Magic and Mayhem: The Delusions of American Foreign Policy from Korea to Afghanistan

by Derek Leebaert

Afghanistan and Iraq are the latest in a string of blunders that includes Vietnam and an unintended war with China from 1950 to '53, those four fiascoes being just the worst moments in nearly a lifetime of false urgencies, intelligence failures, grandiose designs, and stereotyping of enemies and allies alike. America brought down the Soviet empire at the cold war's most dangerous juncture, but even that victory was surrounded by myths, such as the conviction that we can easily shape the destinies of other people. "Magic and Mayhem "is a strikingly original, closely informed investigation of two generations of America's avoidable failures. In a perfectly timed narrative, Derek Leebaert reveals the common threads in these serial letdowns and in the consequences that await. He demonstrates why the most enterprising and innovative nation in history keeps mishandling its gravest politico-military dealings abroad and why well-credentialed men and women, deemed brilliant when they arrive in Washington, consistently end up leading the country into folly. Misjudgments of this scale arise from a pattern of self-deception best described as "magical thinking." When we think magically, we conjure up beliefs that everyone wants to be like us, that America can accomplish anything out of sheer righteousness, and that our own wizardly policymakers will enable gigantic desires like "transforming the Middle East" to happen fast. Mantras of "stability" or "democracy" get substituted for reasoned reflection. Faith is placed in high-tech silver bullets, whether drones over Pakistan or helicopters in Vietnam. Leebaert exposes these magical notions by using new archival material, exclusive interviews, his own insider experiences, and portraits of the men and women who have succumbed: George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Presidents Kennedy, Carter, and George W. Bush all appear differently in the light of magic, as do wise men from Harvard, Georgetown, Stanford, and think tanks such as RAND and Brookings, as well as influential players from the media and, occasionally, the military, including General David Petraeus as he personifies the nation's latest forays into counterinsurgency. "Magic and Mayhem "offers vital insights as to how Americans imagine, confront, and even invite danger. Only by understanding the power of illusion can we break the spell, and then better apply America's enduring strengths in a world that will long need them.

Genres: Politics, History

336 pages, Hardcover

First published August 13, 2010

Reviews

[Lobstergirl · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a thoughtful, intelligent overview of the "magical thinking" and delusions, usually on the part of highly educated people, that got the U.S. into the series of disastrous wars from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. Leebaert never goes too deep into the weeds; this is an easy read, but one informed by long experience in government and policy-making.

He leans heavily on the notion of "emergency men" (an idea actually borrowed from Jacob Burckhardt), the presidential advisers, think-tankers, academics, journalists, and generals who see urgency around every foreign policy corner, and whose default mode is action and intervention. They include George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Donald Rumsefeld, Dick Cheney, George W. Bush, Charles Krauthammer, and David Petraeus. In our desperation to transform the world's problem areas, we (or, largely, the media) ordain certain of these emergency men as saviors, and fawn over their words and can-do attitudes (McNamara and Petraeus are prime examples).

Our delusions include the assumption that, if only given the opportunity, everyone around the world wants to be like us, and that any foreign policy issue can be "managed," as if it were a corporation, or a case study at business school. The things that America considers need to be managed, and can be managed, have included "China's rise," the internal politics and security of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the guerrilla insurgency in Vietnam.

It's a nonpartisan examination, finding the worst offenses of magical thinking in the Kennedy/Johnson and George W. Bush administrations. The author has an odd soft spot (blind spot?) for Reagan and his administration. There were an awful lot of foreign interventions during the 80s, most if not all of them ugly missteps. Maybe these were too small-bore for Leebaert, or by his metrics didn't involve "magical thinking."

[Patrick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book really explodes the idea that foreign policy is well understood by our leadership and is something that can be easily done!

I think the thing that bothered me most though is that despite such poor and often absolutely wrong advice for so many years on so many issues "the foreign policy" experts are still feted by journalists and given so much attention when they tend to be so wrong!

In light of today's world it should also give one serious pause when you hear so many presidential candidates spout out such simple answers to such complex issues knowing that so much of what they say is simply a campaign slogan designed to garner votes!

[Dan · Rating 2 out of 5]

I was wrong on the Iraq War. Well, perhaps that's too certain. If I believed in 2003 what I believe now, I think I would have come down against the war. Whether or not I was right or wrong would be besides the point; some of my views have evolved over those past eight years.

With that in mind, Leebaert's "Magic and Mayhem" was a good read for someone in my shoes. Leebaert's thesis is that Americans succumb to "magical thinking" when it comes to foreign policy, believing far more heavily in their own agency than is warranted. Leebaert believes that this "magical thinking" leads the US to make bad foreign policy choices, like engaging in nation building, or pushing across the 38th parallel towards the Yalu River. Over the last eight years, I believe that I have come to agree with this position, and I also believe that Leebaert did a pretty good job of demonstrating his thesis.

So, why was I so disappointed in this book?

1. Structure - The structure of this book is, quite frankly, incoherent. It reads like a rambling monologue, switching from topic to topic. It desperately could have used sub-headings in its chapters to signify switches to different topics, but it would have been more persuasive if he had simply gone chronological, focusing on the "magical thinking" of different eras or presidencies, and then tying them together at the end. The topical structure has way too much overlap to be coherent, with, for example, discussions of historical myth appearing quite often outside of the chapter on it. This was frustrating to me as a reader. He was making good points, but they were detached from any logical framework.

2. Going halfway - Leebaert is pretty adamant about what he disagrees with over the last 60 years of American foreign policy: Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, the current occupation of Afghanistan. He is also, periodically, supportive of various US interventions: going after Al Qa'ida after 9/11, the Gulf War, much of Reagan's economic focus on the Soviet Union. Leebaert never does anything to spell out his alternative vision. I think in terms of the response to the 9/11 attacks, and the objective of preventing future attacks. I see three ways you can oppose the US' Middle Eastern adventurism:

- Blowback: You can buy into the Chalmers Johnson thesis that US activities instigate terrorism, and that withdrawing from that region would reduce the terror threat at home;
- The hard-headed cost/benefit: You can support the notion that, if there is any benefit to the US' security in the adventurism, it is not worth the price in tax dollars and the blood of soldiers.
- The "ineffectual": US policy in the Middle East has zero effect on the terror threat.

I think those cover the full spectrum of the problem. If you disagree with all three statements, you buy into the notion that the US' efforts in the Middle East, while unpleasant, are necessary to thwart terrorism. You may disagree with some of the implementation of them, but the policy itself is sound to you.

But where does Leebaert come down? We have no idea. All we know is that he is opposed to magical thinking in foreign policy. He does a great job demonstrating our weakness for it, but he does not do a great job of spelling out an alternate vision, other than to lay out warning signs and ways to avoid those pitfalls.

Perhaps that was his goal, but to me, it seemed an awful lot like a doctor correctly diagnosing a disease but leaving the room prior to providing treatment (or indicating that the disease was terminal), and all while having terrible bedside manner (I'll use "bedside manner" as an analogy for "structure").

If the structure was better, or if he had come up with some interesting vision at the end for a better approach to foreign policy, I would rate this book higher. But with those two weaknesses in mind, I have to come down hard. It's a shame, too. Leebaert clearly is a brilliant guy. It seems like Derek Leebaert would be a great lecturer and even better in Q&A.

[Lauren Albert · Rating 4 out of 5]

The argument here was more of less the same as the other book I recently reviewed, "The Icarus Syndrome" though this was shorter and less tedious. The elements of magical thinking he discusses are "Emergency Men" ("part of being an emergency man is wading into action with cheerful confidence, with that valor of ignorance"); the "Mystique of Management" ("believing that any problem can be methodically broken down to be triumphantly reassembled"); "Star Power" ("well-informed Americans starstruck by reputed wizards of national security"); "Labeled, not Understood" ("after three years of occupying Iraq, only six out of a thousand U.S. professional staff in Baghdad spoke fluent Arabic"); "Myths of History" ("Events are cast in the light of their gross similarities rather than their telling, dangerously particular differences"); "We'll Show them the Light" (Believing that "The hearts and minds of distant people are throbbing to be transformed into something akin to the way we see ourselves") and also (though it doesn't appear to have its own chapter) "expectation of a wondrous return on investment". I think that the way Leebaert breaks down the types of misleading historical analogies commonly used is very interesting and useful (to ancient history, to World War II with talk of "appeasement" and "Munich."). And I think he does a better job than Beinart at explaining why this happens and how to fix it. He discusses the lack of true historical knowledge, the lamentable dearth of foreign-language speaking diplomats and Foreign Service "experts." He points out how many Congressman don't even hold passports and then unsurprisingly know little about the countries whose fate they discuss. I knew nothing about the weakness of the system of political appointees for national service positions which he discusses in some detail.

[The American Conservative]

'Derek Leebaert’s Magic and Mayhem seeks to explain how such experts get power and why their influence is so pernicious. Leebaert, a Georgetown University professor, derides the influence of “magical thinking” in foreign policy: “Shrewd, levelheaded people are so frequently bewitched into substituting passion, sloganeering, and haste for reflection, homework, and reasonable objectives.”'

Read the full review, "Worst and Brightest," on our website:
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

As what Leebart calls "magic men" (which sadly includes women) proliferate, his history and cautionary wisdom is most helpful.