What do you think?
Rate this book
Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone
Larry Devlin arrived as the new chief of station for the CIA in the Congo five days after the country had declared its independence, the army had mutinied, and governmental authority had collapsed. As he crossed the Congo River in an almost empty ferry boat, all he could see were lines of people trying to travel the other way—out of the Congo. Within his first two weeks he found himself on the wrong end of a revolver as militiamen played Russian-roulette, Congo style, with him. During his first year, the charismatic and reckless political leader, Patrice Lumumba, was murdered and Devlin was widely thought to have been entrusted with (he was) and to have carried out (he didn't) the assassination. Then he saved the life of Joseph Desire Mobutu, who carried out the military coup that presaged his own rise to political power. Devlin found himself at the heart of Africa, fighting for the future of perhaps the most strategically influential country on the continent, its borders shared with eight other nations. He met every significant political figure, from presidents to mercenaries, as he took the Cold War to one of the world's hottest zones. This is a classic political memoir from a master spy who lived in wildly dramatic times.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published February 20, 2007
36 people are currently reading
478 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews
February 8, 2025
Legendary CIA Operations Officer's Firsthand Account of the Cold War Congo Crisis --
Larry Devlin is a legendary CIA Case Officer, Station Chief and Operations Officer who was the first CIA Chief of Station in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was part of the original first generation of CIA men, most of whom were WWII veterans, who defined the Cold War Intelligence Game at the peak of the CIA's golden era in the late 50s and early 60s. He later went on to be the Station Chief in Laos.
"Chief of Station, Congo" is the memoir of his time in the former Belgian colony. He arrived ten days after it's independence to a country on the brink of total anarchy and in the midst of a military mutiny. The communists were courting the country's first African Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and Katanga, its wealthiest and most Westernized province was threatening to secede and collapse the entire national character of this, a nation as large as the western half of the US, in the midst of Africa.
Needless to say, Larry Devlin had to adapt quickly to events on the ground and this is the basis of this very readable first person narrative.
Devlin is a good writer and although this book was published in 2007, it remains an important relic of the era, capturing, as it does, events from the American perspective. The US had little political stake and almost no colonial baggage to manage in the period of African national movements that tore the continent apart from 1960-80. The Congo enterprise was also greatly overshadowed by events in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America which were far more important to the US Cold War effort than Africa. Nonetheless, the US played an important covert hand in the Congo and Devlin gives us all the details that one supposes he could. He discusses, for example, the contentious issues around the death of Patrice Lumumba, a man Devlin claims he was ordered to assassinate but chose, instead, to stall and let local events take their course. Lumumba was eventually kidnapped, taken to Katanga and killed, one supposes, at the hands of his political enemies, Moïse Tshombe (later Prime Minister) and Mobutu Sese Seko. Devlin, however, was implicated in popular left-leaning books about CIA intrigue. He regretted this aspect of his work more than any other.
Devlin also played a large hand in the mercenary operations employed by Moïse Tshombe to end the Simba (Communist) rebellion in the eastern provinces. While he downplays his role in this book, Chris Hoare, the biographer of his father, Congo mercenary leader Colonel "Mad" Mike Hoare, has written that Devlin and the Americans were the absolute paymasters behind the mercenaries (I HIGHLY recommend Chris' book, "Mad Mike Hoare: The Legend" for more details about the Devlin-Hoare relationship. They became great friends later in their colorful lives.). Devlin does acknowledge the enormous contribution of the US Air Force in sustaining both the Belgian Paratrooper intervention and the mercenaries during the Stanleyville Campaign.
The book does have some dull, dry moments, but these can't be helped. Real intelligence operations are not as action-packed or romantic as popular culture suggests. Intelligence is a largely bureaucratic process and Devlin, in the "warts-and-all" manner in which he writes, includes the exciting and the dull as his story demands. One of the most fascinating parts of the book are those describing the heroic roles of the American women who accompanied the various US embassy staff personnel to the Congo. Devlin's wife and daughter proved to be pretty tough cookies themselves. Devlin impressed the two American ambassadors in Leopoldville so much they offered him a position in the State Department. But Devlin, whose background was as an Army officer in WWII, declined.
This is a great book for those interested in the CIA, the Cold War, the African independence movements, intelligence operations, war and conflict, counter-terrorism, mercenary operations, and modern African history.
HIGHLY, HIGHLY Recommended.
Larry Devlin is a legendary CIA Case Officer, Station Chief and Operations Officer who was the first CIA Chief of Station in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was part of the original first generation of CIA men, most of whom were WWII veterans, who defined the Cold War Intelligence Game at the peak of the CIA's golden era in the late 50s and early 60s. He later went on to be the Station Chief in Laos.
"Chief of Station, Congo" is the memoir of his time in the former Belgian colony. He arrived ten days after it's independence to a country on the brink of total anarchy and in the midst of a military mutiny. The communists were courting the country's first African Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and Katanga, its wealthiest and most Westernized province was threatening to secede and collapse the entire national character of this, a nation as large as the western half of the US, in the midst of Africa.
Needless to say, Larry Devlin had to adapt quickly to events on the ground and this is the basis of this very readable first person narrative.
Devlin is a good writer and although this book was published in 2007, it remains an important relic of the era, capturing, as it does, events from the American perspective. The US had little political stake and almost no colonial baggage to manage in the period of African national movements that tore the continent apart from 1960-80. The Congo enterprise was also greatly overshadowed by events in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America which were far more important to the US Cold War effort than Africa. Nonetheless, the US played an important covert hand in the Congo and Devlin gives us all the details that one supposes he could. He discusses, for example, the contentious issues around the death of Patrice Lumumba, a man Devlin claims he was ordered to assassinate but chose, instead, to stall and let local events take their course. Lumumba was eventually kidnapped, taken to Katanga and killed, one supposes, at the hands of his political enemies, Moïse Tshombe (later Prime Minister) and Mobutu Sese Seko. Devlin, however, was implicated in popular left-leaning books about CIA intrigue. He regretted this aspect of his work more than any other.
Devlin also played a large hand in the mercenary operations employed by Moïse Tshombe to end the Simba (Communist) rebellion in the eastern provinces. While he downplays his role in this book, Chris Hoare, the biographer of his father, Congo mercenary leader Colonel "Mad" Mike Hoare, has written that Devlin and the Americans were the absolute paymasters behind the mercenaries (I HIGHLY recommend Chris' book, "Mad Mike Hoare: The Legend" for more details about the Devlin-Hoare relationship. They became great friends later in their colorful lives.). Devlin does acknowledge the enormous contribution of the US Air Force in sustaining both the Belgian Paratrooper intervention and the mercenaries during the Stanleyville Campaign.
The book does have some dull, dry moments, but these can't be helped. Real intelligence operations are not as action-packed or romantic as popular culture suggests. Intelligence is a largely bureaucratic process and Devlin, in the "warts-and-all" manner in which he writes, includes the exciting and the dull as his story demands. One of the most fascinating parts of the book are those describing the heroic roles of the American women who accompanied the various US embassy staff personnel to the Congo. Devlin's wife and daughter proved to be pretty tough cookies themselves. Devlin impressed the two American ambassadors in Leopoldville so much they offered him a position in the State Department. But Devlin, whose background was as an Army officer in WWII, declined.
This is a great book for those interested in the CIA, the Cold War, the African independence movements, intelligence operations, war and conflict, counter-terrorism, mercenary operations, and modern African history.
HIGHLY, HIGHLY Recommended.
September 6, 2017
Larry Devlin's Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone is not a comprehensive history of CIA operations in the Congo, but a personal memoir of his involvement there. Devlin was the CIA's man in that country for two separate tours in the early and mid-sixties. In his book, he refutes two stories commonly purveyed about the roles played by the U.S. government, the CIA, and himself in the Congo after independence from Belgium in 1960. Devlin denies, categorically, complicity by the U.S. in the execution of Patrice Lumumba. According to him, Lumumba's Congolese enemies engineered his murder without the knowledge or assistance of the U.S. Secondly, despite his close relationship with Mobutu, Devlin insists neither he nor any other U.S. figures aided or possessed prior knowledge of Mobutu's coup d'etat which overthrew the elected government in 1965. Many conspiracy theories have grown up around both these historical events, but Devlin's accounts are convincing to me. He points out that the detailed history by the Belgian, Ludo de Witte, demonstrated Lumumba was killed by Congolese alone with the knowledge of some Belgians. De Witte's book sparked creation of a parliamentary investigatory committee in Belgium. Geert Versnick, chairman of that committee, interviewed Devlin. The committee's report “conclusively clears me (Devlin) of any responsibility for Lumumba's death.”
While the CIA was “hip deep” in Cold War machinations in Congo, I doubt they were involved in all the shenanigans attributed to them. I buy Larry Devlin's versions of events. His book contains amusing anecdotes and gripping accounts of episodes – both dangerous and funny – during his time in the newborn Congolese nation. It's a strong Three Stars in my library.
While the CIA was “hip deep” in Cold War machinations in Congo, I doubt they were involved in all the shenanigans attributed to them. I buy Larry Devlin's versions of events. His book contains amusing anecdotes and gripping accounts of episodes – both dangerous and funny – during his time in the newborn Congolese nation. It's a strong Three Stars in my library.
May 13, 2009
Probably not for everybody, this first person history of the first years of the Congo's independence from Belgium enhanced my understanding of the events of the 1960s in a sprawling and often incomprehensible African nation. Devlin calls them like he sees them and so offers insightful appraisals of Mobutu, Lumumba, Kasavubu, and Tshombe among others. He is partisan, opinionated, and honest. Despite the title, this is not a book about the CIA but rather one man's history of an exciting time.
September 3, 2008
A good book about the turbulent time in the Congo in the 60's. One has to read between the line as the author tries to paint the CIA role as being the most innocent and hands off of all participant. One doesn't not become a super power by being naive, which is what the Author is trying to do!
February 9, 2009
interesting companion to The Poisonwood Bible
July 27, 2025
Fascinating. Surprised at the low rating. Interesting CIA tales mostly in the old Léopoldville (now Kinshasa).
The author (ex CIA) is mates with Mobutu, no surprises there! Interesting to hear a positive take on Mobutu (not saying it’s all true by any means), when most Congo literature is throughly pro Lumumba.
Also good to read about the dynamics behind the Katanga rebellion / secession (part of which continues to this day) and the factions involved: UN, Tshombe, Belgians, Brits, etc….
This is another Congo “Must Read”.
The author (ex CIA) is mates with Mobutu, no surprises there! Interesting to hear a positive take on Mobutu (not saying it’s all true by any means), when most Congo literature is throughly pro Lumumba.
Also good to read about the dynamics behind the Katanga rebellion / secession (part of which continues to this day) and the factions involved: UN, Tshombe, Belgians, Brits, etc….
This is another Congo “Must Read”.
November 27, 2020
An interesting presentation about a very busy time, but in a corner of the world a lot of Americans haven’t focused on all that much, not at the time, nor since. Larry Devlin was the CIA’s Chief of Station in newly-independent Congo, doing his best to hold up the American end during a crucial part of the Cold War. Much of it reads boldly and breathlessly, almost like a Western. One assumes Devlin is being at least a bit self-serving, as are most memoir-writers, but it is both entertaining and informative nonetheless.
I suspect Devlin was able to get so much of this story out in public not only because of its age, but because the countless hearings that covered some of the more significant issues Devlin recounts. He maintains his innocence in terms of later accusations as to his involvement in assassinations and coups, and claims that “I told ya so” on a couple of occasions where it seemed like maybe he was more just hedging his bets at the time.
Unfortunately, the last third of the book gets a little jumpy and patchy, with Devlin sometimes dropping a narrative when it seems unfinished, then jumping into another one with no transition. Maybe that was the pre-publication review board’s black Sharpie “highlighter” at work? Maybe his editor just got tired or sloppy toward the end? Even still, there are some interesting nuggets in there too.
Devlin may seem to apologize a bit too much for some of his authoritarian friends in the Congo. I totally understand where he was coming from, fighting the Cold War against the Soviets, trying to prevent more of the world from falling behind the Iron Curtain of totalitarianism and poverty, not to mention trying to prevent the Cold War from going hot. So the bad people who support the U.S. are at least better than the bad people who support the other side. But we don’t have to make excuses for them beyond that, do we? Unless, of course, our consciences are too delicate for the reality as it was.
As he said in his own words:
While Washington did not want a coup, there was little it could do once Mobutu had taken over. In a profound sense, the Cold War played into his hands. The United States could not afford to withdraw its support for him because, if it did, the still restive Soviet-backed rebels in Stanleyville would surely have taken over the country…Washington wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling the Congo and thus had to work with whomever was in power and could keep the Soviets’ surrogates at bay. (p 236)
Devlin’s account of the other side at least did not tend to overestimate them:
Shortly after the Congo became independent, Moscow announced that it was sending food for the “poor, hungry, oppressed workers and peasants” of the Congo. Sure enough, a Soviet ship arrived at Matadi, the Congo’s primary seaport. It was full of wheat. Unfortunately, the Congo did not possess a flour mill, so it had to be loaded on a ship once more and sent elsewhere to be milled. The episode did not match Moscow’s fraternal dispatch of snowplows to tropical Guinea two years earlier but it made clear that our Cold War adversaries were not ten feet tall. (p 26)
It really was another world then. Devlin describes not only the Embassy opening itself up to be a flophouse for American refugees, but Embassy officers opening up their homes as well. In today’s world, every Embassy and Consulate is a fortress unto itself, and American citizens are shown no greater hospitality than local nationals.
For those wishing for a peek into the clandestine world, Devlin offers a surprisingly frank glimpse, though one assumes even he left out some of the really good parts. For those with an interest in the Cold War or in the history of Africa, this certainly fills an important place and is well worth reading. Anyway, it’s pretty fun reading for much of it and it isn’t some dry history book from high school, so you could even take it to the beach with you. Definitely a good read, but not a must-read.
I suspect Devlin was able to get so much of this story out in public not only because of its age, but because the countless hearings that covered some of the more significant issues Devlin recounts. He maintains his innocence in terms of later accusations as to his involvement in assassinations and coups, and claims that “I told ya so” on a couple of occasions where it seemed like maybe he was more just hedging his bets at the time.
Unfortunately, the last third of the book gets a little jumpy and patchy, with Devlin sometimes dropping a narrative when it seems unfinished, then jumping into another one with no transition. Maybe that was the pre-publication review board’s black Sharpie “highlighter” at work? Maybe his editor just got tired or sloppy toward the end? Even still, there are some interesting nuggets in there too.
Devlin may seem to apologize a bit too much for some of his authoritarian friends in the Congo. I totally understand where he was coming from, fighting the Cold War against the Soviets, trying to prevent more of the world from falling behind the Iron Curtain of totalitarianism and poverty, not to mention trying to prevent the Cold War from going hot. So the bad people who support the U.S. are at least better than the bad people who support the other side. But we don’t have to make excuses for them beyond that, do we? Unless, of course, our consciences are too delicate for the reality as it was.
As he said in his own words:
While Washington did not want a coup, there was little it could do once Mobutu had taken over. In a profound sense, the Cold War played into his hands. The United States could not afford to withdraw its support for him because, if it did, the still restive Soviet-backed rebels in Stanleyville would surely have taken over the country…Washington wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling the Congo and thus had to work with whomever was in power and could keep the Soviets’ surrogates at bay. (p 236)
Devlin’s account of the other side at least did not tend to overestimate them:
Shortly after the Congo became independent, Moscow announced that it was sending food for the “poor, hungry, oppressed workers and peasants” of the Congo. Sure enough, a Soviet ship arrived at Matadi, the Congo’s primary seaport. It was full of wheat. Unfortunately, the Congo did not possess a flour mill, so it had to be loaded on a ship once more and sent elsewhere to be milled. The episode did not match Moscow’s fraternal dispatch of snowplows to tropical Guinea two years earlier but it made clear that our Cold War adversaries were not ten feet tall. (p 26)
It really was another world then. Devlin describes not only the Embassy opening itself up to be a flophouse for American refugees, but Embassy officers opening up their homes as well. In today’s world, every Embassy and Consulate is a fortress unto itself, and American citizens are shown no greater hospitality than local nationals.
For those wishing for a peek into the clandestine world, Devlin offers a surprisingly frank glimpse, though one assumes even he left out some of the really good parts. For those with an interest in the Cold War or in the history of Africa, this certainly fills an important place and is well worth reading. Anyway, it’s pretty fun reading for much of it and it isn’t some dry history book from high school, so you could even take it to the beach with you. Definitely a good read, but not a must-read.
January 15, 2011
Wow! There are few books or memoirs like this one. This is a riveting read from the former CIA man on the ground in the early 1960’s newly independent Congo. From the moment he hit the ground until his final months, he was dealing with mutinous soldiers, Soviet intrigue, deadly foreign mercenaries and the threat of communist pawn Patrice Lumumba. Devlin puts to rest the lie that the CIA assassinated Lumbumba (It was the Belgium’s; but Eisenhower did in fact order a “hit” on Lumbumba which never came close to being implemented – Devlin would not do it). I really enjoyed this book and learned a great deal of this chaotic time in the Cold War – and how the United States was victorious in the Congo against the Soviet onslaught. Without this victory, the Soviets would have most likely pushed their influence much deeper and broader into the rest of Africa. Devlin is just another of America’s unsung heroes (along with multiple cameo roles by a young US Foreign Service Officer who served along with Devlin, Frank Carlucci, who would go on to serve as Defense Secretary under President Reagan).
October 2, 2007
Although Devlin's egotistical nature gets in the way of some of the enjoyment (how many times did he have to write in his promotions and brag?), this is a very worthy read. It's about his time as chief of station of the CIA in Congo in the 60s when Lumumba was assassinated and he is often credited with being the one who assassinated him. He denies it, but says that he did get the order but ignored it. It is a worthy book to get a sense of the history and cold war politics; what the daily life of an agent was(maybe is still); Congolese and UN politics at the time which were tumultuous; and how we sometimes easily fall into bed with politicians who seemed like they might not be so bad but in the end are a disaster (mobutu). The parts that I can't stomach are when he is talking about how much he treasured Mobutu as a close friend and doesn't apologize for his behavior but says, "He wasn't that much worse than other dictators". Ah yes...it was a mistake that they titled the term "Kleptocracy" after his dictatorship? Anyway, if you can slog through the BS and egoism, it's worth it.
July 10, 2007
Devlin, an old CIA Cold warrior, recounts his time in one of its warmest spots with a minimum of style. While a co-author would have helped the listless prose, the books true fault lies in its tendentious viewpoint — US tactics were justified by the Soviet threat. But this is the book’s value as well — by unabashedly defending morally expedient choices, Devlin holds the mirror up to our own times.
August 8, 2017
Larry Devlin was the CIA's man in Congo for some of the main years of unrest right after it gained independence from Belgium. At that time the Soviet Union was looking for a country to be their foothold in Africa, so Larry spent most of his years trying to keep Congo out of the hands of the Soviets. No small task when the country is in turmoil and power keeps changing hands.
This was a fascinating read. It gave some great insights into the Cold War power struggles in Africa, an eye-opening look at what a real CIA agent's life is like and Embassy life (not what you might always imagine), and a behind the scenes look at politics in a 1960s African country. This was hard to put down. It's very well written, and shockingly pretty clean. Highly recommended if you are interested in behind the scenes stories, African history, or any kind of thriller.
Notes on content: Only two or three swear words total. No sexual content. There are some nail-biting moments that Devlin survived including serious threats with guns and knives but he manages to get out of them. It is related that some others are not as fortunate, but it is just mentioned and there's no graphic details.
This was a fascinating read. It gave some great insights into the Cold War power struggles in Africa, an eye-opening look at what a real CIA agent's life is like and Embassy life (not what you might always imagine), and a behind the scenes look at politics in a 1960s African country. This was hard to put down. It's very well written, and shockingly pretty clean. Highly recommended if you are interested in behind the scenes stories, African history, or any kind of thriller.
Notes on content: Only two or three swear words total. No sexual content. There are some nail-biting moments that Devlin survived including serious threats with guns and knives but he manages to get out of them. It is related that some others are not as fortunate, but it is just mentioned and there's no graphic details.
April 23, 2020
An unusual memoir, few former CIA operatives go into print!
The centrepiece is Devlin’s justification for his role in the downfall of Patrice Lamumba and his defence against culpability. His memory is unsurprisingly selective and his foreknowledge of Mobutu’s plan to hand Lamumba over to his murderers is glossed over and his failure to inform CIA Director of the handover for 3 days by when Lamumba was dead is omitted.
Mobutu’s kleptocracy is similarly glossed over and as Devlin sees him as the right man for the mess Congo was in after independence.
Clearly written and gives an interesting insight into his role and Developments in the Congo but as self-justification it falls down when considered again recent research including Stephen Weissman’s excellent work.
The centrepiece is Devlin’s justification for his role in the downfall of Patrice Lamumba and his defence against culpability. His memory is unsurprisingly selective and his foreknowledge of Mobutu’s plan to hand Lamumba over to his murderers is glossed over and his failure to inform CIA Director of the handover for 3 days by when Lamumba was dead is omitted.
Mobutu’s kleptocracy is similarly glossed over and as Devlin sees him as the right man for the mess Congo was in after independence.
Clearly written and gives an interesting insight into his role and Developments in the Congo but as self-justification it falls down when considered again recent research including Stephen Weissman’s excellent work.
January 2, 2019
I'm not sure exactly what could've made this book better. But for me I think it was a bit too much indepth of all the political figures in congo, I would've liked to seen a more broader picture. The stories of what actually happened in Congo were really good, but overall you're gonna be reading a book that looks at one particular country in a specific era and unless you are very interested in Congo this book is just too specific for me.
The backdrop of the cold war was interesting but I felt this book needed to have a lot more information from the russian perspective to make it a bit less one-sided.
The backdrop of the cold war was interesting but I felt this book needed to have a lot more information from the russian perspective to make it a bit less one-sided.
July 10, 2022
Basically an awful [AWFUL] person recounts how he helped cement Congo's instability, helped overthrow democratically elected Lumumba, and aided Mobutu; and somehow rationalizes everything... while being proud. Another nation ruined by imperialism and neo-colonialism at the hands of Americans [and Belgians].
November 19, 2024
These books written by former CIA are all kinda similar: deadening amounts of mundanity, punctuated with a few thrilling tales and brief peaks behind the curtain. Still, an interesting “memoir”. However, Devlin’s protestations at not being involved more directly in PROP seem a bit…forced? Methinks thou doth protest too much, M. Devlin. 3.5/5
March 15, 2020
I read this book cause I was interested in Mobutu Sese Seko. Unfortunately, there is not much information about him. Devlin was Chief of Station 1960-1967 and Mobuto took power in 1965.
But in total there are some interesting stories of the Cold War games and CIA agent life in Congo chaos time.
But in total there are some interesting stories of the Cold War games and CIA agent life in Congo chaos time.
June 18, 2022
I saw this on the shelf at my mom's house, it turns out it got there via my brother. It was actually very interesting! Obviously told from the perspective of imperialist American ambitions, but very much worth a read about a part of history we don't tend to learn a lot about on this continent.
January 25, 2023
Devlin paints as accurate a picture as one can when it comes to the Congo. Having spent my formative years there and knowing what I know now, the portrait is pretty much spot on and gives you a sense what it was like to live there and be operational.
July 10, 2019
Interesting insight into the Congo in the 1960s. Learned much.
April 22, 2020
First-Hand account of the history of Zaire/Congo including major rulers up to Mobutu
September 22, 2022
Not only a book on Cold War Intelligence but delves into African politics (tribalism). Gives one insight to how the region has developed into what it is today.
Read
April 23, 2025unrepentant but an interesting read regardless
November 5, 2025
i’ve read the Church report and declassified CIA cables so i know damn well this man was lying about being morally opposed to murdering Lumumba… but interesting read nonetheless!
April 14, 2010
I read this as a companion piece to King Leopold's Ghost, curious to see what happened in the Congo after the Belgians left. And although it does give a very clear summary of the development of the Congolese political scene in the 1960's, that wasn't what I ultimately found most interesting about this book. No, what was truly fascinating was the insight that Larry Devlin provides in to US foreign policy in the Third World during the Cold War. Devlin shows us just how important the Congo was to the Soviet effort to expand in to the Southern hemisphere, and try to outflank NATO. While several other, minor countries had already fallen under Soviet influence by the early '60s, what Khrushchev really needed was to gain a foothold in the Congo - its natural resources, its strategic location at the heart of Africa, its significance in sheer size, could have been instrumental in gaining control over the African continent.
Devlin and the rest of the Embassy staff in the Congo soon realized just how important this apparent backwater post was, and eventually (not without a lot of prodding from Devlin and the others) Washington realized it too. But even before the folks in Washington clearly understood the situation, Devlin's mission was clear to him: he had to stop the Soviets from gaining political influence in the Congo. To accomplish this he supported an influential group of politicians known as the Binza group, and ultimately to Colonel Mobutu, who were all strongly opposed to replacing the Belgians with the Russians. This meant opposing local demagogue Lumumba and his supporters, who flirted with the Soviets and their socialist African neighbors. The support and opposition provided by Devlin and US took various forms, some of them fairly benign, such as advising and mentoring Mobutu; some of them not so benign, like providing money, weapons, and transportation to crush opposing forces; some of the downright shady, like initiating an effort to assassinate Lumumba.
This last point clearly rankles with Devlin, who goes out of his way to make it clear that he did not approve of the assassination plot, and that he did everything in his power to delay it until it for as long as possible. The question I debated for a while after I put this book down was: was he ultimately involved in Lumumba's death? On the one hand he was a CIA agent, and so perhaps one should take anything he writes with a grain of salt - there's certainly plenty of sources which still suggest he was involved. But I came away from this book with the sense that Devlin was at his core a decent man, and I believe him.
If the book has a flaw, I think it's that it's a little soft on Mobutu, who's depicted as a largely benign dictator. That just doesn't jive with anything else I've read about him.
Devlin and the rest of the Embassy staff in the Congo soon realized just how important this apparent backwater post was, and eventually (not without a lot of prodding from Devlin and the others) Washington realized it too. But even before the folks in Washington clearly understood the situation, Devlin's mission was clear to him: he had to stop the Soviets from gaining political influence in the Congo. To accomplish this he supported an influential group of politicians known as the Binza group, and ultimately to Colonel Mobutu, who were all strongly opposed to replacing the Belgians with the Russians. This meant opposing local demagogue Lumumba and his supporters, who flirted with the Soviets and their socialist African neighbors. The support and opposition provided by Devlin and US took various forms, some of them fairly benign, such as advising and mentoring Mobutu; some of them not so benign, like providing money, weapons, and transportation to crush opposing forces; some of the downright shady, like initiating an effort to assassinate Lumumba.
This last point clearly rankles with Devlin, who goes out of his way to make it clear that he did not approve of the assassination plot, and that he did everything in his power to delay it until it for as long as possible. The question I debated for a while after I put this book down was: was he ultimately involved in Lumumba's death? On the one hand he was a CIA agent, and so perhaps one should take anything he writes with a grain of salt - there's certainly plenty of sources which still suggest he was involved. But I came away from this book with the sense that Devlin was at his core a decent man, and I believe him.
If the book has a flaw, I think it's that it's a little soft on Mobutu, who's depicted as a largely benign dictator. That just doesn't jive with anything else I've read about him.
February 26, 2009
"I thoroughly enjoyed my tours of duty in the Congo," Larry Devlin writes. "It was a tough, tiring time, but accomplishing American objectives and contributing to the defeat of the Soviet Union made it worthwhile... That, after all, was the raison d'etre of my assignment as Chief of Station, Congo." This quotation, taken from the concluding chapter of Larry Devlin's memoir of his CIA tour in the Congo, is the mood that carries the story -- of local power struggles, near death experiences, and clandestine operations, all part of an effort to keep the Cold War cold.
Other reviewers have pointed out an obvious fact: that in this memoir, Larry Devlin is trying to vindicate his actions and cast his involvement in the best possible way. This is neither unusual nor particular surprising for a memoirist of controversial action. What is noteworthy is the way in which Devlin justifies his years in the Congo. In this respect, the richest chapter in the book is the "Author's Note" appended at the end of the story (perhaps unfortunately so, for it may be an invitation to some readers to skip this section). And I quote:
"I realize full well that persons who have not borne such a responsibility [of keeping a Cold War from going Hot:] may find it difficult to accept some of my methods. My generation had seen Hitler in action. We had to defeat the new threat of communism, and we made a considerable contribution to achieving this objective. In 1960, the Congo was on the front line of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. We... made a major contribution to preventing a Hot War, one that would have likely resulted in death and chaos never before experienced."
There is sense in this view, especially for those who, freshly relieved of the horrors of warfare, were keen to prevent a third world war. It is equally sensible for the reader to look past political debates and read Chief of Station, Congo for what it is: a historical document, a first-hand account of a CIA officer's experience. Leave it to the historian to determine the accuracy of his account. Leave it to the moralist to determine the rightness of his actions. Leave it to the psychoanalyst to determine why Devlin stretched this or withheld that. There are, of course, many aspects of the book to critique; one thinks especially of Devlin's unusually positive views of Mobutu. Yet any criticisms of Devlin's inaccuracy or of his disagreeable political justifications must bear in mind that this is, after all, a personal memoir, and a quite timely one at that.
Other reviewers have pointed out an obvious fact: that in this memoir, Larry Devlin is trying to vindicate his actions and cast his involvement in the best possible way. This is neither unusual nor particular surprising for a memoirist of controversial action. What is noteworthy is the way in which Devlin justifies his years in the Congo. In this respect, the richest chapter in the book is the "Author's Note" appended at the end of the story (perhaps unfortunately so, for it may be an invitation to some readers to skip this section). And I quote:
"I realize full well that persons who have not borne such a responsibility [of keeping a Cold War from going Hot:] may find it difficult to accept some of my methods. My generation had seen Hitler in action. We had to defeat the new threat of communism, and we made a considerable contribution to achieving this objective. In 1960, the Congo was on the front line of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. We... made a major contribution to preventing a Hot War, one that would have likely resulted in death and chaos never before experienced."
There is sense in this view, especially for those who, freshly relieved of the horrors of warfare, were keen to prevent a third world war. It is equally sensible for the reader to look past political debates and read Chief of Station, Congo for what it is: a historical document, a first-hand account of a CIA officer's experience. Leave it to the historian to determine the accuracy of his account. Leave it to the moralist to determine the rightness of his actions. Leave it to the psychoanalyst to determine why Devlin stretched this or withheld that. There are, of course, many aspects of the book to critique; one thinks especially of Devlin's unusually positive views of Mobutu. Yet any criticisms of Devlin's inaccuracy or of his disagreeable political justifications must bear in mind that this is, after all, a personal memoir, and a quite timely one at that.
March 28, 2017
Falling somewhere between David Foster Wallace's The Pale King and Ian Fleming's Casino Royale, this memoir is a real world look at a CIA operative's life as part of the staff of a U.S. Embassy. Danger, intrigue and civil service bureaucratic infighting abound, making it an interesting window into the sausage making of foreign policy.
May 22, 2008
Revealing. Provides a good picture of the chaotic events after Congo attained independence. But the book should be noted for what's said and what's not. His portrayals, in much better light, of Mobutu, a man generally reviled for his brutal dictatorship reinforced with almost casual barbaric violence (look up how Lumeme died), is telling.
Some episodes are downright gripping, such as him being kidnapped at gunpoint on his way reporting to his duty, almost hopeless of making it out alive.
Other episode are more humorous. In one, his colleague shot an intruder. He showed up under his diplomatic cover (gives him diplomatic immunity) only to get arrested. But in a poor country such as Congo, he - repeatedly - was then "un-arrested" to fetch with his car other legal official to crime scene, then re-arrested, eventually resulting in the surreal scenario of his driving himself to prison, with the involved policeman, detective and legal migistrate as passenger. And the "evidence" -- the dead corpse - in the trunk, whose hand remaining stucking out due to onset of rigor mortis.
When the Russians were about to establish an embassy,
the event also put on competent display the author's playful wit. He schemed to delay the purchase by the Russias of their embassy building to allow the Americans time to bug the structure. Once the Russians moved in, Devlin - in a commanding show of understanding for local culture, then managed to employ a witch doctor to cast, in front of the Russian building with much drama and flair, a curse for the building and anybody who dares to enter.
Needless to say, words spread.
Fast, fun read. But don't treat it as serious history. This is not the intent of the author anyway.
Some episodes are downright gripping, such as him being kidnapped at gunpoint on his way reporting to his duty, almost hopeless of making it out alive.
Other episode are more humorous. In one, his colleague shot an intruder. He showed up under his diplomatic cover (gives him diplomatic immunity) only to get arrested. But in a poor country such as Congo, he - repeatedly - was then "un-arrested" to fetch with his car other legal official to crime scene, then re-arrested, eventually resulting in the surreal scenario of his driving himself to prison, with the involved policeman, detective and legal migistrate as passenger. And the "evidence" -- the dead corpse - in the trunk, whose hand remaining stucking out due to onset of rigor mortis.
When the Russians were about to establish an embassy,
the event also put on competent display the author's playful wit. He schemed to delay the purchase by the Russias of their embassy building to allow the Americans time to bug the structure. Once the Russians moved in, Devlin - in a commanding show of understanding for local culture, then managed to employ a witch doctor to cast, in front of the Russian building with much drama and flair, a curse for the building and anybody who dares to enter.
Needless to say, words spread.
Fast, fun read. But don't treat it as serious history. This is not the intent of the author anyway.
August 17, 2016
The author served as Chief of Station, the top CIA member of the Embassy from July 1960 until the Spring of 1963. He returned for a second tour from July 1965 until June 1967. His arrival the first time was 10 days after the Congo (now DRC) got its independence from Belgium. The government and the military were in shambles and the Soviet Union was trying to seize the opportunity to gain a foothold in Africa. Devlin worked with leaders, among them Mobutu, to establish a moderate government and keep the Soviets at bay. Devlin had completed the tour and returned to the U.S., working as Chief of the East Africa branch at CIA headquarters, when he was asked to return for a second tour in the Congo. He did and it was not long after arriving that a Mobutu led coup took over power.
The Cold War era is a time I know essentially nothing about, although I suspect at some point in school we'd studied it. This was an interesting read of some of what went on in the world at that time and for the most part, I enjoyed it. He's careful in places to only use first names, or admit that he was changing individuals' names, and I'm sure that was intentional to protect the individuals and what could be classified information. But in other places, he was rather condemning of U.S. policies. I have a family member with Foreign Service experience and have heard it said that while you may not agree with policy, you do not come out and speak against it. Perhaps Devlin felt that since he was writing about events 40 years in the past, and was writing after he'd retired from the Service, that this gave him permission to be negative. The book is an interesting look into events and the lives of Americans serving around the world in a non-military capacity.
The Cold War era is a time I know essentially nothing about, although I suspect at some point in school we'd studied it. This was an interesting read of some of what went on in the world at that time and for the most part, I enjoyed it. He's careful in places to only use first names, or admit that he was changing individuals' names, and I'm sure that was intentional to protect the individuals and what could be classified information. But in other places, he was rather condemning of U.S. policies. I have a family member with Foreign Service experience and have heard it said that while you may not agree with policy, you do not come out and speak against it. Perhaps Devlin felt that since he was writing about events 40 years in the past, and was writing after he'd retired from the Service, that this gave him permission to be negative. The book is an interesting look into events and the lives of Americans serving around the world in a non-military capacity.
June 8, 2012
This is a fascinating account of Larry Devlin’s cold war African experience serving as the CIA Chief of Station in the Congo in the 1960s. Larry was recruited directly out of grad school (The Harvard international relations program which later became the Kennedy School of Government) by McGeorge Bundy, who later became the national security adviser to President Kennedy. Bundy persuaded Larry that the CIA would play the pivotal role in preventing a “hot” nuclear war by thwarting Soviet expansion in the “cold“ war. Larry achieved some notoriety when he was ordered, at the apparent request of President Eisenhower, to assassinate Prime Minister Lumumba, who seemed to be falling under the influence of the Soviet Union. Larry thought that this was a dumb idea and did what any wise bureaucrat would do by slow rolling his boss until another solution emerged. Larry’s biography provides a compelling account of what operational CIA folks really do (or did during he cold war). He was almost assassinated himself on several occasions, only to be saved by his teen aged daughter Maureen (twice!) who, along with her father, became the only father-daughter team to ever receive the CIA’s Intelligence Star, their medal for valor.
June 10, 2016
I found out about this book accidentally when I discovered a podcast called "Spycast" in which an ex CIA man interviews other ex CIA people (and occasionally MI5 and MI6).
One of the episodes featured the author "Larry Devlin" (he died a year afterwards) and I knew I just had to read this book. Devlin was the "Chief of Station" in the Congo in the 60's and his story is pretty fantastic.
The book is a great read but Devlin is no travelogue writer. So you won't get any rich descriptions of the climate, scenery or people. He writes in a terse and understated style that doesn't often capture the raw emotion and excitement that were no doubt present.
Devlin had many harrowing escapes but writes of them with a blase fashion as if he were describing what he had for breakfast.
Once you get used to this style the book does come alive and the complexity of the shifting allegiances and tribal alliances overlaid with the agendas of the Cold War powers come to the forefront and, I guess, that is the real story of the Congo in the early post-independence days.
This is the kind of book that could be turned into an HBO series similar to Homeland - I hope someone does it. It would be fantastic television.
One of the episodes featured the author "Larry Devlin" (he died a year afterwards) and I knew I just had to read this book. Devlin was the "Chief of Station" in the Congo in the 60's and his story is pretty fantastic.
The book is a great read but Devlin is no travelogue writer. So you won't get any rich descriptions of the climate, scenery or people. He writes in a terse and understated style that doesn't often capture the raw emotion and excitement that were no doubt present.
Devlin had many harrowing escapes but writes of them with a blase fashion as if he were describing what he had for breakfast.
Once you get used to this style the book does come alive and the complexity of the shifting allegiances and tribal alliances overlaid with the agendas of the Cold War powers come to the forefront and, I guess, that is the real story of the Congo in the early post-independence days.
This is the kind of book that could be turned into an HBO series similar to Homeland - I hope someone does it. It would be fantastic television.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews