In a career spanning decades, Mitchell B. Reiss has been at the center of some of America’s most sensitive diplomatic negotiations. He is internationally recognized for his negotiation efforts to forge peace in Northern Ireland and to stem the nuclear crisis in North Korea. In Negotiating with Evil, Reiss distills his experience to answer two questions more vital today than Should we talk to terrorists? And if we do, how should we conduct the negotiations in order to gain what we want?
To research this book, Reiss traveled the globe for three years, unearthing hidden aspects of the most secret and sensitive negotiations from recent history. He has interviewed hundreds of individuals, including prime ministers, generals, intelligence operatives, and former terrorists in conflict-torn regions of Europe, Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. The result is a fascinating examination of the different methods countries have employed to confront terrorist movements, the mistakes made, the victories achieved, and the lessons learned.
Negotiating with Evil is a penetrating and insightful look into high-stakes diplomacy in the post-9/11 world and a vital contribution to the global security debate as the United States and its allies struggle to confront terrorist threats abroad and at home.
Mitchell B. Reiss is a leading expert on American foreign policy and is internationally recognized for his negotiating skills during the Northern Ireland peace process and the North Korean nuclear crisis. On July 1, 2010, Reiss became the twenty-seventh President of Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland.
When to negotiate with terrorists - Who are terrorists and enemies of the state, who to negotiate with, how to open the communication, how many attempts to make, how should there be preconditions, and what makes it work, what makes it fail. All these questions and more are discussed in depth through 5 examples of governments working to communicate with groups that try to force change through terrorist activities. Some worked - Ireland - some haven't - yet. Through hundreds of interviews and intense research Reiss brings the stories of these attempts and repeated attempts at peace to life. I have brought some of his insights into a class I teach. I give some of the twists and turns experienced in peace negotiations as examples of how it can work and how it can go wrong.
The book begins with a clear conceptual introduction to the topic. Reiss points out, "While there is no guarantee that talking to enemy states will promote a country's national interests, there is likewise no guarantee that not talking will do so." Sometimes talks are opposed on the principled grounds that the very willingness to negotiate will diminish one's own state's moral authority and unjustly elevate the enemy's status. Other times, talks are opposed on the practical grounds that likely concessions would not lead to a fair solution but would only attempt to appease the enemy. "Appeasement is flawed," Reiss explains, "because it cannot satisfy states that wish to overturn the existing order, not merely negotiate adjustments to it." This is followed by chapters of recent case studies of negotiations in Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Iraq which should satisfy history buffs.