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Modern War Studies
Inside Hitler's High Command
Challenging previous accounts, Geoffrey Megargee shatters the myth that German generals would have prevailed in World War II if only Hitler had not meddled in their affairs. Indeed, Megargee argues, the German high command was much more flawed than many have suspected or acknowledged. Inside Hitler's High Command reveals that while Hitler was the central figure in many military decisions, his generals were equal partners in Germany's catastrophic defeat.
Megargee exposes the structure, processes, and personalities that governed the Third Reich's military decision making and shows how Germany's presumed battlefield superiority was undermined by poor strategic and operational planning at the highest levels. His study tracks the evolution of German military leadership under the Nazis from 1933 to 1945 and expands our understanding of the balance of power within the high command, the role of personalities in its organizational development, and the influence of German military intellectuals on its structure and function. He also shows how the organization of the high command was plagued by ambition, stubbornness, political intrigue, and overworked staff officers. And his "a week in the life" chapter puts the high command under a magnifying glass to reveal its inner workings during the fierce fighting on the Russian Front in December 1941.
Megargee also offers new insights into the high command crises of 1938 and shows how German general staff made fatal mistakes in their planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Their arrogant dismissal of the Soviet military's ability to defend its homeland and virtual disregard for the extensive intelligence and sound logistics that undergird successful large-scale military campaigns ultimately came back to haunt them.
In the final assessment, observes Megargee, the generals' strategic ideas were no better than Hitler's and often worse. Heinz Guderian, Franz Halder, and the rest were as guilty of self-deception as their Fuhrer, believing that innate German superiority and strength of will were enough to overcome nearly any obstacle. Inside Hitler's High Command exposes these surprising flaws and illuminates the process of strategy and decision making in the Third Reich.
Megargee exposes the structure, processes, and personalities that governed the Third Reich's military decision making and shows how Germany's presumed battlefield superiority was undermined by poor strategic and operational planning at the highest levels. His study tracks the evolution of German military leadership under the Nazis from 1933 to 1945 and expands our understanding of the balance of power within the high command, the role of personalities in its organizational development, and the influence of German military intellectuals on its structure and function. He also shows how the organization of the high command was plagued by ambition, stubbornness, political intrigue, and overworked staff officers. And his "a week in the life" chapter puts the high command under a magnifying glass to reveal its inner workings during the fierce fighting on the Russian Front in December 1941.
Megargee also offers new insights into the high command crises of 1938 and shows how German general staff made fatal mistakes in their planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Their arrogant dismissal of the Soviet military's ability to defend its homeland and virtual disregard for the extensive intelligence and sound logistics that undergird successful large-scale military campaigns ultimately came back to haunt them.
In the final assessment, observes Megargee, the generals' strategic ideas were no better than Hitler's and often worse. Heinz Guderian, Franz Halder, and the rest were as guilty of self-deception as their Fuhrer, believing that innate German superiority and strength of will were enough to overcome nearly any obstacle. Inside Hitler's High Command exposes these surprising flaws and illuminates the process of strategy and decision making in the Third Reich.
352 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2000
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About the author
Geoffrey P. Megargee
8 books4 followersGeoffrey P. Megargee was an American historian and author who specialized in World War II military history and the history of the Holocaust. He served as the project director and editor-in-chief for the Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933–1945 produced by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Megargee's work on the German High Command (the OKW) won the 2001 Distinguished Book Award from the Society for Military History.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
March 4, 2026
A strange book to me as I am noticing a trend in the recent ww2 books I have read. They start off with a great premise that hooks you and then the book recedes to a regurgitation of things you have heard many times before with extremely tiny sections that are original or new.
Most of this book is focused on the staff disputes between OKH and OKW which are famous. Even then 80% of the book runs up to 1942 and then he briskly goes through the last 3 years. This might be due to Germany not conducting many operations after 1942 due to them having to react to superior forces and having such a convoluted and divided command structure that no group was able to make a plan that would reshuffle units around.
What is interesting is he makes the obvious point that any sensible person should have but often gets left out. That by December 1941 the Germans lost the war due to failing to knock out the Soviets in a few weeks and declaring war on the US. No matter how perfectly they played their cards they were not going to win. Every description of Barbarossa mentions that their logistics ran out or slowed operations but no one mentions that they believed they could get to the Volga in 1941! They seemed to take about 50-60% of the ground they took in 1941 in the first 2 weeks or so. Which justifies that expectation. He also points out that between Hitler and his generals no one had any strategic vision after the fall of France. The main point of the book is that what made them good in the beginning, their operational art and command system, which was their only advantage gradually broke down and was not paired with a strategic vision to win the war and the army became more and more ideological while the Soviet's became better and better at operations. That and the German staff doctrine placed little emphasis on intelligence gathering or logistics which wrecked them. They thought intelligence gathering was less relevant as they planned on the enemy doing the thing that would be most damaging to them not what they would most likely do.
The German system worked well against well known enemies like France and Britain as they could predict what they would do but they were blind the whole time against the Soviets. They constantly underestimated their strength and were surprised by their attacks.
The book's main point is to be realistic on the German General staff that is so idolized in the West. He points out constantly that what the Generals complained about after the war was not at all what happened during. They complain that Hitler started a war they knew they couldn't win when in fact they all wanted and expected a war to rectify things. He believes many generals did not think they had lost till very very late in the war.
I have heard people say Hitler was an organizational genius, after reading this book I don't know how anyone could think that.
Most of this book is focused on the staff disputes between OKH and OKW which are famous. Even then 80% of the book runs up to 1942 and then he briskly goes through the last 3 years. This might be due to Germany not conducting many operations after 1942 due to them having to react to superior forces and having such a convoluted and divided command structure that no group was able to make a plan that would reshuffle units around.
What is interesting is he makes the obvious point that any sensible person should have but often gets left out. That by December 1941 the Germans lost the war due to failing to knock out the Soviets in a few weeks and declaring war on the US. No matter how perfectly they played their cards they were not going to win. Every description of Barbarossa mentions that their logistics ran out or slowed operations but no one mentions that they believed they could get to the Volga in 1941! They seemed to take about 50-60% of the ground they took in 1941 in the first 2 weeks or so. Which justifies that expectation. He also points out that between Hitler and his generals no one had any strategic vision after the fall of France. The main point of the book is that what made them good in the beginning, their operational art and command system, which was their only advantage gradually broke down and was not paired with a strategic vision to win the war and the army became more and more ideological while the Soviet's became better and better at operations. That and the German staff doctrine placed little emphasis on intelligence gathering or logistics which wrecked them. They thought intelligence gathering was less relevant as they planned on the enemy doing the thing that would be most damaging to them not what they would most likely do.
The German system worked well against well known enemies like France and Britain as they could predict what they would do but they were blind the whole time against the Soviets. They constantly underestimated their strength and were surprised by their attacks.
The book's main point is to be realistic on the German General staff that is so idolized in the West. He points out constantly that what the Generals complained about after the war was not at all what happened during. They complain that Hitler started a war they knew they couldn't win when in fact they all wanted and expected a war to rectify things. He believes many generals did not think they had lost till very very late in the war.
I have heard people say Hitler was an organizational genius, after reading this book I don't know how anyone could think that.
May 6, 2025
The best account of German war planning I’ve ever read. Comically dysfunctional in many ways, the Prussian view of general staff functions worked well operationally, which seemed to lull the German high command into making the same mistakes in WWII that they made in the previous war in terms of command structure, logistics, intelligence, and personnel.
December 21, 2008
An award-winning account of strategic decision making in Nazi Germany.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews