dirt landing strip, and there are two men, dressed in Western-style clothing, walking around on the strip. They are definitely not Afghans, and we think they may be al-Qa’ida. One of the men is very tall and thin and may be bin Ladin himself. We wanted to check with your team before authorizing a Hellfire shot against the vehicle and the two men.”
- I told him to hold on while we checked our maps. I turned to Rick. “You’re not going to believe this, but I think the Predator is looking at Chris and Ed, and this guy thinks Ed is bin Ladin. They want to hit them with a Hellfire.”
CAVALRY CHARGE
- Yesterday’s battle was unique—the climactic engagement of the fight had been a six-hundred-man cavalry charge by Dostum’s men across a broad open field straight into the Taliban defensive lines.
A PAIR OF GLOVES
- My driver was a young man whom I had not seen before. He was dressed in Northern Alliance military clothing, with a thin field jacket for his coat. He had boots but no gloves. When I repacked earlier that day, I had found a second pair of high-quality wool gloves in the bottom of one of my duffel bags. I gave them to the young man, saying in Dari that they were a gift for him. He looked incredulous but pulled them on; he flexed his fingers, then started to cry. He shook my hand hard, thanking me, and I was embarrassed at his emotion at my simple gesture. I could only guess that he had been surprised at the gift and even more surprised at the quality of the gloves. They were undoubtedly the first pair of gloves he had ever owned. No Afghan in the valley had better gloves than he did.
CHECHENS ARE WELL, NUTS
- Craig stood looking at the three men across from him. It had been one the finest displays of bravery he had ever seen or, for that matter, heard of. Three men, running under fire across six hundred to seven hundred yards of open ground, with sixty men firing at them, and never breaking stride. Now they stood there, jeering at the men they had humiliated...The GBU-31 exploded at that moment within feet of the Chechen standing so proudly.
A FEW SET-BACKS THAT HAMPERED THE MISSION
- Another case of lack of attention to the traffic that we were sending in.
- It was clear to us—and confirmed by a Department of Defense film taken from inside the C-17s—that parachutes had not been used. The food had been pushed out of the rear of the aircraft in large cardboard containers, which quickly broke apart, allowing the food packets to fall to Earth individually. From twenty-seven thousand feet, the packets quickly reached terminal velocity as they scattered for miles in the drop pattern.
- this reluctance to bomb the Taliban around Kabul was a political decision rather than a military one...the potential political ramifications of allowing the Northern Alliance forces to capture the city, was still dragging on within the NSC.
- There had been no coordination with my team on this insertion effort, and at that moment we were unprepared to receive the inbound A-Team.
- “They’re getting ready to land,” he said. “They must think they’re at the landing coordinates, but they’re a mile or more short!” The sound shifted again. “Ah, hell, they’re landing! This is all screwed up!”...Because no one was injured and the mistake was soon corrected, the worst aspect of all this was that it took place in front of our Afghan hosts. We had bragged to Engineer Aref that the Special Forces could land in the dark exactly on target,
- the State Department had finally and firmly refused to host Dr. Abdullah in Washington. I would have to tell Aref when he came.
- an airdrop of weapons was to be made to Dostum this evening. Atta threatened to attack Dostum’s forces if that airdrop took place...a battle between senior NA commanders over such issues as who hosts a CIA team and who gets a few weapons and some ammunition will be seen as proof that the Northern Alliance should be restrained and cannot be trusted to lead the fight against the Taliban.
- He made a small mistake, but a grave one, and did not realize that the geocoordinates he was reading to the circling B-52 were for his own team’s position, not the Taliban target across the valley.
HAHA
- After a few visits to the kitchen, we all decided it was best not to know exactly what was going on in there.
- One other problem plagued us throughout our stay. It turned out that Pappy suffered from terrible flatulence. The man would start farting immediately upon waking up and would continue through the day until he fell asleep. We hollered at him, made jokes about him, and got mad at him, but it did no good. He would shrug and say, “I can’t help it. It’s this diet. What can I do?” Then a minute later he would pass another cloud of mind-numbing gas.
- I could not help but think of a humorous description of a helicopter I once heard—ten thousand moving parts trying desperately to come apart.
WTF
- Within a few seconds, the firing stopped and a young Afghan militiaman stood on the edge of the ZSU position facing down toward the battlefield. He raised both arms toward the sky—his AK-47 in his right hand and the severed head of a Taliban fighter held by its hair in his left—and he shouted in a clear, ringing voice, “Allahu Akbar!”
FACTOIDS
- The Philippine Muslim terrorist group that kidnapped and held three American citizens in 2002 is named Abu Sayyaf in honor of the good professor,
- I knew that Mumtaz was being truthful about the significance of the 40th Day celebrations; that was an important milestone in the mourning cycle in Islam.
- ODA/ CCE Team (Command and Control Element) to the Panjshir, to coordinate the activities of the soon-to-be-two ODAs on the ground here.
BONUS
BLU-82: https://images.app.goo.gl/Dbksyn8qRxs...
MISSION OF THE AUTHOR’S TEAM
- “Gary, I want you to take a small team of CIA officers into Afghanistan. You will link up with the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley, and your job is to convince them to cooperate fully with the CIA and the U.S. military as we go after bin Ladin and the al-Qa’ida. You will also evaluate their military capabilities and recommend steps we can take to bring the Northern Alliance forces to a state of readiness so they can effectively take on the Taliban forces, opening the way for our efforts against UBL.”
- the CIA was not authorized to conduct laser targeting operations—that was restricted to U.S. military personnel
JAWBREAKER
- One last thing was required—the team needed a name. I suggested that we call ourselves the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT), which was the formal NE Division name for earlier teams dispatched into northern Afghanistan. However, our code name would be JAWBREAKER.
“U.S.A.! U.S.A.!”
- As we moved toward the helicopter, I was admiring the new paint job. Then I saw the registration number. There in bold black paint on a light green background was 9-11-01.
INITIALLY HAD NO SPECIAL OPS PERSONNEL
- The bottom line was that no SpecOps personnel would accompany JAWBREAKER into Afghanistan. The official reason given was that without SAR capability, the mission was considered “too dangerous” for U.S. military personnel.
EASIER TO GET IN DUE TO PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIPS
- The door to future cooperation with Masood and the Northern Alliance was again open, and the CIA’s efforts over the next five years would keep that door open. This proved critical in making it possible for my team to enter Afghanistan on 26 September 2001
WHAT A LITTLE MONEY CAN DO...
- In the forty days I was in the Panjshir Valley, I spent $ 5 million, the vast majority passed to our Afghan allies for their use, with only a small amount used as payment for essential supplies and equipment that the team required. That is a lot of money, but when measured against what the money helped achieve—the collapse of the Taliban as a military force, the disruption of the al-Qa’ida organization, and the denial of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism—it was money well spent.
AUTHOR SPENT LOTS OF TIME ON THE POTTY
- I squatted there in pain and shame, embarrassed and hurting. I was feverish and dehydrated, and my bowels were locked in spasms. I had soiled myself and the floor, and I knew it was not going to get any better that night. It was a great start to my time in Afghanistan.
AFGHAN MACGYVER
- Late that afternoon, Jan Mohammad came to Rick and me with word that, if we wanted, he could arrange to have a TV satellite dish installed in the compound that would allow us to receive CNN and BBC news broadcasts. We were incredulous. Satellite TV, here in the Panjshir? Oh, yes, it was possible, Jan Mohammad explained. The dish was made locally, from what turned out to be sheets of misprinted aluminum beer can stock imported from the Far East, and thin iron construction rebar bent to form the dish frame. The electronics were imported from Tajikistan. These electronic components were not easy to come by and were expensive, but Jan Mohammad had located two complete sets. The satellite dish could be up and running within a few hours.
CLOSE CALL
- The Predator is looking at an SUV parked on the dirt landing strip, and there are two men, dressed in Western-style clothing, walking around on the strip. They are definitely not Afghans, and we think they may be al-Qa’ida. One of the men is very tall and thin and may be bin Ladin himself. We wanted to check with your team before authorizing a Hellfire shot against the vehicle and the two men.”
- I told him to hold on while we checked our maps. I turned to Rick. “You’re not going to believe this, but I think the Predator is looking at Chris and Ed, and this guy thinks Ed is bin Ladin. They want to hit them with a Hellfire.”
CAVALRY CHARGE
- Yesterday’s battle was unique—the climactic engagement of the fight had been a six-hundred-man cavalry charge by Dostum’s men across a broad open field straight into the Taliban defensive lines.
A PAIR OF GLOVES
- My driver was a young man whom I had not seen before. He was dressed in Northern Alliance military clothing, with a thin field jacket for his coat. He had boots but no gloves. When I repacked earlier that day, I had found a second pair of high-quality wool gloves in the bottom of one of my duffel bags. I gave them to the young man, saying in Dari that they were a gift for him. He looked incredulous but pulled them on; he flexed his fingers, then started to cry. He shook my hand hard, thanking me, and I was embarrassed at his emotion at my simple gesture. I could only guess that he had been surprised at the gift and even more surprised at the quality of the gloves. They were undoubtedly the first pair of gloves he had ever owned. No Afghan in the valley had better gloves than he did.
CHECHENS ARE WELL, NUTS
- Craig stood looking at the three men across from him. It had been one the finest displays of bravery he had ever seen or, for that matter, heard of. Three men, running under fire across six hundred to seven hundred yards of open ground, with sixty men firing at them, and never breaking stride. Now they stood there, jeering at the men they had humiliated...The GBU-31 exploded at that moment within feet of the Chechen standing so proudly.
A FEW SET-BACKS THAT HAMPERED THE MISSION
- Another case of lack of attention to the traffic that we were sending in.
- It was clear to us—and confirmed by a Department of Defense film taken from inside the C-17s—that parachutes had not been used. The food had been pushed out of the rear of the aircraft in large cardboard containers, which quickly broke apart, allowing the food packets to fall to Earth individually. From twenty-seven thousand feet, the packets quickly reached terminal velocity as they scattered for miles in the drop pattern.
- this reluctance to bomb the Taliban around Kabul was a political decision rather than a military one...the potential political ramifications of allowing the Northern Alliance forces to capture the city, was still dragging on within the NSC.
- There had been no coordination with my team on this insertion effort, and at that moment we were unprepared to receive the inbound A-Team.
- “They’re getting ready to land,” he said. “They must think they’re at the landing coordinates, but they’re a mile or more short!” The sound shifted again. “Ah, hell, they’re landing! This is all screwed up!”...Because no one was injured and the mistake was soon corrected, the worst aspect of all this was that it took place in front of our Afghan hosts. We had bragged to Engineer Aref that the Special Forces could land in the dark exactly on target,
- the State Department had finally and firmly refused to host Dr. Abdullah in Washington. I would have to tell Aref when he came.
- an airdrop of weapons was to be made to Dostum this evening. Atta threatened to attack Dostum’s forces if that airdrop took place...a battle between senior NA commanders over such issues as who hosts a CIA team and who gets a few weapons and some ammunition will be seen as proof that the Northern Alliance should be restrained and cannot be trusted to lead the fight against the Taliban.
- He made a small mistake, but a grave one, and did not realize that the geocoordinates he was reading to the circling B-52 were for his own team’s position, not the Taliban target across the valley.
HAHA
- After a few visits to the kitchen, we all decided it was best not to know exactly what was going on in there.
- One other problem plagued us throughout our stay. It turned out that Pappy suffered from terrible flatulence. The man would start farting immediately upon waking up and would continue through the day until he fell asleep. We hollered at him, made jokes about him, and got mad at him, but it did no good. He would shrug and say, “I can’t help it. It’s this diet. What can I do?” Then a minute later he would pass another cloud of mind-numbing gas.
- I could not help but think of a humorous description of a helicopter I once heard—ten thousand moving parts trying desperately to come apart.
WTF
- Within a few seconds, the firing stopped and a young Afghan militiaman stood on the edge of the ZSU position facing down toward the battlefield. He raised both arms toward the sky—his AK-47 in his right hand and the severed head of a Taliban fighter held by its hair in his left—and he shouted in a clear, ringing voice, “Allahu Akbar!”
FACTOIDS
- The Philippine Muslim terrorist group that kidnapped and held three American citizens in 2002 is named Abu Sayyaf in honor of the good professor,
- I knew that Mumtaz was being truthful about the significance of the 40th Day celebrations; that was an important milestone in the mourning cycle in Islam.
- ODA/ CCE Team (Command and Control Element) to the Panjshir, to coordinate the activities of the soon-to-be-two ODAs on the ground here.
BONUS
BLU-82: https://images.app.goo.gl/Dbksyn8qRxs...
June 19, 2019
I had seen Gary's name in other books about the conflict in Afghanistan so i thought reading his account would be interesting. The book was quite interesting to begin with Gary and his team planning operation JAWBREAKER. Once they settled into Northern Alliance territory in Afghanistan it slowly started to dull.
They take bumpy car rides. Gary hits his head on the ceiling of the car. The roads are bumpy. They have a meeting. They drive back. The roads are still bumpy. Washington does nothing in the north. They take more car rides. Do you like reading about bumpy car rides? They have more meetings and take more bumpy car rides and Washington continues to ignore Gary's advice. But they get Starbucks coffee delivered. They drink coffee.
Very late in the book, the US powers that be finally decide to begin a bombing campaign in the north that would allow the NA to battle for control of Taliban controlled cities. Finally something is happening. By now however the book is almost over, I've lost interest, Gary has returned state side, and Kabul falls quickly. The end.
They take bumpy car rides. Gary hits his head on the ceiling of the car. The roads are bumpy. They have a meeting. They drive back. The roads are still bumpy. Washington does nothing in the north. They take more car rides. Do you like reading about bumpy car rides? They have more meetings and take more bumpy car rides and Washington continues to ignore Gary's advice. But they get Starbucks coffee delivered. They drink coffee.
Very late in the book, the US powers that be finally decide to begin a bombing campaign in the north that would allow the NA to battle for control of Taliban controlled cities. Finally something is happening. By now however the book is almost over, I've lost interest, Gary has returned state side, and Kabul falls quickly. The end.
May 28, 2015
I thought that this book was really slow at first and kind off boring just one huge packing list honestly. It had not much battles/action. It was an pretty good account through on it in which I thought was interested at times. It was definiteley though was not a cliff hanger, but it was still okay ish.
January 14, 2012
I suspect few know how important the CIA was in Afghanistan both during the Soviet invasion and the 2001 invasion. Yet they'll be forever remembered for the Iraq WMD mess.
April 29, 2023
Gary Schroen's "First In" is a firsthand account of the CIA's role in the early days of the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Schroen was the leader of the CIA's first team into Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, and his book provides a detailed and at times gripping account of the CIA's efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime and bring al-Qaeda to justice. While working with the Northern Alliance.
The book is well-written and informative, and Schroen does a good job of bringing the reader into the world of the CIA and the challenges of operating in a war zone. However, the book is also slow-paced, and Schroen's biases for Russians, against Afghans, and against Pakistanis made the book somewhat uneven?
Overall, "First In" is an important and informative book, but it is not without its flaws. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the War on Terror, the CIA (or other major intelligence agencies in general and how field operatives go about getting stuff done)*but* be prepared for a slow read and authors idiosyncrasies (for example he mentioned how he watched the movie Austin Powers while in Afghanistan and how he hated it, how can ANYONE hate Austin Powers???).
Here are some specific examples of actual weirdness:
He frequently expresses appreciation for Russian made items he used in Afghanistan (Helicopter, Trucks, Beer, Binoculars) even though Russians did everything they could to make sure Afghanistan would be a quagmire for Americans. And also because in my experience Russian mass produced things sorta suck (like the Lada cars which are famous for being unreliable).
He also makes some cutting remarks about Pakistan,and how Pakistanis in power have harmed American interests over and over with their short sighted behavior (but goes on to praise them in the book's conclusion).
Despite weirdness, Schroen does provide some insightful observations about Afghan culture and the challenges of operating in a war zone (going on and on about his explosive diarrhea was perhaps a bit TMI?). He also makes a strong case for the importance of human intelligence in the fight against terrorism. I particularly enjoyed the detail he goes into about the preparations the author and his team undertook. Despite the CIA's bureaucratic tendencies (he sorta makes it sound like an episode of The Office). Hand-wringing in the State Department (mostly fueled by misguided Pakistanis who seem to have too much influence on American policy making - according to the author) is also described in clear-eyed terms.
I was quite surprised to learn that US Armed forces were not allowed to fly over Tajikistan or Uzbekistan for quite some time as the war was starting and that this was a major point of consternation as the US needed to land Special Forces in Afghanistan for various tasks that needed to get done. What would Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have done had the flights just flown over without permission (perhaps with fighter jet escorts)? Would they have shot them down? I doubt it. Not when America was out for terrorist blood. So I found myself wishing there were more envelope pushers handling things, it'd obviously cause more international incidents and possibly some minor wars but would get things done! Obviously my very in-expert and more than likely idiotic opinion.
Overall, "First In" is an important and informative book, but it is slow (be warned). And the author's views need to be taken in context of his personality and his long career in the CIA.
The book is well-written and informative, and Schroen does a good job of bringing the reader into the world of the CIA and the challenges of operating in a war zone. However, the book is also slow-paced, and Schroen's biases for Russians, against Afghans, and against Pakistanis made the book somewhat uneven?
Overall, "First In" is an important and informative book, but it is not without its flaws. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the War on Terror, the CIA (or other major intelligence agencies in general and how field operatives go about getting stuff done)*but* be prepared for a slow read and authors idiosyncrasies (for example he mentioned how he watched the movie Austin Powers while in Afghanistan and how he hated it, how can ANYONE hate Austin Powers???).
Here are some specific examples of actual weirdness:
He frequently expresses appreciation for Russian made items he used in Afghanistan (Helicopter, Trucks, Beer, Binoculars) even though Russians did everything they could to make sure Afghanistan would be a quagmire for Americans. And also because in my experience Russian mass produced things sorta suck (like the Lada cars which are famous for being unreliable).
He also makes some cutting remarks about Pakistan,and how Pakistanis in power have harmed American interests over and over with their short sighted behavior (but goes on to praise them in the book's conclusion).
Despite weirdness, Schroen does provide some insightful observations about Afghan culture and the challenges of operating in a war zone (going on and on about his explosive diarrhea was perhaps a bit TMI?). He also makes a strong case for the importance of human intelligence in the fight against terrorism. I particularly enjoyed the detail he goes into about the preparations the author and his team undertook. Despite the CIA's bureaucratic tendencies (he sorta makes it sound like an episode of The Office). Hand-wringing in the State Department (mostly fueled by misguided Pakistanis who seem to have too much influence on American policy making - according to the author) is also described in clear-eyed terms.
I was quite surprised to learn that US Armed forces were not allowed to fly over Tajikistan or Uzbekistan for quite some time as the war was starting and that this was a major point of consternation as the US needed to land Special Forces in Afghanistan for various tasks that needed to get done. What would Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have done had the flights just flown over without permission (perhaps with fighter jet escorts)? Would they have shot them down? I doubt it. Not when America was out for terrorist blood. So I found myself wishing there were more envelope pushers handling things, it'd obviously cause more international incidents and possibly some minor wars but would get things done! Obviously my very in-expert and more than likely idiotic opinion.
Overall, "First In" is an important and informative book, but it is slow (be warned). And the author's views need to be taken in context of his personality and his long career in the CIA.
May 13, 2023
On September 11th, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency’s most decorated field officer stood inside the George Bush Center for Intelligence watching live television feed of the worst terrorist attack to have ever occurred on United States soil. Decades of worldwide deployment under his belt, Gary Schroen was less than three months away from a well-earned retirement when, without hesitation, he accepted a grim offer from the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center director to return to Afghanistan. Satellite imagery still showed hot spots at Ground Zero as Schroen smuggled six American paramilitary operatives and $3 million in hundred-dollar bills packed into a plastic tub over the Hindu Kush mountains and into the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul by means of a converted Soviet era helicopter. Armed with automatic weapons and an order to kill Osama bin Laden, Schroen led his team to the front lines of the Northern Alliance’s fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban before the U.S. military arrived. He had already survived an assassination attempt in Iran and the deadly 1979 U.S. Embassy Islamabad riot. He spoke Persian and Dari, perfected during previous stints in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. He was the man for the job.
Operational security dictates certain aspects of his exploits in post-9/11 Afghanistan be omitted from Schroen’s book. However, he makes up for this with detailed accounts of his team’s rudimentary provisions and close calls. From using a single hole in the floor as a toilet for over a dozen people, to a telephone call from a Predator drone operator about to drop a Hellfire missile on two CIA officers after mistaking them for jihadists, readers learn just how dire the situation was. Admittedly, the details are a double-edged sword that give parts of the book the feel of a mundane journal rather than a page-turning thriller. The CIA is an intelligence gathering agency, not intended for combat or diplomacy. Much of the day to day work done on the ground by Schroen’s “Jawbreaker” team, while incredibly dangerous due to its proximity to the battle lines, consisted of anticlimactic sit-down meetings with local leaders. The casual reader who lacks specific interest in the War on Terrorism will likely find this memoir exhaustively meticulous.
Operational security dictates certain aspects of his exploits in post-9/11 Afghanistan be omitted from Schroen’s book. However, he makes up for this with detailed accounts of his team’s rudimentary provisions and close calls. From using a single hole in the floor as a toilet for over a dozen people, to a telephone call from a Predator drone operator about to drop a Hellfire missile on two CIA officers after mistaking them for jihadists, readers learn just how dire the situation was. Admittedly, the details are a double-edged sword that give parts of the book the feel of a mundane journal rather than a page-turning thriller. The CIA is an intelligence gathering agency, not intended for combat or diplomacy. Much of the day to day work done on the ground by Schroen’s “Jawbreaker” team, while incredibly dangerous due to its proximity to the battle lines, consisted of anticlimactic sit-down meetings with local leaders. The casual reader who lacks specific interest in the War on Terrorism will likely find this memoir exhaustively meticulous.
November 30, 2021
Flags a bit in its account of events after the author left Afghanistan. Scenes are brief with little analysis and plenty of stilted dialogue. But the first 2/3 is quite interesting (a little too much info about the author's inability to adjust his gut to whatever he was eating or drinking there), and the Afterword is a clear, persuasive statement of what was subsequently done wrong in aiding the Afghan government, and what it would take to put it right. All rendered moot by events, sad to say.
November 18, 2017
Excellent first-hand account of the CIA's operations in Afghanistan post 9/11 until the fall of Kabul.
The author goes into great detail of his mission to build a team, make contact with the Northern Alliance, enter Afghanistan, bring in Special Forces and the daily struggles with policymakers back in the US.
The author goes into great detail of his mission to build a team, make contact with the Northern Alliance, enter Afghanistan, bring in Special Forces and the daily struggles with policymakers back in the US.
November 27, 2024
4.2–an incredible look at the logistics of inserting the first team into Afghanistan after 9/11. Speaks on the tension between Washington and those on the ground, the regional dynamics of tribal leaders vying for the US’ backing, and how our Air Force devastates moral and allowed the Northern Alliance to take back Kabul within days once properly allocated.
October 12, 2025
An interesting read! I enjoyed this more than I thought I would, admittedly there were parts of the book where I phased out a little, especially when they were getting ready to land in Afghanistan the first time. Things picked up once they were finally in, but their transit and prep started dragging a little.
all in all a good read!
all in all a good read!
August 25, 2020
Being a tale which actually happened, it is interesting to see the procedure to stablish a military operation overseas from scratch.
Overall the book is interesting but sometime it "runs in circles" over the same problematics.
Overall the book is interesting but sometime it "runs in circles" over the same problematics.
May 24, 2021
It was a slow but interesting account of the first CIA officers in Afghanistan following 9/11. I was surprised by the seemingly mundane duties of taking meetings, writing reports, and wresting with the bureaucracy that largely comprised the mission.
September 24, 2022
Not what I hoped for in this book. Long, drawn out retell of events that occurred in a few months after the September 11th attack on the US. It showed how the CIA, the US Military and government do not share information and cooperation is very limited.
November 20, 2022
Interesting episode in the history of the world, but this was not the guy to write it. Recommended if you have any interest in hearing about a middle-aged man's catastrophic bowel situation and not much else.
October 16, 2024
Lots of internal US politics, lots of detail about shitting his pants. This is a very personal book.
If you read one book about the early Afghanistan operations, I would recommend others, but there are a lot of details about US paramilitary operations and habits in here.
Never trust a spook.
If you read one book about the early Afghanistan operations, I would recommend others, but there are a lot of details about US paramilitary operations and habits in here.
Never trust a spook.
November 14, 2017
I never knew about this operation, and was really pleased with the read.
March 10, 2018
Want to find out what made “12 Strong” possible? Read this book.
March 12, 2020
Very poorly written. I couldn't finish it.
March 28, 2020
I thought it was an interesting book that offered a glimpse of how an area of government that we seldom see operates. The beginning of the book held my attention more than the ending.
April 29, 2020
Incredibly written, fascinating, real
September 28, 2022
The very recent death of the author alerted me to this book. It did answer some questions for me.
April 2, 2023
Another prime example of the idiot's out of DC running on the war through politic's
January 9, 2025
One of the best and most interesting books that I have read about the Afghanistan war experience.
July 26, 2019
Really great ideas but had to start skimming after two-thirds.
March 9, 2012
While an interesting tale of coalition building and coordination with tribal rebel factions and airport setup and startegy, I was hoping for more. The author claims that there was surprisingly little that he wrote which was censored for national security during the review stages, but this is also because a senior veteran CIA agent such as he had a pretty good idea what he could get away with exposing in the first place - and he self-censored probably 90% of what you'd want to be in the book for national security reasons. For that unavoidable reason I did not feel that the book lived up to billing. Perhaps their job to setup the camps, infrastructure, and build the tenuous coalitions between warring factions was truly that dry of an affair to discuss when half the audience is expecting some kind of James Bond fantasy tale and are left with a more realistic and true to life example of an intelligence officer's work...drudgery in setting up the conditions for the battle to be fought by soldiers and militia.
I do need to point out that the details and characters in the coalition show exactly why they had so much difficulty doing their jobs and the insight provided by the countless tales are enlightening, it just came off as anti-climactic negotiations of how to try to please both warlords without one losing face, only to have to buy them off for millions at a time and then dance around their local interpersonal politics while the war is spooling up. It just wasn't as compelling as a - perhaps unrealistic - expectation of most readers when thy see the title. The reader wants to hear about a daring sneak across the border under fire and the reality is much closer to "the truck had a flat after the large pothole so we had to bribe a farmer for..." and "i had the runs so bad they had to special deliver emergency medicine". and then describe how we bought beatup ten and twenty year old Toyota forerunners off the locals for $30k apiece while the author justifies how cautious and miserly he was the literal millions in cash they carried in cardbaord boxes. While it is obvious from that to mention that there are some interesting details in this book, it didn't grab me the way related histories (some involving some of the same warlord characters) did. I can recommend "Not a Good day to die" "Kill Bin-Ladin" (no relation to the mission which actually killed him) and "The Mission, the Men, and Me" which covers some of the similar territories but will appeal to a broader audience of readers without as many feeling let down that it was comparatively flat, while seeming to come from a far more interesting source.
I do need to point out that the details and characters in the coalition show exactly why they had so much difficulty doing their jobs and the insight provided by the countless tales are enlightening, it just came off as anti-climactic negotiations of how to try to please both warlords without one losing face, only to have to buy them off for millions at a time and then dance around their local interpersonal politics while the war is spooling up. It just wasn't as compelling as a - perhaps unrealistic - expectation of most readers when thy see the title. The reader wants to hear about a daring sneak across the border under fire and the reality is much closer to "the truck had a flat after the large pothole so we had to bribe a farmer for..." and "i had the runs so bad they had to special deliver emergency medicine". and then describe how we bought beatup ten and twenty year old Toyota forerunners off the locals for $30k apiece while the author justifies how cautious and miserly he was the literal millions in cash they carried in cardbaord boxes. While it is obvious from that to mention that there are some interesting details in this book, it didn't grab me the way related histories (some involving some of the same warlord characters) did. I can recommend "Not a Good day to die" "Kill Bin-Ladin" (no relation to the mission which actually killed him) and "The Mission, the Men, and Me" which covers some of the similar territories but will appeal to a broader audience of readers without as many feeling let down that it was comparatively flat, while seeming to come from a far more interesting source.
August 12, 2011
First In, is a first person account of the events between the 19th of September until the 10th of November, told mainly from the perspective of Gary Schroen, leader of the JAWBREAKER CIA squad sent to establish relations with the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley, near the stalemated frontlines of the Taliban. Despite being the lead of US forces in Afghanistan (a 7 man crew), his account is very low to the ground, recounting the incessant problems of Diarrhea and relations and the daily interactions with Northern Alliance leaders. The details make the story, such as taking naps on boxes holding $10 million in cash or the simple pleasure of Starbucks coffee brewed in the field.
Schroen still manages to give a picture of how the Afghanistan war unfolded, with ground forces of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban hemmed in to their respective defensive positions. He details how the US military consistently acted ponderously or incompetently. One poignant example is when Schroen was called by the Air Force to confirm coordinates for a Predator UAV strike; he realized that the ‘thin man wearing western clothing’ was not Bin Laden, but his teammate Ed. Schroen combines the personal narrative with sections from other teams across Afghanistan, when they took Mazar-e-Sharif or the perils of Karzai in the south. The timeline ends with the fall of Kabul, with only a small afterward from 2004.
For what it aims to do, the book succeeds with flying colors. Schroen makes his opinions known, but they do not interfere with the story. Mild prose is overwhelmed by the amount of detail and clear description of the conflicts in strategy among the myriad of parties involved, making for a compelling and informative story.
Schroen still manages to give a picture of how the Afghanistan war unfolded, with ground forces of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban hemmed in to their respective defensive positions. He details how the US military consistently acted ponderously or incompetently. One poignant example is when Schroen was called by the Air Force to confirm coordinates for a Predator UAV strike; he realized that the ‘thin man wearing western clothing’ was not Bin Laden, but his teammate Ed. Schroen combines the personal narrative with sections from other teams across Afghanistan, when they took Mazar-e-Sharif or the perils of Karzai in the south. The timeline ends with the fall of Kabul, with only a small afterward from 2004.
For what it aims to do, the book succeeds with flying colors. Schroen makes his opinions known, but they do not interfere with the story. Mild prose is overwhelmed by the amount of detail and clear description of the conflicts in strategy among the myriad of parties involved, making for a compelling and informative story.
October 15, 2009
Feeling like I needed to revisit the US response to 9/11 and it's first [CIA:] mission to Afghanistan following 9/11 prompted my interest in reading this book now - plus my dad recommended it as a good read! It was interesting to learn about U.S. relations with the Northern Alliance early on, the amount of cash flow CIA agents had on hand was pretty overwhelming, friendly fire mishaps, Starbucks coffee, and gross descriptions of bathroom stalls & male camaraderie[regarding it:] added to the realness/reality of the story. The author was probably aiming for that last part I mentioned as light hearted to the seriousness of his CIA mission, but I just thought it was gross.
June 6, 2013
If you want to know about how the US was able to rout the Taliban in Afghanistan, this is the book to read. Given a choice between First In and Jawbreaker, another first hand account by a CIA agent, First In is better written and lacks the self centered egotistic writing of Jawbreaker. This is a story of how alliances are bought and the CIA went in and paved the way for special forces and eventually the rest of the military to invade. There are other books out there on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Bin Laden, but if you want to know how the US was able to invade and defeat the Taliban so quickly, then read this book.
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