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Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the "nuts and bolts" of war. He considers the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, often mentioned (but rarely explored) by the vast majority of books on military history. By concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, van Creveld is also able to offer an original reinterpretation of military history. First Edition Hb (1977): 0-521-21730-X FIrst Edition Pb (1979): 0-521-29793-1
313 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1977
24 people are currently reading
2063 people want to read
About the author
Martin van Creveld
65 books128 followersMartin Levi van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 45 reviews
October 24, 2023
This is one of those books that you buy and then when it arrives instantly regret. Not because it's a bad book. It isn't. I found it easy to read and interesting enough. I'm not sure there were too many surprises - if you don't have enough petrol you can't run your tanks (I'm being facetious here) - but the logistical difficulties of D-Day was a bit of an eye-opener. I regret it because it cost £26. Yes, I made the decision to buy it, but I thought it was going to be more informative, and - a small point, but not unimportant - of better physical quality (I've read it the once and already it's heavily creased and almost falling apart). The other problem is, as a casual reader I have no idea if what Creveld is arguing is accurate. To do that you would need years of specialist reading. Just in passing, this is the second book I've read recently which states that the Germans DID have winter clothing for their soldiers in Russia. They just couldn't get it to them in time because of logistical problems. It's a point worth making, but the difference between not having winter clothing and having it but not being able to deploy it seems very small.
July 23, 2023
A good study, if not exhaustive, of the problems and resolutions of supplying armies in the field. Often times he seems to come up with different reasons for why things worked the way they did than would be the accepted norm for various times of warfare. Things like Napoleon didn't devise a new method of supply, or warfare in any real sense, just took advantage of things that others had done previously on a more grand scale. One of the things that he came up with in conclusion was that vehicles have not extended the reach of armies on the move. Sort of the Soviet way of doing things. Punch go as far as you can, stop and resupply and move again. This also appears to have been the case on the Western Front as well, only a little less visible and blamed primarily on the lack of good ports as opposed to any other reason.
I found some weaknesses in the book, which in the ten year update chapter at the end I was glad to see that the author actually expressed as well. Things like the book is very Euro-centric. No campaigns in the America's or Asia in this work. But since this book came out there are a number of other authors who have dived into the subject and now there is if anything a great deal of selection to look into these aspects of Supplying Armies at War.
I most likely won't be following this avenue of reading, but I am glad that I read this book, it provides a lot to consider.
I found some weaknesses in the book, which in the ten year update chapter at the end I was glad to see that the author actually expressed as well. Things like the book is very Euro-centric. No campaigns in the America's or Asia in this work. But since this book came out there are a number of other authors who have dived into the subject and now there is if anything a great deal of selection to look into these aspects of Supplying Armies at War.
I most likely won't be following this avenue of reading, but I am glad that I read this book, it provides a lot to consider.
July 8, 2015
Impressive. Somewhat difficult to absorb when talking about Napoleon and Marlborough; but treatment of WWII and especially the D-Day landings (latter half of the book) shows some of the best military analysis and writing I've encountered. It is a superbly informative way to view these events; and remains at all times lucid and transparent. Macro-scale topics and micro-scale incidents; choice aphorisms and broad principles are handled in a finely balanced manner. A very fun and engaging read for military junkies.
July 6, 2008
"Clearly, logistics is the hard part of fighting a war."
--Lt. Gen. E. T. Cook, USMC, November 1990
"Gentlemen, the officer who doesn't know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless."
--Gen. George S. Patton, USA
"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."
--Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps)
As the last of those three quotes puts so pithily, the true study of war lies less in the romantic areas of strategy and tactics than it does in the less romantic but perhaps more practical and pertinent study of the real business of making war - logistics and operational analysis. In this masterful work, Martin Van Crevald applies operational analysis to the texts of history to dissect some of the most important military campaigns in Western history with an eye toward explaining how logistics dictated, or more often failed to dictate, the strategy and and tactics of some of histories most famous commanders. By doing so, he shows that insufficient logistic support virtually foredoomed many a campaign to failure regardless of the merit of the commander or the skill of the troops.
Martin van Crevald is the only non-American author whose books are on the required reading list for American Army officers. It is pretty much impossible to read this book and not see why that is so. Certainly one of the best books on military theory I've ever read, and maybe one of the best books of history I've ever read.
--Lt. Gen. E. T. Cook, USMC, November 1990
"Gentlemen, the officer who doesn't know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless."
--Gen. George S. Patton, USA
"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."
--Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps)
As the last of those three quotes puts so pithily, the true study of war lies less in the romantic areas of strategy and tactics than it does in the less romantic but perhaps more practical and pertinent study of the real business of making war - logistics and operational analysis. In this masterful work, Martin Van Crevald applies operational analysis to the texts of history to dissect some of the most important military campaigns in Western history with an eye toward explaining how logistics dictated, or more often failed to dictate, the strategy and and tactics of some of histories most famous commanders. By doing so, he shows that insufficient logistic support virtually foredoomed many a campaign to failure regardless of the merit of the commander or the skill of the troops.
Martin van Crevald is the only non-American author whose books are on the required reading list for American Army officers. It is pretty much impossible to read this book and not see why that is so. Certainly one of the best books on military theory I've ever read, and maybe one of the best books of history I've ever read.
April 17, 2023
I always enjoy watching a master historian change the narrative and force us to think differently about what happened in the past, and one of the best paradigm-breaking military historians out there is Dr. van Creveld. This, his ground-breaking examination of military logistics not only takes a fresh look at some of the hoarier generalities with which the supply and movement of armies are dismissed in previous narratives, but the book made it cool to talk about logistics, and helped to spawn a series of books that bring this vital but often-overlooked topic to light. After an overview of the pre-modern logistician had to deal with (mostly water transport and bullock-carts), Van Creveld cleverly focuses his formidable attention on several famous modern mobile operations that had logistical complications, such as Napoleon's 1905 and Russian campaigns, Barbarossa, the German Wars of Unification, the battles in the Western Desert, etc. and that utilized new technologies, such as railroads and motor vehicles. Suddenly, decisions which seem illogical in the distance of time are made clear when examined from an administrative perspective. We also get a better sense of what happens when the logistical means don't match the objectives, as Hitler and Napoleon both discovered in Russia.
I feel like I learned a lot from this book but, more than that, it made me aware of a topic I had overlooked in my personal education. Professionals study logistics, indeed. I would recommend Supplying War to anyone who desires a fascinating and approachable introduction to the subject.
I feel like I learned a lot from this book but, more than that, it made me aware of a topic I had overlooked in my personal education. Professionals study logistics, indeed. I would recommend Supplying War to anyone who desires a fascinating and approachable introduction to the subject.
April 3, 2025
September 27, 2010
There is an expression in the US military: “Amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.” And this is made crystal clear in this book which explains in detail why so many great campaigns in history, such as the German invasion of the Soviet Union, faltered because of totally inadequate logistics planning. The author is the world authority on military logistics. Absolutely first rate.
April 12, 2023
One of those history books you read that points out something that feels so intuitive, and yet which is never central in most of the works of general or specific history that one reads. Here, that basic insight is that militaries rely on logistics, and the capacity to supply armies has been as central, if not more so, to war and conflict than strategies and goals of the states engaged in them. It proceeds by reviewing the development of supply systems and logistical apparatuses from roughly the 1600s until the Second World War, and identifies the key pivot point between older and newer forms of logistical requirements as 1914, with the start of World War I. It was at this point, van Crevald argues, that the requirements of armies for ammunition and industrial supplies drastically surpassed the needs for food and fodder, which previously had been the bulk of supplies needed. The result has been that modern armies have been increasingly reliant on increasingly complex supply chains in a manner completely different from the armies of the early modern era, which could carry their ammunition and gather their food on the march. I learned so much about how supply systems work and were developed, methods for calculating supply requirements and capacities, and how modern warfare since 1914 has flipped the existing needs of armies. Also, for being an ostensibly dull topic, this was for me a thoroughly gripping read, with easily spaced out chapters that made it easy to pick up and put down.
Some other things I learned, in no particular order:
-as late as 1914, armies still relied on foraging from the countryside to feed themselves.
-sieges before 1914 were almost as hard for the besieger as the besieged, since the food requirements of the armies were usually much bigger than could be transported, and if they stayed in one place to besiege a location, they would exhaust the supplies of that region very quickly.
-the German general staff commission a study in 1841 which concluded that railways would never replace marching on the highroad for military transport.
-the Allies in invading Northern Europe succeeded in spite of, rather than because of, the extensive preparations and calculations of their logistics staffers, who were insisting that advancing on the Seine and liberating Paris would not be possible before the fall even as Allied forces were doing it in August.
-For all the focus that has been lavished on Erwin Rommel's generalship in North Africa, he essentially did not pay much attention to logistics and blamed the failure of supplies for his troops on issues like the defense of Malta when really his inability to bring supplies forward from Tripoli was to blame.
-The German invasion of the Soviet Union was always conducted at the extreme limits of what the German supply system could sustain, and I came away less wondering why the Germans eventually were stopped and more asking myself how the Germans were even able to make the gains against the Soviets that they did.
-Germany's Blitzkrieg tactics later in World War II relied on the French and Dutch vehicles captured in 1940, which provided vital to providing any kind of road-mobile supply system for the Wehrmacht.
Some other things I learned, in no particular order:
-as late as 1914, armies still relied on foraging from the countryside to feed themselves.
-sieges before 1914 were almost as hard for the besieger as the besieged, since the food requirements of the armies were usually much bigger than could be transported, and if they stayed in one place to besiege a location, they would exhaust the supplies of that region very quickly.
-the German general staff commission a study in 1841 which concluded that railways would never replace marching on the highroad for military transport.
-the Allies in invading Northern Europe succeeded in spite of, rather than because of, the extensive preparations and calculations of their logistics staffers, who were insisting that advancing on the Seine and liberating Paris would not be possible before the fall even as Allied forces were doing it in August.
-For all the focus that has been lavished on Erwin Rommel's generalship in North Africa, he essentially did not pay much attention to logistics and blamed the failure of supplies for his troops on issues like the defense of Malta when really his inability to bring supplies forward from Tripoli was to blame.
-The German invasion of the Soviet Union was always conducted at the extreme limits of what the German supply system could sustain, and I came away less wondering why the Germans eventually were stopped and more asking myself how the Germans were even able to make the gains against the Soviets that they did.
-Germany's Blitzkrieg tactics later in World War II relied on the French and Dutch vehicles captured in 1940, which provided vital to providing any kind of road-mobile supply system for the Wehrmacht.
October 18, 2017
"Hundreds of books on strategy and tactics have been written for every one on logistics."
Van Creveld takes the unglamorous but necessary task of examining logistics throughout the ages and delivers a fine book that gives the reader a deeper understanding of an often overlooked subject. His conclusions - that "most armies seem to have prepared their campaigns as best as they could on an ad hoc basis, making great, if uncoordinated efforts to gather together the largest possible number of tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, railway troops etc., while giving little, if any, thought to the 'ideal' combination which, in theory, would have carried them the furthest" and that "to believe that war, or indeed any other aspect of human behaviour, can ever be grasped by means of the intellect alone is to give proof of a hubris" are smashing.
Van Creveld takes the unglamorous but necessary task of examining logistics throughout the ages and delivers a fine book that gives the reader a deeper understanding of an often overlooked subject. His conclusions - that "most armies seem to have prepared their campaigns as best as they could on an ad hoc basis, making great, if uncoordinated efforts to gather together the largest possible number of tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, railway troops etc., while giving little, if any, thought to the 'ideal' combination which, in theory, would have carried them the furthest" and that "to believe that war, or indeed any other aspect of human behaviour, can ever be grasped by means of the intellect alone is to give proof of a hubris" are smashing.
July 10, 2025
In order to get ingest all of the information in this book, you do require an extensive knowledge of European history. Without serious knowledge of the thirty years war, I was a bit lost in the details but luckily the main takeaways applied all the way to WW1.
In general, it’s better to keep your army moving, because you are feeding your troops with the food you can buy, steal, requisition along the way. When you attempt you stop you are fucked. This is why Napoleons troops all starved on the way back from Russia.
Then we get to WW1 and my expectation was that the technology would make military supply chains good enough that they don’t need to live off the land. Nope they were trecking shit across Europe with horses.
Anyways the interesting thing that changes in WW1 is that the % of tonnage being moved shifted from being mostly food to weapons and ammo. Unfortunately you cannot grow that shit on trees, so real supply chains were necessary.
Also the Nazis were trash at logistics. They built these fancy tanks that were effective but broke down too often and required too many spare parts. Not as big of a deal when you are moving a few hundred miles west to France. A lot bigger if a deal when you are making you way through Russia in the winter. Or moving through the North African desserts.
While this book wasn’t life changing it has certainly changed the way I think about history, which is a 4 start rating for me.
In general, it’s better to keep your army moving, because you are feeding your troops with the food you can buy, steal, requisition along the way. When you attempt you stop you are fucked. This is why Napoleons troops all starved on the way back from Russia.
Then we get to WW1 and my expectation was that the technology would make military supply chains good enough that they don’t need to live off the land. Nope they were trecking shit across Europe with horses.
Anyways the interesting thing that changes in WW1 is that the % of tonnage being moved shifted from being mostly food to weapons and ammo. Unfortunately you cannot grow that shit on trees, so real supply chains were necessary.
Also the Nazis were trash at logistics. They built these fancy tanks that were effective but broke down too often and required too many spare parts. Not as big of a deal when you are moving a few hundred miles west to France. A lot bigger if a deal when you are making you way through Russia in the winter. Or moving through the North African desserts.
While this book wasn’t life changing it has certainly changed the way I think about history, which is a 4 start rating for me.
July 19, 2021
One of the reasons why I am interested in military history is the art in which armies move around and how commanders manage to get men and equipment in the right place at the right time. Supplying War shows the reader, in part, how this works and what can go wrong.
Van Creveld shows how and why Napoleon was able to move his troops around quickly and how they managed supplies. He explains how one campaign was successful and yet the other failed miserably. The Franco-Prussian war saw a first use of trains, but they played a far larger role during WWI. But WWI was also a different kind of war, not yet seen before. Where armies used to move around and live of the land, the static war made this impossible. It was also a war that saw an immense use of artillery shells which needed to be brought forward.
Operation Barbarossa saw the German army move quickly into Russia, but it came to a halt when the supplies ran out and the logistics couldn't keep up with demand. And yes, winter did play a part in this too. What would have happened if Rommel had obeyed the order not to start an offensive without proper preparations shortly after his arrival in North Africa? The Normandy campaign, which had a slow start, suddenly exploded with the Allied armies racing across France, till they ran out of fuel. Despite great efforts on the logistics side, it took a while to recover.
In this Second Edition, Van Creveld also points out the lessons learned during the Gulf Wars. It shows us how the modern armies are highly dependent on the industry at home.
Overall I enjoyed reading this book since it did show me a couple of things that are quite logical when explained yet are easily overlooked. It is well written and quite easy to understand even if you are not fully familiar with the campaigns he uses to explain the logistics issues involved.
Van Creveld shows how and why Napoleon was able to move his troops around quickly and how they managed supplies. He explains how one campaign was successful and yet the other failed miserably. The Franco-Prussian war saw a first use of trains, but they played a far larger role during WWI. But WWI was also a different kind of war, not yet seen before. Where armies used to move around and live of the land, the static war made this impossible. It was also a war that saw an immense use of artillery shells which needed to be brought forward.
Operation Barbarossa saw the German army move quickly into Russia, but it came to a halt when the supplies ran out and the logistics couldn't keep up with demand. And yes, winter did play a part in this too. What would have happened if Rommel had obeyed the order not to start an offensive without proper preparations shortly after his arrival in North Africa? The Normandy campaign, which had a slow start, suddenly exploded with the Allied armies racing across France, till they ran out of fuel. Despite great efforts on the logistics side, it took a while to recover.
In this Second Edition, Van Creveld also points out the lessons learned during the Gulf Wars. It shows us how the modern armies are highly dependent on the industry at home.
Overall I enjoyed reading this book since it did show me a couple of things that are quite logical when explained yet are easily overlooked. It is well written and quite easy to understand even if you are not fully familiar with the campaigns he uses to explain the logistics issues involved.
August 27, 2020
An updated edition of a ground-breaking study that opened a new field of study.
As a military historian, van Creveld's book gave me a totally new insight into the nature, problems, and impacts of logistics and supply on warfare for the last four centuries. It blows away many commonly held assumptions on the matter with careful research, showing that the systems of logistics used since time immemorial were gradually improved over time, but did not really change until the ammunition demand of WWI trench warfare forced them to.
The impacts of the need to forage for supplies on the courses of battles and campaigns is made clear (even the planning of Napoleon in 1806 and of the magnificent planning of the Germans in 1914 quickly collapsed in the face of reality). If the old saying of 'Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics' is true, then this is an essential book for all professionals.
As a military historian, van Creveld's book gave me a totally new insight into the nature, problems, and impacts of logistics and supply on warfare for the last four centuries. It blows away many commonly held assumptions on the matter with careful research, showing that the systems of logistics used since time immemorial were gradually improved over time, but did not really change until the ammunition demand of WWI trench warfare forced them to.
The impacts of the need to forage for supplies on the courses of battles and campaigns is made clear (even the planning of Napoleon in 1806 and of the magnificent planning of the Germans in 1914 quickly collapsed in the face of reality). If the old saying of 'Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics' is true, then this is an essential book for all professionals.
March 31, 2015
Have been reading David Stahel's massive 4 volume work on the opening round on the Eastern Front, his latest book "The Battle for Moscow" references Creveld, on the massive logistic difficulties the Wehrmact faced.
Supplying War, Covers the logistical side of the war from some fast moving armies from the 17th century, WWI, the Eastern Front, to D Day. Liked his chapters on WWI, the Schlieffen Plan, and laid the Wehrmact failure of supply out east directly on the OKH.
I've enjoyed the book immensely, and anyone who is interested in military history should give this a read. That supplying Armies is a very tough job and no matter how well prepared you are things will go wrong and one must be very flexible.
Supplying War, Covers the logistical side of the war from some fast moving armies from the 17th century, WWI, the Eastern Front, to D Day. Liked his chapters on WWI, the Schlieffen Plan, and laid the Wehrmact failure of supply out east directly on the OKH.
I've enjoyed the book immensely, and anyone who is interested in military history should give this a read. That supplying Armies is a very tough job and no matter how well prepared you are things will go wrong and one must be very flexible.
August 3, 2011
4/5 Stars. A very, very dry book for the most part but there are some spots that impressively lighten it up. This book is all about the logistics of warfare. The writer attempts to show how wars are won or lost often through logistical failure or excellence and many times throughout history tactical and strategic excellence failed to achieve the desired result because of a poor mastery of logistics. Would recommend this for anyone in the military in a logistics branch, would not recommend this for anyone outside the military at all.
May 18, 2014
Probably one of my top ten favourite military history books. I first read it for my BA in the 1970s and still have the original copy. At the time it was a radical approach to the study of logistics and its impact on strategy. Subsequent research and time has wiped some of the gloss off its originality but it remains an important book. Essential reading for scholars, soldiers and anyone interested in how wars are influenced by logistics.
May 22, 2023
Martin Van Creveld is a highly respected (renowned?) Israeli military historian and this compact but 'fully-supplied' account of the role of logistics certainly bolsters that reputation. I say fully-supplied except that my only quibble is that he focuses solely on European warfare, ignoring the important lessons of the American Civil War near the dawn of the railroad age, and I dropped 1-star for that omission. But it is still a superb account on the nature, role and evolution of logistics. For the non-history buffs, 'Wallenstein' in the title refers to the Catholic general from the Thirty Years War. Gustavus Adolphus from the same period also gets a cameo but the 17th and early 18th century wars (the 'Dutch' wars and the Spanish Succession) of Louis XIV and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) receive a fuller treatment. This was the era when siege warfare reached its apex and Van Creveld provides tremendous insight into the logistical issues of the period. Armies basically has to 'move or die' due to the necessity of living 'off the land', but Marlborough's famous march to the Danube culminating at Blenheim proved the exception and the analysis of how he did it (logistically) is quite interesting.
The Napoleonic Wars of course receive significant attention, the last major conflict before the advent of rail. The brilliant march to Austerlitz in 1805 and of course the 1812 debacle receiving the most analysis. An interesting point made repeatedly about all the 17th to 19th century wars was the fact that human and horse (especially) sustenance was by far the chief supply challenge, not the consumption of shells and bullets. The slow-firing weapons of the era simply did not consume much!
He moves on to the pivotal wars of German unification culminating in the Franco-Prussian war (1870) and the interesting transition to rail transport but stressing the continued role of wagons and horse supply necessary to supply the much larger armies. That trend continued right through WW1 and even WW2 until Ford and U.S. industry was able to motorize the entire Allied armies in Europe. Unfortunately, he does not discuss the role of U.S. truck shipments to the Soviet Union in allowing the Red Army to solve major supply transport issues. His analyses of the logistics of Schlieffen Plan in 1914 and especially Operation Barbarossa in 1941 are superb. Still amazed at what the Germans were thinking in 1941, other than following a maniac. How the largest invasion in human history got planned in less than a year and almost succeeded despite the literally insane logistical challenges that are described in some detail in this superb book!
The Napoleonic Wars of course receive significant attention, the last major conflict before the advent of rail. The brilliant march to Austerlitz in 1805 and of course the 1812 debacle receiving the most analysis. An interesting point made repeatedly about all the 17th to 19th century wars was the fact that human and horse (especially) sustenance was by far the chief supply challenge, not the consumption of shells and bullets. The slow-firing weapons of the era simply did not consume much!
He moves on to the pivotal wars of German unification culminating in the Franco-Prussian war (1870) and the interesting transition to rail transport but stressing the continued role of wagons and horse supply necessary to supply the much larger armies. That trend continued right through WW1 and even WW2 until Ford and U.S. industry was able to motorize the entire Allied armies in Europe. Unfortunately, he does not discuss the role of U.S. truck shipments to the Soviet Union in allowing the Red Army to solve major supply transport issues. His analyses of the logistics of Schlieffen Plan in 1914 and especially Operation Barbarossa in 1941 are superb. Still amazed at what the Germans were thinking in 1941, other than following a maniac. How the largest invasion in human history got planned in less than a year and almost succeeded despite the literally insane logistical challenges that are described in some detail in this superb book!
December 21, 2020
A good book, providing a series of case studies of the role of logistics on military campaigns in modern warfare. This book provides emphasis to the old adage that “amateurs talk tactics while professionals discuss logistics.” Through studies of major campaigns from the 17th century through to WWII the author, famed scholar Martin Van Creveld, convincingly explains how logistics have shaped the course and outcome of military conflict. Though written over 40 years ago, this book is still relevant - even if some of the campaigns studied have new perspectives (Schlieffen’s Plan and Market Garden most noticeably). The book centers not on the leadership of the commanders or the course of the campaigns, but rather on the logistics planned and executed. Van Creveld shows how campaign plans are very much at the mercy of logistics and how armies that understand their logistical challenges are far more likely to prevail, even if they don’t fully fix the reasons for those challenges. He argues that the ability to overcome these logistic challenges comes from an elastic model of supply, with successful armies having the initiative and demeanor to quickly shift focus to means of supply that work, most noticeably “living off the land.” He also points out tha, although technology has changed the method of supply (wagons to railroads to trucks) the concurrent technological change in other military areas have only made logistics more complicated. This is more true as industrial style warfare of the 20th century has further constrained an elastic method of supply. I especially liked the inclusion of the Allied 1944 campaigns in France as a counterpoint to the idea that a well-stocked “larder” will ensure success. Van Creveld shows that having a bounty of supplies can be just as detrimental to a campaign’s objective as having a dearth. My one issue with the book was its narrow focus on Central European campaigns, Napoleon’s Russian campaign being the only campaign discussed which did not primarily take place between the Rhine and Seine rivers. The American Civil War (with its many logistical case studies) is never mentioned, nor are maritime logistics fully appreciated. But, the arguments made are still convincing, so including these other facets would have presented a wider viewpoint but wouldn’t have changed the conclusion. This a needed book for anyone studying the profession of arms. Highly recommended for those wanting to understand the effect of logistics on campaign plans.
October 25, 2022
Few would realize that it took until the 1970s for an academic treatment of military logistics, but yet Martin Van Creveld's book is the first real look into the historical evolution of the movement of materiel. It's for that reason I give Van Creveld the benefit of the doubt. The book is a march through what Van Creveld holds as the seminal conflicts, from the 30 Years War to the Second World War. Creveld selects these conflicts in order to advance his theories as to how military logistics evolved. Creveld's theories are sound, but he focuses on too few and far too eurocentric to be definitive (Creveld, the definitive expert on Israeli military history, could have look the `48 or `67 or even `73 for analysis). Despite getting way too pedantic at times, the book is more breath than depth. Furthermore, his speculation on the future of logistics was completely off base as he completely misses the role of contractors in the MIC (though accurately guessing the future is a tricky business). Finally the author's writing style suffers from the worst of all crimes: it's far to English. He could have used to be far more concise and simple in his language.
June 12, 2021
Supplying War delivers a snapshot of logistics in 6 historical settings: Napoleon’s 1812 Russian campaign, the German war of reunification in 1870, the Schlieffen plan of 1914, and the World War Two campaigns of Barbarossa, Alamein and Normandy.
Van Creveld’s study of logistics is well researched and informative, but it is a book of its time. First published in 1977, the ideas which may have been original are now fairly well established. That said, the level of detail and the length are about right for the subject. The selected campaigns have been cherrypicked for their uniqueness in terms of technology and organisation, which allows the author to cover a wide range of ideas without making the book too long.
Van Creveld’s study of logistics is well researched and informative, but it is a book of its time. First published in 1977, the ideas which may have been original are now fairly well established. That said, the level of detail and the length are about right for the subject. The selected campaigns have been cherrypicked for their uniqueness in terms of technology and organisation, which allows the author to cover a wide range of ideas without making the book too long.
August 24, 2020
This was at least my fourth rereading of this classic work by a contemporary expert on military affairs. Not many books examine logistics in all its forms and this is by far the best. At times the writing and analysis reminded me of the work of Hans Delbruck in that the comfort Van Creveld shows with numbers and rationality resembles the way Delbruck treated the past in his analyses.
Making sure the men have food and ammo and show up on time are the keys to victory in modern war and Van Creveld demonstrates that with his usual wit and keen analysis.
Really, you need to read this, particularly if you know little of Supplying War.
Making sure the men have food and ammo and show up on time are the keys to victory in modern war and Van Creveld demonstrates that with his usual wit and keen analysis.
Really, you need to read this, particularly if you know little of Supplying War.
June 7, 2024
As a 30-year Air Force logistician, I found van Creveld's book a meticulously researched and engaging analysis of the logistics behind some of Europe's most important military campaigns. The author does a deep dive into the often-overlooked details of movement, supply, and transportation, offering insights into why Napoleon triumphed in 1805 but faltered in 1812, the march to Moscow, and Rommel's desert campaigns. This book (with a version updated in 2004) is a must-read for anyone interested in the crucial 'nuts and bolts' that underpin successful military operations, offering new perspectives on historical events from Gustavus Adolphus to Patton.
June 29, 2019
Książka jest swoistym klasykiem u osób, zajmujących się wojskowością. Nie ma czego się dziwić, gdyż jak to pisał Skalski "o korzeniach kwiatów" mało się piszę i mówi. Kolumna ciężarówek z jedzeniem i paliwem na ekranie, raczej nie porwie nikogo. Zaczynamy od wojsk, które prawie utrzymują się na miejscu, poprzez częściowe zaopatrywane z baz i kończymy na całkowitym zaopatrzeniu z centrali. Co ciekawe po 1914 roku wzrosła potrzeba transportu na pierwszą linię amunicji. Szkoda, że autor trochę po macoszemu potraktował Amerykanów i ZSRR.
August 22, 2018
Not a book for beginners to the field of military history. However, it offers a great perspective on the realities of war and what it takes to make a plan succeed. While his research was extensive and enlightening, some of his conclusions are a little off basis and clearly demonstrate the author's lack of military experience. That being said, he offers a lot of conclusions that are on the money and are highly relevant to operations today. Worth a read by any soldier looking for some good PD.
June 18, 2018
Clunkily written with an unfortunate zeal for numbers, it is an unusually striking view of historical thinking. Where The Art of War is more philosophy, this book is a history. Reading it around the same time as The Prize, a history of oil, greatly enlightened my sense of modern world structures.
August 31, 2022
From Europe in the 17th century to the adventures of Patton and the 3. Army in WW2, Martin Van Creveld covers a huge swath of the evolution of logistics in military history. Taking careful note of consumption & supply numbers, he shows that logistics can & should be something of serious academic study. There's much to unpack in this book... It's one I'll be sure to revisit in the future!
December 22, 2024
"...the battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins."
--Rommel
"Strategy became an appendix of logistics."
--The author
This book is a must-read for any military historian; amateur or professional. If a study of a campaign or battle isn't considering that 9/10 of that conflict is logistics--it is wrong.
--Rommel
"Strategy became an appendix of logistics."
--The author
This book is a must-read for any military historian; amateur or professional. If a study of a campaign or battle isn't considering that 9/10 of that conflict is logistics--it is wrong.
March 28, 2020
Solid book that can be a bit heavy at times. His analysis on the sustainment and logistics aspects of some major campaigns adds richness to the literature that tends to focus on the operational or movement and maneuver aspects of warfare.
January 2, 2023
As exemplified in the case of Rommel and the Afrika Korps, it's easy to lose sight of the logistical element when conducting an ends- means analysis. Of course logistics are an inescapable part of one's "means" and therefore such disregard is almost always folly.
February 19, 2024
Overall a survey of battles as examples of how war was (or wasn’t) impacted by logistics. The key takeaway - 1914 changed everything. From food and fodder being the primary drain on way pre-1914; and a focus on fuel, parts, and ammunition being the focus after.
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