A fascinating analysis of one of the most important political and economic ideas of our time: the ties between America’s military and its economy
In Dwight D. Eisenhower’s last speech as president, on January 17, 1961, he warned America about the “military-industrial complex,” a mutual dependency between the nation’s industrial base and its military structure that had developed during World War II. After the conflict ended, the nation did not abandon its wartime economy but rather the opposite. Military spending has steadily increased, giving rise to one of the key ideas that continues to shape our country’s political landscape.
In this book, published to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of Eisenhower’s farewell address, journalist James Ledbetter shows how the government, military contractors, and the nation’s overall economy have become inseparable. Some of the effects are beneficial, such as cell phones, GPS systems, the Internet, and the Hubble Space Telescope, all of which emerged from technologies first developed for the military. But the military-industrial complex has also provoked agonizing questions. Does our massive military establishment—bigger than those of the next ten largest combined—really make us safer? How much of our perception of security threats is driven by the profit-making motives of military contractors? To what extent is our foreign policy influenced by contractors’ financial interests?
Ledbetter uncovers the surprising origins and the even more surprising afterlife of the military-industrial complex, an idea that arose as early as the 1930s, and shows how it gained traction during World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam era and continues even today.
I'll most definitely reread sections in this book I found intriguing. Both the quantity, and quality of the information contained within this book was something you just wouldn't expect for a short book of 220 pages. "Unwarranted Influence" illustrates the insidious forces that have and still operate within the deep state and political spheres. The military-industrial complex is a complex nexus between arms manufacturers and the government (specifically the legislative branch and the Department of Defense). A specific idea called the "merchants of death thesis" (coined in the 1930's) points out that arms manufacturers purposely perpetuate and start wars abroad to maximize their profits. Evidence of this is highlighted throughout the book and administrations as far back as Eisenhower have been up against forces within the MIC that control legislatures into fighting for increased defense appropriations budgets. The book mainly examines the Eisenhower administration and how the MIC manifested itself during Eisenhower's tenure. The Vietnam War had everything to do with arms manufacturers encouraging further American involvement and nothing to do with the "principled" notion of fighting communism abroad.
An interesting piece of history I learned was the Kennedy administration's stance on the issue. In the 1960's (during Kennedy's campaign), Kennedy advocated for increased defense spending because he fell for fabricated Air Force statistics that claimed that the United States was far behind the Soviet Union in the amount of missiles they had. Kennedy and his defense secretary Robert McNamara later learned that the widely circulated "missile gap" stats were a fabrication. They were also up against legislatures fighting for the production of the B-70 even though it was completely useless. Kennedy and McNamara had also learned that the military (specifically Air Force) had factions within them making preparations for a preemptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. The administration (just like Eisenhowers) constantly had to fend against defense contractors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressmen whose districts benefited from military spending.
Another piece of history that wasn't mentioned in the book that should've been mentioned and that I also thought was atrocious was the Kennedy administration and "Operation Northwoods." Declassified documents reveal a plan that had been outlined during Kennedy's tenure by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that involved the United States and CIA attacking American civilians and American military personnel through terrorist attacks. The plan would've used these attacks to justify a war with Cuba by blaming the attacks on the Cuban government. Kennedy ultimately rejected the plan. What does this prove? It proves the deep state's self interest and the lengths the deep state will take to go to war.
I'm only listing a few examples of how the military had become a self-serving entity interested in business with individuals who would only benefit from wars. The end of the book also brings up the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and how similar entities that were responsible for the Vietnam War was also responsible for these wars. The MIC controls the government.
The book also proposes potential solutions such as nationalizing the arms manufacturers responsible for military armament and repealing the "Military Sales Act." This law states that selling arms abroad is under the "commerce" sphere, not the "foreign aid" sphere. Obviously, this complex problem does not have one simple solution. Simply lowering defense appropriations isn't enough simply because the MIC has cornered the government. Arms lobbyists and defense contractors and the grip they hold aren't to be underestimated. This book can do a much better job than I can on the MIC explanation on its history.
I'll end this review with an Eisenhower quote: "America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched progress, riches, and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment."
Ledbetter takes us through the ideological antecedents of Eisenhower's famous "military-industrial complex" speech, charts how usage of the phrase has changed since Ike used it, and describes how various politicians and activists have acted upon the concerns he popularized.
So, we get interesting discussion of the 1930s "merchants of death" movement, Ike's own studies of the army-industry relationship around the same time, C. Wright Mills, Norman Cousins (a big influence on Ike, surprisingly) SDS, and so on. Ledbetter has gone back to the speech's original drafts in order to trace who was responsible for contributing what, but the paper trail is very incomplete and much remains uncertain.
I particularly enjoyed the section on how the Vietnam-era Left put Ike's idea to use. There's a wistful pleasure merely in reading about the days when activists harassed weapons manufacturers and warmongerers---it's sadly clear that today's pseudo-Left is far too busy with "The Resistance" to be bothered with such things. However, one notes an ironic episode in 1970 in which protestors tried to shut down the University of Minnesota because of its connection with weapon making and research. Its president at the time, Malcolm Moos, had been Eisenhower's chief speechwriter, and may well have been responsible for launching the concept which, all unwittingly, the protestors were using as their basis for action.
Picked up this book at the library after noticing it next to another book I'd planned to check out. This is an excellent primer on Eisenhower's concerns about the Military-Industrial Complex, from his early Army days charged with producing reports on industrial mobilization for the War Department to the history of the unnerving concept from the post-Civil War era to today. Gave me more appreciation of the overall issue and Eisenhower's internal struggles with it while president. Will refer to this often, I presume.
This book gives a great overview of the idea of the military-industrial complex; however, I think more detail could have been included. This book frames the problem well, but it would have been nice to see solutions presented. Overall, it is sobering to understand the grave concern that Dwight Eisenhower, presumably a military man, held toward the strong relationship between the military, private industry, and the federal government.