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Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb
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In this revised edition of the highly praised Engaging India, Strobe Talbott updates his bestselling diplomatic account of America's parallel negotiations with India and Pakistan over nuclear proliferation in the late 1990s. The update looks at recent nuclear dealings between India and the United States, including Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 2005 visit to America. Under the highly controversial agreement that emerged, the United States would give India access to U.S. nuclear technology and conventional weapons systems. In exchange, India would place its civilian nuclear program under international monitoring and continue the ban on nuclear testing. Praise for the hardback edition ""A fascinating study of how diplomatic dialogue can slowly broaden to include subtle considerations of the domestic politics and foreign policies of both countries involved."" Foreign Affairs ""An important addition to the literature of modern diplomatic history.""—Choice ""Detailed and revealing... an honest behind-the-scenes look at how countries make and defend policies.... A must-read for any student of diplomacy.""—Outlook (India) ""A rapidly engrossing work and a welcome addition to modern world history shelves.""—Reviewer's Bookwatch ""A highly engaging book; lucid, informative and at times, amusing.""—International Affairs
"
In this revised edition of the highly praised Engaging India, Strobe Talbott updates his bestselling diplomatic account of America's parallel negotiations with India and Pakistan over nuclear proliferation in the late 1990s. The update looks at recent nuclear dealings between India and the United States, including Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 2005 visit to America. Under the highly controversial agreement that emerged, the United States would give India access to U.S. nuclear technology and conventional weapons systems. In exchange, India would place its civilian nuclear program under international monitoring and continue the ban on nuclear testing. Praise for the hardback edition ""A fascinating study of how diplomatic dialogue can slowly broaden to include subtle considerations of the domestic politics and foreign policies of both countries involved."" Foreign Affairs ""An important addition to the literature of modern diplomatic history.""—Choice ""Detailed and revealing... an honest behind-the-scenes look at how countries make and defend policies.... A must-read for any student of diplomacy.""—Outlook (India) ""A rapidly engrossing work and a welcome addition to modern world history shelves.""—Reviewer's Bookwatch ""A highly engaging book; lucid, informative and at times, amusing.""—International Affairs
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279 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2004
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
June 13, 2014
A fascinating book on Indo-US parleys over non-proliferation that rivals thrillers in tautness and pace. Very reassuring to learn the sharp focus of Indian effort on its national interest.
August 13, 2025
Strobe Talbott, the gentle US Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001 chronicles the events which led to and resulted from India and Pakistan’s tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998. The book ingenuously narrates the diplomatic fallout of the explosions and how India withstood the onslaught from the US singlehandedly and with esteem. As we know, India tested first and Pakistan was virtually forced to follow suit. Though the explosion was beneath the ground in Pokhran in Western India, its impact was felt half a world away in the White House. We read about how helpless the Clinton administration felt when the news was broken to them by CNN. The author then tells the long but lucidly described story of the ups and downs in the complex dialogue America maintained with India. The author represented the Americans and Jaswant Singh, India’s foreign minister, acted as his counterpart. Readers get a clearly articulated picture of what bothered the administration, their plan to get India sign along the dotted line and India bided their time well enough to beat Clinton on his homeground, when he lost face after the Republican majority senate threw out his test ban treaty summarily. When Clinton and the Democratic Party lose the presidency, CTBT was also buried quietly. The book is well structured, with a limpid account of the history which led to the bomb and the after-events that finally led to lifting of post-test sanctions and integrating India back into the world stage.
Talbott begins the book with a neat and precise introduction to the events which led to India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. Even though democracies in the modern sense, both India and the US had more to disagree about than to agree with, in the past. Talbott describes how India sided with the USSR in the political game, assisted in no small measure by Nehru’s socialist agenda, which was continued by Indira Gandhi, his daughter and prime minister, who was disdainful of capitalism in general. After China tested the atom bomb in 1964, a test ban treaty came into being, and a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) sought to bring in a regime in which the five nations already possessing nuclear weapons were allowed to continue holding them while non-nuclear states were forced to forego the weapons option. India objected to this discriminatory treaty and wanted itself to be given the honoured place due to it on account of being the world’s largest democracy. The ‘peaceful’ nuclear tests conducted in May 1974 was a milestone in India’s path to become a nuclear weapon state. Things moved with a feverish pitch during the administration of Bill Clinton, beginning in 1993. We get a ringside view of the activities through the candid prose of the author who was a prominent official in the American government. Clinton was proposing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and forcing India to sign and ratify the NPT, which would have sealed the country’s hopes of becoming a nuclear power forever. Indians acted fast, but the effort was open and the political establishment weak-kneed. In December 1995, American spy satellites detected extensive movements in Pokhran and Clinton warned Narasimha Rao, then prime minister, against any misadventure. Rao promptly buckled and called off the tests. But politics in India was fast moving towards a transformation. The Hindu nationalist party – BJP – came to power in March 1998, with Vajpayee at its helm. Inducting nuclear weapons in the country’s arsenal was an electoral manifesto of the party, which it did on May 11, 1998 – less than 60 days after it assumed office – exploding five weapons in a span of three days. The US administration was taken completely off-guard and even the State department and the CIA learned the news through CNN – a greater shame they couldn’t even imagine.
Talbott was a born negotiator and shares his experiences dealing the regimes in India and Pakistan. At the very outset, he was aware of the structural and constitutional differences between the two countries – one an out and out democracy and the other where instability of elected governments was the harm. At the time when negotiations were going forth, Pakistan had a civilian – Nawaz Sharif – as the PM, but General Karamat controlled the administration as usual. The author clearly differentiates the caliber and tone of negotiations. Indians tried to wear the Americans down, and hoping for congressional restraints which was expectable as the Republicans controlled it. Pakistan was ‘bullying on its weaknesses’ and Talbott likens their reaction to that of a person who holds a pistol to his own head, threatening to pull the trigger unless we handed him our wallets. Talbott also identifies that the discussions with Pakistanis were not as intellectually engaging as that with India (p.105) and the rootlessness of Pakistani interlocutors was painfully evident as most of them were worried about who controls what in Pakistan and hence unwilling or unable to deviate much from their brief. In fact, military leaders exhibited a calm and cooler demeanour than the civilian leadership. Pakistani bureaucrats sometimes lost their bearings and assumed intimidating expressions towards their guests. Talbott describes one such incident when a high-ranking official leaned across the table in a moment of rage as if trying to strangle his American counterpart. He had to be physically restrained (p.105). On the other hand, the Indian side displayed a diligent maturity becoming of a responsible democracy. Jaswant Singh and Talbott became close friends during the dialogue process.
Watching from close quarters, Talbott enjoyed a prime spot in bringing out the complex nature of interactions President Clinton had with India before and after its nuclear tests. It is said that Clinton admired India right from his education days at Oxford. He read E.M.Forster’s ‘A passage to India’ more than once in those days. Himself a voracious reader of history, Clinton had as his partner Hillary, who also had a warm regard for India, where she had planned an educational programme in her career. The Democrat-President was eager to visit India during the second term in office, but the nuclear tests upset the apple cart. As the author says, Clinton preferred managing differences with foreign leaders whom he regarded as essentially decent, conscientious, and deserving of a better relationship with the US. Even though he became very furious in the immediate aftermath of the tests, he cooled down considerably and appointed the author as the interlocutor in his engagement with India in a bid to secure the country’s signature on CTBT and to ensure a speedy visit, which had been postponed as part of the sanctions regime. Then he fell into the grips of temptation in the form of an obliging young intern at the White House and lost credibility with the populace, coming close to impeachment. Clinton finally made the India visit in 2000, without obtaining any leverage on his points of contention with the hosts.
The book exemplifies the importance of the personal equation in international relations. The excellent rapport existed between Talbott and Jaswant Singh was instrumental in ironing out many of the stark differences of opinion where they existed and of ignoring the stubborn opposition to some points where no amount of compromise could be effected. We get the impression that a small part of the coldness that suddenly crept up between the US and Pakistan may be accounted for the superior level of mutual communication between the two. The book as a whole is written in an appreciative mood for India and its variegated processes and institutions of democracy, even though those same factors hindered the development of high-level talks in no small measure. It also shows the total change of stress on key issues whenever there is a transfer of power in the White House. Clinton was a staunch non-proliferationist, but as soon as George W Bush took over, he reversed many of his predecessor’s steps. Talbott fumes over Bush’s near-casual acceptance of India as a nuclear power without any of the strings attached.
The book is recommended.
Talbott begins the book with a neat and precise introduction to the events which led to India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. Even though democracies in the modern sense, both India and the US had more to disagree about than to agree with, in the past. Talbott describes how India sided with the USSR in the political game, assisted in no small measure by Nehru’s socialist agenda, which was continued by Indira Gandhi, his daughter and prime minister, who was disdainful of capitalism in general. After China tested the atom bomb in 1964, a test ban treaty came into being, and a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) sought to bring in a regime in which the five nations already possessing nuclear weapons were allowed to continue holding them while non-nuclear states were forced to forego the weapons option. India objected to this discriminatory treaty and wanted itself to be given the honoured place due to it on account of being the world’s largest democracy. The ‘peaceful’ nuclear tests conducted in May 1974 was a milestone in India’s path to become a nuclear weapon state. Things moved with a feverish pitch during the administration of Bill Clinton, beginning in 1993. We get a ringside view of the activities through the candid prose of the author who was a prominent official in the American government. Clinton was proposing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and forcing India to sign and ratify the NPT, which would have sealed the country’s hopes of becoming a nuclear power forever. Indians acted fast, but the effort was open and the political establishment weak-kneed. In December 1995, American spy satellites detected extensive movements in Pokhran and Clinton warned Narasimha Rao, then prime minister, against any misadventure. Rao promptly buckled and called off the tests. But politics in India was fast moving towards a transformation. The Hindu nationalist party – BJP – came to power in March 1998, with Vajpayee at its helm. Inducting nuclear weapons in the country’s arsenal was an electoral manifesto of the party, which it did on May 11, 1998 – less than 60 days after it assumed office – exploding five weapons in a span of three days. The US administration was taken completely off-guard and even the State department and the CIA learned the news through CNN – a greater shame they couldn’t even imagine.
Talbott was a born negotiator and shares his experiences dealing the regimes in India and Pakistan. At the very outset, he was aware of the structural and constitutional differences between the two countries – one an out and out democracy and the other where instability of elected governments was the harm. At the time when negotiations were going forth, Pakistan had a civilian – Nawaz Sharif – as the PM, but General Karamat controlled the administration as usual. The author clearly differentiates the caliber and tone of negotiations. Indians tried to wear the Americans down, and hoping for congressional restraints which was expectable as the Republicans controlled it. Pakistan was ‘bullying on its weaknesses’ and Talbott likens their reaction to that of a person who holds a pistol to his own head, threatening to pull the trigger unless we handed him our wallets. Talbott also identifies that the discussions with Pakistanis were not as intellectually engaging as that with India (p.105) and the rootlessness of Pakistani interlocutors was painfully evident as most of them were worried about who controls what in Pakistan and hence unwilling or unable to deviate much from their brief. In fact, military leaders exhibited a calm and cooler demeanour than the civilian leadership. Pakistani bureaucrats sometimes lost their bearings and assumed intimidating expressions towards their guests. Talbott describes one such incident when a high-ranking official leaned across the table in a moment of rage as if trying to strangle his American counterpart. He had to be physically restrained (p.105). On the other hand, the Indian side displayed a diligent maturity becoming of a responsible democracy. Jaswant Singh and Talbott became close friends during the dialogue process.
Watching from close quarters, Talbott enjoyed a prime spot in bringing out the complex nature of interactions President Clinton had with India before and after its nuclear tests. It is said that Clinton admired India right from his education days at Oxford. He read E.M.Forster’s ‘A passage to India’ more than once in those days. Himself a voracious reader of history, Clinton had as his partner Hillary, who also had a warm regard for India, where she had planned an educational programme in her career. The Democrat-President was eager to visit India during the second term in office, but the nuclear tests upset the apple cart. As the author says, Clinton preferred managing differences with foreign leaders whom he regarded as essentially decent, conscientious, and deserving of a better relationship with the US. Even though he became very furious in the immediate aftermath of the tests, he cooled down considerably and appointed the author as the interlocutor in his engagement with India in a bid to secure the country’s signature on CTBT and to ensure a speedy visit, which had been postponed as part of the sanctions regime. Then he fell into the grips of temptation in the form of an obliging young intern at the White House and lost credibility with the populace, coming close to impeachment. Clinton finally made the India visit in 2000, without obtaining any leverage on his points of contention with the hosts.
The book exemplifies the importance of the personal equation in international relations. The excellent rapport existed between Talbott and Jaswant Singh was instrumental in ironing out many of the stark differences of opinion where they existed and of ignoring the stubborn opposition to some points where no amount of compromise could be effected. We get the impression that a small part of the coldness that suddenly crept up between the US and Pakistan may be accounted for the superior level of mutual communication between the two. The book as a whole is written in an appreciative mood for India and its variegated processes and institutions of democracy, even though those same factors hindered the development of high-level talks in no small measure. It also shows the total change of stress on key issues whenever there is a transfer of power in the White House. Clinton was a staunch non-proliferationist, but as soon as George W Bush took over, he reversed many of his predecessor’s steps. Talbott fumes over Bush’s near-casual acceptance of India as a nuclear power without any of the strings attached.
The book is recommended.
September 26, 2012
Essential reading on the origins of the modern chapter of Indo-US relations and its architects.
April 18, 2019
As a 10-14 year old, I vividly remember reading major world events concerning India, like it going nuclear, getting sanctioned, Kargil war, Parliament attacks etc. This book helped me understand what went behind the scenes between India & US at a diplomatic level as those national headlines flashed.
An excellent recount of what it took for India and US to go from mutually suspicious to a state of undeclared natural allies. A good primer on the foundational work done between 98 and 2006 by diplomats of US & India.
Contrary to my expectations, I expected the book to cover what transpired between India and US, during 9/11. The subject was touched, but doesn’t address to my curiosity at any level.
An excellent recount of what it took for India and US to go from mutually suspicious to a state of undeclared natural allies. A good primer on the foundational work done between 98 and 2006 by diplomats of US & India.
Contrary to my expectations, I expected the book to cover what transpired between India and US, during 9/11. The subject was touched, but doesn’t address to my curiosity at any level.
December 8, 2020
A fascinating piece regarding complex political negotiations and diplomacy. I was intrigued how changes of leadership in a country affects the ongoing dialogue between diplomats and negotiators. I read this book to have an understanding of complex inter-state diplomatic negotiation dynamics and to learn a bit about India's democracy scene. India is a very strong country that will affect the global scene in the next 10-20 years while the conflict between China and U.S.A. is approaching. Let's hope India will not strongly choose a side but opt to have a balanced policy towards China, USA and Russia. This will be better for the world peace.
November 14, 2021
A very detailed account of the process undertaken by the US to engage diplomatically with India, in the light of its newfound understandings on the security and strategic needs of the world's largest democracy. A book that every aspiring policy-maker, diplomat, politician must read. The book only re-emphasizes upon the fact that PM Vajpayee's resolve in strengthening India's arsenal is a testimony to his vision and leadership.
December 25, 2017
This is one of the beautiful classics I would say. This gives you detailed version from American perspective. It basically dwells more about how India and US did fine tune diplomatic relationship. Some of the chapters are really thrilling especially when Bill Clinton was furious with Nawaz Sharif. A must for everyone who loves to read political affairs.
November 8, 2018
Very well written, extremely informative and interesting. The chapter dealing with the kargil war is the USP of this book.
Giving 4 stars instead of 5 only because I found it difficult to read more than 50-100 pages of the book at once. Due to the intensity and detailed nature of the book, a reader may need to take several breaks while reading.
Giving 4 stars instead of 5 only because I found it difficult to read more than 50-100 pages of the book at once. Due to the intensity and detailed nature of the book, a reader may need to take several breaks while reading.
Read
June 29, 2018A real diplomatic walk through that takes you the backstage of some real action pieces.
January 17, 2019
A great way to know about diplomatic relations of India, US, and Pakistan.
March 15, 2020
A really enjoyable book that provides a great brief history on the rivalry between India and Pakistan. I appreciated the perspective that Mr. Talbott provided in sharing the mindset of the Indian government as well as the mindset of the Pakistani government as both raced to secure nuclear weapons. An often overlooked achievement of the Clinton administration was President Clinton's deftness in defusing an explosive situation when India detonated a nuclear weapon and the world was holding onto its breath for Pakistan's reaction.
August 21, 2015
Books written by retired US officials about foreign policy usually center around the self-righteousness of the US and how they had, in times of great need, saved the other countries from the brink of extinction. For a change this book is one with a difference.
Written by Strobe Talbott, one of the respected US foreign office officials, it talks about the tumultuous times of 1998 to 2005 when the Indian subcontinent was the main focus of the world. 1998 was when India, under Atal Behari Vajpayee, tested a nuclear weapon hoodwinking the mighty US spy network. The book talks about the happenings from then on and how he liaised with the then foreign minister of India Jaswant Singh to try and get India to sign the CTBT and NPT and failed in that effort.
In a period of two and a half years, he met with Jaswant Singh for over fourteen times in different places of the world to get India to sign the wholly discriminatory treaties that would have severely handicapped India from developing into a nuclear power.
The geo-politics surrounding the nuclear situation and its aftermath, the way Jaswant Singh proved to be a an extremely hard nut to track and made sure that India’s interests are safeguarded when it came to such partial treaties , how India under Vajpayee withstood the international pressure and made the US agree to every thing that India wanted wihout giving in to any of the US’s demands are all explained by the former US official in great detail.
We get to know how until then the US was treating India and Pakistan on a hyphenated equation and was seeing India from a Pakistan perspective and was trying to dole out concessions or the promise of concessions and was wanting India to do the bidding of the US and how the then BJP government tilted the scales and make the US enter into meaningful dialogue with India. Until then it had always been a monologue situation and by the BJP government’s nuclear diplomacy the US was made to consider India as a dialogue partner. All these and more are explained in vivid detail by Strobe Talbott who was until May 1998 the Russian expert in Clinton’s State Department.
The authenticity of Talbott is striking. He describes in great detail the very conversations that took place between himself and Jaswant Singh. From these it is a pleasure to understand the great person that Jaswant Singh was in terms of safeguarding India’s interests.
This hard stand and never compromising attitude of the Vajpayee government ultimately resulted in the US administration under George Bush agreeing to have the Indo US Nuclear Deal without India signing the CTBT and the NPT.
Talbott sums up his impression on Jaswant thus :” He achieved more of his objectives than I”. And in the end he says thus: “Jaswant put his country’s interests before his”. What more vindication of Jaswant and the Vaipayee government than this compliment from the super power’s own representative !
An essential read for someone who needs to understand the US turn around in its relations with India.
http://amaruvi.wordpress.com
Written by Strobe Talbott, one of the respected US foreign office officials, it talks about the tumultuous times of 1998 to 2005 when the Indian subcontinent was the main focus of the world. 1998 was when India, under Atal Behari Vajpayee, tested a nuclear weapon hoodwinking the mighty US spy network. The book talks about the happenings from then on and how he liaised with the then foreign minister of India Jaswant Singh to try and get India to sign the CTBT and NPT and failed in that effort.
In a period of two and a half years, he met with Jaswant Singh for over fourteen times in different places of the world to get India to sign the wholly discriminatory treaties that would have severely handicapped India from developing into a nuclear power.
The geo-politics surrounding the nuclear situation and its aftermath, the way Jaswant Singh proved to be a an extremely hard nut to track and made sure that India’s interests are safeguarded when it came to such partial treaties , how India under Vajpayee withstood the international pressure and made the US agree to every thing that India wanted wihout giving in to any of the US’s demands are all explained by the former US official in great detail.
We get to know how until then the US was treating India and Pakistan on a hyphenated equation and was seeing India from a Pakistan perspective and was trying to dole out concessions or the promise of concessions and was wanting India to do the bidding of the US and how the then BJP government tilted the scales and make the US enter into meaningful dialogue with India. Until then it had always been a monologue situation and by the BJP government’s nuclear diplomacy the US was made to consider India as a dialogue partner. All these and more are explained in vivid detail by Strobe Talbott who was until May 1998 the Russian expert in Clinton’s State Department.
The authenticity of Talbott is striking. He describes in great detail the very conversations that took place between himself and Jaswant Singh. From these it is a pleasure to understand the great person that Jaswant Singh was in terms of safeguarding India’s interests.
This hard stand and never compromising attitude of the Vajpayee government ultimately resulted in the US administration under George Bush agreeing to have the Indo US Nuclear Deal without India signing the CTBT and the NPT.
Talbott sums up his impression on Jaswant thus :” He achieved more of his objectives than I”. And in the end he says thus: “Jaswant put his country’s interests before his”. What more vindication of Jaswant and the Vaipayee government than this compliment from the super power’s own representative !
An essential read for someone who needs to understand the US turn around in its relations with India.
http://amaruvi.wordpress.com
February 8, 2015
Talbott was along with Jaswant Singh one of the architects of bringing the real foundation to India-US foreign relationship. Their efforts to understand the south asian dynamics of regional balance along with pragmatic approach to mutual relationship brought real depth to generally frosty interaction between US-India. The book gives riveting insight into international diplomacy, India's going nuclear and the interplay of great game between isolation and total engagement.
Although as with quite a bit of American writing the perspective of being world savior hovers in between but this is a great read to understand how foreign policy is conducted and how as much as everything else its also a game of management, threats, give n take and human psychology. An account of our times when the country went into one of most important peaceful transition in politics, foreign affairs and way the country was carried along by political leadership.
Although as with quite a bit of American writing the perspective of being world savior hovers in between but this is a great read to understand how foreign policy is conducted and how as much as everything else its also a game of management, threats, give n take and human psychology. An account of our times when the country went into one of most important peaceful transition in politics, foreign affairs and way the country was carried along by political leadership.
June 19, 2016
This was a brisk read, both due to the nature of content included as well as Talbott's lucid writing style. Although, the book doesn't cover the denouement of America's courtship of India (I.e. The nuclear deal of 2005), the book does a good job of laying the pieces down for one to gauge how the relationship nurtured over time.
I especially liked the author's personal anecdotes with Jaswant Singh, a public figure I admire a lot, as well as learning facets of India's diplomatic troupe.
I especially liked the author's personal anecdotes with Jaswant Singh, a public figure I admire a lot, as well as learning facets of India's diplomatic troupe.
June 15, 2016
Wonderful and detailed behind the looks at the diplomatic conversations that shaped India-US relations from 1996-2004. The most fascinating part was the tense moments when India and Pakistan were on the brink of a thermonuclear war and Bill Clinton came to the rescue. Also, Strobe Talbott throws light on the statesmanship of towering personalities like Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh.
February 5, 2015
A still relevant history of India becoming nuclear, how the Clinton administration handled it. History has led to it also being a good look at the BJP's previous time in government. Dry, but probably unavoidably so.
July 29, 2016
One of the best books to know how diplomacy works. Especially, if we need to know about India's nuclear phases, the way Indian Diplomats worked with US diplomats ..Its truly engaging ..Its like a story but real events. Hatsoff to Strobe Talbott
June 7, 2007
Lucidly written. This book gives a great insight into international diplomacy in general, and between India and the US in particular.
February 1, 2016
For those who remember when India and Pakistan detinated a nuclear bomb in the late 90's - this is a good account of the behind the scenes negotiations that took place betweeen the US and India
March 10, 2019
I imagine this book is very popular in Pyongyang as the Kim regime seeks to secure its own India-style nuclear relationship with the US.
July 18, 2018
Excellent books on Indo-american relationship and personal relationship building by Strobe Talbott
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews