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The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked
"
Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter ""was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system—the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures—was designed to do, and it did it."" The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.
"
Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter ""was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system—the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures—was designed to do, and it did it."" The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.
"
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First published March 1, 1979
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About the author
Leslie H. Gelb
22 books3 followersLeslie Howard Gelb was a correspondent and columnist for The New York Times and later a senior Defense and State Department official.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
November 26, 2021
At first glance, the title of Leslie H. Gelb's book sounds ridiculous. The American government's involvement in the Vietnam conflict was undoubtedly a failure. After decades of commitment to prevent Communist domination, at the cost of billions of dollars and thousands of American and Vietnamese lives, it is impossible to assert the effort was successful.
Nevertheless, while most historians base their studies on the conventional wisdom that America's failure in Vietnam was the failure of America's foreign policy decision-making system, and that the disastrous results suggest American policy-makers did not realize what they were doing when they decided to do it, Gelb confidently argues that those choosing to increase American involvement knew victory would probably not be the result. "Without recognizing this point, it will be impossible to perceive accurately or to appreciate the other lessons of the war," warns he.
The paradox is that although the foreign policy failed, the domestic policy-making apparatus worked. Vietnam was not a deviation from this apparatus, but rather a logical result of the principles American leaders brought with them into it. Gelb lists three general criteria by which the American system can be acknowledged as workable.
First, the main goal of post-war American foreign policy – the containment of international Communism – was pursued consistently.
Second, differences of opinion among Americans were resolved through compromise, and policy did not stray far from the golden middle of public opinion. While it is true that in the late 1960s the war went on in spite of the public's desire to withdraw, in the early years of the decade those who were in favor of ending the war by escalation outnumbered the pacifists. Americans wanted the war. They did not want the prolonged war they got, though, so by 1967 those advocating for letting the Communists win had indeed become more and louder.
Third, virtually all views and recommendations were considered, and all important decisions were made without illusions about the chances of success. Gelb acknowledges that this is the hardest point to believe. Conventional wisdom sees the expansion of military operations as a deluded journey into a quagmire and maintains that had there been a grain of realistic pessimism about the chances of victory among American policy-makers, they would have made the decision to get out much earlier. However, argues Gelb, although American leaders were deluded about many things, each time they turned the escalation up another notch they did not do it because they believed it would provide victory defined as decisive defeat of the enemy. At best they hoped they might be lucky, but they did not expect to be.
Furthermore, contrary to the wide-spread belief those in the American government who opposed escalation were not ignored. The hawks heard them out and were usually pessimistic themselves, but while the doves doubted the current policy-making more than their colleagues, even the most convinced of them, having seen the narrow array of options, supported the vital decisions on aid, troops, and bombing. As Gelb explains, they did this because at the time the Cold War ideology underscored the urgency of the first point – the joint agreement that containment required preventing the Communists from seizing control of all Vietnam.
If the decision-making apparatus failed, it did so in ways that were not unique to the Vietnam conflict, but seem so because the costs were horrible and the aftermath tragic. The most significant problem was that the American policy-makers omitted to force a definitive early limit on how big the tolerable eventual total costs should be. Since the cost of not intervening in Vietnam was considered greater than the cost of intervening, the final military cost of the invasion was not assessed. At the time the vital decisions were made it was the cost of accepting, not preventing, defeat that appeared incalculable to the American government. "The system in this case coped as democracies usually do: by compromising between extreme choices, satisfying the partisans of neither extreme of opinion within the government but preventing the total alienation of either," writes the author.
According to him, democratic governments are inherently ill-prepared for decisive long-term planning. Democracy requires frequent accountability from the leaders, so they have to prioritize near-term results. If they had not felt constrained by the price of losing public support at important points during their decision-making, as President Lyndon B. Johnson felt in 1965, American policy-makers would have had more freedom to withdraw. They would have also had more freedom to escalate involvement further, though.
THE IRONY OF VIETNAM analyzes the history of the decision-making process that resulted in steady increases in American involvement in Vietnam after the Second World War. It focuses on what happened in Washington until the decision to cease escalation was made in 1968. If the reader is not well-acquainted with the background of the Vietnamese civil war, the internal affairs of South Vietnam and the Communist North, the economic, social, and cultural factors that influenced the conflict, and the logistics of the war itself, Gelb's work is not a good start, for it does not deal with the complexities of the Vietnam conflict as a whole. However, this concise study offers a unique approach to the story of why America got into Vietnam in the first place and why its involvement grew so rapidly. It traces the workings of the American decision-making system to demonstrate why it was effective while foreign policy was not. The author's arguments are supported by well-done research and therefore persuasive. I recommend it to all open-minded Vietnam history buffs.
Nevertheless, while most historians base their studies on the conventional wisdom that America's failure in Vietnam was the failure of America's foreign policy decision-making system, and that the disastrous results suggest American policy-makers did not realize what they were doing when they decided to do it, Gelb confidently argues that those choosing to increase American involvement knew victory would probably not be the result. "Without recognizing this point, it will be impossible to perceive accurately or to appreciate the other lessons of the war," warns he.
The paradox is that although the foreign policy failed, the domestic policy-making apparatus worked. Vietnam was not a deviation from this apparatus, but rather a logical result of the principles American leaders brought with them into it. Gelb lists three general criteria by which the American system can be acknowledged as workable.
First, the main goal of post-war American foreign policy – the containment of international Communism – was pursued consistently.
Second, differences of opinion among Americans were resolved through compromise, and policy did not stray far from the golden middle of public opinion. While it is true that in the late 1960s the war went on in spite of the public's desire to withdraw, in the early years of the decade those who were in favor of ending the war by escalation outnumbered the pacifists. Americans wanted the war. They did not want the prolonged war they got, though, so by 1967 those advocating for letting the Communists win had indeed become more and louder.
Third, virtually all views and recommendations were considered, and all important decisions were made without illusions about the chances of success. Gelb acknowledges that this is the hardest point to believe. Conventional wisdom sees the expansion of military operations as a deluded journey into a quagmire and maintains that had there been a grain of realistic pessimism about the chances of victory among American policy-makers, they would have made the decision to get out much earlier. However, argues Gelb, although American leaders were deluded about many things, each time they turned the escalation up another notch they did not do it because they believed it would provide victory defined as decisive defeat of the enemy. At best they hoped they might be lucky, but they did not expect to be.
Furthermore, contrary to the wide-spread belief those in the American government who opposed escalation were not ignored. The hawks heard them out and were usually pessimistic themselves, but while the doves doubted the current policy-making more than their colleagues, even the most convinced of them, having seen the narrow array of options, supported the vital decisions on aid, troops, and bombing. As Gelb explains, they did this because at the time the Cold War ideology underscored the urgency of the first point – the joint agreement that containment required preventing the Communists from seizing control of all Vietnam.
If the decision-making apparatus failed, it did so in ways that were not unique to the Vietnam conflict, but seem so because the costs were horrible and the aftermath tragic. The most significant problem was that the American policy-makers omitted to force a definitive early limit on how big the tolerable eventual total costs should be. Since the cost of not intervening in Vietnam was considered greater than the cost of intervening, the final military cost of the invasion was not assessed. At the time the vital decisions were made it was the cost of accepting, not preventing, defeat that appeared incalculable to the American government. "The system in this case coped as democracies usually do: by compromising between extreme choices, satisfying the partisans of neither extreme of opinion within the government but preventing the total alienation of either," writes the author.
According to him, democratic governments are inherently ill-prepared for decisive long-term planning. Democracy requires frequent accountability from the leaders, so they have to prioritize near-term results. If they had not felt constrained by the price of losing public support at important points during their decision-making, as President Lyndon B. Johnson felt in 1965, American policy-makers would have had more freedom to withdraw. They would have also had more freedom to escalate involvement further, though.
THE IRONY OF VIETNAM analyzes the history of the decision-making process that resulted in steady increases in American involvement in Vietnam after the Second World War. It focuses on what happened in Washington until the decision to cease escalation was made in 1968. If the reader is not well-acquainted with the background of the Vietnamese civil war, the internal affairs of South Vietnam and the Communist North, the economic, social, and cultural factors that influenced the conflict, and the logistics of the war itself, Gelb's work is not a good start, for it does not deal with the complexities of the Vietnam conflict as a whole. However, this concise study offers a unique approach to the story of why America got into Vietnam in the first place and why its involvement grew so rapidly. It traces the workings of the American decision-making system to demonstrate why it was effective while foreign policy was not. The author's arguments are supported by well-done research and therefore persuasive. I recommend it to all open-minded Vietnam history buffs.
December 7, 2015
The authors support their hypothesis in that the US political system for decades did what they set out to do, namely, not let the communists take over South Vietnam. The US executives opted for the “middle road” solution, neither to escalate to total war nor withdraw and allow communist takeover, thus giving themselves and subsequent US leaders more options while placating political extremists. The US was never there to win. Interesting book.
September 29, 2021
I've read a lot of books about Vietnam but somehow I missed this one. It was mentioned in one of the many opinion pieces about the Afghanistan debacle as being the best book written about Vietnam, so I had to get it. It was out of print, so I picked up a used one on Amazon. It covers the period from the end on WWII to 1968: Truman through Johnson, with only afterthought for the end of the war under Nixon and Ford. Gelb and Betts make the argument, pretty convincingly, that the Vietnam War, from the American point of view, did what it was intended to do, which was to contain communism, which was the consensus political and popular goal in the country at that time. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson certainly all bought in to it. As did Congress and the American public. It was only when that consensus began to crumble (beginning with the Tet Offensive in 1968) that American troops were ultimately withdrawn (over the next four years) from Vietnam. If containment was no longer the goal, why did we need to be in Vietnam?
I happened to be in the Army in 1972, stationed in Saigon, when Nixon went to China. We were all floored, lifers and draftees alike. Why were we there? It made no sense. I think Gelb and Betts hit the nail on the head. What may seem counterintuitive now, and this is their point, is that it DID make sense, up until then, because containment was the agreed upon policy, both among the DC political elite and among the general populace. It took a long time for that consensus to change. And at a great cost in lives and treasure.
I happened to be in the Army in 1972, stationed in Saigon, when Nixon went to China. We were all floored, lifers and draftees alike. Why were we there? It made no sense. I think Gelb and Betts hit the nail on the head. What may seem counterintuitive now, and this is their point, is that it DID make sense, up until then, because containment was the agreed upon policy, both among the DC political elite and among the general populace. It took a long time for that consensus to change. And at a great cost in lives and treasure.
March 16, 2009
Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (1979): Containment and bureaucracy made intervention inevitable, even logical. Communist containment trumped all other imperatives. Only when containment was reassessed (Nixon and Kissinger) could Vietnam be abandoned.
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November 15, 2021---
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
March 25, 2022
Remains Relevant Today
Gelb and Betts make a strong case that the U.S. got itself bogged down in the Vietnam quagmire because its national seunity decision-making system functioned pretty much the way it was intended to. The problem was with the larger assumptions about Communism and the commitment to containment. The strong consensus around these doctrines made it all but impossible for U.S. leaders to avoid commiting to South Vietnam's survival, or to figure out how to get out once policy makers realized they were stuck. The book, despite its age, is especially of interest in view of our just-concluded debacle in Afghanistan. Substitute "Islamic Terrorism" for "Communism" and you can see how America's policy mistakes and failures in Afghanistan recapitulated the mistakes and failures in Vietnam.
Gelb and Betts make a strong case that the U.S. got itself bogged down in the Vietnam quagmire because its national seunity decision-making system functioned pretty much the way it was intended to. The problem was with the larger assumptions about Communism and the commitment to containment. The strong consensus around these doctrines made it all but impossible for U.S. leaders to avoid commiting to South Vietnam's survival, or to figure out how to get out once policy makers realized they were stuck. The book, despite its age, is especially of interest in view of our just-concluded debacle in Afghanistan. Substitute "Islamic Terrorism" for "Communism" and you can see how America's policy mistakes and failures in Afghanistan recapitulated the mistakes and failures in Vietnam.
November 15, 2021
---
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews