The Juggler

by Warren F. Kimball

Here Warren Kimball explores Roosevelt's vision of the postwar world by laying out the nature and development of FDR's "war aims"--his long-range political goals. As the face of eastern Europe and the world changes before our eyes, Roosevelt's goals, dismissed during the Cold War as impractical, seem less unrealistic today.

Genres: History

320 pages, Paperback

First published April 1, 1991

Reviews

[Alex Hope · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the last and by far the best book on FDR I have read for my essay. Warren Kimball shows that FDR might not have been a consistent strategist, as nearly all authors studying FDR say, but a consistent improviser. He builds up a lot of good arguments and dismantles both the defenders and the critics of FDR. This book would be very useful if you are studying FDR. I cannot express how much joy I have had reading it.

[Justin Michael James Dell · Rating 3 out of 5]

I did not get what I expected out of this book. Kimball has written this monograph with the purpose of explicating FDR's foreign policy "assumptions" - the term the author uses to denote the core principles that undergirded the President's foreign policy outlook - in order to dispel the conventional wisdom that says that Roosevelt had only a reactive foreign policy, not a carefully thought-out, proactive one. FDR's changing tactics and strategies may have appeared haphazard, even contradictory, argues Kimball, but they were all chosen in pursuit of immutable goals. This is an intriguing thesis, but I found that Kimball's substantiation of it was botched. The defects in his presentation are mostly stylistic. He demonstrates an impressive familiarity with a lot of the archival material related to inter-Allied diplomacy during the Second World War period, but the person of President Roosevelt almost seems peripheral in Kimball's text that is supposed to be about him! I found that more often than not, Kimball composed a chapter describing a notable development in foreign affairs during the Second World War (such as the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, or Lend-Lease from the United States to Britain), exhausting the reader with a step-by-step account of the diplomatic wrangling that ensued in international circles involved in the issue, only then at the end to add some brief insight into how FDR waded into the issue. The point that Kimball is trying to get across to the reader easily falls through the cracks of all of the diplomatic cable information he sifts through first. Now, to be fair, Kimball begins his text by stating that part of his philosophy as a historian of FDR is to demonstrate how the president was shaped by the context or arena of world affairs, all the while underscoring the dialectical way in which he in turn shaped the course of events therein, and so this may account for his approach. Still, I found FDR 'distant' in this text. This is compounded by a dearth of primary source quotations from the President, leaving us without a genuine window into his mind.

Still, to give the book its due credit, it certainly serves as a decent primer on the subject of inter-Allied diplomacy during the Second World War - no small utility. Kimball also has a wry sense of humour and has a habit of impishly captioning some of the images that adorn his text - something I found rather amusing.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

In The Juggler, Kimball bases his analysis of FDR's wartime statesmanship on an assessment of what the historical record reveals about FDR's assumptions. Where Arthur Link portrayed a "higher realism" in the policies of Woodrow Wilson, Warren Kimball portrays a "higher consistency" in Fanklin Roosevelt's foreign policy. As he notes in "The Persistent Evangel of Americanism," By trying to systematize Roosevelt's thinking [as Beard implicitly tried to do], we automatically distort, since he never articulated a cohesive philosophy. He avoided contradictions rather than trying to reconcile or confront them. Nevertheless, his actions - successful or not - show a conceptual consistency that reveals his assumptions." (p.187)

This project of identifying FDR's "basic assumptions" can encompass both the ideological proclivities engendered by the capitalist political economy (as seen in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms) and the practical considerations of power politics (as seen in his attempt to engineer a postwar order). Because of this elasticity, Kimball can go beyond the dichotomy between revisionism and internationalism identified by Cole in his overview. The strength of this collection results from its value as a synthesis.

One example of Kimball's approach to FDR's foreign policy, the addressed in "Roosevelt and the Postwar World" illustrates very well Kimball's discovery of Roosevelt's assumptions at work. Fearing an uncooperative Stalin would spoil his grand vision of a postwar world policed by the "Four Powers." FDR held Churchill at bay at Tehran and courted Stalin instead. Both Roosevelt (at Tehran) and Cordell Hull (at Moscow) refused to discuss specifics on Eastern Europe and Poland. These actions speak louder than words, revealing Roosevelt's assumption that "Woodrow Wilson had the right idea - stability and security (peace and prosperity?) for the United States can be achieved only on a worldwide scale. Peace is indivisible, or so the phrase goes. But Wilson erred in being too structured, too specific, too inflexible, too unwilling to be practical and accept the realities of great power relations" (p. 187.)

Though FDR never came out and said that he was attempting to implement a "Wilsonian vision" using practical means, his actions aimed at keeping Stalin within "The Family Circle" clearly indicate as much.

[JerryDeanHalleck · Rating 2 out of 5]

A well written liberal defense of FDR's wartime statesmanship. Kimball argues FDR wasn't a naive dupe of Stalin but realistically understood that Stalin needed to placated to keep him fighting Germany. And that there was no point in winning WW II, just to start WW III against the USSR.

I think Kimball makes a good point. Once you agree with FDR that (1) Germany's unconditional defeat was the primary USA objective in WW II and (2) that the German people were "mad dogs" that had to be conquered, punished, and re-educated, then FDR appeasement of Stalin makes perfect sense. As does, handing over the Baltics and Eastern Europe to the USSR.

My only real criticism is that Kimball ascribes a seriousness and long-range thinking to FDR that does not exist. For example, FDR didn't give a rap about Communism, he never read a book on it, didn't understand it, and didn't have an anti-communist bone in his body.

FDR was angry over the treatment of the Jews, hated the Germans, and wanted Germany occupied and destroyed as a nation. Thats all he really cared about. FDR had been a warhawk in 1917 and thought we'd been too soft on Germany in 1919, and he was going to make sure that didn't happen again.

Nor, despite the blahblah of the "Atlantic Charter" did he care about the peoples of Europe. What happened to the Europeans after the war, wasnt his concern. For example, he fully expected a communist revolution in France, and wanted to make sure the USA wasnt involved on either side. He wanted American troops out of Europe by 1947. What happened after that was their business.