Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs

by Ray Takeyh

For over a quarter century, Iran has been one of America's chief nemeses. Ever since Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah in 1979, the relationship between the two nations has been antagonistic: revolutionary guards chanting against the Great Satan, Bush fulminating against the Axis of Evil, Iranian support for Hezbollah, and President Ahmadinejad blaming the U.S. for the world's ills.

The unending war of words suggests an intractable divide between Iran and the West, one that may very well lead to a shooting war in the near future. But as Ray Takeyh shows in this accessible and authoritative history of Iran's relations with the world since the revolution, behind the famous personalities and extremist slogans is a nation that is far more pragmatic--and complex--than many in the West have been led to believe. Takeyh explodes many of our simplistic myths of Iran as an intransigently Islamist foe of the West. Tracing the course of Iranian policy since the 1979 revolution, Takeyh identifies four distinct periods: the revolutionary era of the 1980s, the tempered gradualism following the death of Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989, the "reformist" period from 1997-2005 under President Khatami, and the shift toward confrontation and radicalism since the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005.

Takeyh shows that three powerful forces--Islamism, pragmatism, and great power pretensions--have competed in each of these periods, and that Iran's often paradoxical policies are in reality a series of compromises between the hardliners and the moderates, often with wild oscillations between pragmatism and ideological dogmatism. The U.S.'s task, Takeyh argues, is to find strategies that address Iran's objectionable behavior without demonizing this key player in an increasingly vital and volatile region. With its clear-sighted grasp of both nuance and historical sweep, Guardians of the Revolution will stand as the standard work on this controversial--and central--actor in world politics for years to come.

Genres: Iran, History, Nonfiction, Middle East, International Relations, Politics

316 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2009

Reviews

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

At first, I was not sure I would go far into this book. Published in 2009, it was a blatant play for a slot in the new Obama administration. And it worked as he got a position in the State Dept. I figured the book would be slanted but his review of Iranian history and politics was pretty decent. Giving it 3 Stars
The book was a return to the days of the "Shiite Crescent", the Iran-Contra affair, rise of suicide bombing in Lebanon, Op Eagle Claw, 444 days of hostages (of Nightline too). I found his explanation of the origin of the US Embassy takeover interesting and more than just because Carter let the Shah into the US for cancer treatment:

Domestic political rivalries and fears of a potential U.S.-sponsored coup have often been seen as the most likely culprits for the hostage crisis. However, two other factors must also be taken into consideration, namely, the clerics’ quest to usher in a militant foreign policy and a desire to strike a psychological blow against the United States.
Some good points on the Iran-Iraq War. Just before the start of that war, Iraq was in great shape, ready to take the leadership of Arab countries. The long decline started with the war:

However, Iran’s provocations cannot alone account for the war, as opportunism and greed also pressed Saddam toward conflict. Saddam's ambition to emerge as the leading actor in the Middle East was reinforced by Iraq’s changing regional position. By 1979, the Iraqi regime was at its most stable, as it had largely silenced the Kurdish insurgency while its oil wealth stood second only to Saudi Arabia’s. Within the Middle East, Egypt's expulsion from the councils of Arab states because of its peace treaty with Israel made Irag the focal point of Arab order. The size of its army, its rising oil revenues, and its geopolitical centrality enhanced its predominance as well. Saddam seemed to have perceived that his move against Iran was a necessary step toward consolidating his regional position The opportunity to tame Khomeini and emerge as the Arab hegemon coincided with internal convulsions in Iran that made that task seemingly much easier.

In the midst of these changes, Saddam must have noticed how his antagonist was dismantling its armed forces.…... Iran indulged in its rhetorical assaults and mischievous practices while at the same time making itself vulnerable to the retribution that such conduct often provokes.

Sensing great opportunities within his grasp, Saddam convinced himself that this would be a quick war. History has shown over and over again that, as a political leadership contemplates war, it overstates its own military capabilities and undervalues its foe’s ability to wage war. Overconfidence accompanied fear and opportunity, as Saddam sought to gain strategic advantage while dispelling a grave threat. This was a preventive campaign: a war of ambition and a war to punish a strident regional rival. Saddam sensed that a quick thrust could either cause the collapse of the theocratic regime or force it to quickly petition for peace, leaving him with the sizeable and valuable Khuzistan territory in southwestern Iran. The seeming imbalance of military power between the two states and a suitable international environment whereby Iran was distrusted and isolated made the invasion inevitable.
He makes several interesting points:
-Because of the consequences of the Iran-Contra affair, no US bureaucrat or political person will try to find any creative way to open talks or any relations with Iran (up to 2009).
-Some Iranian leaders after Khomeini recognize a need to open relations with the West. The election of Khatami and the hopes of domestic liberalization had already made Europe a more receptive audience to Iran’s entreaties. As a gesture of reconciliation, Khatami ended the long-standing practice of assassinating Iranian dissidents in Europe. Although it is customary to label Iran as one of the most active sponsors of terrorism, Khatami succeeded in shutting down an important aspect of Tehran’s portfolio of violence. For a president with tentative control over the security services, this was no small achievement.

It was also during Khatami’s presidency that the issue of the fatwa against Rushdie was finally settled. Foreign Minister Kharrazi declared conclusively that “The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention, nor is it going to take any action whatsoever to threaten the life of the author of the Satanic Verses or anybody associated with his work, nor will it assist or encourage anybody to do so.” After decades of living underground, the beleaguered author was finally allowed to pursue a more normal life and resume his literary pursuits.

In response to Iran’s moves, the European policy evolved from “critical dialogue” to “constructive engagement.” The new policy brought about a lifting of the prohibition on ministerial meetings and the full resumption of commercial relations. In July 1998 Italian prime minister Romano Prodi became the first European official to travel to Iran since the imposition of the diplomatic embargo on such high-level visits. Khatami would eventually embark on his own European tour that would take him to Italy, France, and the Vatican. Not long into his tenure, Khatami had managed to achieve two out of his three diplomatic objectives. The United States, however, would prove his most vexing challenge. Khatami hoped to break the internal stalemate and soften Khamenei’s stance by gaining substantial concessions from the unlikeliest of sources,
the United States itself.

The hardliners never let any opening or opportunity pay off. Pretty clear the search for Iranian “moderates” is a bunch of BS”. If any exist, they have no power. Khatami is one “reformer” who may make a little progress in Europe and with the Gulf States. No luck with the US. The Iranians expect the US to make unilateral up-front concessions to get talks going. The rise of Khatami and the reform movement caught a skeptical Washington establishment mired in the lessons of the Iran-Contra affair flat footed. The United States’ “dual-containment” policy remained largely unaltered, as the administration wanted to see more palpable changes in areas such as terrorism and the peace process before embarking on a fundamental revision of its policy. Nearly six months after Khatami’s interview, President Clinton made his first important foray into the Iran debate: “We believe that Iran is changing in a positive way, and we would like to support that.” This statement was followed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s call for Iran to join the United States in devising a “roadmap to normalized relations.” Still, the administration, which was concerned about Khatami’s ability to effect real change in Iran, often invoked the catchphrase “good deeds, not good words.” Khatami had hoped for measurable concessions from the United States to disarm his domestic critics, while the Clinton team hoped for important adjustments from Iran before embracing Khatami.”

Two years after Khatami’s CNN interview, Albright responded with one of the most thoughtful and impressive speeches given by a U.S. official on the subject of Iran. In an important gesture of contrition, Albright apologized for America’s role in the coup against Musaddigq in 1953. The secretary acknowledged that the “coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development.” In another magnanimous gesture, Albright similarly expressed regret for America’s assistance to Iraq during its war with Iran. The secretary then moved beyond lofty words and lifted the sanctions on Iran’s carpets, pistachios, and caviar, all of which were among Iran’s most lucrative exports.

Khamenei’s response to Albright’s gesture was insensitive and incendiary. The supreme leader betrayed his suspicion when he even denounced America’s contrition “as just another ploy laying the ground for their sinister plots.” In an address to a large gathering of the faithful, Khamenei declared that “They admit that they supported and backed the dictatorial, oppressive, corrupt and subservient rule of the shah for 25 years. And they are now saying that they supported Saddam Husayn in his war against Iran.

-The concept of the enemy of my enemy is my friend permeates the history of the region. The strange lineup of allies and enemies during the Iran-Iraq War is fascinating to review. The support of Saddam Hussein despite his use of chemical weapons and his blatant attacks on civilian targets points out the hypocrisy of the West.

I wonder if this author had a major role in the development of the nuke deal with Iran. He laments throughout that both sides are unable to make progress on relationships. Too easy to throw a wrench into the works and stop any effort.

BTW, WTF is it with both Obama and Biden in Iran? In both cases, there are revolts and uprisings by young people against the regime yet neither guy takes action to support them. Very strange.

[Adrian · Rating 5 out of 5]

As one would expect from a Council of Foreign Relations publication, Guardians of the Revolution not only fails to disappoint, but delivers immeasurably in its chronicling and analysis of post 1979 Iran.
Speaking as a post Graduate who wrote an MA Dissertation on Iran, this highly readable volume has delivered a great deal of insight into, what was for myself at least, a very familiar subject matter.
Guardians of the Revolution has the revelatory aspect rarely found in modern scholarship, comparable to insights that are delivered upon the opening of archives. While dealing primarily with the 1979 Revolution and its aftermath, much greater insight is shed upon the earlier life of Khomeini. We learn how Khomeini was able to seize power in the Revolution and move it in his direction, how he was able to consolidate his hold on power, and why the political system he founded lives to this day.
Much insight is given in the post Khomeini era of Rafsanjani and later Khatami, but a curious insight is given into the rise of "The New Right." The ubiquitous Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is only one of many vanguards of the Revolution who cut their teeth in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. This new elite contrasts to the Revolutionary elite as they are not of clerical stock, rather veterans of the conflict with Iraq, and frequently, former members of the Revolutionary Guard. The rise of the new right is something the West failed to anticipate, and it is aptly explored by Takeyh in the latter part of the book.
On the whole, Guardians of the Revolution is not just an insightful exploration of Iran's Revolution and the regime it created, it is a highly readable and page turning volume that one struggles to put down, and leaves one wanting more after the final page has been turned.
In short a devastating account of modern Iran, and one of the best political science books I have read in recent years.

[Michael Gerald · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great analytical reference for understanding politics in Iran.

[Damir · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author's thesis is that there were several missed opportunities for rapprochement between the USA and Iran, especially during the moderate government in Iran at the end of the 90s. I am skeptical about this and think that the hypothetical warming of relations could only be short-lived, taking into account the nature of the Iranian regime and fact that the moderates were only one of the factions (as the author points out) that ultimately lost in the internal struggle with the radicals.

Whether you agree with that thesis or not is less important because the book is worth reading. It is a detailed overview of the internal and foreign policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1979. to mid 2000s. It also explains the complicated way of functioning and the structure of government in Iran, which is specific compared to the rest of the world. Fifteen years have passed since the publication of the book, so it would require a new updated edition, but the book is still relevant and is essential reading for anyone interested in Iranian politics since 1979. and the Middle East in general.

[Kevin Andres · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mostly about foreign policy more than domestic policy. Pretty good summary though. Interesting to read it now, almost a decade after publication with the benefit of hindsight.

[Diane · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book looks at Iran's foreign policy, from the 1979 revolution until the Ahmadinejad regime. The author does a good job of discussing the motivations and backgrounds of the actors involved, and hence shows how Iranian politicians have a number of different approaches to foreign relations. However, it does not appear that the author has visited Iran, or interviewed any Iranians in the West, which I think weakens the book a bit, since he is often making inferences based on the individuals' public statements, which may or may not be truthful. He also provides only limited insight into the various political factions' popular support bases.

Nevertheless, he provides the best account that I've read of the Iranian Reformist movement, and analyzes why that movement has been unsuccessful thus far. He also explains the role of the Iran-Iraq War in the Iranians' thinking, and how more hard-line parties are able to use this conflict to support their purposes. He deals with the Iran-U.S. relationship, but he does not make this the center of the book, which I think is good, because it puts the relationship in the larger context of Iranian foreign relations.

[Shane · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was a great look at the internal politics of post-revolutionary Iran. It gave a good sense of the rifts between the "old guard" of the revolution and the "new right." Takeyh clearly illustrates the process by which Iran has become less democratic. He takes the reader through the internal struggle that has taken place since the revolution, which saw the hardliners take over the government in 2005, push out the reformists, and finalize their centralization of power. He also shows the ways in which Iranian politicians use "external threats" to manipulate internal politics. Takeyh can be a little naive about the U.S. side of things (he calls the US' invitation to the Shah to come to the country for medical treatment in '79 a humanitarian gesture!) Overall, a thorough and detailed study of Iranian politics since the birth of the Islamic Republic.

[Rashad Raoufi]

this is a well referenced and researched book that attempts to examine the revoloutaionary iran, first 50 pages are much chronichled so i knew them already but the rest was engaging although it details the support of the clerics for terrorism it does not shed any light to the actual symetrical and much more sucessful operations of mossad, i think its for cfr so it has its american bias but it still tries to be anlytical. its an illuminating book that goes beyond the simplistic depiction of iran in the general media and publications.

[Steven Passmore · Rating 3 out of 5]

A thorough dense book about the Iranian revolution, Ray Takeyh's book is a pretty good summary of the past 30 or 40 years of Iranian politics. I also think that's it's non-biased, maybe a too dull. He lists both American and Iranian policy failures, and the Persian/Arab Sunni/Shia regional hegemonic rivalries. It's not exactly paradigm shifting, but a good book.

[Bryce · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a thorough and balanced account if the historical relationship between the US and Iran. I found that it provided an excellent basis for understanding current events related to Iran.

[Alina Utrata · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent account of Iranian domestic politics and affairs since the Revolution. Highlights include explanations of regional perspectives of Iran after the Iran-Iraq war, the Reformist movement, the Green Revolution and other facets of recent Iranian history.

[Jamie is · Rating 5 out of 5]

Written by a professor of mine at Georgetown who also (I believe) is affiliated with CFR. Provided an excellent understanding of Iranian political dynamics that I was able to follow without any academic background in the country, but which colleagues who did felt offered new analysis.

[Jim Jewell · Rating 3 out of 5]

Decent overview of Iranian political dynamics.