The Second World War: A Military History

by Gordon Corrigan

A landmark reassessment of World War II that reconsiders the immense six-year conflict under the lens of the many separate campaigns fought in Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean.

A definitive single-volume military history of World War II, Gordon Corrigan's The Second World War reveals the vastly diverse ways in which each campaign was waged against very different enemies who rarely, if ever, coordinated their efforts. Corrigan, who has developed a scholarly reputation of challenging long-held historical assumptions, examines the agendas of the warring nations and offers fresh and vivid interpretations of how the war was fought and how it was won. In particular, the author dispels myths regarding the effectiveness of the American and British war efforts and brings the contributions of the Russian armies to the forefront.

Vast in vision and epic in scope, The Second World War will change forever the way we think about the titanic conflicts that decided the shape of the modern world.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, War

624 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2010

Reviews

[Mervyn Whyte · Rating 2 out of 5]

I wouldn't normally make a comment on a book I'm only 5% of the way through. But then I read this footnote:

'The term 'intellectual' is one frequently found in descriptions of political groupings and presumably refers to writers, artists, poets, philosophers and other idlers whose influence is considerably greater than their numbers or contribution would warrant.'

Until I've read more, I'm giving Corrigan the benefit of the doubt and assuming the above is just a bit of mischief. I mean, no sensible person can really believe that writers, artists, poets and philosophers are idlers. Having written three novels myself - and just started a fourth - I can assure anyone who hasn't written one that it's hardly the life of an idler. Anyway, let's - for now - put it down to mischief by Corrigan and press on.

Ah, the footnote on p.46 about the fox-hunting squirearchy taking over has put my rating down to three-stars. Carry on at this rate and it'll be down to one-star before we reach p.100. This might be a DNF - Did Not Finish.

Hitler may have been bad, but he wasn't mad? As if virulent antisemitism isn't a form of madness.

The German armed forces taking a personal oath to Hitler isn't really any different to the British armed forces taking an oath to the British monarch? Except the British monarch isn't head of state, head of the armed forces AND prime minister all in one.

We might - might - be heading into David Irving territory.

Why would anyone want to get off one horse and on another in the middle of a river? asks Corrigan. Because the horse you're on is exhausted and risks drowning both itself and the rider?

Some of Corrigan's comparisons...The Gestapo with British Special Branch, Hoepner's call for the annihilation of the enemy with 'some of the things Churchill said about the Nazis'...Odd.

A defence of the Waffen-SS, 'who by and large behaved themselves...'

Corrigan is extremely generous when it comes to the German Army and its role in the atrocities in the East. I thought the evidence was now clear on this matter: that the German Army was deeply complicit in much of the horrors.

This isn't a badly written book, and I can handle Corrigan's criticisms of Churchill and the British war machine. But one gets the feeling that he's rooting for the Germans in their fight against the Russians. Maybe it's just me. His 'witty' asides don't help. Someone needs to tell him that he's not as humorous as he thinks he is. Still, I'm nearly halfway through, so something is keeping me reading it. When I first started I didn't think I'd be able to finish it.

'It is one of the more unfortunate assumptions propounded by British class warriors that, because someone is well bred, has been to a decent school and speaks properly, he is therefore foppish and incompetent.' The same point can be made from the other side. Like, the unfortunate, snobbish, assumptions propounded by those who are 'well' bred that those who aren't, and who didn't go to a 'decent' school and who don't speak 'properly' are therefore thuggish, incompetent and not fit for leadership roles. Just as many battles were probably lost on the playing fields of Eton as won.

Hitler's extraordinary intuition that just occasionally proved him right... Being proved right occasionally doesn't mean one has extraordinary intuition. Being proved right (almost) all the time might mean you have that. But being right occasionally... That's just luck.

I always thought it was Hitler who insisted the D-Day landings would be at Pas de Calais and it was his generals who thought they wouldn't be? Corrigan claims the opposite. More of the Fuhrer intuition that Corrigan is much taken by. I think in turn, the Fuhrer would've been taken by Corrigan's insistence that the death penalty should be available - and presumably enforced - for mutiny.

'Had the (concentration camp) inmates been really determined they could have effected their own escape...' When I first read the sentence I thought I was imagining things. A star deserves to be deducted from the rating for this sentence alone.

There wouldn't have been as much killing of British personnel by Israeli 'terror gangs' in Palestine (or as many Jews going up 'the chimneys of the crematoria') if the British hadn't prevented Jewish immigration into Palestine in the way that it did.

Corrigan has some very strange views. Using napalm against an oil slick - as the British did - rather than against human beings - as the Americans did - is hardly morally equivalent.

What was von Rundstedt supposed to say at the beginning of the Ardennes offensive? 'Nothing for the Fuhrer and for the Fatherland'?

It might not have been politically acceptable to nuke China in 1950... What about morally acceptable?

I'm sure I read somewhere that Germany's (and her Allies') territories and conquests up until 1941 DID give her the same industrial capacity as her enemies. But she didn't use it properly.

No votes in defence spending? Tell Reform voters and GB News that.

And no, I don't have to respect Nazi racialism, Japanese militarism or Soviet totalitarianism.

Erm, an okay, single-volume, military history of the war. With some very strange - and often quite worrying - conclusions, asides and points of view. I finished it. But I wouldn't read it again. Or anything else by Corrigan.

[Raimonds Jansons · Rating 5 out of 5]

The superiority in men and equipment finally decides everything

Gordon Corrigan looks at the course of the Second World War from a somewhat untraditional angle, viewing it as simultaneous, large-scale conflicts, which had less in common, then we usually tend to think. The book is "a military history", even though the account keeps a thought-stimulating ratio of military and political aspects of the war; the former, certainly, always being in the foreground. The reader, supposedly, should not be taken aback, noticing that the narrative palpably is written from a British perspective. Hence, for example, the warfare on the Eastern Front receives equivalent, but less expressive analysis than depiction of hostilities whether in Burma or Italy.

The author is good-humored and says that he is a simple infantryman. However, regardless of the military background, Corrigan is a pragmatist and admits that wars are not decided by the courage, leadership, training and loyalty of the troops, but money, population and industrial capacity. He dares to say, that for American industry the war came as an economic bonanza and finally got the US out of the Great Depression. Japan, on the other hand, entering the war took up an enormous gamble, since it had stocks for only eighteen months of military consumption. Germany, even with the best of its efforts, couldn't match Russian industrial production helped by Western aid.

The same happened on operational level. Rommel was finally forced to accept that the supply and manpower situation in Panzer Army Africa precluded any further offensives. Wehrmacht in Russia, despite some of its advanced armoured and motorized divisions, overall, could move no faster than Napoleon's Grande Armée. Corrigan ascertains that after the battle of Moscow the German army did not have any stores to build defenses, to say nothing of winter clothing and troop accommodation. On top of that, mundane matters like food rations, identical for all ranks in Wehrmacht, made understanding between the German army and its allies even less common. Thus, the Spanish Army's Blue Division's officers, whose rations used to be more plentiful, on the Eastern Front had to accept the same amount and quality for everybody, and also would they have to put up with sausages, sauerkraut and German bread, rather than fresh meat and vegetables. Thus supplies had a major impact on the course of the whole war, deciding a lot more than mere outcome of the battle in Stalingrad pocket, where 1500 tons of supplies per day were needed.

The narrative is enticing because of the author's healthy dose of criticism, like when describing the British as a nation old in the art of duplicitous diplomacy. He affords to be vaguely cynical saying that for the British Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a delightful Christmas cake, since the whole Churchill's war policy was based on hanging on until America could come in.

Here we come to the author's attitude towards Churchill and Corrigan here is merciless. He says Churchill wanted finest hours, glorious adventures and swashbuckling offensive action; that he was largely responsible for the shambles of Norway (p.96) and considered the war with Japan a very remote possibility (p.179). Churchill was his doctors' most cantankerous patient (p.306) and considered most RAF officers to be oily mechanics (p.207). The most humorous is a paragraph about a signal, that reportedly in 1939, was sent from the Admiralty to all ships: "Winston is back". According to Corrigan, no trace of this signal has ever been found and nobody but Churchill has ever admitted to seeing it. Even more, some cynics had suggested, if it was ever sent, it was in exasperation rather than jubilation. However, not everything in the book about Churchill is only in a negative light. He praises, for instance, Churchill's line versus Chiang Kai-shek (p.388) and his bearing in not accepting Hitler's peace feelers (p.110).

Corrigan isn't lining up brass hats against frock coats, though clearly sympathizes with intelligent military commanders, like Japanese Major-General Kuribayashi, who was fluent in English and able to quote Shakespeare. Particularly depressing Corrigan finds expression of some politicians - "to hold at all costs", meaning that soldiers are destined to be killed. On the other hand, Corrigan praises military discipline. Whether total abstainer or not, but he contrasts Wehrmacht's artillery lieutenant-colonel shot by firing squad, because found drunk on duty, and the Russian General Vasily Chuikov, who commanded the Sixty-Second Army in Stalingrad and consumed alcohol as if prohibition was just round the corner. Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Corps, in its turn, he says, had unkindly been referred to as a uniformed drinking club. As Allied troops in Italy were greeted by cheering crowds in the towns and villages, the rate of Allied desertion duly went up, because soldiers couldn't resist temptation sitting out the war surrounded by Italian girls.

That's, evidently, the reason why Corrigan comes to conclusion that unlike the war itself, the battles were won by the soldiers, who were led by wise and experienced officers. He even doesn't vacillate to voice his assessment, that in comparison to the Red Army soldiers, the German soldier was a far better in 1942 (p.238), and therefore Wehrmacht reached Volga, despite 3,25 million Germans at the time were facing 6 million Russians. He also admits that the British knew they couldn't beat the Germans in a battle of manoeuvre (p.401); but for the US Marines it took on average 1500 rounds to kill one Japanese!

In a 600 page volume I found some insignificant inaccuracies. It is said the Courland pocket was in Lithuania (p.530), whereas it was in Latvia; the Winter War lasted from 30 October 1939 until 13 March 1940 (p.93), whereas it started at the end of November. The author also is a bit simplistic saying that 9 May is VE Day in Russia and the states of the former USSR (p.563).

Overall, I was impressed by the book. It is an exciting read for WWII buffs and history experts alike. Corrigan doesn't romanticize the war - not even for a second. However, he makes us realize, that one should know more about the epoch, which despite the horrors of war and food rationing provided the healthiest generation of Britons ever.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

As the title indicates, this book focuses exclusively on the military history of WWII and there is thus a lot of text devoted to unit dispositions and changes in commanders. And, as the author is a retired British officer, there is naturally a stronger emphasis on the War from the British standpoint. Those being said, it is wonderfully well-written and offers insights that I have not seen elsewhere--at least so emphatically. (E.g., Churchill was a blustering, blundering amateur who contantly tried to micro-manage the war effort to no good end; Montgomery was an indifferent commander but a shameless self-promoter, who could not get along with anyone--such as Eisenhower--who was not a sycophant.) He states that the German Army was the best military force of the War, but that neither, nor both of the Germans and Japanese ultimately could win against Russian manpower and American industrial and technological strength. Fascinating reading.

[James Kubecki · Rating 1 out of 5]

I had high hopes for this book, but regretfully, am forced to give it a low rating.
Overall, it's a decent overview in broad strokes of the major campaigns of the war. The book, however, is plagued by a number of problems:
1. Lack of maps. There are many long prose descriptions of geography, but not a single map in the entire book. For a military history, this is a grievous omission.
2. Overly anglocentric. Reading the book, one almost, but not quite, gets the impression that the US was of some small contribution to the British victory.
3. Snark. The author is very opinionated, which is fine, but he makes gratuitous digs against pretty much every major player on the Allied side.
4. Subtle anti-Semitism. There are a number of comments in the book which are thinly veiled anti-Semitic remarks, or at the very least, anti-Israel.

[Karin · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.5 stars. This is a very readable tome. I found some campaigns and theatres far more interesting than others, especially Burma since Grandpa served there but it isn't one you hear about often. For the most part, the book comes across as an unbiased and authoritative review of the entire war. However, Corrigan definitely has strong opinions about the military leaders and politicians and doesn't hold back from praise or personal insults. He also uses some completely unnecessary language about women which leads me to think we would not be friends. He could have found a far better way to describe the media coverage around London evacuees than to refer to them as sluts. That left such a sour taste in my mouth that I rushed the rest of my reading so I could just be done with the book.

[Derek Weese · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a purely military look at the war, one which I found a bit refreshing considering the author was a former British Army officer who served with NATO and, I'm assuming, knows what he's talking about from a professional military standpoint.
Quickly, I should mention that he writes his book in an unconventional, conversational style. Being a college student (in other words, a professional debtor) I am used to very dry, almost homicidaly mind numbing academic works that are about as enjoyable to read as ones own obituary. Mr. Corrigan wrote in a very witty, sarcastic, even at times snarky style that I found endearing, I'm sure others will find it otherwise.
First off Mr. Corrigan is harshly critical of his own team, the Brits. He thinks very little of Churchill as a strategist, fair enough, and is harsh on all major British generals especially Montgomery. I truly felt that his own insights were valid- the British were too timid to sum it all up. I think the same could be said for the American side of the war (he was a bit more charitable to the Americans) and while I know my own thoughts are controversial, I am not impressed with the performance of the US Armed Forces in Europe. I felt they too were highly timid, lacked the killer instinct (that all army's should posses in order to achieve victory) and, like the British, relied far too heavily on material means to win the war when a rapid advance would have meant a swifter end to the war. Though, undoubtedly, higher casualties to military personnel (but this would have saved the lives of those in occupied Europe...)
Another complaint I remember he had with the British (and I also peg upon the Americans-then as well as now) was their propensity to get bogged down in the minutiae of staff work, paper work and the muddled conditions of a too strict adherence to the chain of command. This tended to sap the British of their reaction times to events, making them slower and dimmer intellectually, and also refused many truly brilliant field commanders (such as Brigade and Corps commanders) the ability to utilize badly needed personal initiative and the very Germanesque creative interpretation of orders. In other words the British, and to a somewhat lesser extent the Americans, tended to adhere far too closely to a rote plan, missing many, many, many opportunities for truly decisive victory along the way.
He is, I think, a little too praiseworthy of the Red Army. I wholeheartedly agree that it was in the Eastern Front that Germany lost the war, but the Soviet Union could never have survived against Germany, and her allies, alone. The Red Army was simply too brain dead at the top in the very beginning, and they never quite fully recovered from the devastation wrought during Operation Barbarossa. True, they did improve throughout the war, but how much of an improvement is it when instead of losing men at a ten to one rate against your foe, you only bring it down to roughly three to one? Your still losing far more men (and women too, the Soviets deployed girls along their boys from time to time) and manpower, even in the Soviet Union, is never an infinite resource. As Chris Bellamy points out in his book 'Absolute War: Soviet Russia in World War II', the Russian and Ukrainian populations have never recovered from the devastating losses taken during 1941-1945. Granted Stalin's bumbling and meddling plays a huge factor in the horrendous losses suffered by the Red Army, but like one can't blame Hitler for Germany's defeat, one can't blame Stalin always for the huge losses suffered by a Red Army that was simply always outclassed by its opponent in almost every way besides material. Gordon also makes what I believe to be the mistake of accepting, blindly as most Western historians do, the obviously inflated industrial production numbers of the Soviet Union. Seeing as how the numbers of Soviet tanks at the front sharply declined from 1943 to 1945 this means that either the Soviets really didn't produce half as many tanks as they said they did (which I believe to be closer to the truth seeing as how many an industrial commissar would be loath to send contrarion news to Moscow in regards to slow production or short numbers considering he or she might lose their head in the process...) or the Germans obviously inflated kill reports in tank battles are close to the truth or, as is likely the case, the truth is a mixture of both combined with poor Soviet maintenance work and poor craftsmanship. Still, the Red Army bore the lions share of the war against Germany, but without the material and financial aid of the US and Great Britain, it was doubtful they'd have lasted as long as they did. And several times during the war, major operations in the West would draw the more mobile, first rate German formations westwards, making the Eastern Front, for the Germans, a defensive front utilizing reserve and or second rate formations. Even these shot to pieces the majority of Red Army formations that smashed against them, even if these German units were defeated, they'd still inflict far higher losses on their opponents in defeat. If Russia did win the war, and I think one can say that they did, it was a Pyrrhic victory at best.
The Japanese did very well in the early stages, mopping the floor with both the Americans and the Brits for months, but then their impetus slowed, Germany was not on the verge of victory, and the Western Allies were able to devote more and more resources to fighting them. The Japanese, far and away less industrialized than Germany, were simply no match for the industrial might of the US, despite having a top notch Navy and Air Force their Army was simply an anachronism. Even though the Japanese Army performed brilliantly and in open field battles, the Allies could only truly defeat them with overwhelming force.
This leaves the Germans. Gordon Corrigan believes, and I concur, that the Germans were hands down the best in the world. Both on a unit level, a man for man level, and on a leadership level. I couldn't agree more, even though its' politically incorrect in academia to state such. However, and this is something that NATO truly needs to take to heart, despite Germany's obvious military greatness it was not enough to stem the eventual tide of crushing numerical and material superiority that the Allies possessed. Even so, there is a double lesson to be learned: While quantity can overcome quality the price of doing so is so enormous that one wonders if anyone in the globe, of the foreseeable future, would be willing to pay the price to use quantity to defeat quality. In defeat the Germans hammered their foes, even in 1944 till the end they did very well, even with troops who weren't trained to the standards of 1940 or 41. Germany's tactical flexibility, the intellectual stamina of its officer corps, the quality of its weaponry, the ability of its men and officers to utilize creative interpretation of orders to fit the situation as well as to be forgiven the flagrant flaunting of orders if said flaunting brought victory made the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS and everything else the Germans could field the most deadly armed forces in human history save for possibly the legions of Rome and the Han Dynasty.

All in all a really good read, though as others have noted Corrigan is silent on many of the atrocities inflicted by the warring powers on civilians and you will not find anything other than military analyses and narrative in this work. Still, it's a worthy read, and at the least it's so well written that it is not a hard read at all.
Recommended.

[Colin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a quirky, imaginative and entertaining narrative of the military campaigns of the Second World War. The author does not hold back from his trenchant views and makes very pertinent arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of the various militaries and their leadership, both military and political. There are some interesting and somewhat unusual diversions from the familiar story. For example, several pages are devoted to German plans to seize Gibraltar. However, the key campaigns are covered well and even those readers familiar with the war will profit from this book. The concluding chapter is fair and balanced, although some of the views about the future shape of conflicts have not stood the test of time, given the Russo-Ukraine War. But overall, this is an excellent book which is strongly recommended.

[Christopher Reid · Rating 1 out of 5]

Unfortunately Corrigan took on a topic bigger than his britches and it shows in the quality or lack thereof. Numerous falsifiable statements (20 million killed in the Soviet Purge???) and constant Fascist apologia was too much. Managed to finish it but it is easily the weakest book I've read on WW2.

[Charlie Lake · Rating 5 out of 5]

An absolutely brilliant read. A blow by blow account of the battles that shaped the world during world war, with commentary of what went right and what went wrong for all sides. Highly highly recommended. A book to keep and refer to time and time again. Very readable.

[Wayne · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm not quite sure what to make of this one. It's not your typical History book and that is both a good and a bad thing. Corrigan does not attempt to analyze the political, economic, cultural, or sociological aspects of the war. He doesn't have the space. He concentrates on the military history of the war, and on even that limited scope he has arguably bitten off more than he could chew. That being said he does open with a couple of chapters that set the scene for each relevant country. These opening chapters are some of the best, most concise analysis on the origins of the conflict that I have ever read. Subsequently he focuses almost exclusively on military aspects. With so many theatres to cover with so many belligerent nations involved his coverage is inevitably sparse. However, he covers the main theatres and gives a good overall look at the pace, progress, and conduct of the war by all sides. He goes out of his way to give all points of view and present a balanced judgment, defending those whom he believes to have been judged harshly and providing needed context for others whose contributions to history are a bit more controversial.
Corrigan writes with a unique style for a historian. His irreverent comments and footnotes are very entertaining and provide rare insight to some of the personalities involved and how those personalities affect the course of history. This is the first history of the war that I have read that was written by an Englishman. He provides far more coverage of the British involvement, specifically in Burma and Malaya than any that I have read before. He also, justly, spends significant time and gives much credit to the Soviets and the fighting on the eastern front. It was a pleasing change of pace to read about aspects of the war that I knew were significant but had never read much about because American writers don't seem to spend much time on them. I was pleased to note that the British seemed to think that Montgomery was as big an egotistical fop as the Americans did.
The organization of the book left me a bit fuddled with the author jumping back and forth from theatre to theatre and attempting to follow, loosely, a chronological order. I can't fault the author much on this because there really is no easy way to write a history of the Second World War and not end up with a jumbled mess. The author chose to put all of his maps at the beginning of the book instead of interspersed. This has the advantage of always knowing where to look for the relevant map.
He ends the book with not only summaries of the principal nations involved but the various armed services. He analyzes them on their conduct of the war and their contributions to the success or ultimate defeat of their respective nations. He also compares his analysis with the standard view of history and is very plain in pointing out who got undeserved credit and who got a bum rap.
In the end the author's writing style made this an enjoyable book to read. Given its size, breadth, and scope I would not recommend it to anybody that was not already well read on the subject.

[Bap · Rating 3 out of 5]

As sometimes happens, there were two 600 plus pages histories published in 2011. Showing how crazy I am I read them both simultaneously. I pushed on to fInish this one first since it is a library book. It is quite good but pales in comparison with Inferno by Max Hastings. Both are Brits which has a distinguished record of military historians with Keegan being my favorite.

Corrigan cItes this book as a military history. He ignores the collateral stories of the holocaust or the sweeping changes that this war had on ordinary lives. Corrigan makes no bones about the fact that he believes that the German army was far and away the best fighting force in the war. They punched above their weight and came within a whisper of victory but in an age of total war, if a quick knock- out punch is not delivered, the country that can equip the most soldiers and tanks, artillery, and war planes will win against an adversary that may be better led . Even if you have a kill rate of two to one, if your adversary can field and equip armies at 4 to 1. Numbers will tell.

Corrigan is no fan of Churchill who he views ask a meddling amateur, a blow hard. Nor does he have much admiration for Montgomery. He gives respect to the stalwart and grimly determined Russian armies. He points out that there were 3 separate wars being fought at the same time. The Russian front where 80 per cent of the Germans fought and where they suffered 80 per cent of theIr casualties . The western front which included the middle east and the pacific where the Japanese unwisely jumped in convinced that the Germans were headed for victory.

Corrigan also points out that the war was brutal with massacres routinely practiced by 3 of the combatants: the Russians, Germans and Japanese. Corrigan is strangely mute about the atrocities against the Jews. He also points out the widespread rape was condoned and encouraged by both the Russians and the Japanese.

World War two has also shaped the world in the past 65 years. Without WW 2 there would have not been the cold war between the two biggest victors. Israel would not have come about and the concomitant Mideast wars; colonialism was swept away by the war and shattered the myth of white supremacy especially in Asia; the war led to the economic unification of europe and the distaste for war. The war also ushered in the age of nuclear weapons and the fear of a nuclear holocaust.

Without the Hastings book to contend with I would rate this book far higher but Inferno is a five star read and better in every way.

[Woody Curran · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a thorough survey of the military-specific aspects of WWII. Corrigan presumes a fairly comprehensive understanding of the command structure of armies, but there are a few asides that explain the importance of various types of small arms, tanks, artillery, etc.

The main issue I have with this book is that the scope of all theaters of WWII are too much to cover in one large book without the "story" becoming quite confusing. There is a tension between trying to treat the entire set of conflicts in one volume and including massive amounts of detail about each theater and every general involved in every major battle. It starts to feel like a laundry list of battles and armies rather than a story I could connect with.

Good book, but not a great one.

[James Teener · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not the best WWII history I've read. Give him high marks for his opinions, but there were a few editable factual errors, and the writing style was often awkward and jerky. Given his thoughts on William Slim, he should write a book on him and the CBI. I would also like to see him put together a book on the British Imperial General Staff and its generals and field marshals during WWII. It would likely be an original and interesting read. If only he had the style of Keegan or, better, of David McCollough.

[Chris · Rating 2 out of 5]

A military history that does focus on the main points of what happened during WWII, yet I found that by focusing only on the military portion a lot gets left out and skimmed over that was as important to the issues that occurred during the war, such as the holocaust. While this is a very detailed history, and I did learn a few new things about this, there was a lot of remarks and opinions by the author that I believe the book could have done without. Overall not a bad history but not an amazing one either.

[Patrick Andersen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Picked up on a whim from the bargain tables at the local bookstore, I stumbled upon this excellent overview of the Second World War, from pre-war all the way through the aftermath. Author has strong opinions regarding his heroes and villains; Churchill gets scant praise, while there is no small admiration for the German military and the Americans in general. Being twice removed from the war itself, I have a far greater appreciation of how it played out because of this work.

[David Wyatt · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a soldier's history. Corrigan was a British officer, and so he can be very harsh of commanders and orders who fail to show the full measure and professional honesty but this is a very readable, even compelling interpretation of the Second World War and one I find quite valid. Highly recommended.

[Vinodh Haridoss · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very Detailed.

[David Douglas · Rating 4 out of 5]

The evil NSDAP party led by Hitler bite off more than they can chew. USSR and USA emerge as superpowers and 60 million people die.

[Philippe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Best single volume history I've read on the subject.