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Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with Puralism
John Courtney Murray is renowned for his contributions to American ethical debates and well known for his defense of civil religious freedom. He strongly felt that religion should be taught in public schools and universities. Murray had a decisive influence on juridical, political, and social theories. This intriguing volume includes, in addition to two of Murray's most important statements on religious freedom, two essays newly made available to the reading public. This fascinating collection will help readers look back at past struggles over religious liberty and forward to dilemmas presently facing the church. The Library of Theological Ethics series focuses on what it means to think theologically and ethically. It presents a selection of important and otherwise unavailable texts in easily accessible form. Volumes in this series will enable sustained dialogue with predecessors though reflection on classic works in the field.
- GenresTheology
280 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1993
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August 31, 2025
FOUR ARTICLES ARGUING IN FAVOR OF CIVIL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
John Courtney Murray (1904-1967) was a Jesuit priest and theologian, who was also editor of the Jesuit journal ‘Theological Studies.’ (He was even featured on the cover of Time magazine on December 12, 1960.)
The General Introduction to this book by J. Leon Hooper, S.J., explains, “This volume presents four distinct arguments for civil religious freedom, all written by Murray. He completed the first in 1955… His church and his religious order suppressed its publication and instructed Murray to cease writing on the issue. The second article … was published in 1964. After being invited to the second, but not the first, session of the [Second Vatican] Council… in response to what the Council had to say about religious freedom and church/state relations, Murray wrote the last two articles of this collection.” (Pg. 12)
He explains in his introduction to the first article, “Leo XIII was a problem because he had also endorsed establishment and intolerance, giving them a more systematic and thereby more compelling grounding than had Pius IX. Here Murray attempted to separate Leo XIII’s reclaimed focus on social dualism from his endorsement of establishment and intolerance.” (Pg. 49)
Murray wrote, “There is no doubt that the care of religion stands high among the functions and purposes of government…. The more concrete question concerns a particular legal institution… of ‘establishment’… whereby Catholicism is erected by human law into ‘the religion of the state.’ … this legal institution … furnishes the premise of legal intolerance of dissenters… in which … the force of law is to be used to ‘exterminate’ all manner of dissent from the official state religion… the substantive issue is always the same. It is the issue of legal intolerance and of its juridical premise, the legal institution of a ‘state religion.’” (Pg. 50)
He notes, “There is the question, whether the Catholic faith, the one true faith, ought by divine law to be the public religion of all human societies… with the theologically consequent question, whether any other religion may claim public existence within human society on equal title of divine right… [and] whether the Catholic faith… ought by human law to be established as the official ‘religion of the state’; with the juridically consequent question, whether any other religion may claim public existence within this particular state on equal title of equal right.” (Pg. 60-61)
He asserts, “Law is … a coercive discipline ultimately effective … through force and fear; and it is therefore subject to a political norm, the norm of wisdom in the use of force. The particular laws of establishment and intolerance must find their justification in terms of these two norms. An appeal solely to the moral and theological norm of law is not enough.” (Pg. 66-67)
He points out, “Leo XIII willingly admitted that American constitutional law is good law. What he will not admit is that the goodness of American legal experience can be made the basis for theoretical conclusions. What is good law is not therefore good dogma. What is defensible on the grounds of public advantage … is not therefore demonstrable on grounds of ultimate truth… The Continental argument was inconsequential, invalid, as an argument. It ignored the differential character of law and ethics, of legal experience and theological principle… It erred in arguing from the pragmatic order of legal goodness to the speculative order of universal truth.” (Pg. 88)
He acknowledges, “It would be pointless to argue the relative merits of the diverse applications---for instance, to argue the question whether the constitutional law which governs 28 million Catholic Spaniards is ‘better law’ than the constitutional law which governs 32 million Catholic Americans. The argument would be pointless because the situations are incommensurable… The more decisive thing is to know the right manner of argument for or against any of these legal decisions, for or against any legal decision affecting the relation of human law---that is, the state---to the order of religion.” (Pg. 113)
Hooper states in his introduction to the second article, “Murray composed [it]… before and during the third session [of Vatican II]… The second section is a broad historical analysis of the changing state of religious liberty question, from the Roman Empire to John XXIII. The first section abruptly presents the canonist position and Murray’s own argument ‘objectively’ … In the third section, Murray tried to sketch the full range of issues that separated him from the canonists.” (Pg. 127-128)
He states of the view of Leo XIII and others, “The religious criterion is the good of the Church. Within conditions of national Catholic unity the good of the Church is served by intolerance; elsewhere, by tolerance. The First View puts forward its answer to the moral question, and its consequent answer to the constitutional question as true, certain, and immutable… The whole system … derives from this concept. Moreover, this First View is declared to be the doctrine of the Church, supported by magisterial authority.” (Pg. 134)
He adds, “However, the First View maintains that progress within the tradition ended with Leo XIII, and the systematization of his doctrine by subsequent canonists. Catholic doctrine has reached its final and definitive mode of conception and statement. It has defined forever the ideal instance of constitutional law with regard to public care of religion. Many changes have taken place in the world since Leo XIII; in particular, there is a wide demand for religious freedom as a personal right and as a legal institution. These changes, however, [supposedly] represent decadence, not progress. Their sole historical effect has been to create more evils that the Church must tolerate; hence the scope of tolerance must be broadened. For the rest, the ideal remains, transhistorical, unquestionable.” (Pg. 136-137)
He states, “it will be sufficient rapidly to recall four basic principles which combine to make government constitutional… limited in its powers. The first principle is the distinction between the sacred and secular orders of human life… The second principle is the distinction between society and state… The third principle is the distinction between the common good and public order… The foregoing three principles belong to the order of political truth. When government is based on them, it is based on truth.” (Pg. 144-145)
He states that the ‘Free Exercise of Religion’ has three component elements: [1] Ecclesial or Corporate Freedom… The pregnant phrase expresses the whole supernatural reality of the Church, as the community of the faithful and as a spiritual authority … [2] Freedom of Religious Association… freedom of affiliation with a religious community is inseparable from personal freedom of conscience… [3] Freedom of religious expression. This… is both a personal and also an ecclesial freedom, whose exercise is public, within society.” (Pg.. 148-149)
Later, he summarizes, “no argument can be made today that would validate the legal institution of religious intolerance, much less canonize it as a Catholic ideal. The institution cannot even be tolerated today as a harmless archaism…. The fact is that legal intolerance stands condemned by the common consciousness of the peoples of the world.” (Pg. 189)
In the third essay, he notes, “It would be fair to say that the Church---that is, the hierarchy and the Holy See---did nothing to advance the struggle for the political rights of man in the 18th and 19th centuries---those rights, notably the right of free speech, which safeguard the person against the encroachments of the state and also secure for citizens a share in the processes of government.” (Pg. 219)
In the fourth article, he says, “in the sphere of religion no one is to be compelled to act against his conscience…. Second, in the sphere of religion no one is to be impeded from acting according to his conscience… It is around this second immunity that the conciliar debate turned.” (Pg. 231)
This book will be of keen interest to those (especially Catholics) studying modern political theory.
John Courtney Murray (1904-1967) was a Jesuit priest and theologian, who was also editor of the Jesuit journal ‘Theological Studies.’ (He was even featured on the cover of Time magazine on December 12, 1960.)
The General Introduction to this book by J. Leon Hooper, S.J., explains, “This volume presents four distinct arguments for civil religious freedom, all written by Murray. He completed the first in 1955… His church and his religious order suppressed its publication and instructed Murray to cease writing on the issue. The second article … was published in 1964. After being invited to the second, but not the first, session of the [Second Vatican] Council… in response to what the Council had to say about religious freedom and church/state relations, Murray wrote the last two articles of this collection.” (Pg. 12)
He explains in his introduction to the first article, “Leo XIII was a problem because he had also endorsed establishment and intolerance, giving them a more systematic and thereby more compelling grounding than had Pius IX. Here Murray attempted to separate Leo XIII’s reclaimed focus on social dualism from his endorsement of establishment and intolerance.” (Pg. 49)
Murray wrote, “There is no doubt that the care of religion stands high among the functions and purposes of government…. The more concrete question concerns a particular legal institution… of ‘establishment’… whereby Catholicism is erected by human law into ‘the religion of the state.’ … this legal institution … furnishes the premise of legal intolerance of dissenters… in which … the force of law is to be used to ‘exterminate’ all manner of dissent from the official state religion… the substantive issue is always the same. It is the issue of legal intolerance and of its juridical premise, the legal institution of a ‘state religion.’” (Pg. 50)
He notes, “There is the question, whether the Catholic faith, the one true faith, ought by divine law to be the public religion of all human societies… with the theologically consequent question, whether any other religion may claim public existence within human society on equal title of divine right… [and] whether the Catholic faith… ought by human law to be established as the official ‘religion of the state’; with the juridically consequent question, whether any other religion may claim public existence within this particular state on equal title of equal right.” (Pg. 60-61)
He asserts, “Law is … a coercive discipline ultimately effective … through force and fear; and it is therefore subject to a political norm, the norm of wisdom in the use of force. The particular laws of establishment and intolerance must find their justification in terms of these two norms. An appeal solely to the moral and theological norm of law is not enough.” (Pg. 66-67)
He points out, “Leo XIII willingly admitted that American constitutional law is good law. What he will not admit is that the goodness of American legal experience can be made the basis for theoretical conclusions. What is good law is not therefore good dogma. What is defensible on the grounds of public advantage … is not therefore demonstrable on grounds of ultimate truth… The Continental argument was inconsequential, invalid, as an argument. It ignored the differential character of law and ethics, of legal experience and theological principle… It erred in arguing from the pragmatic order of legal goodness to the speculative order of universal truth.” (Pg. 88)
He acknowledges, “It would be pointless to argue the relative merits of the diverse applications---for instance, to argue the question whether the constitutional law which governs 28 million Catholic Spaniards is ‘better law’ than the constitutional law which governs 32 million Catholic Americans. The argument would be pointless because the situations are incommensurable… The more decisive thing is to know the right manner of argument for or against any of these legal decisions, for or against any legal decision affecting the relation of human law---that is, the state---to the order of religion.” (Pg. 113)
Hooper states in his introduction to the second article, “Murray composed [it]… before and during the third session [of Vatican II]… The second section is a broad historical analysis of the changing state of religious liberty question, from the Roman Empire to John XXIII. The first section abruptly presents the canonist position and Murray’s own argument ‘objectively’ … In the third section, Murray tried to sketch the full range of issues that separated him from the canonists.” (Pg. 127-128)
He states of the view of Leo XIII and others, “The religious criterion is the good of the Church. Within conditions of national Catholic unity the good of the Church is served by intolerance; elsewhere, by tolerance. The First View puts forward its answer to the moral question, and its consequent answer to the constitutional question as true, certain, and immutable… The whole system … derives from this concept. Moreover, this First View is declared to be the doctrine of the Church, supported by magisterial authority.” (Pg. 134)
He adds, “However, the First View maintains that progress within the tradition ended with Leo XIII, and the systematization of his doctrine by subsequent canonists. Catholic doctrine has reached its final and definitive mode of conception and statement. It has defined forever the ideal instance of constitutional law with regard to public care of religion. Many changes have taken place in the world since Leo XIII; in particular, there is a wide demand for religious freedom as a personal right and as a legal institution. These changes, however, [supposedly] represent decadence, not progress. Their sole historical effect has been to create more evils that the Church must tolerate; hence the scope of tolerance must be broadened. For the rest, the ideal remains, transhistorical, unquestionable.” (Pg. 136-137)
He states, “it will be sufficient rapidly to recall four basic principles which combine to make government constitutional… limited in its powers. The first principle is the distinction between the sacred and secular orders of human life… The second principle is the distinction between society and state… The third principle is the distinction between the common good and public order… The foregoing three principles belong to the order of political truth. When government is based on them, it is based on truth.” (Pg. 144-145)
He states that the ‘Free Exercise of Religion’ has three component elements: [1] Ecclesial or Corporate Freedom… The pregnant phrase expresses the whole supernatural reality of the Church, as the community of the faithful and as a spiritual authority … [2] Freedom of Religious Association… freedom of affiliation with a religious community is inseparable from personal freedom of conscience… [3] Freedom of religious expression. This… is both a personal and also an ecclesial freedom, whose exercise is public, within society.” (Pg.. 148-149)
Later, he summarizes, “no argument can be made today that would validate the legal institution of religious intolerance, much less canonize it as a Catholic ideal. The institution cannot even be tolerated today as a harmless archaism…. The fact is that legal intolerance stands condemned by the common consciousness of the peoples of the world.” (Pg. 189)
In the third essay, he notes, “It would be fair to say that the Church---that is, the hierarchy and the Holy See---did nothing to advance the struggle for the political rights of man in the 18th and 19th centuries---those rights, notably the right of free speech, which safeguard the person against the encroachments of the state and also secure for citizens a share in the processes of government.” (Pg. 219)
In the fourth article, he says, “in the sphere of religion no one is to be compelled to act against his conscience…. Second, in the sphere of religion no one is to be impeded from acting according to his conscience… It is around this second immunity that the conciliar debate turned.” (Pg. 231)
This book will be of keen interest to those (especially Catholics) studying modern political theory.
January 27, 2013
The greatest apologist until Robert Novak for what Pope Leo XIII called the Americanist Heresy. John Courtney Murray peddled trash that no ultramontine Catholic can take seriously.
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