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What Darwin Got Wrong
With a New Afterword
What Darwin Got Wrong is a remarkable book, one that dares to challenge the theory of natural selection as an explanation for how evolution works--a devastating critique not in the name of religion but in the name of good science. Combining the results of cutting-edge work in experimental biology with crystal-clear philosophical arguments, Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini mount a reasoned and convincing assault on the central tenets of Darwin's account of the origin of species. This is a concise argument that will transform the debate about evolution and move us beyond the false dilemma of being either for natural selection or against science.
What Darwin Got Wrong is a remarkable book, one that dares to challenge the theory of natural selection as an explanation for how evolution works--a devastating critique not in the name of religion but in the name of good science. Combining the results of cutting-edge work in experimental biology with crystal-clear philosophical arguments, Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini mount a reasoned and convincing assault on the central tenets of Darwin's account of the origin of species. This is a concise argument that will transform the debate about evolution and move us beyond the false dilemma of being either for natural selection or against science.
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
37 people are currently reading
671 people want to read
About the author
Jerry A. Fodor
26 books87 followersJerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He is the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is also the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. Fodor is of Jewish descent.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
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August 1, 2016
Friend Justin (who has several names, some too crude to mention here) brought Fodor to my attention. Given my interest in philosophy and opposition to Dawkins, Pinker et al, I was, as they say, happy as a pig rolling in its own fecal matter.
The title of course is a knowing provocation (remember when Marx was the 19th century thinker everyone had an opinion about? those were the days). My guess is that it was chosen by the publisher, not the authors. Darwin's names has become a kind of shibboleth; Richard Dawkins will confidentially tell you that adherence to Darwin is the minimum requirement to be considered a rational human being. He and the other 'new atheists' pulled off a remarkable rhetorical coup in characterizing any deviation from the neo-Darwinist line as hostile to reason as such.
So it's important to emphasize that Fodor and his co-author fully accept the genealogy of species - that is, that most or all species are related by historical descent (they would most definitely take Scopes's side in the Scopes monkey trial). What they object to is the theory of natural selection, roughly that adaptation to the environment is the sole or primary engine of evolution.
The first part of the book deals with empirical evidence that seems to call natural selection into question; the second with conceptual difficulties that neo-Darwinists have never been able to resolve or even properly address. Fodor points to certain oddly persistent metaphors in the evolutionary literature; for instance, Pinker writing of what the mind was 'designed' for; Gopnik claiming that selective breeding and natural selection are literally the same thing. Is this merely due to the awkwardness of language? No, Fodor claims that in order to be coherent, the theory of natural selection actually requires an unacknowledged intentional agent. Thus a tacit teleology is smuggled into the heart of what's supposed to be the crown jewel of naturalism.
A pretty pass. Both Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini are avowed atheists and naturalists. The book actually ends with a plea that we give up natural selection for the sake of a more robust, superstition-free atheism. Of course they have no comprehensive theory to propose as an alternative to natural selection. At the moment the state of our knowledge is just too limited. Yet they also insist, whatever the explanation may be, it will be found within naturalism.
Which, I'm afraid, may open a door the authors don't particularly want to walk through. Just what is naturalism? Dawkins and company at least have the advantage of a simple definition: naturalism is adherence to the views of Darwin. Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini presumably want to identify naturalism with the laws of nature, the excision of all supernatural explanations. But then it seems the problem is we don't actually possess the ultimate laws of nature (quantum mechanics and relativity are notoriously incompatible in some instances, string theory an uncashed check), and how do we know beforehand whether something counts as supernatural or not? To many of the educated elite of Newton's time gravity appeared to be an occult force.
In any case, these are questions for another book, or another shelf of books. What Darwin Got Wrong is excellent and stimulating. As far as I can tell it succeeds marvelously at its polemical purpose.
The title of course is a knowing provocation (remember when Marx was the 19th century thinker everyone had an opinion about? those were the days). My guess is that it was chosen by the publisher, not the authors. Darwin's names has become a kind of shibboleth; Richard Dawkins will confidentially tell you that adherence to Darwin is the minimum requirement to be considered a rational human being. He and the other 'new atheists' pulled off a remarkable rhetorical coup in characterizing any deviation from the neo-Darwinist line as hostile to reason as such.
So it's important to emphasize that Fodor and his co-author fully accept the genealogy of species - that is, that most or all species are related by historical descent (they would most definitely take Scopes's side in the Scopes monkey trial). What they object to is the theory of natural selection, roughly that adaptation to the environment is the sole or primary engine of evolution.
The first part of the book deals with empirical evidence that seems to call natural selection into question; the second with conceptual difficulties that neo-Darwinists have never been able to resolve or even properly address. Fodor points to certain oddly persistent metaphors in the evolutionary literature; for instance, Pinker writing of what the mind was 'designed' for; Gopnik claiming that selective breeding and natural selection are literally the same thing. Is this merely due to the awkwardness of language? No, Fodor claims that in order to be coherent, the theory of natural selection actually requires an unacknowledged intentional agent. Thus a tacit teleology is smuggled into the heart of what's supposed to be the crown jewel of naturalism.
A pretty pass. Both Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini are avowed atheists and naturalists. The book actually ends with a plea that we give up natural selection for the sake of a more robust, superstition-free atheism. Of course they have no comprehensive theory to propose as an alternative to natural selection. At the moment the state of our knowledge is just too limited. Yet they also insist, whatever the explanation may be, it will be found within naturalism.
Which, I'm afraid, may open a door the authors don't particularly want to walk through. Just what is naturalism? Dawkins and company at least have the advantage of a simple definition: naturalism is adherence to the views of Darwin. Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini presumably want to identify naturalism with the laws of nature, the excision of all supernatural explanations. But then it seems the problem is we don't actually possess the ultimate laws of nature (quantum mechanics and relativity are notoriously incompatible in some instances, string theory an uncashed check), and how do we know beforehand whether something counts as supernatural or not? To many of the educated elite of Newton's time gravity appeared to be an occult force.
In any case, these are questions for another book, or another shelf of books. What Darwin Got Wrong is excellent and stimulating. As far as I can tell it succeeds marvelously at its polemical purpose.
June 27, 2014
The title of Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini's (F & P) book is What Darwin Got Wrong, and true to the title F & P do tell us exactly what Darwin got wrong. One problem with this is that modern students of biology do not read Darwin, and unless they care about Darwin's thoughts in particular, they shouldn't. Any modern college level textbook on biology has more to say than Darwin, and will say it in a way that is more comprehensible. The correctness of neo-Darwinism does not depend on Darwin being correct about every detail. Luckily for us, F & P's thesis is more relevant than the title suggests.
The unfortunate thing is that I cannot pin down exactly what F & P intend as their thesis. On the first page of the first chapter F & P tell us that their thesis is (1) "that NS [Natural Selection] is irredeemably flawed," (p. 1), but on the very next page they explain that their book shows (2) that NS is not the mechanism for speciation. (p. 2) Claim (1) is much stronger than claim (2), and they alternate between these two claims throughout the book. It seems that whenever they feel their position is strong they tell us that they have shown (1), but if there are weaknesses in their argument they fall back to claim (2).
One area of weakness, for instance, is their use of quote mining things said by scientists. In chapter 10 in particular, they cherry pick quotes as prodigiously as the Intellegent Design folks. Too bad none of the quotes support thesis (1), and in many instances it is a stretch to say that a given quote completely supports thesis (2). My reading of the quotes presented as authoritative agreements with F & P's position make the much weaker claim the NS is just one of the many mechanisms that explain the origin of species, and it may very well be that NS is not even a major mechanism. Yet, this statement is far from the claim that NS is "irredeemably flawed."
Repeatedly in the introduction and in chapter 10, F & P tell us that they are misunderstood. That their critics treat their arguments as if they were made by Intellegent Design supporters. Yet, they leave themselves open to this criticism. In chapter 5 F & P present several examples of complex behaviors or a nearly perfect anatomical feature, and make the claim that these examples refute NS because they cannot see how such a complex behavior, for instance, could come about in a stepwise fashion since any missing portion of the process would make the entire adaptation useless. How do F & P not recognize in their argument the same logic as used in the "irreducible complexity" arguments given by Intellegent Design proponents? "Because the bacterial flagellum is a complex system," we are told by Intellegent Design proponent William Dembski, "and because I cannot fathom how it came about by adaptation, it must be that NS is wrong." Along with the quote mining previously mentioned it is obvious why F & P are treated like Intellegent Design proponents even when they claim otherwise.
The unfortunate thing is that I cannot pin down exactly what F & P intend as their thesis. On the first page of the first chapter F & P tell us that their thesis is (1) "that NS [Natural Selection] is irredeemably flawed," (p. 1), but on the very next page they explain that their book shows (2) that NS is not the mechanism for speciation. (p. 2) Claim (1) is much stronger than claim (2), and they alternate between these two claims throughout the book. It seems that whenever they feel their position is strong they tell us that they have shown (1), but if there are weaknesses in their argument they fall back to claim (2).
One area of weakness, for instance, is their use of quote mining things said by scientists. In chapter 10 in particular, they cherry pick quotes as prodigiously as the Intellegent Design folks. Too bad none of the quotes support thesis (1), and in many instances it is a stretch to say that a given quote completely supports thesis (2). My reading of the quotes presented as authoritative agreements with F & P's position make the much weaker claim the NS is just one of the many mechanisms that explain the origin of species, and it may very well be that NS is not even a major mechanism. Yet, this statement is far from the claim that NS is "irredeemably flawed."
Repeatedly in the introduction and in chapter 10, F & P tell us that they are misunderstood. That their critics treat their arguments as if they were made by Intellegent Design supporters. Yet, they leave themselves open to this criticism. In chapter 5 F & P present several examples of complex behaviors or a nearly perfect anatomical feature, and make the claim that these examples refute NS because they cannot see how such a complex behavior, for instance, could come about in a stepwise fashion since any missing portion of the process would make the entire adaptation useless. How do F & P not recognize in their argument the same logic as used in the "irreducible complexity" arguments given by Intellegent Design proponents? "Because the bacterial flagellum is a complex system," we are told by Intellegent Design proponent William Dembski, "and because I cannot fathom how it came about by adaptation, it must be that NS is wrong." Along with the quote mining previously mentioned it is obvious why F & P are treated like Intellegent Design proponents even when they claim otherwise.
January 7, 2022
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قبل البدء علينا القول بأن محتوى هذا الكتاب لا يُناسب القارئ المبتدئ في مجال نقد النظريات العلمية المتعلقة بأفكار داروين، وهو مناسب أكثر لأصحاب الاختصاص والسبب يرجع لتشعب الأفكار التي رد عليها المؤلف وتشعبت بطبيعة الحال النظريات المطروحة هنا، لذا اقتضى التنويه.
الكتاب من تأليف العالمين جيري فودور وماسيمو بيتالي بالماريني، والهدف الأساسي من هذا الكتاب هو تقديم نقد علمي يكشف الأخطاء الموجودة في نظرية دارون ولا أقول مجرد أخطاء بل هي مغالطات سبحان من جعل ذهن هذا العالم يغفل عنها ليظهر بعد كل هذا الزمان خطئه وشتات أفكاره.
الكتاب فصلين اثنين: الأول تحدث عن طبيعة نظرية الانتخاب الطبيعي، والفصل الثاني تحدث عن الحالة التصورية التي استعرض بها المؤلفين الأسس المنطقية في نظرية الانتقاء الطبيعي، ويمكن اختصار رأي المؤلفين بهذا بقولهم أن " الدراوينين قد بالغوا في تقدير دور الإنتاج العشوائي والترشيح الخارجي في تشكيل الأنماط الظاهرية".
وهكذا دارت محاور الكتاب مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار أن كلا المؤلفين لا يؤمنان بوجود الله (الخالق)، في المقابل هم يرفضون هذا التمجيد لنظرية الانتخاب الطبيعي وكأنها الإجابة المثالية والصحيحة لكل الأسئلة التي يطرحها العلم وتطرحها الفلسفة!؟.
ماذا بعد القراءة ؟
كلما تعمقت أكثر بقراءة ما يدور في أذهان العلماء من ذكاء وعبقرية تقصر بهم أمام الإيمان بالله، كلما أدركت حقيقة قوله تعالى( ﴿فَمَن يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَن يَهدِيَهُ يَشرَح صَدرَهُ لِلإِسلامِ وَمَن يُرِد أَن يُضِلَّهُ يَجعَل صَدرَهُ ضَيِّقًا حَرَجًا كَأَنَّما يَصَّعَّدُ فِي السَّماءِ كَذلِكَ يَجعَلُ اللَّهُ الرِّجسَ عَلَى الَّذينَ لا يُؤمِنونَ﴾ [الأنعام: ١٢٥].
#أبجدية_فرح 5/3 🌷📚
#candleflame23bookreviews
#أين_أخطأ_داروين #جيري_فودور #رواسخ
#غرد_بإقتباس
#مراجعة_كتاب
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قبل البدء علينا القول بأن محتوى هذا الكتاب لا يُناسب القارئ المبتدئ في مجال نقد النظريات العلمية المتعلقة بأفكار داروين، وهو مناسب أكثر لأصحاب الاختصاص والسبب يرجع لتشعب الأفكار التي رد عليها المؤلف وتشعبت بطبيعة الحال النظريات المطروحة هنا، لذا اقتضى التنويه.
الكتاب من تأليف العالمين جيري فودور وماسيمو بيتالي بالماريني، والهدف الأساسي من هذا الكتاب هو تقديم نقد علمي يكشف الأخطاء الموجودة في نظرية دارون ولا أقول مجرد أخطاء بل هي مغالطات سبحان من جعل ذهن هذا العالم يغفل عنها ليظهر بعد كل هذا الزمان خطئه وشتات أفكاره.
الكتاب فصلين اثنين: الأول تحدث عن طبيعة نظرية الانتخاب الطبيعي، والفصل الثاني تحدث عن الحالة التصورية التي استعرض بها المؤلفين الأسس المنطقية في نظرية الانتقاء الطبيعي، ويمكن اختصار رأي المؤلفين بهذا بقولهم أن " الدراوينين قد بالغوا في تقدير دور الإنتاج العشوائي والترشيح الخارجي في تشكيل الأنماط الظاهرية".
وهكذا دارت محاور الكتاب مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار أن كلا المؤلفين لا يؤمنان بوجود الله (الخالق)، في المقابل هم يرفضون هذا التمجيد لنظرية الانتخاب الطبيعي وكأنها الإجابة المثالية والصحيحة لكل الأسئلة التي يطرحها العلم وتطرحها الفلسفة!؟.
ماذا بعد القراءة ؟
كلما تعمقت أكثر بقراءة ما يدور في أذهان العلماء من ذكاء وعبقرية تقصر بهم أمام الإيمان بالله، كلما أدركت حقيقة قوله تعالى( ﴿فَمَن يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَن يَهدِيَهُ يَشرَح صَدرَهُ لِلإِسلامِ وَمَن يُرِد أَن يُضِلَّهُ يَجعَل صَدرَهُ ضَيِّقًا حَرَجًا كَأَنَّما يَصَّعَّدُ فِي السَّماءِ كَذلِكَ يَجعَلُ اللَّهُ الرِّجسَ عَلَى الَّذينَ لا يُؤمِنونَ﴾ [الأنعام: ١٢٥].
#أبجدية_فرح 5/3 🌷📚
#candleflame23bookreviews
#أين_أخطأ_داروين #جيري_فودور #رواسخ
#غرد_بإقتباس
#مراجعة_كتاب
February 28, 2017
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini are atheists who have no quarrel with evolution (common descent with modifications) per se, they merely think neo-darwinian natural selection theory is inadequate for explaining it. What Darwin Got Wrong is the book where they make their case.
The authors make many empirical criticisms of neo-darwinism. These are difficult to dismiss, since they are drawn from what many current biologists are learning and saying. The authors think recent trends in biology show that neo-darwinian theory is untenable. As a framework for helping to understand why, they offer a comparison between the theory of natural selection and B.F. Skinner’s theory of learning. Both are “generate and filter” theories involving random generation and exogenous filtering. Skinner’s theory lost general credibility as a growing appreciation of endogenous learning factors and constraints made clear that “what goes on in learning is not plausibly modelled as the exogenous filtering of behaviors that are in the first instance emitted at random.” Similarly, recent trends in biology (especially evo-devo) emphasize endogenous factors and constraints, and the authors think this likewise portends the eventual demise of natural selection theory. The empirical case against natural selection that the authors marshall is multi-faceted, and I will not attempt a summary here. I’ll simply note as interesting that when the authors mention problems such as the Cambrian explosion and the staggering improbability that certain biological structures could have arisen through selection working on random genetic variation, they are citing issues raised by paleontologists and mathematicians that are often cited by proponents of Intelligent Design. Of course, Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini look to self organization theories rather than an intelligent designer as a pathway for explaining some of nature’s most complex and well formed structures; perhaps the authors’ naturalism will predispose certain readers to seriously consider arguments against neo-darwinism that they might have a hard time accepting from the pen of, say, Stephen Meyer.
Given the recent scholarly trends, where is the thinking about evolution heading? The authors acknowledge that support for neo-darwinism remains very strong, and that even many people active in the current research trends they cite somehow simply envision the eventual development of a more refined version of adaptationism. The authors think the facts warrant a more drastic change in outlook, and to help change minds they even contribute their own conceptual attack on the theory of natural selection. To return to the Darwin/Skinner comparison, the authors think that Darwin’s theory is not merely false like Skinner’s and for similar reasons, but empty as well. They argue that the notion of “selection for” involves an unwarranted ghost in the machine unless one can point to “laws” of trait selection, and the authors argue that no such laws exist. Bereft of such laws, “the theory of natural selection reduces to a banal truth: ‘If a kind of creature flourishes in a kind of situation, then there must be something about such creatures (or about such situations, or about both) in virtue of which it does so.’ Well, of course there must; even a creationist could agree with that.” To be clear, the authors do think there are persuasive adaptationist accounts of certain episodes in natural history, but stress that these are contingent historical accounts that do not/can not rise to the level of generally applicable selection laws. The assumption that we possess, need, or could find a single theory that unlocks natural history is, for the authors, misguided.
This book attempts to break the spell of hegemonic theory by arguing that darwinistic mechanisms have no more than limited applicability and deserve no privileged place for explaining natural history. Not only have endogenous factors in the development of phenotypes been greatly under appreciated, there are likely many mechanisms, claim the authors, for the fixation of phenotypes. This second claim gains plausibility in light of the first, but to help drive the point home the authors also spill a bunch of ink arguing that the notion (often employed with rhetorical effectiveness by neo-darwinists ) that organisms are exquisitely adapted for their environment is largely tautological.
This book suggests that Darwin did for natural history what Marx did for history generally: placed it under control of a “theory.” Such 19th century optimism concerning the power of science understandably gained plausibility from earlier triumphs in physics. However, the authors point out that “history, whether natural or otherwise, is par excellence the locus of explanations that do not conform to the Newtonian paradigm.” Yet though Marxism is discredited, Darwinism persists, and even expands, as in the case of sociobiology. Again, the authors do not deny that Darwinians are capable of interesting perspectives and insights. But they decry that if one is to identify as a secular humanist, there is great pressure to pledge allegiance to Darwin. Though some of this pressure surely comes from a historically conditioned tension between science and faith, Darwinism, like Marxism, is also a “totalizing” phenomenon that militates against honest scientific criticism in a way that other scientific theories do not. I would imagine that a fair amount of negative reaction to this book comes from those who feel threatened by (or are maybe simply unwilling to put up with) its attack on the pretense of historical meta-theory.
This is a thought provoking book whose arguments are worth pondering.
The authors make many empirical criticisms of neo-darwinism. These are difficult to dismiss, since they are drawn from what many current biologists are learning and saying. The authors think recent trends in biology show that neo-darwinian theory is untenable. As a framework for helping to understand why, they offer a comparison between the theory of natural selection and B.F. Skinner’s theory of learning. Both are “generate and filter” theories involving random generation and exogenous filtering. Skinner’s theory lost general credibility as a growing appreciation of endogenous learning factors and constraints made clear that “what goes on in learning is not plausibly modelled as the exogenous filtering of behaviors that are in the first instance emitted at random.” Similarly, recent trends in biology (especially evo-devo) emphasize endogenous factors and constraints, and the authors think this likewise portends the eventual demise of natural selection theory. The empirical case against natural selection that the authors marshall is multi-faceted, and I will not attempt a summary here. I’ll simply note as interesting that when the authors mention problems such as the Cambrian explosion and the staggering improbability that certain biological structures could have arisen through selection working on random genetic variation, they are citing issues raised by paleontologists and mathematicians that are often cited by proponents of Intelligent Design. Of course, Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini look to self organization theories rather than an intelligent designer as a pathway for explaining some of nature’s most complex and well formed structures; perhaps the authors’ naturalism will predispose certain readers to seriously consider arguments against neo-darwinism that they might have a hard time accepting from the pen of, say, Stephen Meyer.
Given the recent scholarly trends, where is the thinking about evolution heading? The authors acknowledge that support for neo-darwinism remains very strong, and that even many people active in the current research trends they cite somehow simply envision the eventual development of a more refined version of adaptationism. The authors think the facts warrant a more drastic change in outlook, and to help change minds they even contribute their own conceptual attack on the theory of natural selection. To return to the Darwin/Skinner comparison, the authors think that Darwin’s theory is not merely false like Skinner’s and for similar reasons, but empty as well. They argue that the notion of “selection for” involves an unwarranted ghost in the machine unless one can point to “laws” of trait selection, and the authors argue that no such laws exist. Bereft of such laws, “the theory of natural selection reduces to a banal truth: ‘If a kind of creature flourishes in a kind of situation, then there must be something about such creatures (or about such situations, or about both) in virtue of which it does so.’ Well, of course there must; even a creationist could agree with that.” To be clear, the authors do think there are persuasive adaptationist accounts of certain episodes in natural history, but stress that these are contingent historical accounts that do not/can not rise to the level of generally applicable selection laws. The assumption that we possess, need, or could find a single theory that unlocks natural history is, for the authors, misguided.
This book attempts to break the spell of hegemonic theory by arguing that darwinistic mechanisms have no more than limited applicability and deserve no privileged place for explaining natural history. Not only have endogenous factors in the development of phenotypes been greatly under appreciated, there are likely many mechanisms, claim the authors, for the fixation of phenotypes. This second claim gains plausibility in light of the first, but to help drive the point home the authors also spill a bunch of ink arguing that the notion (often employed with rhetorical effectiveness by neo-darwinists ) that organisms are exquisitely adapted for their environment is largely tautological.
This book suggests that Darwin did for natural history what Marx did for history generally: placed it under control of a “theory.” Such 19th century optimism concerning the power of science understandably gained plausibility from earlier triumphs in physics. However, the authors point out that “history, whether natural or otherwise, is par excellence the locus of explanations that do not conform to the Newtonian paradigm.” Yet though Marxism is discredited, Darwinism persists, and even expands, as in the case of sociobiology. Again, the authors do not deny that Darwinians are capable of interesting perspectives and insights. But they decry that if one is to identify as a secular humanist, there is great pressure to pledge allegiance to Darwin. Though some of this pressure surely comes from a historically conditioned tension between science and faith, Darwinism, like Marxism, is also a “totalizing” phenomenon that militates against honest scientific criticism in a way that other scientific theories do not. I would imagine that a fair amount of negative reaction to this book comes from those who feel threatened by (or are maybe simply unwilling to put up with) its attack on the pretense of historical meta-theory.
This is a thought provoking book whose arguments are worth pondering.
August 10, 2012
Why has this book received such bad press? It is not, strictly speaking, a bad book. At least its overarching argument is not a bad one. So why the vitriolic dismissals of it? I believe there are two main reasons for this.
The first and likely most prevalent reason is Fodor's characteristic hubris. To a certain extent, when Fodor is writing in his own field (i.e. philosophy of psychology and cognitive science) he can get away with writing as if those who disagree with him don't know what they are talking about. He is rightly considered one of its leading figures and with that status comes a certain amount of privilege. However, when you stray into unfamiliar waters it is customary to tone it down a bit, to show a certain amount of deference to the experts, even if your goal is to contradict them in the end. Fodor doesn't do this and he pays the price. Doing this would have afforded him a certain measure of charity, but instead his arguments are being rejected as ridiculous without a second thought by those who are more in the know. Even those who are willing to put up with his shenanigans in his home discipline are backing away in order to save face. In a lot of ways, this book is a public relations disaster for the philosophy profession.
The second reason for the overall failure of this book is connected to the first. In short, a book-length treatment was not needed to get this argument across. Publishing the book seems to have been part of a polemic strategy on the part of the authors to get their position out into the mainstream of scientific discourse. Again, hubris is the issue. The motivation behind getting the book published wasn't that the authors had a books worth of material on the subject of evolution and natural selection. They wanted their argument to make a splash.
Take Part I. It contains a superfluous analogy between natural selection and psychological behaviorism. What this analogy was suppose to prove was never made particularly clear. At most it gave Fodor the opportunity to flog the dead behaviorist horse yet again. It also allowed him to remind the reader of the sacred cow that he and Chomsky once toppled. If he did it once maybe he can do it again, right? The rest of Part I was taken up by a summary of recent developments in the fields of evolutionary biology and genetics over the last 20 years, including the rise of evolutionary development theory (evo-devo) and epigenetics. This information is covered in far more depth and detail in other publications. Fodor and his co-author didn't need to include one of their own in this book. It would have been good enough for them to provide a quick summary of the relevant findings and their implications, along with references to these other sources.
The book's only substantial arguments are developed in Part II, spanning a mere 68 pages (with generously sized font). Whether or not the view they are meant to defend is correct, they are interesting arguments that are worthy of some attention within the philosophy of science. Roughly speaking, the dispute between Fodor and his opponents seems to come down to a disagreement over what being a distinct level of scientific explanation entails (i.e., should it pick out novel causal mechanisms, should its generalizations be counter-factual supporting, must these generalizations appeal to ceteris paribus laws, etc.) and whether the theory of evolution by natural selection fits the bill. According to Fodor, selectionist explanations are not scientific. Rather, they are purely historical accounts (i.e., "just one damned thing after another"). They do not specify law-like relations and we, therefore, cannot make any kind of verifiable empirical predictions based on them.
The main thrust of this argument could have easily been captured in a co-authored journal article. Certainly it would have to be a long one but getting a 50+ page article published has never been a problem for Fodor in the past. When you are responsible for publishing The Language of Thought AND The Modularity of Mind you can get away with that sort of thing. But, of course, an article in Mind would not have garnered Fodor's argument the amount of attention this book did.
As far as the philosophy of science goes, Fodor's position is quite controversial but certainly respectable. Qua philosopher of science, it is Fodor's prerogative to hold this position and, as charitable interpreters, it is our duty to respect it and give it a fair hearing. However, it is beyond arrogant for Fodor to suggest that evolutionary biologists are seriously mistaken about what they are doing on the grounds of a single, contentious argument. Nor was it a good idea on Fodor's part to compound this arrogant move by publishing a book length treatment of his argument (along with a fair bit of filler) for consumption by those outside of the field. He certainly did not need to give his book the title What Darwin Got Wrong. In doing so Fodor has forfeited the protection that his position and reputation within the discipline have afforded him and has likely done serious damage to his professional reputation. Major faux pas, Jerry.
The first and likely most prevalent reason is Fodor's characteristic hubris. To a certain extent, when Fodor is writing in his own field (i.e. philosophy of psychology and cognitive science) he can get away with writing as if those who disagree with him don't know what they are talking about. He is rightly considered one of its leading figures and with that status comes a certain amount of privilege. However, when you stray into unfamiliar waters it is customary to tone it down a bit, to show a certain amount of deference to the experts, even if your goal is to contradict them in the end. Fodor doesn't do this and he pays the price. Doing this would have afforded him a certain measure of charity, but instead his arguments are being rejected as ridiculous without a second thought by those who are more in the know. Even those who are willing to put up with his shenanigans in his home discipline are backing away in order to save face. In a lot of ways, this book is a public relations disaster for the philosophy profession.
The second reason for the overall failure of this book is connected to the first. In short, a book-length treatment was not needed to get this argument across. Publishing the book seems to have been part of a polemic strategy on the part of the authors to get their position out into the mainstream of scientific discourse. Again, hubris is the issue. The motivation behind getting the book published wasn't that the authors had a books worth of material on the subject of evolution and natural selection. They wanted their argument to make a splash.
Take Part I. It contains a superfluous analogy between natural selection and psychological behaviorism. What this analogy was suppose to prove was never made particularly clear. At most it gave Fodor the opportunity to flog the dead behaviorist horse yet again. It also allowed him to remind the reader of the sacred cow that he and Chomsky once toppled. If he did it once maybe he can do it again, right? The rest of Part I was taken up by a summary of recent developments in the fields of evolutionary biology and genetics over the last 20 years, including the rise of evolutionary development theory (evo-devo) and epigenetics. This information is covered in far more depth and detail in other publications. Fodor and his co-author didn't need to include one of their own in this book. It would have been good enough for them to provide a quick summary of the relevant findings and their implications, along with references to these other sources.
The book's only substantial arguments are developed in Part II, spanning a mere 68 pages (with generously sized font). Whether or not the view they are meant to defend is correct, they are interesting arguments that are worthy of some attention within the philosophy of science. Roughly speaking, the dispute between Fodor and his opponents seems to come down to a disagreement over what being a distinct level of scientific explanation entails (i.e., should it pick out novel causal mechanisms, should its generalizations be counter-factual supporting, must these generalizations appeal to ceteris paribus laws, etc.) and whether the theory of evolution by natural selection fits the bill. According to Fodor, selectionist explanations are not scientific. Rather, they are purely historical accounts (i.e., "just one damned thing after another"). They do not specify law-like relations and we, therefore, cannot make any kind of verifiable empirical predictions based on them.
The main thrust of this argument could have easily been captured in a co-authored journal article. Certainly it would have to be a long one but getting a 50+ page article published has never been a problem for Fodor in the past. When you are responsible for publishing The Language of Thought AND The Modularity of Mind you can get away with that sort of thing. But, of course, an article in Mind would not have garnered Fodor's argument the amount of attention this book did.
As far as the philosophy of science goes, Fodor's position is quite controversial but certainly respectable. Qua philosopher of science, it is Fodor's prerogative to hold this position and, as charitable interpreters, it is our duty to respect it and give it a fair hearing. However, it is beyond arrogant for Fodor to suggest that evolutionary biologists are seriously mistaken about what they are doing on the grounds of a single, contentious argument. Nor was it a good idea on Fodor's part to compound this arrogant move by publishing a book length treatment of his argument (along with a fair bit of filler) for consumption by those outside of the field. He certainly did not need to give his book the title What Darwin Got Wrong. In doing so Fodor has forfeited the protection that his position and reputation within the discipline have afforded him and has likely done serious damage to his professional reputation. Major faux pas, Jerry.
March 20, 2013
I hate to admit it, but I bought this book because of the covers. I was interested in the theme, but the real reason I immediately bought it and started reading it were the covers.
As the authors put it, it is "an attack on the most influential scientific orthodoxy of the last 150 years". Although at times demanding a lot of attention, there are humorous parts, beginning with the introduction bearing the name "Terms of Engagement" :), as well as the Granny Gravity bit.
The authors claim that there might be something fatally wrong with the theory of natural selection. But please, natural selection, not evolution. I hate going into an argument about a book on the philosophy of biology only to realize that the person I'm talking to doesn't differentiate between evolution and natural selection. Which I also noticed in some reviews. That brings me to the next issue. Apparently, this work got a lot of negative feedback. If I understood correctly, from evolutionary biologists and people obsessed with creationism. Going back to my notes, I went along and downgraded it from 5 to 4 stars. Why? Because I realized there was I lot I didn't understand. I have a ton of notes on this book, and it would take me too long to get into it, but what matters is that I really liked it. After reading other reviews, I thought I should re-read it, because I obviously missed something. Or did they? I've been reading on evolution for the better part of the last ten years, and this book was extremely refreshing. Probably because it wasn't written by biologists. Now I don't consider myself any kind of an authority on these matters, and besides reading, I haven't really had the chance to sort out my standpoints (to myself or others) in a discussion or really breaking down some arguments. Some of the criticism seems "legit", other like they haven't even read the book. But as far as changing your perception goes, this book does it for me. After reading so many of the Darwin's bulldogs' books, it's exciting to start reading Lewontin, as well as non-biologists' takes on these themes in biology - a look from "the other culture" (the humanities one), if you will.
The references are recent (mostly from 2000 to 2009) and they present excerpts from the most up-to-date literature and scientific facts. (Which others call quote picking.) It is really interesting.
I'm just going to add some quotes, and you can think what you like about it. About selfish genes, they quote (somebodys? my notes are not good): "To consider genes as independent units is meaningless from the physiological as well as the evolutionary viewpoint"; "Advocacy of the gene as the unit of selection is operationally incoherent and genetically misconceived". On evolution in general: "Selection involves whole phenotypes, not individual traits"; "Evo-devo revolution has stressed that evolution is essentially the evolution of the arrow that connects the genes and the phenotype." On the intentionality of natural selection: "Darwin thought that he could start with a mental process and then get to natural selection by abstracting the minds away. But that is what we are saying can't be done."; "Fiddlesticks. The human mind wasn't created, and it wasn't designed, and there is nothing that natural selection cares about; natural selection just happens. This isn't Kansas, Toto."
Read it, if only to find new interesting authors. There are other biologists out there besides Richard Dawkins!
P.S. I guess we are all reacting to this book in response to the accumulated annoyances from before. An idea by a Croatian author is that particular stances and positions in the evolutionary theory have a lot to the with the persons' socio-economical background and political affiliations - basically, that everybody sees what they'd like to see. I'm beginning to think it is for the most part true.
As the authors put it, it is "an attack on the most influential scientific orthodoxy of the last 150 years". Although at times demanding a lot of attention, there are humorous parts, beginning with the introduction bearing the name "Terms of Engagement" :), as well as the Granny Gravity bit.
The authors claim that there might be something fatally wrong with the theory of natural selection. But please, natural selection, not evolution. I hate going into an argument about a book on the philosophy of biology only to realize that the person I'm talking to doesn't differentiate between evolution and natural selection. Which I also noticed in some reviews. That brings me to the next issue. Apparently, this work got a lot of negative feedback. If I understood correctly, from evolutionary biologists and people obsessed with creationism. Going back to my notes, I went along and downgraded it from 5 to 4 stars. Why? Because I realized there was I lot I didn't understand. I have a ton of notes on this book, and it would take me too long to get into it, but what matters is that I really liked it. After reading other reviews, I thought I should re-read it, because I obviously missed something. Or did they? I've been reading on evolution for the better part of the last ten years, and this book was extremely refreshing. Probably because it wasn't written by biologists. Now I don't consider myself any kind of an authority on these matters, and besides reading, I haven't really had the chance to sort out my standpoints (to myself or others) in a discussion or really breaking down some arguments. Some of the criticism seems "legit", other like they haven't even read the book. But as far as changing your perception goes, this book does it for me. After reading so many of the Darwin's bulldogs' books, it's exciting to start reading Lewontin, as well as non-biologists' takes on these themes in biology - a look from "the other culture" (the humanities one), if you will.
The references are recent (mostly from 2000 to 2009) and they present excerpts from the most up-to-date literature and scientific facts. (Which others call quote picking.) It is really interesting.
I'm just going to add some quotes, and you can think what you like about it. About selfish genes, they quote (somebodys? my notes are not good): "To consider genes as independent units is meaningless from the physiological as well as the evolutionary viewpoint"; "Advocacy of the gene as the unit of selection is operationally incoherent and genetically misconceived". On evolution in general: "Selection involves whole phenotypes, not individual traits"; "Evo-devo revolution has stressed that evolution is essentially the evolution of the arrow that connects the genes and the phenotype." On the intentionality of natural selection: "Darwin thought that he could start with a mental process and then get to natural selection by abstracting the minds away. But that is what we are saying can't be done."; "Fiddlesticks. The human mind wasn't created, and it wasn't designed, and there is nothing that natural selection cares about; natural selection just happens. This isn't Kansas, Toto."
Read it, if only to find new interesting authors. There are other biologists out there besides Richard Dawkins!
P.S. I guess we are all reacting to this book in response to the accumulated annoyances from before. An idea by a Croatian author is that particular stances and positions in the evolutionary theory have a lot to the with the persons' socio-economical background and political affiliations - basically, that everybody sees what they'd like to see. I'm beginning to think it is for the most part true.
March 14, 2025
Part I: Lewontin Strikes Back (Literally, the authors thank and quote Lewontin so often that it feels like he wrote this section.) – "Everything's oh so complex, with epigenetics and stuff, you gotta stop being so modernist and reductionist and respect the pluralities and relativities... Leave all your theories and come to the Continent where there is no Grand Narrative..." Okay this caricature may be reflecting my personal protest at Lewontin; Fodor and the Italian guy with the long name (this didn't turn out to be as short as I expected – okay now I'm at loss, I should have just written his name damn it) don't sound as continental as Lewontin. At least in this part; they actually say at the end of the book that "there is no theory of evolution; all there is, is natural history."
Part II: The Philosopher's Stone – "Natural selection could have just as well selected hearts for the sounds they make! I mean, not really; of course the hearts are there to pump blood, but your theory of natural selection cannot specify that! Because to distinguish between the real function and the free-riders, it should be able to use counterfactuals ("what if there was pumping without sound / sound without pumping?") and this requires a mind, and natural selection doesn't have a mind! But scientists have... Sooo, the theory of natural selection can make use of counterfactuals and generate accurate explanations... And the process of natural selection doesn't need to pin down free-riders; they only concern it if they are beneficial or harmful; then they're more than free-riders and selected-for or -against accordingly... Okay, nevermind. I thought I was on to something..." The second part where Fodor realizes his mistake was added by me. I wish it needn't be. (And the reason I engage with only Fodor here is that I don't know the other author; I read the whole book with the voice of Fodor in my mind.)
This book is written by self-proclaimed atheists who ask for revisions in the theories that explain the fact of evolution, although it's so full of clumsy inferences (from biological data) and bad arguments that it's a treasure house for creationists. It is sad that it hasn't got much to offer on real science/philosophy to compensate for that toxic by-product. Samir Okasha has made the ultimate one-sentence definition: "What Darwin Got Wrong makes for entertaining and engaging reading, but is the sort of thing that gives philosophy of science a bad name.”
Part II: The Philosopher's Stone – "Natural selection could have just as well selected hearts for the sounds they make! I mean, not really; of course the hearts are there to pump blood, but your theory of natural selection cannot specify that! Because to distinguish between the real function and the free-riders, it should be able to use counterfactuals ("what if there was pumping without sound / sound without pumping?") and this requires a mind, and natural selection doesn't have a mind! But scientists have... Sooo, the theory of natural selection can make use of counterfactuals and generate accurate explanations... And the process of natural selection doesn't need to pin down free-riders; they only concern it if they are beneficial or harmful; then they're more than free-riders and selected-for or -against accordingly... Okay, nevermind. I thought I was on to something..." The second part where Fodor realizes his mistake was added by me. I wish it needn't be. (And the reason I engage with only Fodor here is that I don't know the other author; I read the whole book with the voice of Fodor in my mind.)
This book is written by self-proclaimed atheists who ask for revisions in the theories that explain the fact of evolution, although it's so full of clumsy inferences (from biological data) and bad arguments that it's a treasure house for creationists. It is sad that it hasn't got much to offer on real science/philosophy to compensate for that toxic by-product. Samir Okasha has made the ultimate one-sentence definition: "What Darwin Got Wrong makes for entertaining and engaging reading, but is the sort of thing that gives philosophy of science a bad name.”
July 31, 2011
I read this through once and then a lot of it a second time. I really struggled to make head or tail of their arguments, and why they thought they had such a killer critique of the theory of natural selection.
For full review please see: Smear campaign.
For full review please see: Smear campaign.
June 13, 2013
This doesn't merit a proper review; there's no substance here. More than just building on Gould's toxic legacy, Fodor and Piattelli have out-Discovery Instituted the Discovery Institute.
No wonder Midgley liked it.
No wonder Midgley liked it.
March 12, 2019
Eye opener. The authors knew they were going full controversial, but were confident to be right. Be sure, it seems to me most of the controversy around the book is linked to a bad effect of antonomasia - just like if you try to criticize the European Union, people may get mad mostly because they equate EU with Europe. In this case, people got and get mad because they equate tout cur evolutionism with (neo-)Darwinism. Well, this book is not against evolution. Evolution is a fact - and it was unquestionably the biggest conceptual innovation of the 19th century because it removed Aristotelian fixed hierarchies from nature. What this book purports to prove is instead that the claim that (all) evolution can be explained by the theory originally proposed by Charles Darwin (and Wallace, always forgotten (perhaps because not British?)) as more recently (saved and) expanded with the inclusion of genetics (the so-called modern synthesis, aka neo-Darwinism) is false, empty. In fact Fodor and Piattelli-Palmerini claim that there is no theory of evolution, and probably there cannot be, and anyway natural selection and adaptationism can at most justify only a part of it instead of being the main mechanism behind evolution.
How they proceed along this if anything intellectually very stimulating path is actually rather simple after all, and in spite of being already rather short the book could have been even shorter (they could have made a synthesis of the arguments upfront), what makes it look like long is the writing style. They start with stating what they consider the essence of neo-Darwinism - and here, it is understood that they risk the straw man fallacy, because people that do not agree on this definition may have arguments to contest since the beginning. They claim that neo-Darwinism explains evolution by envisioning a source of random mutations in the genotypes whose corresponding phenotypes are then filtered by natural selection. According to Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini this statement, for want of sounding quite right upfront, and in spite of having been repeated ad nauseam for ages, is false and actually empty. The reason is essentially two-fold. The first is that such theory assumes that all changes to the phenotypes are exogenous, whereas this is demonstrably false or at least do not cover all evidence. So the first part of the book describes endogenous constraints on the expression of genotypes into phenotypes, which are getting clearer in time: epigenetics, horizontal movement of transposable elements (transposons), the hierarchical level of structure that control the biological development (so called evo-devo, according to which nothing in evolution makes sense unless in the light of developmental biology), and the even more fundamental physics of complex systems, according to which many structures just cannot be different from what they are because that's how matter does according to existing laws. This latter trend recovers observations from D'Arcy Thompson and Stuart Kauffman in particular. This part is also illustrated with the analogy with Skinnerian behaviorism, which breaks down in an important aspect that constitutes the second part of the argument of the book: natural selection is a void filter because it lacks intentionality, therefore the (Darwin's own) analogy with artificial selection is a misconception. To distinguish among traits that supposedly affect positively the fitness of a phenotype from free-riders requires intention, basically a mind. The reason is that to distinguish the two one needs counterfactuals (Mill's method of differences), but unfortunately counterfactuals cannot exert evolutionary pressure without some mind/intention enforcing it (whereas in a theory of behavior minds are in place, and mental representations were vindicated after the death of Skinnerism). As a matter of fact, once you realize this you start to see (plenty of examples in the book, particularly in the Appendix) that virtually all supposedly Darwinian accounts of evolution are post hoc and based on counterfactuals - this makes the book an eye opener in the first place. They claim that the inference from "X is F and was selected" to "X was selected for F" is illicit in natural selection because it requires an intention that is absent in an explicitly naturalistic theory. The beloved perfect fit to ecological niches turns out to suffer from the same problem, because on one hand adaptation and niche are defined circularly, and on the other is a truism because not finding a niche means death (unless one finds his niche, which the right place to get a living from, (s)he dies). (Lynn Margulis also pointed out - not in the book - that the simple fact that you are living means you are fit; besides, the intervention of minds is per se a huge challenge to the theory, for instance I can decide not to reproduce even after killing everyone else).
So what is left? Well, natural history, as indeed most supposedly evolutionary accounts already are - descriptions of causal chains with eventually some plausible narrative on top. In fact, the book claims that it is really hard to do much more than that, and certainly Darwin could not do it and certainly not in a way that covers all cases.
As I said, the writing style is not the smoothest you'll find (that's big part of the reason I finished reading the book only at the third attempt), and admittedly part of the immediacy of the book is lost in philosophical arguments, some rather technical, that are not palatable to all. However the attitude is still rather colloquial and witty (especially in the notes), which partly compensates for that. The authors own the cited bibliography, and do not particularly restraint from criticizing uber-Darwinians like Pinker, Dennett and of course Dawkins (selfish gene, blind watchmaker... talking about intentionality), which per se is a decent source of entertainment.
A few side notes:
The fact that criticizing (neo-)Darwinism is considered heresy speaks of the current existence of dogmas in science.
Popper's falsificationism as solution to the problem of inference owes a lot to Darwinian thought (though Popper himself stated that Darwinism cannot be tested), and the heuristic validity of his theory remains intact even if Darwinism were discredited, as this book aims to do.
To cite more philosophy of science, the authors claim that, simply and humbly, what we are left with after dismissing adaptationism tout cur is a "whatever works" scenario (a la Feyerabend): there are many and multiple ways in which phenotypes can and do change and are transmitted across generations, and the complexity of their mutual interference and the co-evolution with the surrounding ecologies and environment makes it just too hard if possible at all to explain (which means to pre-dict instead of only post-dict) the evolution of the existent with a single theory (just like a theory of human society is practically a non sequitur). Contingency is vindicated. And this is still consistent with mechanicism, to which the authors fully abide as well as to atheism.
The authors do not veer into politics, however they ask themselves why neo-Darwinism was not abandoned just like behaviorism was (it had the same structure and faults, in their opinion). Here I cannot help but think (admittedly influenced by Enzo Pennetta's books) that the reason is that without even the semblance of an all-encompassing naturalistic theory of evolution the scientific priesthood would feel empty and ungrounded, and could not defend its status against the previous, religious priesthood - in fact, the authors admit to have been advised to avoid the controversy also for this reason, not to give such strong arguments to the "enemy" and instead keep continuing lull ourselves with a posteriori but ultimately arbitrary though plausible at best explanations of historical events.
How they proceed along this if anything intellectually very stimulating path is actually rather simple after all, and in spite of being already rather short the book could have been even shorter (they could have made a synthesis of the arguments upfront), what makes it look like long is the writing style. They start with stating what they consider the essence of neo-Darwinism - and here, it is understood that they risk the straw man fallacy, because people that do not agree on this definition may have arguments to contest since the beginning. They claim that neo-Darwinism explains evolution by envisioning a source of random mutations in the genotypes whose corresponding phenotypes are then filtered by natural selection. According to Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini this statement, for want of sounding quite right upfront, and in spite of having been repeated ad nauseam for ages, is false and actually empty. The reason is essentially two-fold. The first is that such theory assumes that all changes to the phenotypes are exogenous, whereas this is demonstrably false or at least do not cover all evidence. So the first part of the book describes endogenous constraints on the expression of genotypes into phenotypes, which are getting clearer in time: epigenetics, horizontal movement of transposable elements (transposons), the hierarchical level of structure that control the biological development (so called evo-devo, according to which nothing in evolution makes sense unless in the light of developmental biology), and the even more fundamental physics of complex systems, according to which many structures just cannot be different from what they are because that's how matter does according to existing laws. This latter trend recovers observations from D'Arcy Thompson and Stuart Kauffman in particular. This part is also illustrated with the analogy with Skinnerian behaviorism, which breaks down in an important aspect that constitutes the second part of the argument of the book: natural selection is a void filter because it lacks intentionality, therefore the (Darwin's own) analogy with artificial selection is a misconception. To distinguish among traits that supposedly affect positively the fitness of a phenotype from free-riders requires intention, basically a mind. The reason is that to distinguish the two one needs counterfactuals (Mill's method of differences), but unfortunately counterfactuals cannot exert evolutionary pressure without some mind/intention enforcing it (whereas in a theory of behavior minds are in place, and mental representations were vindicated after the death of Skinnerism). As a matter of fact, once you realize this you start to see (plenty of examples in the book, particularly in the Appendix) that virtually all supposedly Darwinian accounts of evolution are post hoc and based on counterfactuals - this makes the book an eye opener in the first place. They claim that the inference from "X is F and was selected" to "X was selected for F" is illicit in natural selection because it requires an intention that is absent in an explicitly naturalistic theory. The beloved perfect fit to ecological niches turns out to suffer from the same problem, because on one hand adaptation and niche are defined circularly, and on the other is a truism because not finding a niche means death (unless one finds his niche, which the right place to get a living from, (s)he dies). (Lynn Margulis also pointed out - not in the book - that the simple fact that you are living means you are fit; besides, the intervention of minds is per se a huge challenge to the theory, for instance I can decide not to reproduce even after killing everyone else).
So what is left? Well, natural history, as indeed most supposedly evolutionary accounts already are - descriptions of causal chains with eventually some plausible narrative on top. In fact, the book claims that it is really hard to do much more than that, and certainly Darwin could not do it and certainly not in a way that covers all cases.
As I said, the writing style is not the smoothest you'll find (that's big part of the reason I finished reading the book only at the third attempt), and admittedly part of the immediacy of the book is lost in philosophical arguments, some rather technical, that are not palatable to all. However the attitude is still rather colloquial and witty (especially in the notes), which partly compensates for that. The authors own the cited bibliography, and do not particularly restraint from criticizing uber-Darwinians like Pinker, Dennett and of course Dawkins (selfish gene, blind watchmaker... talking about intentionality), which per se is a decent source of entertainment.
A few side notes:
The fact that criticizing (neo-)Darwinism is considered heresy speaks of the current existence of dogmas in science.
Popper's falsificationism as solution to the problem of inference owes a lot to Darwinian thought (though Popper himself stated that Darwinism cannot be tested), and the heuristic validity of his theory remains intact even if Darwinism were discredited, as this book aims to do.
To cite more philosophy of science, the authors claim that, simply and humbly, what we are left with after dismissing adaptationism tout cur is a "whatever works" scenario (a la Feyerabend): there are many and multiple ways in which phenotypes can and do change and are transmitted across generations, and the complexity of their mutual interference and the co-evolution with the surrounding ecologies and environment makes it just too hard if possible at all to explain (which means to pre-dict instead of only post-dict) the evolution of the existent with a single theory (just like a theory of human society is practically a non sequitur). Contingency is vindicated. And this is still consistent with mechanicism, to which the authors fully abide as well as to atheism.
The authors do not veer into politics, however they ask themselves why neo-Darwinism was not abandoned just like behaviorism was (it had the same structure and faults, in their opinion). Here I cannot help but think (admittedly influenced by Enzo Pennetta's books) that the reason is that without even the semblance of an all-encompassing naturalistic theory of evolution the scientific priesthood would feel empty and ungrounded, and could not defend its status against the previous, religious priesthood - in fact, the authors admit to have been advised to avoid the controversy also for this reason, not to give such strong arguments to the "enemy" and instead keep continuing lull ourselves with a posteriori but ultimately arbitrary though plausible at best explanations of historical events.
June 24, 2010
I'm of the a priori opinion that I liked this book; however, post hoc I'm nonplussed. As it's a serious book calling on the carpet a serious (or at least pervasive) scientific theory, I expected it to be a serious scientific critique. However, it's actually a philosophical critique -- Fodor's influence has a choke-hold on the argumentation style -- which at a minimum means you better be fluent in Latin polemic ("in medias res", "ipso facto", "a fortiori", "tout court", "inter alia", "mutatis mutandis"). By the end, I'm only certain that they're both atheists (which I already knew, and one could anyway glean explicitly before page 1), and they think that Darwin left a deus in the machina. Much of their sophistry was opaque to me, and frankly, their affected cocktail party tone (contractions-like-they're-chatting are ubiquitous, as are would-be witticisms like, "that would be a joke if it were funny") was prosaically patronizing.
If I didn't know better, I would think this was mainly a philosopher talking way out of school. But I do know better, and buried in here somewhere are cogent perspectives that natural selection, as it's presented by Darwin (and his defenders), is teleological, and there are any number of other factors (e.g., epigenetics, self-organization, non-genomic nativism) that are much more consequential to evolutionary processes. I just wish they'd come out and said it.
If I didn't know better, I would think this was mainly a philosopher talking way out of school. But I do know better, and buried in here somewhere are cogent perspectives that natural selection, as it's presented by Darwin (and his defenders), is teleological, and there are any number of other factors (e.g., epigenetics, self-organization, non-genomic nativism) that are much more consequential to evolutionary processes. I just wish they'd come out and said it.
December 30, 2021
Un triste esempio di divulgazione autoreferenziale (un ossimoro) e in ultima analisi, di esposizione irritante. La divulgazione scientifica, anche di alto livello, dovrebbe tenere presenti i cardini di una fruibilita' comune che qui mancano clamorosamente. Diventa arduo quindi anche passare dalla forma al contenuto, al nucleo della tesi proposta dagli autori: la selezione naturale non sarebbe il motore principe dell'evoluzione e non sarebbe nemmeno una teoria vera e' propria non essendo in grado di spiegare in maniera soddisfacente il passaggio ai miliardi di fenotipi presenti (e passati) a partire dai genotipi. L'adattamento (fitness) darwiniano all'ecosistema sarebbe quindi uno dei vari fattori e tra l'altro dei meno importanti, lasciando spazio invece a vincoli endogeni di natura genetica, fisica e chimica che sarebbero in grado di indirizzare o quantomeno ridurre le possibili vie ai fenotipi.
May 24, 2011
This book is recommended for two types of people. Those of philosophical inclination that wants to understand the problems in darwinism posed by modern biology (part I), and those with current biology understanding and that, given the high number of alternative non-gene hereditary mechanisms that we know of, are skeptical of the Dawkins vision of pure random probability as an engine and do not want to give in to intelligent design or guided evolution solutions.
If you're in the first group, you should be satisfied, but if you're in the second group, all you'll get is a jargon-rich tautological discourse that claims the absurdity of random evolution anchoring itself on a criticism of behaviorism.
The only value of this book is in the compilation of recent discoveries in genetics. Not worth it, if you're already a researcher yourself.
If you're in the first group, you should be satisfied, but if you're in the second group, all you'll get is a jargon-rich tautological discourse that claims the absurdity of random evolution anchoring itself on a criticism of behaviorism.
The only value of this book is in the compilation of recent discoveries in genetics. Not worth it, if you're already a researcher yourself.
February 23, 2010
If you believe that natural selection is the mechanism of evolution, you also necessarily believe in some kind of God (which you shouldn't...it's lazy metaphysics). Lucky for us naturalists, as this book makes abundantly clear, evolution doesn't work that way.
March 9, 2020
In my opinion, Fodor risked his prestige as philosopher and cognitive scientist by writing this book. There are so many misunderstandings of basic conceptual issues in evolutionary biology that arguments cannot be taken seriously. Only for Fodor fans.
November 23, 2013
A short, helpful overview of the book's philosophical aims
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2013/08/...
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2013/08/...
January 23, 2018
I never paid much attention to the details of Darwinian theory before I read this book. I assumed, as many do, that the basic ideas are sound. The offspring of any animal vary in traits (blue vs brown eyes, large vs small wings, high vs low intelligence, etc.). Some of those offspring live to reproduce, some don’t.
Not all diversity is good for survival. Brown polar bears would have a harder time avoiding wolves than white ones. Over time and generations, the bears adapted for survival continue in the gene pool, while the nonadaptive ones die out.
Fodor, a philosopher, and Piatelli-Palmarini, a geneticist turned cognitive scientist, argue that Darwin’s idea cannot be correct. After plodding through their dense arguments, I came away with a shocking conclusion: they’re right. The theory of evolution by natural selection cannot be correct. The authors don’t offer an alternative theory, so they have left me with a profound puzzle I did not have before. I love books like that.
Evolution is a scientific theory of mindless process, lacking intention, purpose or direction, like wind rustling leaves for no reason at all. If you’re not already on board with that understanding, this is not a book for you. By arguing that Darwin was wrong, the authors do not say that Intelligent Design, Creationism, or any other such supernatural explanations are right.
The seductive error we commonly make about evolution derives from the success of artificial selection. Humans have been breeding everything from roses to cattle since before Mendel’s peas. When you consider that all varieties of dogs have been bred from wolves, you have to respect the power of artificial selection. It works.
But artificial selection is not a proper model for natural selection because in the natural (non-human) world, nobody is doing the selecting. There is no literal “Mother Nature.” The problem is that we have no natural laws to explain natural selection.
Our intuition (my intuition) is very strong that wolves would have caught and eaten any brown bears quickly, leaving only the white ones to reproduce, thus “selecting” for white fur. But intuition is not a fact. How can fur color in a bear be “selected” by the visual system in a wolf? The scientific fact is that we do not know exactly how natural selection works. I fought it, but I was forced to bow to that logic.
I come away from this book with shaken confidence in the idea of natural selection. Evolution of the species is a reasonable, demonstrable fact, and there’s no problem with the theory of evolution in general. We just don’t know how it works. Natural selection cannot be the answer.
In their explanations, the authors engage in the same promiscuous point-of-view shifting that led to Darwin’s error. Just by using the word, “selection,” they automatically smuggle intentionality and purpose into the discussion because that’s what the word connotes. There is no such thing as selection without intention (except metaphorically). Nearly all the authors’ arguments are flawed by that error.
Still, their basic thrust seems correct, and while they offer no alternatives, I’d rather have no answer than a wrong one.
Not all diversity is good for survival. Brown polar bears would have a harder time avoiding wolves than white ones. Over time and generations, the bears adapted for survival continue in the gene pool, while the nonadaptive ones die out.
Fodor, a philosopher, and Piatelli-Palmarini, a geneticist turned cognitive scientist, argue that Darwin’s idea cannot be correct. After plodding through their dense arguments, I came away with a shocking conclusion: they’re right. The theory of evolution by natural selection cannot be correct. The authors don’t offer an alternative theory, so they have left me with a profound puzzle I did not have before. I love books like that.
Evolution is a scientific theory of mindless process, lacking intention, purpose or direction, like wind rustling leaves for no reason at all. If you’re not already on board with that understanding, this is not a book for you. By arguing that Darwin was wrong, the authors do not say that Intelligent Design, Creationism, or any other such supernatural explanations are right.
The seductive error we commonly make about evolution derives from the success of artificial selection. Humans have been breeding everything from roses to cattle since before Mendel’s peas. When you consider that all varieties of dogs have been bred from wolves, you have to respect the power of artificial selection. It works.
But artificial selection is not a proper model for natural selection because in the natural (non-human) world, nobody is doing the selecting. There is no literal “Mother Nature.” The problem is that we have no natural laws to explain natural selection.
Our intuition (my intuition) is very strong that wolves would have caught and eaten any brown bears quickly, leaving only the white ones to reproduce, thus “selecting” for white fur. But intuition is not a fact. How can fur color in a bear be “selected” by the visual system in a wolf? The scientific fact is that we do not know exactly how natural selection works. I fought it, but I was forced to bow to that logic.
I come away from this book with shaken confidence in the idea of natural selection. Evolution of the species is a reasonable, demonstrable fact, and there’s no problem with the theory of evolution in general. We just don’t know how it works. Natural selection cannot be the answer.
In their explanations, the authors engage in the same promiscuous point-of-view shifting that led to Darwin’s error. Just by using the word, “selection,” they automatically smuggle intentionality and purpose into the discussion because that’s what the word connotes. There is no such thing as selection without intention (except metaphorically). Nearly all the authors’ arguments are flawed by that error.
Still, their basic thrust seems correct, and while they offer no alternatives, I’d rather have no answer than a wrong one.
September 26, 2020
Sembra quasi che Fodor e Piattelli Palmarini vogliano dirci: guarda quanto siamo intelligenti che riusciamo a confutare il Darwinismo, e in effetti il loro è un tentativo ben costruito di erigere una critica argomentata contro qualcosa che con Darwin ha molto a che fare, ma che poi a ben guardare Darwinismo non è. Come Piattelli Palmarini ricorda nell'appendice all'edizione italiana il titolo è strumentale, l’obiettivo reale dei due autori è la Sintesi moderna o Neodarwinismo, in tal senso non sono autorizzato a dire se il loro castello di carte regga o meno all'urto dei loro antagonisti. Certo è che da conoscitore non-professionista della materia ho l’impressione che se riportati a Darwin commettano lo stesso errore di uno dei loro avversari più noti - senza peraltro avere le stesse capacità divulgative. Parlo di Richard Dawkins. Tutti e tre infatti muovono dall'egocentrico tentativo di voler dimostrare qualcosa e perdono di vista la grandezza di Darwin e di altri etologi, evoluzionisti e paleontologi (sì mi riferisco a S.J. Gould) che sono seguiti: persone che raccoglievano e catalogavano dalla natura quantità esorbitanti di dati e solo allora, quando avevano un affresco grandioso nella mente, provavano a dire una cosa – una sola, minima, che però come nel caso di Darwin riusciva a essere sconvolgente e influente... Ecco, a mio avviso se Fodor e Piattelli Palmarini volevano sentirsi dire di essere intelligenti, beh ci sono riusciti, se volevano contribuire alla dialettica scientifica, in un certo senso forse sono riusciti anche in quello anche se nel libro si scorgono dei voluti fraintendimenti che forse sono un po’ troppo strumentali. Se infine volevano realmente portare delle critiche a Darwin e al suo contributo all'evoluzionismo, mi spiace ma hanno fallito miseramente... P.S. Per una critica puntuale e argomentata su ogni punto rimando su Anobii a quanto scritto da Pempi di cui condivido piuttosto ampiamente il punto di vista.
September 27, 2020
Sembra quasi che Fodor e Piattelli Palmarini vogliano dirci: guarda quanto siamo intelligenti che riusciamo a confutare il Darwinismo, e in effetti il loro è un tentativo ben costruito di erigere una critica argomentata contro qualcosa che con Darwin ha molto a che fare, ma che poi a ben guardare Darwinismo non è. Come Piattelli Palmarini ricorda nell'appendice all'edizione italiana il titolo è strumentale, l’obiettivo reale dei due autori è la Sintesi moderna o Neodarwinismo, in tal senso non sono autorizzato a dire se il loro castello di carte regga o meno all'urto dei loro antagonisti. Certo è che da conoscitore non-professionista della materia ho l’impressione che se riportati a Darwin commettano lo stesso errore di uno dei loro avversari più noti - senza peraltro avere le stesse capacità divulgative. Parlo di Richard Dawkins. Tutti e tre infatti muovono dall'egocentrico tentativo di voler dimostrare qualcosa e perdono di vista la grandezza di Darwin e di altri etologi, evoluzionisti e paleontologi (sì mi riferisco a S.J. Gould) che sono seguiti: persone che raccoglievano e catalogavano dalla natura quantità esorbitanti di dati e solo allora, quando avevano un affresco grandioso nella mente, provavano a dire una cosa – una sola, minima, che però come nel caso di Darwin riusciva a essere sconvolgente e influente... Ecco, a mio avviso se Fodor e Piattelli Palmarini volevano sentirsi dire di essere intelligenti, beh ci sono riusciti, se volevano contribuire alla dialettica scientifica, in un certo senso forse sono riusciti anche in quello anche se nel libro si scorgono dei voluti fraintendimenti che forse sono un po’ troppo strumentali. Se infine volevano realmente portare delle critiche a Darwin e al suo contributo all'evoluzionismo, mi spiace ma hanno fallito miseramente... P.S. Per una critica puntuale e argomentata su ogni punto rimando su Anobii a quanto scritto da Pempi di cui condivido piuttosto ampiamente il punto di vista.
October 8, 2024
Fodor's core argument is much shorter than I expected, and can be roughly summarized into two brief arguments:
1. There is a considerable distance between the extension and connotation of things, which makes it impossible for us to judge the connotation through extension.
2. The theory of cotenability is correct and quite strong in conditional sentences outside of the nomic, which makes it difficult for us to distinguish the causality between the antecedent and consequent(counterfactual dependence) through counterfactual evidence; Due to the fact that cotenability requires counterfactual truth, we cannot determine if cotenable counterfactual dependence have causality
Based on these two core views, Fodor not only opposes evolution theory, but also opposes all inductive theories that attempt to give natural law commitments - we should self-restraint, provide historical explanations, and not be swayed by the ghosts of universal laws. But this viewpoint is a bit too strong, and the difference between historical causal explanations and rule-based causal explanations may not be as significant as Fodor suggests
1. There is a considerable distance between the extension and connotation of things, which makes it impossible for us to judge the connotation through extension.
2. The theory of cotenability is correct and quite strong in conditional sentences outside of the nomic, which makes it difficult for us to distinguish the causality between the antecedent and consequent(counterfactual dependence) through counterfactual evidence; Due to the fact that cotenability requires counterfactual truth, we cannot determine if cotenable counterfactual dependence have causality
Based on these two core views, Fodor not only opposes evolution theory, but also opposes all inductive theories that attempt to give natural law commitments - we should self-restraint, provide historical explanations, and not be swayed by the ghosts of universal laws. But this viewpoint is a bit too strong, and the difference between historical causal explanations and rule-based causal explanations may not be as significant as Fodor suggests
December 2, 2018
If I have a complaint about the book it's that at times the writing is overly complex. That being said I think it's a superb polemic on the science and theory of adaptation and natural selection. It made me assess my own assumptions and I had to confess to many of the errors they were pointing out.. While I was reading it I looked up critics of the book and their ideas on various media. Every single one of them either directly misrepresented the idea they attacked or simply ignored the salient section of the book and addressed issues not relevant to the topic. When I see this type of politics in scientific debate I admit to smelling an ego based cognitive bias.
I don't think the idea the book represents should worry anyone who has not devoted their lives to a theory that seems to be untenable. It opens the door to a more pragmatic way of thinking about evolution. There seems to be a lot of folk who would rather be 'Right'.
I don't think the idea the book represents should worry anyone who has not devoted their lives to a theory that seems to be untenable. It opens the door to a more pragmatic way of thinking about evolution. There seems to be a lot of folk who would rather be 'Right'.
June 13, 2019
My rating is probably not the most accurate, as a lot of this book was over my head. The work presupposes a lot of knowledge about evolution, genetics, and psychology. It is not totally obtuse to the average reader, but it is not a relaxing read either.
What the authors do is compare the development of Skinnerian behaviorism with Darwin's theory of natural selection. Both rely pretty much exclusively on outside stimuli for development. Skinner's theory about the strength of outside stimuli has since been called into question, and the authors argue Darwin falls for exactly the same reason. The authors argue Darwin falls because so much development is actually influenced by internal developments, i.e., genetics. This where things get complicated as the authors argue that much of this internal development is not controlled at all by external stimuli.
What the authors do is compare the development of Skinnerian behaviorism with Darwin's theory of natural selection. Both rely pretty much exclusively on outside stimuli for development. Skinner's theory about the strength of outside stimuli has since been called into question, and the authors argue Darwin falls for exactly the same reason. The authors argue Darwin falls because so much development is actually influenced by internal developments, i.e., genetics. This where things get complicated as the authors argue that much of this internal development is not controlled at all by external stimuli.
August 1, 2017
Troppo tecnico?
E' un libro eccessivamente tecnico, non per i contenuti, ma per il fatto che si traggano conclusioni sull'evoluzione utilizzando come base del linguaggio la filosofia per parlare di concetti tecnici (servirebbero una decina di testi per capire a che teorie gli autori vanno a riferirsi con "free rider" eccetera, per chi non è addetto ai lavori). Mi lascia parecchio perplesso il capitolo conclusivo, in cui si cerca di definire attraverso la pura logica filosofica, la realtà tangibile di cosa sia l'evoluzione e di come essa funzioni. E, per altro, gli autori bollano come imperfetta la teoria di Darwin, ma si limitano a far presente che non è chiaro quale sia il modello reale.
E' un libro eccessivamente tecnico, non per i contenuti, ma per il fatto che si traggano conclusioni sull'evoluzione utilizzando come base del linguaggio la filosofia per parlare di concetti tecnici (servirebbero una decina di testi per capire a che teorie gli autori vanno a riferirsi con "free rider" eccetera, per chi non è addetto ai lavori). Mi lascia parecchio perplesso il capitolo conclusivo, in cui si cerca di definire attraverso la pura logica filosofica, la realtà tangibile di cosa sia l'evoluzione e di come essa funzioni. E, per altro, gli autori bollano come imperfetta la teoria di Darwin, ma si limitano a far presente che non è chiaro quale sia il modello reale.
February 20, 2025
This is not, in my opinion, for the casual reader. There is lots of science and logic, a plethora of big words, and arguments that are difficult to understand. In fact I'm not sure I understood one of the main arguments the author's presented which seems to be some sort logic based on counterfactuals, whatever that is.
Perhaps someone more knowledgeable about genetics and logic will find some benefit here. I did not.
Perhaps someone more knowledgeable about genetics and logic will find some benefit here. I did not.
March 18, 2018
Controversial book. I read the book when it initially came out and I was very hostile, but as time goes on I'm warming up to the idea that our conception of Natural Selection as a mechanism needs to be replaced.
January 2, 2024
Watch out for confirmation bias.
October 28, 2018
"What Darwin got Wrong" is a two part book (or three part counting the first chapter). I suspect the two authors wrote the first chapter together after working on the other parts separately. It's really confusing and hard to summarize, and leaves a feeling that either they or you somehow missed the core arguments, and you're left with the parts trying to justify it. Perhaps putting chapter 6 first would have made it clearer.
The book is making the claim that natural selection happens, but isn't the main driving force of evolution, which in turn means the theory of natural selection is wrong. I didn't find this convincing at all. When the environment is getting cold, species which handles cold better will thrive. The rest will die out or have to move. Punctuated equilibrium and control gene mutation explains how this can happen "quickly", leaving few historical traces of crossover periods. I don't have to know exactly how this happens. It's just the best explanation we have.
The argument which traits are "selected for" (the phenotype) and which are "free riders" is a central one. Obviously polar bears were not "selected for" intrinsic properties of the color white, but for matching their environment, and hearts did not evolve for making noises, but for pumping blood. Still, the authors are trying to make a distinctions using these silly examples. The argument seems to be about rigor: When we tell which trait is being "selected for", what methodology other than common sense (keep in mind common sense very often leads us astray) are we using? This is not a terrible point in itself, but it is one that should be filed under the topic philosophy of science or skepticism. Additionally, what else would we be using? Scientific theories have never been bullet proof. They're provisional models of explaining the world until further evidence completes the picture and they have to be refined or scrapped completely. We can't possibly hold them to the kind of rigor this book suggests.
Fodor defended his position (made in this book and "Why Pigs Don't Have Wings") as ontological, not an epistemic. This is a problem, since the book builds on epistemic premises that you have to buy into, and which are never explained. It seems to be something like metaphysical realism and/or discrediting non-deductive reasoning as a valid form of reasoning. Either way, this should have been made explicit and also be the theme of the book, for it to make sense. Now it just doesn't. It's nonsense and a waste of time.
If you want to understand the book, Read chapter 6. That's the meat of it. The rest is just justification. If you don't have the book, but are curious, read the comments to Fodors "Why Pigs Don't Have Wings": http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n20/jerry-fo... or read the other reviews here.
The book is making the claim that natural selection happens, but isn't the main driving force of evolution, which in turn means the theory of natural selection is wrong. I didn't find this convincing at all. When the environment is getting cold, species which handles cold better will thrive. The rest will die out or have to move. Punctuated equilibrium and control gene mutation explains how this can happen "quickly", leaving few historical traces of crossover periods. I don't have to know exactly how this happens. It's just the best explanation we have.
The argument which traits are "selected for" (the phenotype) and which are "free riders" is a central one. Obviously polar bears were not "selected for" intrinsic properties of the color white, but for matching their environment, and hearts did not evolve for making noises, but for pumping blood. Still, the authors are trying to make a distinctions using these silly examples. The argument seems to be about rigor: When we tell which trait is being "selected for", what methodology other than common sense (keep in mind common sense very often leads us astray) are we using? This is not a terrible point in itself, but it is one that should be filed under the topic philosophy of science or skepticism. Additionally, what else would we be using? Scientific theories have never been bullet proof. They're provisional models of explaining the world until further evidence completes the picture and they have to be refined or scrapped completely. We can't possibly hold them to the kind of rigor this book suggests.
Fodor defended his position (made in this book and "Why Pigs Don't Have Wings") as ontological, not an epistemic. This is a problem, since the book builds on epistemic premises that you have to buy into, and which are never explained. It seems to be something like metaphysical realism and/or discrediting non-deductive reasoning as a valid form of reasoning. Either way, this should have been made explicit and also be the theme of the book, for it to make sense. Now it just doesn't. It's nonsense and a waste of time.
If you want to understand the book, Read chapter 6. That's the meat of it. The rest is just justification. If you don't have the book, but are curious, read the comments to Fodors "Why Pigs Don't Have Wings": http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n20/jerry-fo... or read the other reviews here.
August 24, 2013
The work makes the case that there are many sources of adaptive traits (not just natural selection) - rather than being free random generators exploring the gargantuan space of all possible life forms (mostly infeasible), species have evolved to search small internally-constrained spaces that include (mostly) good solutions. The argument that pigs can't grow wings is more rhetorical than scientific - whales evolved from small terrestrial animals like pigs, a more incredible evolutionary feat than merely growing wings.
Examples are thinly illustrative of assertions. Often a small modification of the example would refute the assertion but it would require expertise to know if this is valid - a frustration for most readers who are not experts.
Attacking Darwin's notion of gradualism seems anachronistic. Darwin didn't know about microbiology or genetics or evo devo. We do, we can adapt the modern notion of gradualism. A small genetic (or environmental) change can have a surprising phenotypic effect. Contrary to the work, as a naive first step, counting genetic mutations is a feasible measure of gradual change.
Complaints about biology producing complicated laws smelt of physics envy. Why shouldn't there be a law for each species? Arranged in a subsumption hierarchy (e.g. a taxonomy) these Laws of Life would be as simple as the physics laws esteemed by the authors.
I found it difficult to understand the argument of the work against natural selection in detail. Diagrams or examples would have been helpful.
At the end the work summarises the argument as:
Examples are thinly illustrative of assertions. Often a small modification of the example would refute the assertion but it would require expertise to know if this is valid - a frustration for most readers who are not experts.
Attacking Darwin's notion of gradualism seems anachronistic. Darwin didn't know about microbiology or genetics or evo devo. We do, we can adapt the modern notion of gradualism. A small genetic (or environmental) change can have a surprising phenotypic effect. Contrary to the work, as a naive first step, counting genetic mutations is a feasible measure of gradual change.
Complaints about biology producing complicated laws smelt of physics envy. Why shouldn't there be a law for each species? Arranged in a subsumption hierarchy (e.g. a taxonomy) these Laws of Life would be as simple as the physics laws esteemed by the authors.
I found it difficult to understand the argument of the work against natural selection in detail. Diagrams or examples would have been helpful.
At the end the work summarises the argument as:
Natural selection is supposed to explain why species have adaptive traits. But there is a plausible case in which natural selection does not select an adaptive trait because (in certain cases) natural selection cannot distinguish between a directly-correlated-with-fitness trait (causal relation) and a covariant-with-fitness trait (correlation).The work gives parallel examples for artificial selection (tameness/productivity was primarily selected but orthogonal curly tail, floppy ears, piebald colour traits also resulted), and reinforcement learning e.g. stereotypical behaviour of animals.
August 12, 2022
Full review to come.
The authors make a lot of the same points/criticisms and raise a lot of the same questions/issues that Norman Macbeth does in his book "Darwin retried". However, Macbeth's book is superior.
Nevertheless, I recommend reading both books. They complement each other quite well.
It also has something in common with Keith Windschuttle's "The killing of history". Real historians who are good at their craft didn't have a problem with that book by Windschuttle, and many of them probably agree with the main points he makes in it. "What Darwin got wrong" had a similar reception among real scientists whose job is studying how evolution happens and how it functions. In both cases, the most negative reactions came from ideologues - some who also happen to be experts in the correct field (history or evolution, respectively).
The main problems with the book are the writing style and the fact that it's difficult to read.
The authors make a lot of the same points/criticisms and raise a lot of the same questions/issues that Norman Macbeth does in his book "Darwin retried". However, Macbeth's book is superior.
Nevertheless, I recommend reading both books. They complement each other quite well.
It also has something in common with Keith Windschuttle's "The killing of history". Real historians who are good at their craft didn't have a problem with that book by Windschuttle, and many of them probably agree with the main points he makes in it. "What Darwin got wrong" had a similar reception among real scientists whose job is studying how evolution happens and how it functions. In both cases, the most negative reactions came from ideologues - some who also happen to be experts in the correct field (history or evolution, respectively).
The main problems with the book are the writing style and the fact that it's difficult to read.
March 22, 2010
2 star rating is based on my understanding, not the accepted quality of the book. The review I read led me to believe this was more of a lay person's book, but it requires a better understanding of college level biology than I have. It seems to me to be a couple of levels beyond "The Blind Watchmaker", "The Selfish Gene" and the like. It was a slog to finish, but I did enjoy parts of the book where I felt I learned a little biology. I found most of the philosophical discussions uncompelling, many seemed in the "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" vein.
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