This monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa'ida in Iraq in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group's power and influence. The authors draw on captured financial documents that give details on the daily financial transactions of one specific sector within Anbar province and of the financial transactions of the AQI provincial administration.
Benjamin Bahney is an author and political scientist, with expertise in national security issues in the areas of space, cyber and advanced science and technology. His research interests include strategic stability, deterrence, and escalation management. Ben received an MA in international affairs from UC San Diego and a BA in history from the University of Pennsylvania. He's formerly an associate at the RAND Corporation, where he published on counter terrorism and the internal dynamics of Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Ben also contributes to the opinion pages of the New York Times, US News and World Report, the San Diego Union Tribune, and the Washington Times.
A fascinating monograph from the Rand Corporation of the fundamental financial workings of al-Qa'ida in Iraq-- operational costs, overhead, salaries, compensation to families of deceased members, etc. Where did the money almost exclusively come from? Theft and extortion of the locals (the basic Mafia model). So much for being righteous holy men. They were so profitable that they were able to send excess money to Pakistan at the request of al-Qa'ida senior management. The monograph offers a simple and direct thesis: find new ways to disrupt the money flows and you can significantly disrupt the organization. This publication is an important contribution to understanding the evil we are battling globally.