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The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris – Presidential Ambition, War, Tragedy, and the Wisdom That Follows
“Peter Beinart has written a vivid, empathetic, and convincing history of the men and ideas that have shaped the ambitions of American foreign policy during the last century—a story in which human fallibility and idealism flow together. The story continues, of course, and so his book is not only timely; it is indispensable.” — Steve Coll, author of Ghost Wars Peter Beinart's provocative account of hubris in the American century describes Washington on the eve of three wars: World War I, Vietnam, and Iraq—three moments when American leaders decided they could remake the world in their image. Each time, leading intellectuals declared that the spread of democracy was inevitable. Each time, a president held the nation in the palm of his hand. And each time, a war conceived in arrogance brought tragedy. But each catastrophe also imparted wisdom to a new generation of thinkers. These leaders learned to reconcile the American belief that anything is possible with the realities of a world that will never fully conform to this country's will—and in their struggles lie the seeds of American renewal today.
496 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
About the author
Peter Beinart
10 books174 followersPeter Beinart is the author of The Crisis of Zionism and The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris and The Good Fight. A former editor of The New Republic, he is an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, and the senior political writer for The Daily Beast. He lives with his family in New York City.
http://us.macmillan.com/author/peterb...
http://us.macmillan.com/author/peterb...
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 52 reviews
April 24, 2025
In the main, this book is a critique of George W. Bush's foreign policy in an effort to influence Barack Obama's foreign policy. Therefore, it's in need of an update.
Quote:
All these efforts differ from dominance in one fundamental way: Rather than merely requiring that other nations change, they require that we change as well.
Unquote
Above all else, Americans need to temper their optimism, arrogance, and vision of invincibility with humility and wisdom.
Quote:
All these efforts differ from dominance in one fundamental way: Rather than merely requiring that other nations change, they require that we change as well.
Unquote
Above all else, Americans need to temper their optimism, arrogance, and vision of invincibility with humility and wisdom.
January 16, 2011
Interesting but overlong and repetitious. The author's point is that success makes us cocky. We run a block and think we can win a marathon. In doing so, we ignore critical differences between our original situation and the new one. "[F]oreign policy hubris consists of thinking that you are merely applying the lessons of the past while actually expanding them as the result of success." The book would have been stronger had Beinart shortened it, taken out the constant repetition of his main points, and used a closing section to connect all the dots. I also have to point out that the US can hardly be the only one to fall victim to this syndrome though I believe he would rightly point out that our great power has made us more susceptible than many countries. The Greeks knew it for a human flaw not a national one.
"A wise foreign policy starts with the recognition that since America’s power is limited, we must limit our enemies. That’s why Franklin Roosevelt hugged Stalin close until the Soviet Union had helped us defeat Nazi Germany, and why Richard Nixon opened relations with China, so the United States wasn’t taking on Moscow and Beijing at the same time. By contrast, when America’s leaders outline doctrines that require us to confront long lists of movements and regimes simultaneously, it’s a sign that we’ve lost the capacity to prioritize. And that, in turn, is a sign that we think we are so powerful that we don’t need to prioritize. And that, in turn, is a sign that we’re flying too high."
"A wise foreign policy starts with the recognition that since America’s power is limited, we must limit our enemies. That’s why Franklin Roosevelt hugged Stalin close until the Soviet Union had helped us defeat Nazi Germany, and why Richard Nixon opened relations with China, so the United States wasn’t taking on Moscow and Beijing at the same time. By contrast, when America’s leaders outline doctrines that require us to confront long lists of movements and regimes simultaneously, it’s a sign that we’ve lost the capacity to prioritize. And that, in turn, is a sign that we think we are so powerful that we don’t need to prioritize. And that, in turn, is a sign that we’re flying too high."
March 11, 2016
This book will change the way you see American politics, no matter what your ideological preference. Beinart's essential thesis is that American foreign policy is driven by waves of idealism and of cold realism, unable to find enough intellectual stability to achieve lasting security. It should be read by every person registered to vote.
February 5, 2018
Throughout history the exercise of power has been the driver of events. While it is possible for power to be used in a benign, protective way, it is far more usual and predictable for it to create dreams of dominance in the minds of those that hold it resulting in a breakout where one nation strives to force an area, now as large as the whole planet, into accord with its will.
At present, the United States holds the title of sole superpower. As a democracy, the views held by the American public are an important factor in pushing forward or restraining the exercise of power by those at the top of government. Unlike in the days of royalty, a nation cannot be driven through years of warfare against its will since a change of government is never more than a few years away. This makes it imperative for leaders to influence the public. FDR wished to do so to get America into WW2. LBJ did it with Vietnam. George W. Bush went into a frenzy to get us into Iraq. It is interesting that almost always we the people do not want wars and must be finessed (though that word cannot be applied to the Bush farce) into it.
Peter Beinart is out to show how from the early 20th century to today, the use of power by the United States has gone through 3 phases. Each phase is characterized by caution and ambivalence followed by success (whether expected or not) that brings heightened expectation and inflated self regard leading to hubris with all things thought possible. Hubris brings overreach ending in humiliation. From humiliation come the return of caution and ambivalence to complete a cycle.
Beinart sees the first phase beginning with WW1 as based on reason, centered on the policies of the Wilson administration. People are seen as fundamentally good and capable of coming together for betterment if only the domination of evil governments can be overcome. The symbol of this period is the League of Nations, Wilson's pet project, and international arms control conferences that it was thought could put limits on armaments and war. This was the hubris of reason. The rise of Hitler showing the enthusiastic embrace of totalitarianism by the German people brought this phase to a close.
The second phase, coming with the end of WW2, replaces reason with toughness. No longer are all men basically good, but evil stalks the world and into that role the USSR is placed. George F. Kennan's idea of containment is enthusiastically embraced in Washington. After a momentary setback in Korea, the U.S. goes from strength to strength as the Iron Curtain is faced down in Berlin and Ike's reliance on nuclear weapons keeps the huge Red Army from moving on western Europe. JFK appears to face down the USSR over missiles in Cuba. We can stop communism everywhere, regardless of the actual importance of some remote locale to national security. This hubris produces the intervention in Vietnam, where hundreds of thousands of American lives are lost, the country falls into strife, the presidency of LBJ is humiliated and phase two ends.
Phase three brings Ronald Reagan staging a feel good military campaign that cannot fail in Grenada as memories of Vietnam tragedy are replaced by "morning in America". Clinton's intervention through the use of NATO in the Balkans bring prestige to air power and "precision" weapons along with no U.S. casualties. Neocon ideas that all the peoples of the world yearn for democracy gets reinforcement as one after another Latin American dictatorships fall. If only the U.S. has the will, then it certainly has the might, after the fall of the USSR, to change the world for the better! Comes 9/11 and it's the opportunity to make our move at last. I need not tell the reader of how this phase is humiliated with Iraq and now Syria. Does anyone outside of Israel really have an appetite for the U.S. to take on Iran? That was to be the next government to rout.
This book is a delightful read because Beinart has a wonderful droll sense of humor that he doesn't hesitate to use. He introduces all the intellectuals from John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr through Irving and Bill Kristol, Rumsfeld and Cheney and Wolfowitz, who were fueling the views that drove the three phases. There are dozens of brief bios and wonderful, detailed examples characterizing the personalities in the war of ideas. I love this snippet about Reagan: "commentators often noted that he (Reagan) saw America as a giant Hallmark card, obscured by an overgrown and dastardly federal government."
This is the best overview of American foreign policy since 1900 that I've read. It is deadly serious but at the same time lighthearted in the way it portrays the foibles of individuals and fixed mindsets that seldom, if ever, are swayed by reality while in power. People can be extremely smart and educated yet still be fools. The character traits of presidents are critical. Reagan was surrounded by hawks, yet his sunny view of people held them off despite a surge in U.S. armament.
There are more than a few serious thinkers in this book who become disillusioned to the point of despair. It's quite clearly shown how events are framed within their times and, most important, how people see what they want to see and the public is fickle. The Korean War, for example, was felt, just after it ended, to have been a failure by 70% of the American public. But let the years go by and it gradually is transformed into a success as indicated by polls. This, in itself, is a weakness of modern democracy: no long term collective memory in a society besieged with the immediate sensation at the expense of the reflective thought.
Reading about different outlooks on the world, nations and causes, I couldn't avoid considering my own. Is what I believe warranted by what has happened in the last 100 years? Where will our current hubris, that has our military deployed in hundreds of countries while our State Department is moribund, land us?
What defines hubris is that nothing is impossible; we only lack the will to do anything we want. This is an unfortunate theme of presidents and has long characterized the American outlook. The Icarus Syndrome is a tutorial on how hubris comes to be and is, inevitably, defeated by reality. I am reminded of the little line I learned in grade school - think before you do.
At present, the United States holds the title of sole superpower. As a democracy, the views held by the American public are an important factor in pushing forward or restraining the exercise of power by those at the top of government. Unlike in the days of royalty, a nation cannot be driven through years of warfare against its will since a change of government is never more than a few years away. This makes it imperative for leaders to influence the public. FDR wished to do so to get America into WW2. LBJ did it with Vietnam. George W. Bush went into a frenzy to get us into Iraq. It is interesting that almost always we the people do not want wars and must be finessed (though that word cannot be applied to the Bush farce) into it.
Peter Beinart is out to show how from the early 20th century to today, the use of power by the United States has gone through 3 phases. Each phase is characterized by caution and ambivalence followed by success (whether expected or not) that brings heightened expectation and inflated self regard leading to hubris with all things thought possible. Hubris brings overreach ending in humiliation. From humiliation come the return of caution and ambivalence to complete a cycle.
Beinart sees the first phase beginning with WW1 as based on reason, centered on the policies of the Wilson administration. People are seen as fundamentally good and capable of coming together for betterment if only the domination of evil governments can be overcome. The symbol of this period is the League of Nations, Wilson's pet project, and international arms control conferences that it was thought could put limits on armaments and war. This was the hubris of reason. The rise of Hitler showing the enthusiastic embrace of totalitarianism by the German people brought this phase to a close.
The second phase, coming with the end of WW2, replaces reason with toughness. No longer are all men basically good, but evil stalks the world and into that role the USSR is placed. George F. Kennan's idea of containment is enthusiastically embraced in Washington. After a momentary setback in Korea, the U.S. goes from strength to strength as the Iron Curtain is faced down in Berlin and Ike's reliance on nuclear weapons keeps the huge Red Army from moving on western Europe. JFK appears to face down the USSR over missiles in Cuba. We can stop communism everywhere, regardless of the actual importance of some remote locale to national security. This hubris produces the intervention in Vietnam, where hundreds of thousands of American lives are lost, the country falls into strife, the presidency of LBJ is humiliated and phase two ends.
Phase three brings Ronald Reagan staging a feel good military campaign that cannot fail in Grenada as memories of Vietnam tragedy are replaced by "morning in America". Clinton's intervention through the use of NATO in the Balkans bring prestige to air power and "precision" weapons along with no U.S. casualties. Neocon ideas that all the peoples of the world yearn for democracy gets reinforcement as one after another Latin American dictatorships fall. If only the U.S. has the will, then it certainly has the might, after the fall of the USSR, to change the world for the better! Comes 9/11 and it's the opportunity to make our move at last. I need not tell the reader of how this phase is humiliated with Iraq and now Syria. Does anyone outside of Israel really have an appetite for the U.S. to take on Iran? That was to be the next government to rout.
This book is a delightful read because Beinart has a wonderful droll sense of humor that he doesn't hesitate to use. He introduces all the intellectuals from John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr through Irving and Bill Kristol, Rumsfeld and Cheney and Wolfowitz, who were fueling the views that drove the three phases. There are dozens of brief bios and wonderful, detailed examples characterizing the personalities in the war of ideas. I love this snippet about Reagan: "commentators often noted that he (Reagan) saw America as a giant Hallmark card, obscured by an overgrown and dastardly federal government."
This is the best overview of American foreign policy since 1900 that I've read. It is deadly serious but at the same time lighthearted in the way it portrays the foibles of individuals and fixed mindsets that seldom, if ever, are swayed by reality while in power. People can be extremely smart and educated yet still be fools. The character traits of presidents are critical. Reagan was surrounded by hawks, yet his sunny view of people held them off despite a surge in U.S. armament.
There are more than a few serious thinkers in this book who become disillusioned to the point of despair. It's quite clearly shown how events are framed within their times and, most important, how people see what they want to see and the public is fickle. The Korean War, for example, was felt, just after it ended, to have been a failure by 70% of the American public. But let the years go by and it gradually is transformed into a success as indicated by polls. This, in itself, is a weakness of modern democracy: no long term collective memory in a society besieged with the immediate sensation at the expense of the reflective thought.
Reading about different outlooks on the world, nations and causes, I couldn't avoid considering my own. Is what I believe warranted by what has happened in the last 100 years? Where will our current hubris, that has our military deployed in hundreds of countries while our State Department is moribund, land us?
What defines hubris is that nothing is impossible; we only lack the will to do anything we want. This is an unfortunate theme of presidents and has long characterized the American outlook. The Icarus Syndrome is a tutorial on how hubris comes to be and is, inevitably, defeated by reality. I am reminded of the little line I learned in grade school - think before you do.
November 5, 2019
I forget exactly where I picked up The Icarus Syndrome, but I believe it was in the footnotes of one of the political books I have read semi-recently. In general terms, it is a history of American foreign policy in the 20th and 21st century. I am by no means a foreign policy expert, but in my humble opinion this book is an absolute masterpiece.
The general premise is that American history in the 20th century can be broken up into three ages defined by their particular brand of hubris: the hubris of reason, the hubris of toughness, and the hubris of dominance. The hubris of reason is characterized by an unmerited confidence that all international relations problems can be solved by well-reasoned argument, good planning, and a panel of experts. It ignores the fact that countries-- and people-- aren't always going to be reasonable, and that they have unique interests that can't be accounted for in optimizing "general welfare." Woodrow Wilson was the big player here, and he flied too close to the sun when he thought the League of Nations and his Fourteen Points would essentially end all war, or at least get pretty darn close.
The age of toughness was ushered in by FDR who was able to speak the language of reason to the American public, but behind doors openly acknowledged that power politics is a necessary evil that needs to be accepted. FDR acknowledged that a post-WWII world would require some security for the Soviet Union. In secret meetings that weren't made known to the American public, FDR agreed that Stalin would carve out a sphere of influence in eastern Europe. Was that right? In the age of reason no, but the age of toughness argued that America had to pick its battles-- we couldn't fight communism on all fronts, but we could let the USSR know that we meant business. Things took a turn for the worse when we some thought this limited approach was "weak". It was "soft on communism." Enter McCarthy. Vietnam is the turning point here where our hubris catches up with us.
The age of dominance emerged in a post-Cold War world where we are essentially the only world superpower. Without one big "bad guy", what would be America's role in the world? Reagan initially took a limited approach. But just like in the age of toughness, we eventually overextend. We learn from Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan that we can create democracies with the barrel of a gun. But that all collapses in the Iraq War. We're still trying to figure out what approach we should take to foreign policy.
So, why do I give it such high praise? This book really solidified for me the significance of major world events. A good historian has to be a good story teller, and interpreting history is just as important as telling it. If history is limited to names and dates, it doesn't have a long shelf life in your brain, really. It's just a snooze-fest. Honestly, the more recent stuff-- the 60's and onwards-- was the most interesting to me, because I have never really learned these more recent events that happened during my parents' lifetime and my own lifetime. My U. S. history textbook covered through Reagan, but it got limited attention, because it wasn't going to be a major topic on the AP exam. And even though I was a teen during the Iraq War, I have nothing more than a fuzzy idea that it was really bad for America and that the word "weapons of mass destruction" was thrown around a lot.
One of the things Peter Beinart did that really captured my imagination was that not just the events themselves, but their motivations are presented. You get an inside look at what conversations were going on between the president and his cabinet-- as well as with other world leaders. It was also a reminder that these presidents were human-- and often colorful characters. You think Trump was bad-- you should see Lyndon B. Johnson. Check of this passage, when LBJ was corned by the media about Vietnam:
At a private meeting in 1967, when reporters repeatedly badgered him about why America was in Vietnam, Johnson finally unzipped his pants, pull out his penis, and screamed, "This is why!"
In addition to an insider look in the Oval Office, Beinart includes news stories from the day (like Jimmy Carter's encounter with a feral rabbit and how the public interpreted that as weakness) and major intellectuals who drove a lot of the ideas in foreign policy including Reinhold Niebuhr, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Irving Kristol.
The main takeaway from the book is a sense of balance: we have limits in what we can accomplish and we should be aware of those limits. If it were possible to have an overconfidence barometer, that would definitely be a plus. There were a few really thought-provoking points in the conclusion like:
Talking about threats makes us feel tough and talking about values makes us feel virtuous, but only talking about interests forces us to acknowledge the limits of our ability to be either tough or virtuous. This discomfort with the language of interest is a symptom of America's post-cold war inability to prioritize.
and
It is this recognition that our idealism is tainted by self-interest that should make us pause and pause and pause again before unilaterally invading tyrannical nations on the assumption that their people will thank us for it. Even if we genuinely believe that we are acting from altruistic motives, the people whose country we invade will generally be more suspicious, especially if they have been on the receiving end of armed Western altruism before, and especially once an American soldier shoots their cousin or breaks down their door.
Thinking back, this book was probably was referenced in one of the books on conservatism, because the argument is essentially a small-c conservative one (not to be mis-interpreted as the current embodiment of the Republican party): that their are limits to human reason, that messing with existing systems can do more harm than good, and that you usually underestimate the amount of self-interest in your actions.
The general premise is that American history in the 20th century can be broken up into three ages defined by their particular brand of hubris: the hubris of reason, the hubris of toughness, and the hubris of dominance. The hubris of reason is characterized by an unmerited confidence that all international relations problems can be solved by well-reasoned argument, good planning, and a panel of experts. It ignores the fact that countries-- and people-- aren't always going to be reasonable, and that they have unique interests that can't be accounted for in optimizing "general welfare." Woodrow Wilson was the big player here, and he flied too close to the sun when he thought the League of Nations and his Fourteen Points would essentially end all war, or at least get pretty darn close.
The age of toughness was ushered in by FDR who was able to speak the language of reason to the American public, but behind doors openly acknowledged that power politics is a necessary evil that needs to be accepted. FDR acknowledged that a post-WWII world would require some security for the Soviet Union. In secret meetings that weren't made known to the American public, FDR agreed that Stalin would carve out a sphere of influence in eastern Europe. Was that right? In the age of reason no, but the age of toughness argued that America had to pick its battles-- we couldn't fight communism on all fronts, but we could let the USSR know that we meant business. Things took a turn for the worse when we some thought this limited approach was "weak". It was "soft on communism." Enter McCarthy. Vietnam is the turning point here where our hubris catches up with us.
The age of dominance emerged in a post-Cold War world where we are essentially the only world superpower. Without one big "bad guy", what would be America's role in the world? Reagan initially took a limited approach. But just like in the age of toughness, we eventually overextend. We learn from Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan that we can create democracies with the barrel of a gun. But that all collapses in the Iraq War. We're still trying to figure out what approach we should take to foreign policy.
So, why do I give it such high praise? This book really solidified for me the significance of major world events. A good historian has to be a good story teller, and interpreting history is just as important as telling it. If history is limited to names and dates, it doesn't have a long shelf life in your brain, really. It's just a snooze-fest. Honestly, the more recent stuff-- the 60's and onwards-- was the most interesting to me, because I have never really learned these more recent events that happened during my parents' lifetime and my own lifetime. My U. S. history textbook covered through Reagan, but it got limited attention, because it wasn't going to be a major topic on the AP exam. And even though I was a teen during the Iraq War, I have nothing more than a fuzzy idea that it was really bad for America and that the word "weapons of mass destruction" was thrown around a lot.
One of the things Peter Beinart did that really captured my imagination was that not just the events themselves, but their motivations are presented. You get an inside look at what conversations were going on between the president and his cabinet-- as well as with other world leaders. It was also a reminder that these presidents were human-- and often colorful characters. You think Trump was bad-- you should see Lyndon B. Johnson. Check of this passage, when LBJ was corned by the media about Vietnam:
At a private meeting in 1967, when reporters repeatedly badgered him about why America was in Vietnam, Johnson finally unzipped his pants, pull out his penis, and screamed, "This is why!"
In addition to an insider look in the Oval Office, Beinart includes news stories from the day (like Jimmy Carter's encounter with a feral rabbit and how the public interpreted that as weakness) and major intellectuals who drove a lot of the ideas in foreign policy including Reinhold Niebuhr, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Irving Kristol.
The main takeaway from the book is a sense of balance: we have limits in what we can accomplish and we should be aware of those limits. If it were possible to have an overconfidence barometer, that would definitely be a plus. There were a few really thought-provoking points in the conclusion like:
Talking about threats makes us feel tough and talking about values makes us feel virtuous, but only talking about interests forces us to acknowledge the limits of our ability to be either tough or virtuous. This discomfort with the language of interest is a symptom of America's post-cold war inability to prioritize.
and
It is this recognition that our idealism is tainted by self-interest that should make us pause and pause and pause again before unilaterally invading tyrannical nations on the assumption that their people will thank us for it. Even if we genuinely believe that we are acting from altruistic motives, the people whose country we invade will generally be more suspicious, especially if they have been on the receiving end of armed Western altruism before, and especially once an American soldier shoots their cousin or breaks down their door.
Thinking back, this book was probably was referenced in one of the books on conservatism, because the argument is essentially a small-c conservative one (not to be mis-interpreted as the current embodiment of the Republican party): that their are limits to human reason, that messing with existing systems can do more harm than good, and that you usually underestimate the amount of self-interest in your actions.
October 2, 2011
Peter Beinart firmly places himself in the liberal camp in terms of politics, yet presents us with a tome that chronicles the rise of hubris of the United States that seems to have some conservative elements to it in terms of who built up the hubris (liberals LBJ and Woodrow Wilson). The book is named for Icarus, who in his foolishness, fly too high toward the sun and came crashing back down to earth. Beinhart labels three times in history that hubris has cost us here in the America, the time after World War I, the Vietnam era and the still-going-on (as of this writing) events in Iraq that has cost us an incredible amount of money and soldier's lives. The theme is that America cannot solve all of the world's problems by force alone and that diplomacy is critical in smoothing relations between powers in the world. Beinart does a yeoman's job of carrying us along the road of hubris from 1914 to present day. Yet, I cannot help to wonder why he would qualify LBJ's actions in Vietnam in terms of his agony in making decisions while he excoriates George W. Bush more strongly while he is being portrayed as being nonchalant in his actions in Iraq. LBJ by far was much more clever than Beinart seems to believe. LBJ should have known better than to get us into the quagmire of Vietnam. Bush on the other hand was not the brightest bulb to occupy the White House and led us into Iraq being more ignorant. I would have made LBJ more accountable for his actions, actions of which has led us down the path to slow economic decline through his guns and butter policies. Nevertheless, Beinart makes the point that America can no longer be the savior of the world, a statement that should be well heeded in today's global environment in our present economic condition.
The book contains almost 400 pages with a substantive amount of endnotes and an index. A worthy read for those interested in why we are in the condition we are today.
The book contains almost 400 pages with a substantive amount of endnotes and an index. A worthy read for those interested in why we are in the condition we are today.
February 24, 2023
The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris, by Peter Beinhart, gets its name from the ancient Greek legend of Icarus. According to the legend, Icarus’ father Daedaulus built a pair of wings for him out of wax and feathers. Daedaulus warned his son not to fly too high, or the heat from the sun would melt the wax. Icarus disregarded his father’s advice. His wings fell apart. He fell to his death.
The theme of The Icarus Syndrome is that when American leaders attempt too much in foreign policy they fail. A second theme is that the American people and America’s leaders often draw the wrong lessons from the previous failure, and also from the previous success.
President Woodrow Wilson wanted to end the First World War on the basis of his Fourteen Points. These included free trade, freedom of the seas, disarmament, rights for colonial peoples, an end to secret treaties, and a League of Nations. These seem reasonable. Nevertheless, Peter Beinhart suggests that they expect too much of human nature and of the way nations behave. A more reasonable end of the First World War would have been an alliance between France, Great Britain, and the United States to prevent further acts of German aggression.
The League of Nations proved too weak to deter aggression from Italy, Japan, and finally Germany under the leadership of Hitler.
Beinart does not discuss how a milder peace treaty with Germany may have prevented the resentments Hitler exploited. At any rate, by the 1920’s the consensus developed in the United States that the First World War had been tragically futile. This made it difficult for the United States to respond to Hitler’s aggression before it escalated into the Second World War.
The lesson President Roosevelt learned from the First World War is that peace after the Second World War would have to depend on the cooperation of what he called “The Four Policemen.” These would be the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was willing to give the Soviet Union a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt did not believe, what his American successors did believe, that the Soviet Union intended to conquer the world. In retrospect, Roosevelt’s view makes sense. During the Second World War the Soviet Union lost an estimated twenty eight million dead, and the destruction of one third of its industrial and farm plant. A country so devastated was not about to start another world war.
But Roosevelt died before the War was over. Soon after the end of the War, Winston Churchill gave his Iron Curtain Speech. This set the tone of the ensuing conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. It maintained that the Soviet Union was as aggressive as Nazi Germany. Few Americans read Stalin’s response. I did not read it until I was in college. Stalin replied understandably that Russia had been subjected to a devastating invasion (he could have also mentioned Germany’s invasion in the previous World War) and wanted a buffer zone against a future invasion.
Nevertheless, the lesson the United States learned from the events leading up to the Second World War was that the U.S. military needed to defend any government, however unpopular, against any leftist resistance movement, however popular. This belief finally faded in the jungles of Vietnam.
Beinhart has an interesting analysis of Ronald Reagan. He sees President Reagan as a closet dove who realized that the American people wanted to feel strong without testing that feeling in a war that would involve American casualties. Therefore American troops were not sent to Nicaragua when the Sandinistas took power; we supported the Contras to do our fighting for us. The invasion of Grenada was an easy victory against a weak enemy that nevertheless, showed the American people the pleasing spectacle on the six o’clock news of American troops marching forward for a change.
President George H.W. Bush’s easy victory against the much more formidable enemy of Iraq, and President Bill Clinton’s victory in the Bosnian War without a single American casualty gave President George W. Bush the hubris to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. The wars we started there continue to smolder ten years since the publication of The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris.
The theme of The Icarus Syndrome is that when American leaders attempt too much in foreign policy they fail. A second theme is that the American people and America’s leaders often draw the wrong lessons from the previous failure, and also from the previous success.
President Woodrow Wilson wanted to end the First World War on the basis of his Fourteen Points. These included free trade, freedom of the seas, disarmament, rights for colonial peoples, an end to secret treaties, and a League of Nations. These seem reasonable. Nevertheless, Peter Beinhart suggests that they expect too much of human nature and of the way nations behave. A more reasonable end of the First World War would have been an alliance between France, Great Britain, and the United States to prevent further acts of German aggression.
The League of Nations proved too weak to deter aggression from Italy, Japan, and finally Germany under the leadership of Hitler.
Beinart does not discuss how a milder peace treaty with Germany may have prevented the resentments Hitler exploited. At any rate, by the 1920’s the consensus developed in the United States that the First World War had been tragically futile. This made it difficult for the United States to respond to Hitler’s aggression before it escalated into the Second World War.
The lesson President Roosevelt learned from the First World War is that peace after the Second World War would have to depend on the cooperation of what he called “The Four Policemen.” These would be the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was willing to give the Soviet Union a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt did not believe, what his American successors did believe, that the Soviet Union intended to conquer the world. In retrospect, Roosevelt’s view makes sense. During the Second World War the Soviet Union lost an estimated twenty eight million dead, and the destruction of one third of its industrial and farm plant. A country so devastated was not about to start another world war.
But Roosevelt died before the War was over. Soon after the end of the War, Winston Churchill gave his Iron Curtain Speech. This set the tone of the ensuing conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. It maintained that the Soviet Union was as aggressive as Nazi Germany. Few Americans read Stalin’s response. I did not read it until I was in college. Stalin replied understandably that Russia had been subjected to a devastating invasion (he could have also mentioned Germany’s invasion in the previous World War) and wanted a buffer zone against a future invasion.
Nevertheless, the lesson the United States learned from the events leading up to the Second World War was that the U.S. military needed to defend any government, however unpopular, against any leftist resistance movement, however popular. This belief finally faded in the jungles of Vietnam.
Beinhart has an interesting analysis of Ronald Reagan. He sees President Reagan as a closet dove who realized that the American people wanted to feel strong without testing that feeling in a war that would involve American casualties. Therefore American troops were not sent to Nicaragua when the Sandinistas took power; we supported the Contras to do our fighting for us. The invasion of Grenada was an easy victory against a weak enemy that nevertheless, showed the American people the pleasing spectacle on the six o’clock news of American troops marching forward for a change.
President George H.W. Bush’s easy victory against the much more formidable enemy of Iraq, and President Bill Clinton’s victory in the Bosnian War without a single American casualty gave President George W. Bush the hubris to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. The wars we started there continue to smolder ten years since the publication of The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris.
September 24, 2022
I hate to write this. I thought that this book would be an apology to the thinkers and non thinkers who have been responsible for the horrid shape our domestic and foreign policy matters. As an Army Vet I was not ready for this reading. If at first it was a dreary reading with the coming of WWI and Wilson all of a sudden the events depicted velcro-ed my attention span. Before I knew it I was being brought back to the past which has forever has stained/haunted/grabbed my in intelellectual vision.
I remember being on a airplane flight back to North Carolina from Logan and reading an article in a magazine with shiny pages written by Walter Lippmann. Who was he? I couldn't believe he had the same sentiments that I had about that %$#^&* war in Nam. I was a SPEC 4, MEDIC at 714 Preventive Medicine Unit along with 28 Surgical Hospital out of the 39th Medical Group. I was witness to guys who came back shattered mentally. I also met guys who couldn't wait to go and fire there M16's at those "runty bastsatds". Me? I had been shot at in Basic Training by a crazed soldier right near me who wanted to "kill" everyone..because that's "what we do"....At Fort Rucker I woke up in the barracks was the Sargent was yelling at us to "GET UP!" at 4am! I got up and suddenly I stepped into something wet...it was blood. the guy in the next bed had slit his wrists . Blood everywhere. I can still smell the iron of the blood. ...then even further down ...in Basic the Drill Sergeant yelled at me "Are you a soldier or a citizen? I told him I was a citizen first then a soldier. He scolded me loudly and forced me to drop down and do push ups until I was exhausted. Then he asked if I who I was. I replied "Citizen sir, Soldier next" Then he ordered me to continue doing pushups till he left me lying in the dirt....than in excercizes where we learning to use bayonets and the big poles with big white pads as each end...the Sargent wasn't happy at me and the 3 guys with as we were tapping each other.He wanted us to hit each. Exasaperated he spun me around and put the pole in my hands and told me to swing as hard as I could to hit him in the head. He was badgering me.....yelling at me.screaming at me. I asked him if was sure if he wanted me to do that.'He yelled.."BY GOD YES DO IT!" So I took the pole ..grabbed it like a baseball bat and swung as hard as I could against his head. He ducked just so. Then he screamed "YOU TRIED TO KILL ME!" I said to him that he told me to.He walked away from me.Never spoke to me again. My soldier friends asked what would have done if I had connected. I said I dunno. Maybe pick him and bring him to another Sargent......Also in Basic after supper because one of Drill Sargents wasn't happy with our performances in the field...had us go to the low crawl pit and crawl endlessly .,,back and forth. Suddenly one guy couldn't get up.The Sargent was yelling at him that a lazy son of bitch...a bastard of a fuckng useless trooper.He didn't respond... The Sargent turned him over. He was unconscious. The Sargent suddenly panicked and went away. Came back with his car (A Mustang) he had us lift the guy and put him in the back seat. His head was bouncing on my knees as he was laid out. There were two other soldiers in the front with him. He drove like a bat outta hell to the near dispensary. We picked up the guy and dropped him(or I should say we laid him down in the entranceway to the dispensary. We drove off. The Sargent ordered not to say anything to anyone. Funny..We had no more low crawl practices after suppers...And never saw the sick guy again. I wrote this not to get away from what I was presenting but to showcase case the inherent stupidity and back and forth that were implicit and have been part of the American Experience. He is so right when he writes that the assholes male and female who wrote endlessly of what to do and when to do it..a large part of them never wore a uniform. Yes some had a uniform....and behaved badly. Yet there were 0thers who gave fanatics a bad name. This is a very good bo0k. Stunning. The sidebars and the background
specifics make it so delicious. Read it and weep.
I remember being on a airplane flight back to North Carolina from Logan and reading an article in a magazine with shiny pages written by Walter Lippmann. Who was he? I couldn't believe he had the same sentiments that I had about that %$#^&* war in Nam. I was a SPEC 4, MEDIC at 714 Preventive Medicine Unit along with 28 Surgical Hospital out of the 39th Medical Group. I was witness to guys who came back shattered mentally. I also met guys who couldn't wait to go and fire there M16's at those "runty bastsatds". Me? I had been shot at in Basic Training by a crazed soldier right near me who wanted to "kill" everyone..because that's "what we do"....At Fort Rucker I woke up in the barracks was the Sargent was yelling at us to "GET UP!" at 4am! I got up and suddenly I stepped into something wet...it was blood. the guy in the next bed had slit his wrists . Blood everywhere. I can still smell the iron of the blood. ...then even further down ...in Basic the Drill Sergeant yelled at me "Are you a soldier or a citizen? I told him I was a citizen first then a soldier. He scolded me loudly and forced me to drop down and do push ups until I was exhausted. Then he asked if I who I was. I replied "Citizen sir, Soldier next" Then he ordered me to continue doing pushups till he left me lying in the dirt....than in excercizes where we learning to use bayonets and the big poles with big white pads as each end...the Sargent wasn't happy at me and the 3 guys with as we were tapping each other.He wanted us to hit each. Exasaperated he spun me around and put the pole in my hands and told me to swing as hard as I could to hit him in the head. He was badgering me.....yelling at me.screaming at me. I asked him if was sure if he wanted me to do that.'He yelled.."BY GOD YES DO IT!" So I took the pole ..grabbed it like a baseball bat and swung as hard as I could against his head. He ducked just so. Then he screamed "YOU TRIED TO KILL ME!" I said to him that he told me to.He walked away from me.Never spoke to me again. My soldier friends asked what would have done if I had connected. I said I dunno. Maybe pick him and bring him to another Sargent......Also in Basic after supper because one of Drill Sargents wasn't happy with our performances in the field...had us go to the low crawl pit and crawl endlessly .,,back and forth. Suddenly one guy couldn't get up.The Sargent was yelling at him that a lazy son of bitch...a bastard of a fuckng useless trooper.He didn't respond... The Sargent turned him over. He was unconscious. The Sargent suddenly panicked and went away. Came back with his car (A Mustang) he had us lift the guy and put him in the back seat. His head was bouncing on my knees as he was laid out. There were two other soldiers in the front with him. He drove like a bat outta hell to the near dispensary. We picked up the guy and dropped him(or I should say we laid him down in the entranceway to the dispensary. We drove off. The Sargent ordered not to say anything to anyone. Funny..We had no more low crawl practices after suppers...And never saw the sick guy again. I wrote this not to get away from what I was presenting but to showcase case the inherent stupidity and back and forth that were implicit and have been part of the American Experience. He is so right when he writes that the assholes male and female who wrote endlessly of what to do and when to do it..a large part of them never wore a uniform. Yes some had a uniform....and behaved badly. Yet there were 0thers who gave fanatics a bad name. This is a very good bo0k. Stunning. The sidebars and the background
specifics make it so delicious. Read it and weep.
July 16, 2018
In this book, I repeatedly seen America, being blinded by its own hubris of successful foreign policies, soaring high in confidence, only to finally crash in one way or another. Divided into three parts, this book dealt with three kind of hubrises: the hubris of reason, the hubris of toughness and hubris of dominance. The first one was espoused by Woodrow Wilson, who believed that every country in the world can be ruled by reason, which led to the establishment of League of Nations after World War I and definitely killed by the rise of fascism. The second one was prevalent during Cold War, espoused by the ultra-realists and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, that America must fight communism anywhere and anytime, and culminated in the quagmire of Viet Nam. The third one emerged after the end of Cold War, in which America surfaced as the only superpower. Fueled by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘escalator of democracy’, President W. Bush imposed democracy in Iraq with force, without any meaningful success. This book is full of intellectual sparrings between some of the famous minds of America’s doctrinaires, which unfortunately, became repetitive after a while, but I like the conclusion that America cannot try to impose its values upon the world, especially with force. And, rather than putting its nose on other countries’ affairs it should focus on the betterment of its citizens.
December 27, 2024
This book published in 2010 is dated in terms of its conclusions (Beinart offers foreign policy advice to then President Obama to temper American national hubris with caution by fostering greater humility and reflection when dealing with a post Iraq war world. How quaint.) It is my understanding this book was written as the author's response to his regret for supporting the second US/Iraq war. He engages in a historic deep dive beginning with the WWll era to identify when the US decided it was invincible and responsible for eradicating communism and fostering democracy globally. The journey is fraught with hard historic lessons like Vietnam that should have had a far more lasting influence on US behavior and self image than it did. Post Vietnam war military successes and the Cold War victory soon dimmed the view the US had of itself as anything less than wholly dominant. The US continued to act on the assumptions of moral and military superiority despite any evidence to the contrary. Beinart offers that US global ambitions should be tempered to include a more realistic view of other cultures, values and abilities in determining our degree of influence and cooperation.
I appreciated the history lessons that reframed events in a less outsized more realistic light. Not unpatriotic but tempered. It was a big commitment to read but worthwhile.
I appreciated the history lessons that reframed events in a less outsized more realistic light. Not unpatriotic but tempered. It was a big commitment to read but worthwhile.
December 12, 2025
Froom NYT
For all their daily efforts to disembowel one another, American foreign policy experts agree on one thing: the United States needs a new, coherent and practical strategy for the 21st century. Peter Beinart’s “Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris” doesn’t attain this policy nirvana. Still, it’s a highly readable and useful hundred-year account of American ventures abroad that can serve as a path to understanding past failures and uncovering why policy renewal is now proving so elusive.
Beinart, a journalist and an associate professor at the City University of New York, shifts this search for a new strategy away from the international arena to American society and character. The source of the nation’s foreign policy woes, he argues, lies not in the stars but in ourselves. His thesis is not new, but it is indefatigably rendered: America’s shortcomings flow entirely from hubris or overconfidence, much as the mythical Icarus perished because he flew too near the sun.
It's a stimulating and provocative read.
For all their daily efforts to disembowel one another, American foreign policy experts agree on one thing: the United States needs a new, coherent and practical strategy for the 21st century. Peter Beinart’s “Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris” doesn’t attain this policy nirvana. Still, it’s a highly readable and useful hundred-year account of American ventures abroad that can serve as a path to understanding past failures and uncovering why policy renewal is now proving so elusive.
Beinart, a journalist and an associate professor at the City University of New York, shifts this search for a new strategy away from the international arena to American society and character. The source of the nation’s foreign policy woes, he argues, lies not in the stars but in ourselves. His thesis is not new, but it is indefatigably rendered: America’s shortcomings flow entirely from hubris or overconfidence, much as the mythical Icarus perished because he flew too near the sun.
It's a stimulating and provocative read.
October 7, 2020
An engaging study of America's hubris in 20th century foreign affairs, Beinart's book has a particular focus on the administrations of Wilson, Kennedy/Johnson and Bush Jnr, but enough interstital material to fill in the gaps between them. It's detailed and deep but never dull - Beinart is good at explaining concepts and has an eye for the occasional amusing anecdote to lighten to mood. Although at first glance the book appears to be about wars, it's really more about the "nation-building" that accompanies and follows them, and how a failure to take into account local conditions inevitably brings them unstuck. A very good read, and one that will leave you grateful that Trump is less prone to military adventurism than many of his predecessors.
October 31, 2022
American society 1900 to present repeatedly shift on how to engage with the rest of the world. Progressive ideals that world problems can be resolved by reason, 1900 to WWI (Wilson). Isolation and disarmament in face of power politics in Europe, 1920 to 1939. World policeman with 4 spheres of power influence, US, Britain, Russia and China ( 1940 through 1949. Kennan’s containment thesis in areas of US interest, 1950 to 1970. Clear, informative and well written
May 22, 2024
Wonderfully written book about the last 100 years of American foreign policy. Highlights the mistakes and hubris, the failures of doctrine and culture at various times. The book was a joy to read, easily walking through large blocks of history and recapping many known events. Doesn’t take a partisan stance, or even a moralizing of judgemental approach. Simply lays out the events objectively. Highly recommend.
September 28, 2019
Pretty good overview of American foreign policy from WWI to Iraq. The author is very readable and has an eye for the telling anecdote or quote. I wished he would ditch his conceptual framework - the "Icarus" in the title - and just tell the story. But he does a pretty good job nonetheless.
"The color of truth is grey."
"The color of truth is grey."
March 17, 2025
An thought-provoking study of three phases of American foreign policy - Reason, Toughness, and Dominance - showing how an initially reasonable and successful approach ossified into hubris, with presidents and their advisors convinced that anything was possible if Americans only stuck to the formula.
April 29, 2025
Clearly written history of various ways American leaders have fallen into hubris based on past successes. A clarion call for sobriety, humility and the importance of adaptability and change rather than hubris.
November 1, 2021
3.5 stars
September 9, 2024
really stellar — very long and repetitive
January 22, 2013
As dense in content as easily readable, Beinart’s “The Icarus Syndrome” not only presents a comprehensive and objective self-critique of the last century of US foreign policy, but also provides a detached outlook as to how the US foreign policy should be like in the future. The most interesting message of the book seems to be that it is at least as important to learn lessons from empirical examples as to unlearn them. Beinart repeatedly underlines how constituting an analogical link between today’s challenges and past’s experiences jeopardizes the healthy judgment of problems of the day. What he posits, rather accurately in my opinion, that in fact no matter how pungently bitter or amazingly glamorous past experience has been, decision has always been a function of current power. He makes it “vaguely clear” that policy is being shaped by decisions of men and history serves as a justifying ballast to reinforce that foreign policy position.
I was introduced with this book in a class called “Conceptual Foundations”. Struggling through the dark mazes of international relations theory, I found the Chapter 1, “A Scientific Peace”, a 25-page oasis in the midst of a vast theoretical desert. It was profound and insightful, with a twist of humor. The comparison between Theodore Roosevelt’s cynicism and Woodrow Wilson’s almost naïve positivism was especially noteworthy. I decided to read the whole book.
Beinart’s book, to be sure, is also a compendium of America’s implementation of international relations theories. However impartial he struggles to be, on the other hand, given his respectful attitude towards realists and his steamrolling tone towards “ultrarealists”, one cannot but feel that Beinart himself is intensely influenced by realists. Reinhold Niebuhr, a disillusioned Marxist and a man of religion, despite these very contradictory labels suggest, occurs and reoccurs throughout the book to assert the most consistent international theory in the history of United States foreign policy (which clicked with me because Niebuhr happens to be an influence on myself). It is a tragedy, it seems, that the realist school of US foreign policy is the one that suffers from misunderstandings the most. What Beinart quips as “ultrarealism”, can be summarized as a misconceived and twisted understanding of realism, be it Niebuhr, Kennan, or Morgenthau; pushed to the degree that it would serve, albeit unintentionally, a basis for policies of hubris: Hubris of reason, hubris of toughness, and then, hubris of dominance.
As deeply as Beinart might have been influenced by realists, nevertheless, it is very hard to categorize Beinart as a realist and then move on. Almost every example Beinart presents in this book, he emphasizes policy-makers’ personal backgrounds and how profoundly they were shaped by this or that idea, or personal experience. He seems, in that sense, to be very constructivist; and when presenting foreign policy suggestions for the Obama administration, suggesting multilateralism, he genuinely is an idealist. This makes sense; what the author is building his case against is “ultrarealism”, and nothing more.
Connections that Beinart tends to find between policy-makers’ lives and their decisions are indeed quite illuminating in Beinart’s work. Wilson’s obsession with constitutions; Bush’s comebacks, Kennedy’s long hikes. He imparts all those presidents, secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, directors of CIA, national security advisers as purely human; at some point you find yourself on the brink of sympathizing with LBJ, or worst, Bush Jr.
I think the parts dealing with Bourne, Kennan, Nixon, Reagan, Powell and Bush are especially very interesting and insightful. It is true that, as some readers mentioned, Beinart makes a lot of repetitions, but I think every one of them are necessary just to gird the concepts.
This book is about a kid; who, when given a toy, tries to understand how it worked; breaking a few glasses and vases here and there, bored at times leaving the toy aside and taking it back at others: it is a story about US and its complicated relationship with its might.
It is a highly recommended read as well for international affairs professionals as cerebral and interested citizens.
I was introduced with this book in a class called “Conceptual Foundations”. Struggling through the dark mazes of international relations theory, I found the Chapter 1, “A Scientific Peace”, a 25-page oasis in the midst of a vast theoretical desert. It was profound and insightful, with a twist of humor. The comparison between Theodore Roosevelt’s cynicism and Woodrow Wilson’s almost naïve positivism was especially noteworthy. I decided to read the whole book.
Beinart’s book, to be sure, is also a compendium of America’s implementation of international relations theories. However impartial he struggles to be, on the other hand, given his respectful attitude towards realists and his steamrolling tone towards “ultrarealists”, one cannot but feel that Beinart himself is intensely influenced by realists. Reinhold Niebuhr, a disillusioned Marxist and a man of religion, despite these very contradictory labels suggest, occurs and reoccurs throughout the book to assert the most consistent international theory in the history of United States foreign policy (which clicked with me because Niebuhr happens to be an influence on myself). It is a tragedy, it seems, that the realist school of US foreign policy is the one that suffers from misunderstandings the most. What Beinart quips as “ultrarealism”, can be summarized as a misconceived and twisted understanding of realism, be it Niebuhr, Kennan, or Morgenthau; pushed to the degree that it would serve, albeit unintentionally, a basis for policies of hubris: Hubris of reason, hubris of toughness, and then, hubris of dominance.
As deeply as Beinart might have been influenced by realists, nevertheless, it is very hard to categorize Beinart as a realist and then move on. Almost every example Beinart presents in this book, he emphasizes policy-makers’ personal backgrounds and how profoundly they were shaped by this or that idea, or personal experience. He seems, in that sense, to be very constructivist; and when presenting foreign policy suggestions for the Obama administration, suggesting multilateralism, he genuinely is an idealist. This makes sense; what the author is building his case against is “ultrarealism”, and nothing more.
Connections that Beinart tends to find between policy-makers’ lives and their decisions are indeed quite illuminating in Beinart’s work. Wilson’s obsession with constitutions; Bush’s comebacks, Kennedy’s long hikes. He imparts all those presidents, secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, directors of CIA, national security advisers as purely human; at some point you find yourself on the brink of sympathizing with LBJ, or worst, Bush Jr.
I think the parts dealing with Bourne, Kennan, Nixon, Reagan, Powell and Bush are especially very interesting and insightful. It is true that, as some readers mentioned, Beinart makes a lot of repetitions, but I think every one of them are necessary just to gird the concepts.
This book is about a kid; who, when given a toy, tries to understand how it worked; breaking a few glasses and vases here and there, bored at times leaving the toy aside and taking it back at others: it is a story about US and its complicated relationship with its might.
It is a highly recommended read as well for international affairs professionals as cerebral and interested citizens.
October 14, 2010
An interesting, well-written book on American 20th century history on foreign policy. I've never thought of military confidence in terms of economic boom-and-bust cycles, as this book does. It focuses on three wars: World War I and Woodrow Wilson's "scientific peace," Vietnam and the "hubris of toughness," and Iraq and the "hubris of dominance." About every 40 years, emboldened by a stint of military and economic glory, America has tended to set its sights higher and higher, eventually believing that it's our national destiny to transform the world in our image. Then, much like Icarus in the Greek myth, we fly too high and get burned.
The author was clearly trying to be objective, exposing both the virtues and flaws of each president, and I like how he showed their human side, but I have some issues with the biases of this book. It's not so much in what is said, but what is left out. For example, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are scarcely mentioned, let alone discussed; in repeatedly citing popular opinion, never is it mentioned the forces that shape those opinions: the media; not once was the influence of big money in politics mentioned. It's pretty obvious the author is a fan of Reagan and the neoconservatives. American hegemony almost seems taken for granted at times, with the only issue being that of a good idea taken too far. Of course, the biggest bias is the focus of the book itself, emphasizing war as the most meaningful story of history, and using simplistic game metaphors of "winning a war" versus "losing a war."
Nonetheless, this book offers an invaluable historical perspective on the botched war in Iraq that has shaped our own time. I've always wondered why America suddenly became mortally afraid of terrorists. Terrorism has always been a problem. It seemed more extreme than just 9/11 showing that the threat was worse than we imagined. A rational reaction would have been to step up national security a bit, and institute a few changes to prevent such attacks in the future. The fear that suddenly gripped the nation seemed outrageous. This book explains this, summed up beautifully in this quote: "Fears don't exist in isolation. They tend to rise and fall depending on what people think they can do about them."
The author was clearly trying to be objective, exposing both the virtues and flaws of each president, and I like how he showed their human side, but I have some issues with the biases of this book. It's not so much in what is said, but what is left out. For example, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are scarcely mentioned, let alone discussed; in repeatedly citing popular opinion, never is it mentioned the forces that shape those opinions: the media; not once was the influence of big money in politics mentioned. It's pretty obvious the author is a fan of Reagan and the neoconservatives. American hegemony almost seems taken for granted at times, with the only issue being that of a good idea taken too far. Of course, the biggest bias is the focus of the book itself, emphasizing war as the most meaningful story of history, and using simplistic game metaphors of "winning a war" versus "losing a war."
Nonetheless, this book offers an invaluable historical perspective on the botched war in Iraq that has shaped our own time. I've always wondered why America suddenly became mortally afraid of terrorists. Terrorism has always been a problem. It seemed more extreme than just 9/11 showing that the threat was worse than we imagined. A rational reaction would have been to step up national security a bit, and institute a few changes to prevent such attacks in the future. The fear that suddenly gripped the nation seemed outrageous. This book explains this, summed up beautifully in this quote: "Fears don't exist in isolation. They tend to rise and fall depending on what people think they can do about them."
October 13, 2010
"[...] the recognition that no collection of mortals can impose its will on an unruly globe is not a sign of decay, but of wisdom. And tempered by wisdom American optimism is--and and always will be--one of the great wonders of the world."
I enjoyed this book. Beinart has composed a meaty examination of the United States's foreign policy priorities. From Wilsonian principles to the more recent errant forays of the Bush administration, Beinart makes brilliant use of historical detail and analogy without putting forth the too often stated adage that ignorance and failure to heed history's lessons has doomed actors to a fateful repetition. There is some of that in his thesis, but he gives us more credit than that. Instead, Beinart argues that far too often leaders and policymakers are prone to viewing new historical challenges through prisms for which analogy can be incorrectly and hastily extended. For Vietnam era policymakers the lessons of 1938 Munich were incorrectly grafted onto challenges; for modern day policymakers the lessons of Vietnam were referenced without the right lessons having been gleaned and applied. Our country's consistent selective historical tradition has reaped varying consequences depending upon the ideological bent from which one is interpreting, but the results are often chillingly and painfully the same.
Beinart has written an important book. I look forward to more of his work.
Did I mention he's also an adorable Jewish intellectual? Hubba, hubba.
I enjoyed this book. Beinart has composed a meaty examination of the United States's foreign policy priorities. From Wilsonian principles to the more recent errant forays of the Bush administration, Beinart makes brilliant use of historical detail and analogy without putting forth the too often stated adage that ignorance and failure to heed history's lessons has doomed actors to a fateful repetition. There is some of that in his thesis, but he gives us more credit than that. Instead, Beinart argues that far too often leaders and policymakers are prone to viewing new historical challenges through prisms for which analogy can be incorrectly and hastily extended. For Vietnam era policymakers the lessons of 1938 Munich were incorrectly grafted onto challenges; for modern day policymakers the lessons of Vietnam were referenced without the right lessons having been gleaned and applied. Our country's consistent selective historical tradition has reaped varying consequences depending upon the ideological bent from which one is interpreting, but the results are often chillingly and painfully the same.
Beinart has written an important book. I look forward to more of his work.
Did I mention he's also an adorable Jewish intellectual? Hubba, hubba.
March 24, 2012
A History of American Hubris follows U.S politics from the beginning of the 20th century to current times, attempting to explain the contexts in which policy makers made their decisions, good or bad.
The premise is that most of the catastrophic decisions were the outcome of leaders and thinkers learning a lesson from their short term history and applying it in the wrong context or in a radically different scales. Thus, the U.S timeline is a wave of buildup of confidence in an approach, until that approach leads to a hubris of believing it can work anywhere, and a disastrous crash when its application leads to a resounding failure.
Many critics of failed leaders often paint them as evil monsters or blind fools, something that Beinart never does. Instead, he sees them as the humans they are, driven by their strengths and shortcomings, and the political climate they find themselves in. By doing so he is able to learn from their mistakes. If only for this important lesson, this book should be read by anyone interested in modern politics.
I've picked up this book as a test-case of whether I should read Beinart's latest book - The Crisis of Zionism, a subject more close to home for me. I now can't wait to read it.
The premise is that most of the catastrophic decisions were the outcome of leaders and thinkers learning a lesson from their short term history and applying it in the wrong context or in a radically different scales. Thus, the U.S timeline is a wave of buildup of confidence in an approach, until that approach leads to a hubris of believing it can work anywhere, and a disastrous crash when its application leads to a resounding failure.
Many critics of failed leaders often paint them as evil monsters or blind fools, something that Beinart never does. Instead, he sees them as the humans they are, driven by their strengths and shortcomings, and the political climate they find themselves in. By doing so he is able to learn from their mistakes. If only for this important lesson, this book should be read by anyone interested in modern politics.
I've picked up this book as a test-case of whether I should read Beinart's latest book - The Crisis of Zionism, a subject more close to home for me. I now can't wait to read it.
April 1, 2016
The author defines the intervention to liberate other countries as “hubris” and rethinks the history of diplomacy since Wilson, who insisted the foundation of United League. He criticizes Wilson, LBJ, W. Bush as the hubris and describes it and the anti-war and isolated atmosphere after the hubris as circle. In this circle, he focuses on “generation”, for H. W. Bush, who limited the intervention limited and realistic, and his son, W. Bush, who intervened to liberate Iraq. The author understands the hubris as conflicts between generations in micro level, and backlashes against the anti-war attitude in macro level.
For me, the most interesting is that the author lays himself in the circle. He first supported Iraq war because he liked the idea to liberate Iraq. However, he changed the attitude. After rethinking the history, he reached the problem of the double-standard diplomacy and the federal problem such as poverty, which is the problem also to Obama.
For me, the most interesting is that the author lays himself in the circle. He first supported Iraq war because he liked the idea to liberate Iraq. However, he changed the attitude. After rethinking the history, he reached the problem of the double-standard diplomacy and the federal problem such as poverty, which is the problem also to Obama.
August 24, 2010
"We thought for a moment that the world was plastic and the future unlimited." - Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
"When liberals remarked in horror that genocide wsa occurring in 1994, they were assuming that 1994 would be better than 1944.... Arthur Schlesinger and Reinhold Niebuhr had not assumed that 1944 would naturally be better than 1904. They had not assumed that history only marched one way."
"I am well aware that the unanticipated consequences of ideas and acts are often very different from what was originally intended. That, I would say, is the basic conservative axiom, and it applies to conservatives was well as liberals...." - Irving Kristol
"Totalitarianism was monstrous because it was unrealistic. Perfect societies required perfect people, and since people were by nature imperfect, the communists took it upon themselves to perfect them by force...."
"When liberals remarked in horror that genocide wsa occurring in 1994, they were assuming that 1994 would be better than 1944.... Arthur Schlesinger and Reinhold Niebuhr had not assumed that 1944 would naturally be better than 1904. They had not assumed that history only marched one way."
"I am well aware that the unanticipated consequences of ideas and acts are often very different from what was originally intended. That, I would say, is the basic conservative axiom, and it applies to conservatives was well as liberals...." - Irving Kristol
"Totalitarianism was monstrous because it was unrealistic. Perfect societies required perfect people, and since people were by nature imperfect, the communists took it upon themselves to perfect them by force...."
October 9, 2012
The Icarus Syndrome, Peter Beinart’s history of American hubris as seen through Wilsonian World War I progressivism, Kennedy and Johnson Vietnam toughness and expansion of containment, and Bush(43) era neo-conservatism and dominance. Fascinating how each generation is conditioned by its formative experiences (e.g., those formed during periods of difficult wars are more cautious than those not), and the usual contrast between the military, who know what death is, and some of the policy makers, who do not. Also, just how unwelcome are dissenting views in large organizations.
Helps one understand the caution in the current time, although some of the current political debates suggest that some have not learned the lessons of over-reach.
Helps one understand the caution in the current time, although some of the current political debates suggest that some have not learned the lessons of over-reach.
August 9, 2011
Spoiler alert----
The author's long term solution for American hubris reflected in our foreign policies...wait for it...
SANCTIONS. Even though the author acknowledges that they are not effective and governments don't take them seriously, he argues that because it is in print people can hold their governments accountable for them. He cites the "success" of Egypt and Libya.
I don't have a better solution but I am still not a fan of his sanction solution.
All in all a very in depth bipartison look at America's foreign policy from World War 2 to the War on Terror aka Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. I recommend skipping the epilogue.
The author's long term solution for American hubris reflected in our foreign policies...wait for it...
SANCTIONS. Even though the author acknowledges that they are not effective and governments don't take them seriously, he argues that because it is in print people can hold their governments accountable for them. He cites the "success" of Egypt and Libya.
I don't have a better solution but I am still not a fan of his sanction solution.
All in all a very in depth bipartison look at America's foreign policy from World War 2 to the War on Terror aka Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. I recommend skipping the epilogue.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 10, 2013
'The Icarus Syndrome' is an exhaustive journey into the bowels of political hubris...similar to the biological definition of 'bowels', the literary journey is just as messy, rancid, and toxic. In short, machismo in American politics over the past 100 years or so has had disastrous results (in the short term as well as the long term); Beinart does a good job in unearthing the motivations, fears, and self-serving interests that have fueled American imperialism throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Recommended for history buffs, political buffs, and those who want to dig a little deeper underneath the national veneer to see what dogs turn this nation politically.
July 14, 2015
When you are looking only for hubris, that's what you'll find. Beinhart's promising provocative thesis of a century of American hubris is soon weighted with his fluid prose going florid. In the the process of selective retelling an otherwise insightful series of vignettes on American presidential personalities and actions, where only the hubristic will do, fluent becomes effluent. I continue to read in the hope that this political discharge reaches a treatment plant. Alas, America's hubristic buildup leads only to the poor decision-making of the Iraq War.
Beinart's prose becomes a distraction, as if he is trying to both impress and bamboozle the reader.
Beinart's prose becomes a distraction, as if he is trying to both impress and bamboozle the reader.
April 4, 2013
The first half deserves 4 stars and the second half 3 stars. His analysis of older events is more compelling but I don't think he should be faulted for that: time to reflect is beneficial for the type of analysis he's trying to accomplish. I did find his argument that the US goes through periods of hubris that have been painful and costly. We should remember this anytime we embark on grand, global schemes.
The style is very engaging. It is easy to stay interested and finish.
The style is very engaging. It is easy to stay interested and finish.
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