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Big Fellow, Long Fellow: A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera
Examining the years 1917-22, this biography traces the parallel careers and political lives of Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera, two leaders of the Irish revolution who were very different in temperament and style. It also considers the legacy of Collins on de Valera's later political life.
371 pages, Hardcover
First published November 19, 1998
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155 people want to read
About the author
T. Ryle Dwyer
27 books9 followersThomas Ryle Dwyer was reared in Tralee, County Kerry, Ireland, from an early age. After going to primary and secondary school in Tralee, he returned to the United States to attend St. Ambrose College, Davenport, Iowa, and North Texas State University (now the University of North Texas), where he received B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Modern History.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
May 13, 2016
This is a deeply researched, well written and very detailed history of the Irish struggle for independence from 1916 to 1923 through close examination of the two main actors of the rebellion, war for independence and the Irish civil war. One of its strengths is Dwyer's mastery of the sources--if it there he has read it. One of the weaknesses (the only major problem) is the wealth of detail that Dwyer reveals. For example, one could get bogged down in the memo by memo, letter by letter minutia of the negotiations among various Irish factions for the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921. While intriguing in themselves and an important part of Irish Republican history, their presentation obscures Dwyer's real point, that De Valera maneuvered Collins into negotiating the treaty knowing that any bargain struck with David Lloyd George wouldn't be acceptable to the Republican majority. Collins was aware of the consequences of getting the best deal he could from the British, saying, "Think, what have I got for Ireland? Something she has wanted these past 700 years. Will anyone be satisfied at the bargain? Will anyone? I tell you this, I have signed my death warrant."
When Collins returned from London with the peace treaty, de Valera attacked it as pro-British and a betrayal of Ireland. Collins was assassinated by the IRA in 1922. Eamon de Valera was prime minister or president of Ireland for most of five decades. Dwyer sees the split between them as personal as well as political. Both men were ambitious and often unscrupulous in getting what they wanted. De Valera, elected president of Ireland, feared Collins’s popularity and control of the army; Collins considered de Valera an untrustworthy demagogue. Both were right.
"Big Fellow, Long Fellow" is highly recommended for those who already have some knowledge of the history of Ireland from the Easter Rising (1916) to the assassination of Collins (1922). It seems to be a compromise between popular history and academic history and is missing the scholarly apparatus of citation from the sources although Dwyer's bibliography seems exhaustive.
When Collins returned from London with the peace treaty, de Valera attacked it as pro-British and a betrayal of Ireland. Collins was assassinated by the IRA in 1922. Eamon de Valera was prime minister or president of Ireland for most of five decades. Dwyer sees the split between them as personal as well as political. Both men were ambitious and often unscrupulous in getting what they wanted. De Valera, elected president of Ireland, feared Collins’s popularity and control of the army; Collins considered de Valera an untrustworthy demagogue. Both were right.
"Big Fellow, Long Fellow" is highly recommended for those who already have some knowledge of the history of Ireland from the Easter Rising (1916) to the assassination of Collins (1922). It seems to be a compromise between popular history and academic history and is missing the scholarly apparatus of citation from the sources although Dwyer's bibliography seems exhaustive.
March 17, 2019
A great bargain on Kindle this book brings us a look at the biographies of Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera, with a focus on their actions between the Easter Rising of 1916 and the assassination of Collins in 1922. This piece of Irish history has been covered extensively, and while this book does an excellent job of covering these two giants of Irish history there was not a lot of “new” material. Many years ago I read the Tim Pat Coogan books on Collins and De Valera, and I still consider his viewpoint on both to be persuasive. This book, in the main, is reflective of the Tim Pat Coogan view, which was largely pro-Collins. The author attempts to compensate a bit with a more balanced look at the end of the book at the legacies of both men, both positive and not so positive.
I bought the book with a clear bias in the direction of Coogan, which is to say I am strongly on the Collins side of this long disagreement. This book did not change that perspective. The author lays out the some of the key elements, on the Irish side, in the Anglo-Irish “war” that Michael Collins had such a prominent role in. Collins, through multiple portfolios in the Dail government (Minister of Finance, Director of Intelligence) and through the Irish Republican Brotherhood, was truly the operational leader of the Irish resistance to British rule in Ireland. Although Collins incurred some criticism for the publicity he received, especially after the split with De Valera, his role as the military leader of the Irish effort cannot be minimized. (The man who won the war) The history of the Irish War of Independence is one of surprising success, with the Collins strategy of guerrilla engagement with the British enabling the Irish to impose a punishing burden on the British for their continued presence in Ireland. The British had a massive operational and resource advantage, but the Collins strategy largely negated that British superiority. While there were clearly some differences in approach in this period between Collins and De Valera those differences were, in my view, on the margins. The book covers this period well, and for those interested gives a fair assessment of the war, and of the relative contributions of each man. It is, of course, what happened when the British sued for peace that creates the controversy that goes on to this day.
Much of the focus, correctly, has been on the London peace conference convened to attempt to come to terms that would end the conflict and bring the Irish some form of independence from Britain. But before that conference the Irish did send a delegation to London to lay the groundwork for the ultimate discussions. That delegation was headed by Eamon De Valera, who had multiple private meetings with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. The Irish delegation did not include Collins, who was quite put out by his exclusion. De Valera left that conference without the benefit of anything closely resembling terms, refusing to even carry the written British offer with him back to Ireland. Upon his return De Valera jousted with hard liners in the Dail who insisted that any agreement must uphold the principle of an Irish Republic.
“‘We have done our best,’ de Valera replied, ‘and I have never undertaken to do more than my best.’ ‘We have proclaimed a Republic in arms,’ Brugha reminded him. ‘It has been ratified by the votes of the people, and we have sworn to defend it with our lives.’ ‘The oath never conveyed any more to me than to do my best in whatever circumstances might arise.’ ‘You have accepted a position of authority and responsibility in the Government of the Republic,’ Brugha said striking the table with his fist. ‘You will discharge the duties of that office as they have been defined. I do not want ever again to hear anything else from you.’”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
The book shows multiple examples of De Valera expressing great flexibility on the issues of British acceptance of an Irish Republic, and on the issue of partition. It would make his later actions so much harder to justify.
“Having publicly indicated his willingness to compromise, he went even further in the following days when the Dáil met in private session. In the course of a rather rambling discussion on 22 August, he told deputies to realise that if they were determined to make peace only on the basis of recognition of the Republic, then they were going to be faced with war, except that this time it would be a real war of British reconquest, not just a continuation of limited military coercive measures ‘in support of the civil police’ to force some people to obey the law. In short, he was saying the War of Independence had not been a real war at all.”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
De Valera’s unwillingness to head the Irish delegation to the London Peace Conference, and his designation of Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith as members has been viewed by so many as a cynical move designed to create distance between himself and what he knew a successful outcome might look like. The discussions and dis-agreements between the Irish and the British on the conference itself were telling, and led to a post treaty argument by Collins that truly put De Valera in an awful light.
“The second point at issue involved recognition of Irish sovereignty. ‘Our nation has formally declared its independence and recognises itself as a sovereign state,’ de Valera wrote, in accepting the initial invitation to the Inverness conference. ‘It is only as the representatives of that State and as its chosen guardians that we have any authority or powers to act on behalf of our people.’ It was the publication of this letter which prompted Lloyd George to cancel the conference.”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
De Valera, in stating that the Irish recognized themselves as sovereign in advance of the conference, brought on a cancellation by Lloyd George, who was not willing to give that ground up in advance of the conference. De Valera was forced to withdraw that position in order to get the British to agree to the conference, and he did so. That of course led to the Collins observation that:
“‘The communication of September 29th from Lloyd George made it clear that they were going into a conference not on the recognition of the Irish Republic, and I say if we all stood on the recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we could very easily have said so, and there would be no conference,’ Collins later contended. ‘What I want to make clear is that it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise. I was sent there to form that adaptation, to bear the brunt of it.’”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
The book covers the cynical ploy of De Valera refusing to head the Irish delegation, the cynical and destructive way that De Valera treated the agreement brought home by the Irish plenipotentiaries from London, his refusal to accept a loss when the Dail accepted the Treaty, and his actions and statements that helped to incite the Irish Civil War, which led to the assassination of Collins. The book honestly gives De Valera’s actions no justification, showing his inconsistencies, his ego driven desire to substitute the ludicrous “Document Number Two” for the Treaty when there was no substantive difference between the two, and his foolhardy rhetoric on the treaty, including his “wade through Irish blood” speech.
The author correctly points out that De Valera ultimately proved Collins point that the Treaty was a “steppingstone” to Irish freedom by entering the Free State Government (years after the Collins assassination) himself, assuming the reigns of a government that he had long maintained was an illegitimate perversion of the goal of an Irish Republic. Collins main argument for the Treaty ultimately was borne out by his most bitter antagonist.
De Valera did some truly outstanding work in moving the “Free State” apparatus to an Irish Republic, and his many years of service to the cause of Irish freedom can never be minimized. He was a political giant with an enormous will, but his failures on the Treaty, and his responsibility for the inciting of the Irish Civil War, shall remain a blight on his record, in my view. Collins, like most political leaders, had a healthy menu of faults, many of which the author covers. His military leadership of the government forces in the civil war has, in many quarters, never been forgiven. But the author correctly points out that some of the “faults” that are attributable to Collins stemmed from his desire to avoid the armed conflict with many of his old comrades that a civil war would bring. His desire to keep reaching for political compromise was cited as a weakness, and perhaps it was. Collins was willing to go the extra mile to try to avoid the conflict that ultimately cost him his life. This book was a fair look at two giants of Ireland, and if you have a desire to learn some of this history then this book is a fine vehicle.
I bought the book with a clear bias in the direction of Coogan, which is to say I am strongly on the Collins side of this long disagreement. This book did not change that perspective. The author lays out the some of the key elements, on the Irish side, in the Anglo-Irish “war” that Michael Collins had such a prominent role in. Collins, through multiple portfolios in the Dail government (Minister of Finance, Director of Intelligence) and through the Irish Republican Brotherhood, was truly the operational leader of the Irish resistance to British rule in Ireland. Although Collins incurred some criticism for the publicity he received, especially after the split with De Valera, his role as the military leader of the Irish effort cannot be minimized. (The man who won the war) The history of the Irish War of Independence is one of surprising success, with the Collins strategy of guerrilla engagement with the British enabling the Irish to impose a punishing burden on the British for their continued presence in Ireland. The British had a massive operational and resource advantage, but the Collins strategy largely negated that British superiority. While there were clearly some differences in approach in this period between Collins and De Valera those differences were, in my view, on the margins. The book covers this period well, and for those interested gives a fair assessment of the war, and of the relative contributions of each man. It is, of course, what happened when the British sued for peace that creates the controversy that goes on to this day.
Much of the focus, correctly, has been on the London peace conference convened to attempt to come to terms that would end the conflict and bring the Irish some form of independence from Britain. But before that conference the Irish did send a delegation to London to lay the groundwork for the ultimate discussions. That delegation was headed by Eamon De Valera, who had multiple private meetings with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. The Irish delegation did not include Collins, who was quite put out by his exclusion. De Valera left that conference without the benefit of anything closely resembling terms, refusing to even carry the written British offer with him back to Ireland. Upon his return De Valera jousted with hard liners in the Dail who insisted that any agreement must uphold the principle of an Irish Republic.
“‘We have done our best,’ de Valera replied, ‘and I have never undertaken to do more than my best.’ ‘We have proclaimed a Republic in arms,’ Brugha reminded him. ‘It has been ratified by the votes of the people, and we have sworn to defend it with our lives.’ ‘The oath never conveyed any more to me than to do my best in whatever circumstances might arise.’ ‘You have accepted a position of authority and responsibility in the Government of the Republic,’ Brugha said striking the table with his fist. ‘You will discharge the duties of that office as they have been defined. I do not want ever again to hear anything else from you.’”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
The book shows multiple examples of De Valera expressing great flexibility on the issues of British acceptance of an Irish Republic, and on the issue of partition. It would make his later actions so much harder to justify.
“Having publicly indicated his willingness to compromise, he went even further in the following days when the Dáil met in private session. In the course of a rather rambling discussion on 22 August, he told deputies to realise that if they were determined to make peace only on the basis of recognition of the Republic, then they were going to be faced with war, except that this time it would be a real war of British reconquest, not just a continuation of limited military coercive measures ‘in support of the civil police’ to force some people to obey the law. In short, he was saying the War of Independence had not been a real war at all.”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
De Valera’s unwillingness to head the Irish delegation to the London Peace Conference, and his designation of Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith as members has been viewed by so many as a cynical move designed to create distance between himself and what he knew a successful outcome might look like. The discussions and dis-agreements between the Irish and the British on the conference itself were telling, and led to a post treaty argument by Collins that truly put De Valera in an awful light.
“The second point at issue involved recognition of Irish sovereignty. ‘Our nation has formally declared its independence and recognises itself as a sovereign state,’ de Valera wrote, in accepting the initial invitation to the Inverness conference. ‘It is only as the representatives of that State and as its chosen guardians that we have any authority or powers to act on behalf of our people.’ It was the publication of this letter which prompted Lloyd George to cancel the conference.”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
De Valera, in stating that the Irish recognized themselves as sovereign in advance of the conference, brought on a cancellation by Lloyd George, who was not willing to give that ground up in advance of the conference. De Valera was forced to withdraw that position in order to get the British to agree to the conference, and he did so. That of course led to the Collins observation that:
“‘The communication of September 29th from Lloyd George made it clear that they were going into a conference not on the recognition of the Irish Republic, and I say if we all stood on the recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we could very easily have said so, and there would be no conference,’ Collins later contended. ‘What I want to make clear is that it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise. I was sent there to form that adaptation, to bear the brunt of it.’”
Dwyer, T. Ryle. Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera . Gill Books. Kindle Edition.
The book covers the cynical ploy of De Valera refusing to head the Irish delegation, the cynical and destructive way that De Valera treated the agreement brought home by the Irish plenipotentiaries from London, his refusal to accept a loss when the Dail accepted the Treaty, and his actions and statements that helped to incite the Irish Civil War, which led to the assassination of Collins. The book honestly gives De Valera’s actions no justification, showing his inconsistencies, his ego driven desire to substitute the ludicrous “Document Number Two” for the Treaty when there was no substantive difference between the two, and his foolhardy rhetoric on the treaty, including his “wade through Irish blood” speech.
The author correctly points out that De Valera ultimately proved Collins point that the Treaty was a “steppingstone” to Irish freedom by entering the Free State Government (years after the Collins assassination) himself, assuming the reigns of a government that he had long maintained was an illegitimate perversion of the goal of an Irish Republic. Collins main argument for the Treaty ultimately was borne out by his most bitter antagonist.
De Valera did some truly outstanding work in moving the “Free State” apparatus to an Irish Republic, and his many years of service to the cause of Irish freedom can never be minimized. He was a political giant with an enormous will, but his failures on the Treaty, and his responsibility for the inciting of the Irish Civil War, shall remain a blight on his record, in my view. Collins, like most political leaders, had a healthy menu of faults, many of which the author covers. His military leadership of the government forces in the civil war has, in many quarters, never been forgiven. But the author correctly points out that some of the “faults” that are attributable to Collins stemmed from his desire to avoid the armed conflict with many of his old comrades that a civil war would bring. His desire to keep reaching for political compromise was cited as a weakness, and perhaps it was. Collins was willing to go the extra mile to try to avoid the conflict that ultimately cost him his life. This book was a fair look at two giants of Ireland, and if you have a desire to learn some of this history then this book is a fine vehicle.
June 22, 2023
Well they say history is best viewed with some distance between the writing and the events, far enough after to provide a wider context at least. In 'Big Fellow (i.e. Michael Collins), Long Fellow' (Eamon de Valera) we are looking back 100+ years at the people and events that were so crucial to Irish history, although the book was written in 1998, so the book is 75 years after.
Due to my nearly 100% Irish heritage I have always had more than a passing interest in the generally tortured and difficult history of the 'Emerald Isle' but I am far from expert. Yet I would say T. Ryle Dwyer's account is not for the novice Irish history buff. He presumes a base level of knowledge of the history that native Irish may have and uses purely Irish (often Gaelic) terms without really defining them at times and often throws names out without much context. That is not really a criticism but just an observation. For many Americans their only real exposure to the Irish Rebellion and subsequent events from 1916-1923 may come from the movie 'Michael Collins' which I remember as a really good film, not so sure on it's accuracy. Dwyer's account of the Rebellion, Anglo-Irish War, the Treaty and the Irish Civil War through the prism of these two key players appears to be very well-researched and he has a strong academic background. So what to make of it? A biographical comparison of Collins to de Valera is not 'fair' in some ways--Collin's life being cut short and de Valera insinuating himself into the fabric of Irish history for many decades. Dying as a 'martyr' may confer a certain immortality and glory on Michael C. while the long reign of Eamon dV gave him endless opportunities to recast his role in those pivotal years to his favor.
I believe Dwyer makes every effort to be fair and he does not refrain from criticisms on either side, but the facts as he presents them do not do much, if anything, to enhance the reputation of de Valera during those critical years. The simple fact of his role (or non-role) in the Treaty negotiations will redound forever to his discredit. He was the presumed leader of the Irish 'government' such as it was, but sent the young Michael Collins along with Arthur Griffth and several others to London to negotiate a Treaty with the most powerful empire on earth while he sat back in Ireland taking potshots at the Treaty the entire time and crucially, afterward as well. Yet the the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George who was probably a fairly busy guy and seemingly the entire British Cabinet (including W. Churchill a fierce enemy of Irish independence, among other places of course) managed to find the time to show up. That fact alone is almost unbelievable and disgraceful. And then he did everything he could to sabotage the Treaty in the aftermath leading directly to the Irish Civil War. The long passage of time does very little in my view to exculpate de Valera and I am surprised that the verdict of time is not harsher. Dwyer seems to have reached a similar conclusion but he mostly lets the the people of the time speak with numerous direct quotations and source material from the era. An editorial from 'The Free State' called 'Why?' in 1922 (p. 311) sums up some of the most devastating criticisms of de Valera at the time and there seems little reason 100 years later to impugn these characterizations.
One thing that remains clear even to this day, is that Ulster was never going to be successfully or peaceably held by the Irish Free State or Republic. The Protestant Orange majority in those six counties would have resorted to bloodshed almost immediately, as in fact they were already doing in 1921-22 with savage ferocity, and there is no reason to believe that would not have continued incessantly for decades with tacit or open Britsh support that was freely given since partition in order to maintain their dominance of the Catholics. Not sure that Collins or de Valera clearly recognised that, although Collins seemed to realize it early on but his early efforts met fierce resistance. The so-called 'Troubles' that reignited in the 1960s lend credence to that idea. I have no idea how all this fraught history is viewed in Ireland today, although the situation is essentially unchanged since 1922 on the ground and Ireland remains 26+6 and not equal to One.
Due to my nearly 100% Irish heritage I have always had more than a passing interest in the generally tortured and difficult history of the 'Emerald Isle' but I am far from expert. Yet I would say T. Ryle Dwyer's account is not for the novice Irish history buff. He presumes a base level of knowledge of the history that native Irish may have and uses purely Irish (often Gaelic) terms without really defining them at times and often throws names out without much context. That is not really a criticism but just an observation. For many Americans their only real exposure to the Irish Rebellion and subsequent events from 1916-1923 may come from the movie 'Michael Collins' which I remember as a really good film, not so sure on it's accuracy. Dwyer's account of the Rebellion, Anglo-Irish War, the Treaty and the Irish Civil War through the prism of these two key players appears to be very well-researched and he has a strong academic background. So what to make of it? A biographical comparison of Collins to de Valera is not 'fair' in some ways--Collin's life being cut short and de Valera insinuating himself into the fabric of Irish history for many decades. Dying as a 'martyr' may confer a certain immortality and glory on Michael C. while the long reign of Eamon dV gave him endless opportunities to recast his role in those pivotal years to his favor.
I believe Dwyer makes every effort to be fair and he does not refrain from criticisms on either side, but the facts as he presents them do not do much, if anything, to enhance the reputation of de Valera during those critical years. The simple fact of his role (or non-role) in the Treaty negotiations will redound forever to his discredit. He was the presumed leader of the Irish 'government' such as it was, but sent the young Michael Collins along with Arthur Griffth and several others to London to negotiate a Treaty with the most powerful empire on earth while he sat back in Ireland taking potshots at the Treaty the entire time and crucially, afterward as well. Yet the the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George who was probably a fairly busy guy and seemingly the entire British Cabinet (including W. Churchill a fierce enemy of Irish independence, among other places of course) managed to find the time to show up. That fact alone is almost unbelievable and disgraceful. And then he did everything he could to sabotage the Treaty in the aftermath leading directly to the Irish Civil War. The long passage of time does very little in my view to exculpate de Valera and I am surprised that the verdict of time is not harsher. Dwyer seems to have reached a similar conclusion but he mostly lets the the people of the time speak with numerous direct quotations and source material from the era. An editorial from 'The Free State' called 'Why?' in 1922 (p. 311) sums up some of the most devastating criticisms of de Valera at the time and there seems little reason 100 years later to impugn these characterizations.
One thing that remains clear even to this day, is that Ulster was never going to be successfully or peaceably held by the Irish Free State or Republic. The Protestant Orange majority in those six counties would have resorted to bloodshed almost immediately, as in fact they were already doing in 1921-22 with savage ferocity, and there is no reason to believe that would not have continued incessantly for decades with tacit or open Britsh support that was freely given since partition in order to maintain their dominance of the Catholics. Not sure that Collins or de Valera clearly recognised that, although Collins seemed to realize it early on but his early efforts met fierce resistance. The so-called 'Troubles' that reignited in the 1960s lend credence to that idea. I have no idea how all this fraught history is viewed in Ireland today, although the situation is essentially unchanged since 1922 on the ground and Ireland remains 26+6 and not equal to One.
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September 6, 2023Very interesting and balanced. Michael Collins approach led to a swifter resolution with England but DeValera’s diplomatic appeal and visit to America generated much support among Irish Americans that led to the US government tp pressure England to make peace.
April 29, 2019
Some of this is covered in Dwyer's book Michael Collins The Man Who Won The War. But I still rate this a 5 star book.
October 14, 2024
Good and concise introduction to the two main characters of the Irish revolution and civil war.
April 3, 2024
Great read! Learned about these two leaders!
The book offers a concise and insightful dual biography of Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera. The author navigates their complex relationship, shedding light on their pivotal roles in shaping Ireland's history. A compelling read that captures the essence of two iconic figures.
The book offers a concise and insightful dual biography of Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera. The author navigates their complex relationship, shedding light on their pivotal roles in shaping Ireland's history. A compelling read that captures the essence of two iconic figures.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews