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Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security
When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War.
Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente, and now a
comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbachev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end.
He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.
Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente, and now a
comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbachev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end.
He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.
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First published January 1, 1982
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December 29, 2015
While Gaddis's early 80s account (and the revised version of this book published in 2005) is now "the" book on the subject it is not without its problems, especially for a critical reader familiar with the topics under consideration. Gaddis was the official biographer of George Kennan (author of the Long Telegram), handpicked by him for the purpose. That book, George Kennan: An American Life, won a Pulitzer in 2012. That is why Kennan plays such a central role in this book. Gaddis was a close friend and long time admirer of Kennan.
That is the first, and maybe foremost, problem with this work. Gaddis's account of the varied forms containment policy took across each administration from Truman to Nixon, if you read the original 80s version, or Truman to Bush 43 if you read the revised version, is largely sound. For those unfamiliar with the Long Telegram, NSC-68, the New Look, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response, this is a great introduction, as it was when it was first published. Going first sets the terms of the argument, and Gaddis did that. His version of American Cold War history and containment is essentially the accepted view, though not without critics.
Kennan's role is foremost among critics of the Gaddis/Kennan thesis. Kennan was out of policy making for all intents and purposes by the mid 1950s. It was NSC-68 that first established a containment policy for the Cold War, and that was written by Paul Nitze. Kennan loathed the military focus of NSC-68 and all subsequent policy, but he argued from an ivory tower. Reading the long telegram and his Mr. X article does not leave the reader with a clear strategy a government could implement. Further, the Soviet threat in 1948 and in 1950 were quite different. Kennan's argument for political containment ignored the immediate military threat, and while he was critical of the "symmetrical" model of NSC-68, his own pronouncements on Containment largely failed to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests.
Paul Nitze, who was in the policy trenches from WWII to the end of the Cold War had a much more influential role in shaping American containment policy than Kennan, who while his friend, remained his intellectual foil for most of their lives. Gaddis barely makes mention of Nitze even when he notes the importance (in the revised edition) of the Reykjavik summit. One begins their examination of Cold War history, perhaps, with Kennan, but there his story ends. Nitze's continues. The dude abides, seriously. Nitze is the Forrest Gump of the Cold War, he pops up everywhere. He was one of the first into Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and was one of the last Cold War arms negotiators - alpha and omega. Kennan, he wrote a 19 page "telegram."
Further, Kennan was not the sole father of containment, far from it. If anyone could lay credit to the theory, it was probably the Soviets themselves. But as far as American policy goes, Kennan's voice was not the sole one in 1948, and he was a relatively junior figure. While his telegram had impact, it was in a mileau where many of the ideas he expressed were already "in the mix," not least in the impetus behind the Marshall plan.
One of the other major criticisms of Gaddis's work beyond his Kennan-centric focus is his lack of consistent methodology in evaluating the various permutations of containment policy. The only semi-consistent methodology is his constant relation back to Kennan. In his revised edition he takes this to the extreme in his examination of Reagan's policy, which was hardly containment, had little resemblance to Kennan (unlike Kissinger's), and was actually vociferously opposed at the time by Kennan himself. Kennan (post-Cold War) moderated his views on Reagan and Reagan policy, but it was reluctant and more than a little self-serving. At least Nitze was able to admit he might have missed the forest for the trees at Reykjavik. (Incidentally, Ken Adelman's Reagan at Reykjavik is the best account so far on that subject, though Nitze's own accounts are worthwhile).
Gaddis's account makes it sound like the Cold War was full circle. From on high George Kennan descends with his policy of Containment. And the word was good. But then everyone misunderstood and did it wrong, until they didn't, and the Cold War ended. But it was all due to George Kennan's original version of the policy. Sorry, but that's just poppycock. Even Gaddis has to shade this argument some, acknowledging that Reagan's policy was arrived at independently, and uniquely his. Yet he just can't help but go back to Kennan anyway. Its like one of those professors that writes his PhD thesis and then never stops rewriting and teaching it from then on.
This is not the best book on American Cold War policy, but it was one of the first, and is still a good one. As stated at the outset, it remains a good introduction. But it is vital for readers of Gaddis to take it with a grain of salt and dig deeper. Further, his analysis of Vietnam is especially superficial and not without it's own problems. Because this book mixes history with opinion, and that opinion is not always clear as to whether it is Gaddis's or Kennan's, it is best read with a focus on the history.
That is the first, and maybe foremost, problem with this work. Gaddis's account of the varied forms containment policy took across each administration from Truman to Nixon, if you read the original 80s version, or Truman to Bush 43 if you read the revised version, is largely sound. For those unfamiliar with the Long Telegram, NSC-68, the New Look, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response, this is a great introduction, as it was when it was first published. Going first sets the terms of the argument, and Gaddis did that. His version of American Cold War history and containment is essentially the accepted view, though not without critics.
Kennan's role is foremost among critics of the Gaddis/Kennan thesis. Kennan was out of policy making for all intents and purposes by the mid 1950s. It was NSC-68 that first established a containment policy for the Cold War, and that was written by Paul Nitze. Kennan loathed the military focus of NSC-68 and all subsequent policy, but he argued from an ivory tower. Reading the long telegram and his Mr. X article does not leave the reader with a clear strategy a government could implement. Further, the Soviet threat in 1948 and in 1950 were quite different. Kennan's argument for political containment ignored the immediate military threat, and while he was critical of the "symmetrical" model of NSC-68, his own pronouncements on Containment largely failed to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests.
Paul Nitze, who was in the policy trenches from WWII to the end of the Cold War had a much more influential role in shaping American containment policy than Kennan, who while his friend, remained his intellectual foil for most of their lives. Gaddis barely makes mention of Nitze even when he notes the importance (in the revised edition) of the Reykjavik summit. One begins their examination of Cold War history, perhaps, with Kennan, but there his story ends. Nitze's continues. The dude abides, seriously. Nitze is the Forrest Gump of the Cold War, he pops up everywhere. He was one of the first into Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and was one of the last Cold War arms negotiators - alpha and omega. Kennan, he wrote a 19 page "telegram."
Further, Kennan was not the sole father of containment, far from it. If anyone could lay credit to the theory, it was probably the Soviets themselves. But as far as American policy goes, Kennan's voice was not the sole one in 1948, and he was a relatively junior figure. While his telegram had impact, it was in a mileau where many of the ideas he expressed were already "in the mix," not least in the impetus behind the Marshall plan.
One of the other major criticisms of Gaddis's work beyond his Kennan-centric focus is his lack of consistent methodology in evaluating the various permutations of containment policy. The only semi-consistent methodology is his constant relation back to Kennan. In his revised edition he takes this to the extreme in his examination of Reagan's policy, which was hardly containment, had little resemblance to Kennan (unlike Kissinger's), and was actually vociferously opposed at the time by Kennan himself. Kennan (post-Cold War) moderated his views on Reagan and Reagan policy, but it was reluctant and more than a little self-serving. At least Nitze was able to admit he might have missed the forest for the trees at Reykjavik. (Incidentally, Ken Adelman's Reagan at Reykjavik is the best account so far on that subject, though Nitze's own accounts are worthwhile).
Gaddis's account makes it sound like the Cold War was full circle. From on high George Kennan descends with his policy of Containment. And the word was good. But then everyone misunderstood and did it wrong, until they didn't, and the Cold War ended. But it was all due to George Kennan's original version of the policy. Sorry, but that's just poppycock. Even Gaddis has to shade this argument some, acknowledging that Reagan's policy was arrived at independently, and uniquely his. Yet he just can't help but go back to Kennan anyway. Its like one of those professors that writes his PhD thesis and then never stops rewriting and teaching it from then on.
This is not the best book on American Cold War policy, but it was one of the first, and is still a good one. As stated at the outset, it remains a good introduction. But it is vital for readers of Gaddis to take it with a grain of salt and dig deeper. Further, his analysis of Vietnam is especially superficial and not without it's own problems. Because this book mixes history with opinion, and that opinion is not always clear as to whether it is Gaddis's or Kennan's, it is best read with a focus on the history.
July 24, 2025
It was 1999. I was knee-deep in a Cold War project—buried under maps, acronyms, and the strange thrill of bipolar paranoia—when I fell upon Strategies of Containment in the resounding halls of the National Library. That moment altered my understanding of U.S. foreign policy incessantly.
John Lewis Gaddis doesn’t just chronicle American strategic thinking during the Cold War—he dissects it with the precision of a historian and the insight of a political philosopher. From George Kennan’s early articulation of containment to the more aggressive rollback ideas of NSC-68, from Eisenhower’s “New Look” to Nixon’s détente and Reagan’s “roll-the-dice” brinkmanship, Gaddis traces a dynamic yet deeply fraught evolution of American statecraft. What struck me as a student—and still remains—is how Gaddis balances empathy and critique. He doesn’t villainize; he contextualizes. Every administration’s approach is measured on its own terms: ideological vision, geopolitical restraints, and internal political realities. His shrill yet unhurried prose lends clarity to even the most convoluted diplomatic doctrines. For anyone studying Cold War history or grand strategy, this book is essential—not just for what it reveals about U.S. policy, but for how it teaches us to think critically about power, fear, and long-term planning in a nuclear age. Reading it at the turn of the millennium, with the Cold War already past and the War on Terror yet to erupt, was like reading a ghost story—where the ghosts hadn’t quite left the building.
John Lewis Gaddis doesn’t just chronicle American strategic thinking during the Cold War—he dissects it with the precision of a historian and the insight of a political philosopher. From George Kennan’s early articulation of containment to the more aggressive rollback ideas of NSC-68, from Eisenhower’s “New Look” to Nixon’s détente and Reagan’s “roll-the-dice” brinkmanship, Gaddis traces a dynamic yet deeply fraught evolution of American statecraft. What struck me as a student—and still remains—is how Gaddis balances empathy and critique. He doesn’t villainize; he contextualizes. Every administration’s approach is measured on its own terms: ideological vision, geopolitical restraints, and internal political realities. His shrill yet unhurried prose lends clarity to even the most convoluted diplomatic doctrines. For anyone studying Cold War history or grand strategy, this book is essential—not just for what it reveals about U.S. policy, but for how it teaches us to think critically about power, fear, and long-term planning in a nuclear age. Reading it at the turn of the millennium, with the Cold War already past and the War on Terror yet to erupt, was like reading a ghost story—where the ghosts hadn’t quite left the building.
August 6, 2020
A magnificent piece of work by John Lewis Gaddis. Having seen some of his interviews and lectures on Diplomat and Ambassador George Frost Kennan I was sold, that is, on his great and clear presentation style.
This style translates to the book so, if you want to get a 'feel' or 'feeler' for his writing style - have a look at his interviews, especially the seminars at the United States Navy War College - you will be impressed.
As a veteran reader of IR, FP, Grand Strategy and Domestic/External Politics, I found this book to be a fresh approach and a much-needed change in writing style as mentioned above.
JLG (author) can put across the points in a simple manner. Whilst Kissinger's output I would also classify as readable for most, Kissinger can start explaining things in very long sentences, often without an anchor or link back to the starting premise and so, this means frequent back-reading.
JLG changed all that. He presents his arguments and counterclaims very clearly, and there is no fancy mist in regard to his writing.
He is a serious academic and a distinguished Navy War College tutor. In this book, he tackles the Policy of Containment apropos Foreign Policy and it is contextualized in the Cold War (1947-1992). He does so with immense clarity and the book was published in 1982 I believe.
The book covers everything from Kennan who was the man who articulated the policy of containment but was not the actual author. Much like Shakespeare who organised a selection of Italian plays - do you think an Englishman could come up with such titles as "Romeo & Juliet" or, "The Merchant of Venice|?
Shakespeare had Italian translators and they converted these works for an English audience.
The Policy of containment has no author - some say it was created by the Russians in the 1812 Napoleonic campaign, others say it comes from China and the Sun Tzu, though I consider this a bit of a cliché.
Containment was probably around for centuries much like Soft Power v hard Power, it was only Joseph Nye Sr and Zbigniew Brzezinski who articulated Soft Power and then focused on the concept of soft power - what it means to be able to project power without the use of force of subterfuge.
Anyway, returning to the book. It is a truly magnificent piece of foreign policy research and academia. You will learn everything from the 1946 Moscow regulations; the famous 10 Moscow Spying rules; the NSC 68 document and subsequently, the mysterious (and fascinating) history of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSA's bridging toward the State Dept, Defense Dept and Intelligence Depts (IC).
For any British readers, the US System and MO are unique and in many ways, the most perfect system out of all the 193 UN nation-states.
The White House EO (Exec Office) is analogous to the British Civil Service Cabinet Office (CO) which is, to put it vaguely, a mini "civil service' bespoke for the President/Prime Minister.
The NSC is chaired by the P but is bridging between DOS, DOD, IC, DNI, DCI, JCS and other crucial cabinet-level attendees.
This book covers everything and you can draw your own conclusions as to where Containment came from and how it evolved. We are now (since 2011) using this old doctrine to contain a rising PRC/China. This begs the question, can we simply copy and paste an old doctrine of what is essentially, damage control, to a civilisation state such as China? This book does not cover that, but by the time you finish reading, you will be able to make your own predictions and conclusions drawn from fact and conjecture.
I highly recommend this read.
Other books I recommend:
Theories of IR - K, Waltz
Man, State and War - K, Waltz
Politic among the nations - Hans Morgenthau Jr
EH Carr's What is History? and 20 Years Crisis
Does America Need A foreign Policy - Henry Alfred Kissinger
The Future of British Foreign Policy in a Post-Brexit World - Christopher Hill
The Grand Chessboard - Zbigniew Brżeźinski
The Hell of Good Intentions - Stephen M. Walt (2019)
That should cover you for structural and Off/Defensive Realism as well as realpolitik.
Kissinger's Diplomacy and A World Restored will cover RealPolitik in the classic, 1880s understanding.
Another great scholar who understands realpolitik well is Professor John Mearsheimer who articulates Power Politics in his book: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2004) - a superb analysis of PP and RealPolitik whilst standing by Offensive Realism and, taking a more militaristic approach to IR and Political Science as compared to say, Samuel Huntingdon or Frances Fukuyama.
5/5
Thank You for Reading and I hope you enjoy the book.
Best Regards
ROBERT JOSEPH PISAREK
This style translates to the book so, if you want to get a 'feel' or 'feeler' for his writing style - have a look at his interviews, especially the seminars at the United States Navy War College - you will be impressed.
As a veteran reader of IR, FP, Grand Strategy and Domestic/External Politics, I found this book to be a fresh approach and a much-needed change in writing style as mentioned above.
JLG (author) can put across the points in a simple manner. Whilst Kissinger's output I would also classify as readable for most, Kissinger can start explaining things in very long sentences, often without an anchor or link back to the starting premise and so, this means frequent back-reading.
JLG changed all that. He presents his arguments and counterclaims very clearly, and there is no fancy mist in regard to his writing.
He is a serious academic and a distinguished Navy War College tutor. In this book, he tackles the Policy of Containment apropos Foreign Policy and it is contextualized in the Cold War (1947-1992). He does so with immense clarity and the book was published in 1982 I believe.
The book covers everything from Kennan who was the man who articulated the policy of containment but was not the actual author. Much like Shakespeare who organised a selection of Italian plays - do you think an Englishman could come up with such titles as "Romeo & Juliet" or, "The Merchant of Venice|?
Shakespeare had Italian translators and they converted these works for an English audience.
The Policy of containment has no author - some say it was created by the Russians in the 1812 Napoleonic campaign, others say it comes from China and the Sun Tzu, though I consider this a bit of a cliché.
Containment was probably around for centuries much like Soft Power v hard Power, it was only Joseph Nye Sr and Zbigniew Brzezinski who articulated Soft Power and then focused on the concept of soft power - what it means to be able to project power without the use of force of subterfuge.
Anyway, returning to the book. It is a truly magnificent piece of foreign policy research and academia. You will learn everything from the 1946 Moscow regulations; the famous 10 Moscow Spying rules; the NSC 68 document and subsequently, the mysterious (and fascinating) history of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSA's bridging toward the State Dept, Defense Dept and Intelligence Depts (IC).
For any British readers, the US System and MO are unique and in many ways, the most perfect system out of all the 193 UN nation-states.
The White House EO (Exec Office) is analogous to the British Civil Service Cabinet Office (CO) which is, to put it vaguely, a mini "civil service' bespoke for the President/Prime Minister.
The NSC is chaired by the P but is bridging between DOS, DOD, IC, DNI, DCI, JCS and other crucial cabinet-level attendees.
This book covers everything and you can draw your own conclusions as to where Containment came from and how it evolved. We are now (since 2011) using this old doctrine to contain a rising PRC/China. This begs the question, can we simply copy and paste an old doctrine of what is essentially, damage control, to a civilisation state such as China? This book does not cover that, but by the time you finish reading, you will be able to make your own predictions and conclusions drawn from fact and conjecture.
I highly recommend this read.
Other books I recommend:
Theories of IR - K, Waltz
Man, State and War - K, Waltz
Politic among the nations - Hans Morgenthau Jr
EH Carr's What is History? and 20 Years Crisis
Does America Need A foreign Policy - Henry Alfred Kissinger
The Future of British Foreign Policy in a Post-Brexit World - Christopher Hill
The Grand Chessboard - Zbigniew Brżeźinski
The Hell of Good Intentions - Stephen M. Walt (2019)
That should cover you for structural and Off/Defensive Realism as well as realpolitik.
Kissinger's Diplomacy and A World Restored will cover RealPolitik in the classic, 1880s understanding.
Another great scholar who understands realpolitik well is Professor John Mearsheimer who articulates Power Politics in his book: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2004) - a superb analysis of PP and RealPolitik whilst standing by Offensive Realism and, taking a more militaristic approach to IR and Political Science as compared to say, Samuel Huntingdon or Frances Fukuyama.
5/5
Thank You for Reading and I hope you enjoy the book.
Best Regards
ROBERT JOSEPH PISAREK
May 1, 2016
This is the best account of US foreign policy during the Cold War that I know of. It is also one of the best books about strategy I've ever read. Gaddis argues that USFP consistently and, ultimately, successfully pursued a policy of containment towards the USSR during the Cold War. However, there was a broad range of options and emphases within containment in terms of how to see and address the Soviet threat. Most of the books is devoted to explaining these shifts.
Gaddis mainly argues that the US oscillated back and forth until the 1980's between asymmetrical and symmetrical containment. In asymmetrical containment (Kennan, New Look, Detente) the US tried to avoid playing to Soviet strengths (conventional arms, for instance) and defined American interests more narrowly, usually by focusing on threats that combined hostility, capability, and a vital area of the world. Rather, the US sought to compensate for Soviet strengths by working with other areas in which the US was stronger (economic power, appeal to allies, nuclear deterrence) and making stricter divisions between core and peripheral interests. Under symmetrical containment (NSC-68, flexible response, Reagan's early years), the US sought to meet Soviet strengths at all levels of conflict (nuclear weapons, conventional arms, unconventional warfare) and defined American interests very broadly under the basis of domino effect and credibility arguments. Gaddis seems to prefer asymmetrical containment, but he does a great job across the board in explaining how these different strategists saw the geopolity, US goals, US capabilities, and designed strategies.
Unlike many if not most historians, Gaddis has a great sense of the weight and responsibility of national leadership. He realizes that these actors were trying to balance a number of priorities and achieve the means-ends balance that is so crucial in good strategy. He is, in short, a fair and mostly impartial judge of historical actors. These points especially come through in his discussion of Reagan, whom most academics and policy makers considered a neanderthal of strategy. I have long been perturbed by Reagan's moral Manicheanism, or his willingness to tolerate the most horrible abuses by American allies or proxies while calling out other states for their crimes. Nevertheless, Gaddis shows that Reagan's defense buildup and intense rhetoric pushed the already crisis-ridden and declining USSR to abandon geopolitical competition and embrace both domestic reform and . Reagan didn't cause the Soviet reorientation of policy, but he pushed it along at just the right time, and then adjusted towards a policy of cooperation with Gorbachev. It's hard to deny that for all of his faults, Reagan's overall strategy worked very well in bringing about a victorious and peaceful conclusion to the Cold War. Gaddis adds that Reagan's crucial insight was that in his consideration of the expenditure of resources, he focused more on the Soviet system than the American one because he understood that the US could set such a high bar that the Soviets would break their system in trying to reach it or just give in without trying.
"Strategy" is one of the most overused words in our modern lexicon. People tend to throw it into sentences as a way of making them sound more focused or goal-oriented, but they would often have trouble clearly defining the word. Instead of reading an abstract text, I recommend that anyone interested in strategy check out Gaddis for an exploration of how historical actors in different contexts developed and deployed strategies. The historical lens is probably the most rewarding and nuanced way of approaching the defining and evaluation of strategies. This book is much more complicated than what I can get across in this review, but let me just end by saying that anyone who studies US foreign policy has to read it.
Gaddis mainly argues that the US oscillated back and forth until the 1980's between asymmetrical and symmetrical containment. In asymmetrical containment (Kennan, New Look, Detente) the US tried to avoid playing to Soviet strengths (conventional arms, for instance) and defined American interests more narrowly, usually by focusing on threats that combined hostility, capability, and a vital area of the world. Rather, the US sought to compensate for Soviet strengths by working with other areas in which the US was stronger (economic power, appeal to allies, nuclear deterrence) and making stricter divisions between core and peripheral interests. Under symmetrical containment (NSC-68, flexible response, Reagan's early years), the US sought to meet Soviet strengths at all levels of conflict (nuclear weapons, conventional arms, unconventional warfare) and defined American interests very broadly under the basis of domino effect and credibility arguments. Gaddis seems to prefer asymmetrical containment, but he does a great job across the board in explaining how these different strategists saw the geopolity, US goals, US capabilities, and designed strategies.
Unlike many if not most historians, Gaddis has a great sense of the weight and responsibility of national leadership. He realizes that these actors were trying to balance a number of priorities and achieve the means-ends balance that is so crucial in good strategy. He is, in short, a fair and mostly impartial judge of historical actors. These points especially come through in his discussion of Reagan, whom most academics and policy makers considered a neanderthal of strategy. I have long been perturbed by Reagan's moral Manicheanism, or his willingness to tolerate the most horrible abuses by American allies or proxies while calling out other states for their crimes. Nevertheless, Gaddis shows that Reagan's defense buildup and intense rhetoric pushed the already crisis-ridden and declining USSR to abandon geopolitical competition and embrace both domestic reform and . Reagan didn't cause the Soviet reorientation of policy, but he pushed it along at just the right time, and then adjusted towards a policy of cooperation with Gorbachev. It's hard to deny that for all of his faults, Reagan's overall strategy worked very well in bringing about a victorious and peaceful conclusion to the Cold War. Gaddis adds that Reagan's crucial insight was that in his consideration of the expenditure of resources, he focused more on the Soviet system than the American one because he understood that the US could set such a high bar that the Soviets would break their system in trying to reach it or just give in without trying.
"Strategy" is one of the most overused words in our modern lexicon. People tend to throw it into sentences as a way of making them sound more focused or goal-oriented, but they would often have trouble clearly defining the word. Instead of reading an abstract text, I recommend that anyone interested in strategy check out Gaddis for an exploration of how historical actors in different contexts developed and deployed strategies. The historical lens is probably the most rewarding and nuanced way of approaching the defining and evaluation of strategies. This book is much more complicated than what I can get across in this review, but let me just end by saying that anyone who studies US foreign policy has to read it.
February 7, 2023
Gaddis is the expert on Cold War strategy. A must read.
June 30, 2025
Great Comprehensive book on the Cold War that examines the strategic thinking of leadership across the Cold War
January 30, 2018
Spring 2017: Deep and serious analysis of the American government's response to the Cold War, but with analytical and dry prose, reflecting the inquiry of political science and not the literary flair of the average narrative history. Gaddis shows the brilliance of George Kennan, who wanted America to take a firm line in defense of its morals, but not to try to undermine the Soviet Union by force. Containment was a policy of patience. Many ensuing presidents failed to exhibit Kennan's patience. Only Reagan succeeded in fusing symmetric containment (defending boundaries) and asymmetric containment (defending key points), and then moving beyond these two binaries to try new approaches, such as playing off internal Soviet dynamics. Gaddis understates the importance of Gorbachev, compared to Melvin Leffler's brilliant "For the Soul of Mankind," but Gaddis better understands the dynamics of power and the shallowness of some leaders' claims to ideology than I think Leffler does.
Spring 2018: Reading this book again, I can follow more of Gaddis's argument. It's still an info dump and not exactly thrilling to read. But I can better appreciate how different administrations followed or diverged from Kennan's recommendations. Nixon negotiated with Russia more than Kennan wanted, but implemented Kennan's mixture of friendly and aggressive influences on Russia. Kennedy and Johnson's "flexible response" led to constant escalation and obsession with other countries' perception of America, the opposite of what Kennan wanted.
Spring 2018: Reading this book again, I can follow more of Gaddis's argument. It's still an info dump and not exactly thrilling to read. But I can better appreciate how different administrations followed or diverged from Kennan's recommendations. Nixon negotiated with Russia more than Kennan wanted, but implemented Kennan's mixture of friendly and aggressive influences on Russia. Kennedy and Johnson's "flexible response" led to constant escalation and obsession with other countries' perception of America, the opposite of what Kennan wanted.
January 16, 2015
This is an excellent analysis of the US national security policies beginning with Truman and ending with Reagan. The author evaluates the various strategies of successive administrations according to the criteria of whether ends and means are distinguished, on the axis of symmetrical and asymmetrical responses to provocation and the prevailing political climate (politics are the art of the possible). Truman is evaluated as a pioneer. Ike gets a very negative appraisal as does Johnson. Nixon gets a fair hearing. Carter gets a more sympathetic treatment of his strategy than you would expect, and a lot of Reagan's achievement is rightly attributed to Gorbachev, explicitly citing Kennan's prediction in the "X" article that change in Soviet behavior would only be possible with a new generation of leadership.
January 4, 2021
The end of the Second World War saw the beginning of a long, costly, and dangerous conflict between the Soviet Union and the democracies of the West, principally the United States. as the European Allies were physically and economically battered at war's end. This conflict, the Cold War, was dictated by the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist ideology which viewed capitalism as the long-term enemy of communism.
George Kennan, an American diplomat at the Moscow Embassy, in 1946 sent the "Long Telegram" to the State Department in Washington, D.C. This 8,000 word telegram outlined the nature of the Soviets and the threat they posed to the West. He outlined the policy America would need to employ with the help of other democracies to protect their way of life. That policy was one of containment of Soviet communism. He thus became the principal architect of the means employed to protect against this threat.
Author Gaddis presents Kennan throughout this book, contrasting his original intent as it was used and transformed by each post war presidential administration from Truman to George H. W. Bush when the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended.
The book is mesmerizing; its deep research is richly mined to present much of the argumentation in the words of the principals, their key staff and appointees, and many of their critics and advocates. Gaddis's insights are balanced, showing the good and the bad in each administration's modification and implementation of a containment strategy. In each case he shows how the modification compares with Kennan's original vision of containment. Each President made changes in the "Legacy" left by his predecessor. In part, the changes were based on the desire to make his own mark, and because of different people coming on the global stage, breaking events, and overall changed circumstances.
Among the changed circumstances Gaddis tracks are Tito taking Yugoslavia out of the complete control of Moscow, unlike the more tightly controlled Warsaw Pact nations. The United States used this change to open economic and political ties with Yugoslavia. This was meant to encourage other
Soviet dominated European countries to consider loosening ties. None did, however.
Another major change was the emergence of a rift between Red China and the Soviet Union. Playing on this rift became a continuing U.S. tactic to loosen ties between the two communist powers. It was a game that culminated in President Nixon establishing diplomatic ties with China, a step which led to the eventual economic and political importance of contemporary China.
For readers who have lived through all, or part of the Cold War, this will provide details that may have been lost in daily routine: reading the sports page, watching game shows, or going shopping.
It is kind of talented scholars and writers such as Gaddis to fill in those many missing details and their significance. For younger readers who missed it in real time, this is an instructive look at international relations and how much of the world got to be the way it is. Gaddis reviews the lessons learned by the processes of Cold War relationships. He notes that though circumstances will never be quite the same, there are many possible modes of action revealed in this history. A shortcoming for the use of containment lies in the emergence of non-state actors. How does one contain what he calls the "invisible" threat of bin Laden prior to 9/11?
Highly recommended for general readers with an interest in history, and a must read for those who are attuned to international relations.
George Kennan, an American diplomat at the Moscow Embassy, in 1946 sent the "Long Telegram" to the State Department in Washington, D.C. This 8,000 word telegram outlined the nature of the Soviets and the threat they posed to the West. He outlined the policy America would need to employ with the help of other democracies to protect their way of life. That policy was one of containment of Soviet communism. He thus became the principal architect of the means employed to protect against this threat.
Author Gaddis presents Kennan throughout this book, contrasting his original intent as it was used and transformed by each post war presidential administration from Truman to George H. W. Bush when the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended.
The book is mesmerizing; its deep research is richly mined to present much of the argumentation in the words of the principals, their key staff and appointees, and many of their critics and advocates. Gaddis's insights are balanced, showing the good and the bad in each administration's modification and implementation of a containment strategy. In each case he shows how the modification compares with Kennan's original vision of containment. Each President made changes in the "Legacy" left by his predecessor. In part, the changes were based on the desire to make his own mark, and because of different people coming on the global stage, breaking events, and overall changed circumstances.
Among the changed circumstances Gaddis tracks are Tito taking Yugoslavia out of the complete control of Moscow, unlike the more tightly controlled Warsaw Pact nations. The United States used this change to open economic and political ties with Yugoslavia. This was meant to encourage other
Soviet dominated European countries to consider loosening ties. None did, however.
Another major change was the emergence of a rift between Red China and the Soviet Union. Playing on this rift became a continuing U.S. tactic to loosen ties between the two communist powers. It was a game that culminated in President Nixon establishing diplomatic ties with China, a step which led to the eventual economic and political importance of contemporary China.
For readers who have lived through all, or part of the Cold War, this will provide details that may have been lost in daily routine: reading the sports page, watching game shows, or going shopping.
It is kind of talented scholars and writers such as Gaddis to fill in those many missing details and their significance. For younger readers who missed it in real time, this is an instructive look at international relations and how much of the world got to be the way it is. Gaddis reviews the lessons learned by the processes of Cold War relationships. He notes that though circumstances will never be quite the same, there are many possible modes of action revealed in this history. A shortcoming for the use of containment lies in the emergence of non-state actors. How does one contain what he calls the "invisible" threat of bin Laden prior to 9/11?
Highly recommended for general readers with an interest in history, and a must read for those who are attuned to international relations.
September 3, 2023
I had first plunged into “Strategies of Containment” during my senior year of college, desperate for some quote or passage that I could harvest in service of a hastily composed final paper for a class on American foreign policy in the twentieth century. Years later, I finally bought the book; for years still, it sat unopened on bookshelves or boxes in three different D.C.-area apartments.
This summer, I finally read it; I had been sorely missing the kind of writing that I first experienced from John Lewis Gaddis in his definitive biography of his friend George Kennan, and I was looking for a work-adjacent read to accompany me throughout the season.
“Strategies of Containment” didn’t disappoint. Gaddis captures the Cold War across the U.S. administrations that waged it, capturing each American president’s* approach with the kind of historian’s empathy he has written about elsewhere. In some administrations, the president played the central intellectual and deciding role; regarding other administrations, Gaddis describes the efforts of key Cabinet officials like John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger to shape the course of American foreign policy.
The picture that emerges from Gaddis’ fairly comprehensive rendering is of an American Cold War approach that each president steered through the generally accepted lanes between symmetry and asymmetry. While symmetrical response embraced a more expansive, resource-agnostic competitive relationship with the Soviet Union, practitioners of asymmetrical response sought to maintain credible deterrence by leveraging areas of clear strategic advantage or capability and adhering to more-limited, ruthless prioritization. Gaddis argues that these various applications of strategy should be measured against what their authors hoped to achieve with them, rather than judged by what they “ought” to have achieved. While I think this framework may unduly privilege any given strategist in any given Cold War administration, I would be hard-pressed to identify a suitable alternative for assessment.
Ironically, when Gaddis first revised “Strategies of Containment” — in the throes of the Global War on Terror — his new readers would likely have needed convincing about the ongoing relevance of Cold War history to the national security challenges they faced. No such need exists today.
*With the possible exception of Jimmy Carter’s administration, to which Gaddis devotes insignificant attention and considerable disapproval.
This summer, I finally read it; I had been sorely missing the kind of writing that I first experienced from John Lewis Gaddis in his definitive biography of his friend George Kennan, and I was looking for a work-adjacent read to accompany me throughout the season.
“Strategies of Containment” didn’t disappoint. Gaddis captures the Cold War across the U.S. administrations that waged it, capturing each American president’s* approach with the kind of historian’s empathy he has written about elsewhere. In some administrations, the president played the central intellectual and deciding role; regarding other administrations, Gaddis describes the efforts of key Cabinet officials like John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger to shape the course of American foreign policy.
The picture that emerges from Gaddis’ fairly comprehensive rendering is of an American Cold War approach that each president steered through the generally accepted lanes between symmetry and asymmetry. While symmetrical response embraced a more expansive, resource-agnostic competitive relationship with the Soviet Union, practitioners of asymmetrical response sought to maintain credible deterrence by leveraging areas of clear strategic advantage or capability and adhering to more-limited, ruthless prioritization. Gaddis argues that these various applications of strategy should be measured against what their authors hoped to achieve with them, rather than judged by what they “ought” to have achieved. While I think this framework may unduly privilege any given strategist in any given Cold War administration, I would be hard-pressed to identify a suitable alternative for assessment.
Ironically, when Gaddis first revised “Strategies of Containment” — in the throes of the Global War on Terror — his new readers would likely have needed convincing about the ongoing relevance of Cold War history to the national security challenges they faced. No such need exists today.
*With the possible exception of Jimmy Carter’s administration, to which Gaddis devotes insignificant attention and considerable disapproval.
January 15, 2018
Motivated by current events, I recently reread this for the first time in many years. It continues to be an excellent treatment of the Cold War, in large part because of Gaddis' systematic list-based narrative.
Relative to my previous reading, the book was more work for me this time because it assumes the reader already knows Cold War history well. That was fine when I was still reading a lot of Cold War material, but in this recent read I was less familiar and had to spend a lot of time with Wikipedia.
George Kennan continues to hold up remarkably well; how many political thinkers of the 2nd half of the 20th century hold up that well? Other items that struck me on this read:
- The foreign policy bureaucracy has its weaknesses, but ultimately ignoring it has cost us on a number of occasions (eg, under Nixon/Kissinger, think of Portugal, Pakistan, Cyprus, Israel).
- That said, I still have a hard time with the modern popular view of Nixon and Kissinger. Says Gaddis, "It is difficult to think of anything the Nixon administration could have done that would have produced a more dramatic shift in world power relationships of greater benefit to the United States at lower cost" (295). They pulled this off while reducing defense budgets and so on.
- The doctrines of the Eisenhower admin really have not aged well--New Look, tactical nukes, etc. I don't so much blame Ike and Dulles for this; really it is about the learning curve of the nuclear world. Truman and Ike were really on the steep part of that learning curve, and McNamara learned as well. It is scary to think of modern administrations coming in with no familiarity with that history.
Overall a great read, and well worth the reread.
Relative to my previous reading, the book was more work for me this time because it assumes the reader already knows Cold War history well. That was fine when I was still reading a lot of Cold War material, but in this recent read I was less familiar and had to spend a lot of time with Wikipedia.
George Kennan continues to hold up remarkably well; how many political thinkers of the 2nd half of the 20th century hold up that well? Other items that struck me on this read:
- The foreign policy bureaucracy has its weaknesses, but ultimately ignoring it has cost us on a number of occasions (eg, under Nixon/Kissinger, think of Portugal, Pakistan, Cyprus, Israel).
- That said, I still have a hard time with the modern popular view of Nixon and Kissinger. Says Gaddis, "It is difficult to think of anything the Nixon administration could have done that would have produced a more dramatic shift in world power relationships of greater benefit to the United States at lower cost" (295). They pulled this off while reducing defense budgets and so on.
- The doctrines of the Eisenhower admin really have not aged well--New Look, tactical nukes, etc. I don't so much blame Ike and Dulles for this; really it is about the learning curve of the nuclear world. Truman and Ike were really on the steep part of that learning curve, and McNamara learned as well. It is scary to think of modern administrations coming in with no familiarity with that history.
Overall a great read, and well worth the reread.
October 10, 2025
Gaddis raises a very insightful remark in the preface about History books being Splitters (putting forth a very specific argument about a historical phenomenon/event that points to its uniqueness) and Lumpers (tracing a historical thread through a series of historical events and exploring commonalities). Gaddis’ book falls in the Lumpers category. The magic in Gaddis’ book is the way he traces the thread of containment and how it has been altered (particularly through alternating between symmetrical and asymmetrical responses) through the several American administrations that made up the Cold War. This is much more challenging than writing a similar narrative through the USSR which had far fewer leaders than that of the US throughout the Cold War (Will pick up Vladislav Zubok’s book soon to see how he does it.) Gaddis’s writing style does tend to be fairly long-winded (surprising for a military historian) and he often gives far too many examples and elaboration for a specific point (even to the point of writing in circles sometimes). As such, analysing each administration by their doctrines and their implementation in separate chapters was a bit unnecessary as it gave Gaddis too much space to be long-winded. But Gaddis always comes back to the main frame of containment and how Kennan’s original frame has been altered through the Cold War. Definitely the must-read book to understand American foreign policy throughout the Cold War.
July 19, 2022
I read this in college, almost 30 years ago (really???) shortly after the fall of the USSR. Now, as we again look at thwarting Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe, this updated edition seems decidedly relevant once more.
It is also interesting to contrast American policy during the Cold War, and how that carried over into George H. R. Bush and Clinton's approach towards Middle Eastern dictators, with the interventionist (and failed) actions of George W. Bush and, to some extent, Barack Obama on one hand, and the idea of 'diplomatic resets'. In short, Gaddis' original argument that containment is a slow-grind sort of policy that doesn't please hawks, public opinion, or those stuck confronting the power being contained, it works with a lower cost in lives and less unpredictability in the outcome, seems to hold up, not least by contrasting it with how feckless, reckless and ineffectual post-Cold War policy has been in attaining any of its goals. Containment is clearly what we see in the current NATO approach to the Ukraine war; how it plays out will be a coda to Gaddis' positions -- if only there wasn't a very real human cost in the process.
It is also interesting to contrast American policy during the Cold War, and how that carried over into George H. R. Bush and Clinton's approach towards Middle Eastern dictators, with the interventionist (and failed) actions of George W. Bush and, to some extent, Barack Obama on one hand, and the idea of 'diplomatic resets'. In short, Gaddis' original argument that containment is a slow-grind sort of policy that doesn't please hawks, public opinion, or those stuck confronting the power being contained, it works with a lower cost in lives and less unpredictability in the outcome, seems to hold up, not least by contrasting it with how feckless, reckless and ineffectual post-Cold War policy has been in attaining any of its goals. Containment is clearly what we see in the current NATO approach to the Ukraine war; how it plays out will be a coda to Gaddis' positions -- if only there wasn't a very real human cost in the process.
December 31, 2024
In this sweeping account of US foreign policy during the Cold War, Gaddis argues that a seminal telegraph/memo from an obscure diplomat, George Keenan, in 1946 influenced a “strategy of containment” that was implemented by the Truman administration and adapted by all future administrations through Reagan. He further argues that each administration’s version of the strategy depended on its assessment of US strengths and weaknesses compared to its adversaries and an assessment of resources available. GOP administrations highly estimated Western strengths and viewed resources as finite. Democrat administrations tended to be the opposite.
Gaddis critically analyzed each administration’s foreign policy relative to Keenan’s principles. He argued that JFK/LBJ mutations of the strategy contributed to the Vietnam disaster, Nixon/Kessinger’s reversal led to détente, Carter has no strategy, and Reagan gets much credit for governing at the right time in history with the right policies. This is a foundational book for historians of 20th-century America.
Gaddis critically analyzed each administration’s foreign policy relative to Keenan’s principles. He argued that JFK/LBJ mutations of the strategy contributed to the Vietnam disaster, Nixon/Kessinger’s reversal led to détente, Carter has no strategy, and Reagan gets much credit for governing at the right time in history with the right policies. This is a foundational book for historians of 20th-century America.
September 5, 2017
This was a very fascinating book for me. Growing up in the tail end of the cold war, I always wondered how we got to where we were with the soviets and nuclear weapons. I wondered why Korea and Vietnam were so important to our national security. I had a hard time understanding why the world was carved up the way it was. In Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis clearly lays out the public policy on national security policy and how it evolved over time. He analyzes each administration and provides insights into their thought processes and the key players. Although this book is a bit dated, it is critical for anyone trying to understand modern foreign policy and national security. Things have changed, that's for sure, but we are where we are now because of decisions that were made decades ago.
November 3, 2023
Read this for my independent study on the presidency. Very in-depth treatment of containment: the origins, evolution, and implementation of various strategies through Cold War presidencies. Boring at times and extremely fascinating at others. He was super critical of Jimmy Carter, but that’s ok, since it was (mostly) good criticism. Overall a 4/5
July 31, 2017
In-depth coverage of US cold war policy
May 9, 2018
This book is essential for anyone who wants to learn more about the Cold War. I learned so much from this book.
June 16, 2021
One of the best books I have read covering the post WW2 international political system.
May 15, 2022
If you are interested in what the title advertises, this is the book. Of course not a beach read - a dense but rewarding slog.
August 1, 2023
Thorough and detailed analysis/evaluation of various Presidential administrations' relations to the USSR and China.
August 19, 2023
96/100
5 stars - 90/100
4 stars - 80/100
3 stars - 70/100
2 stars - 60/100
1 star - 50/10
5 stars - 90/100
4 stars - 80/100
3 stars - 70/100
2 stars - 60/100
1 star - 50/10
Read
January 24, 2025Have read chapters on Truman and Nixon.
March 26, 2025
They call me dih George kennans long telegram cause it take a couple years to make u feel it
November 13, 2025
Might have enjoyed this more if I didn’t hate the class that it’s for I don’t know
Also just wordy and annoying sometimes
Also just wordy and annoying sometimes
November 11, 2018
Fantastic read providing lots of inspiration for think long term
Very valuable book that helped me see a lot more subtlety and vision associated with US leaders in the Cold War era. Ends with a summary of what can be transferred to future grand strategies.
Very valuable book that helped me see a lot more subtlety and vision associated with US leaders in the Cold War era. Ends with a summary of what can be transferred to future grand strategies.
August 31, 2014
A. Synopsis:
1. This is a “lumper” account of US security policy during the Cold War (since WWII). IT looks at the evidence not though a window of economic, diplomatic, ideological, or a military perspective. Instead it focuses on strategy. Gaddis employs this “strategic” perspective on the central preoccupation postwar national security policy--the idea of containment.
B. There are five specific “strategic” or “geopolitical” codes in the postwar era that correspond to each presidential administration. These are a set of assumptions about the world that tend to govern how a person responds to crisis.
1. George Kennan’s original strategy of containment articulated between 1947-49 and largely implemented in the Truman administration. He thought the goal of policy should be to protect the security of the nation and advance the welfare of its people. He saw the Soviet challenge as psychological.
a) His first stage in his strategy was to not divide the world in American and Soviet spheres of influence. He sought the emergence of long term powers in Europe and Asia
b) Once the balance of power was restored he sought to reduce the Soviet Unions ability to expand beyond her borders.
c) The third step was to convince the Soviet Union to reject their universalism and adopt particularism in favor of national diversity. This could be achieved through counter-pressure
2. The assumptions surrounding NSC-68 between 1950-53 as a result of the Korean War. Following the loss of China to Communism and the Soviets detonation of an atomic bomb and NSC-68, which defined the course of US policy, was written. This was a stricter definition of containment. The new belief was that the Soviet’s had to change themselves and that no diplomacy could achieve this.
3. Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look” which lasted from 1953-61. They sought to avoid isolationism and take an active role in containing Communism. They held great fear of the “domino theory” in Indochina. The New Look included 3 main points: continuation of Truman’s strategy of containment; a strategy of deterrence which involved drawing clear borders and defending them; the use of liberation (political, psychological, economic, and covert means) to “roll back” Communist influence.
4. Kennedy-Johnson “flexible response” strategy from 1961-69. Wanted to distance himself from his predecessor whose policy he felt was becoming unwieldy. The ultimate goal was to prevent one bloc of nations from overcoming the US. The goal was not to remake the world, but balance the power within it. But, this view did not change from the zero-sum assumptions of the IKE administration (this was the belief that any victory for communism was a defeat for the US). Flexible Response was to prepare the US for responding in any of a number of ways to Communist aggression (Viet Nam was a test case for Flexible Response)
a) Bolster conventional, nuclear, and unconventional (guerrilla warfare) military capabilities
b) The strategic missile build up (which proceeded even after the myth of the “missile-gap” had been exposed)
c) A renewed effort to solidify alliances
d) A new emphasis on non-military instruments of containment
e) Attempts to manage more effectively domestic resources vital to defense
f) An expansion of IKE’s efforts to open up areas of negotiation with the Soviets.
5. The complex of ideas referred to as détente put forward by Nixon and Kissinger in the early 1970s and continued by both Ford and Carter until the invasion of Afghanistan. Détente was a relaxing of tension between nations. But, through détente Nixon and Kissinger believed that they could contain the power and influence of the Soviet Union.
a) Three philosophical changes
(1) The first stage was to recognize the multidivisional nature of power. Nuclear weapons were spreading parity throughout the world. The zero-sum game must be abandoned.
(2) Accept that conflict and disharmony were a part of life and the international order. This meant giving up the attempt to change the internal nature of other societies.
(3) The third stage was to recognize the limits of foreign policy. The defense policy shifted from “superiority” to “sufficiency.”
b) Requirements for implementing a strategy of détente
(1) Engagement of the Russians in serious negotiations on substantive issues.
(2) “Linkage.” This was the belief that all issues were fundamentally related. This was difficult for the Russians because they liked to compartmentalize issues.
(3) The effort to establish links between the US and USSR’s chief rival in the Communist world as a means of putting further pressure on Moscow. This was achieved through Nixon’s trips to China.
1. This is a “lumper” account of US security policy during the Cold War (since WWII). IT looks at the evidence not though a window of economic, diplomatic, ideological, or a military perspective. Instead it focuses on strategy. Gaddis employs this “strategic” perspective on the central preoccupation postwar national security policy--the idea of containment.
B. There are five specific “strategic” or “geopolitical” codes in the postwar era that correspond to each presidential administration. These are a set of assumptions about the world that tend to govern how a person responds to crisis.
1. George Kennan’s original strategy of containment articulated between 1947-49 and largely implemented in the Truman administration. He thought the goal of policy should be to protect the security of the nation and advance the welfare of its people. He saw the Soviet challenge as psychological.
a) His first stage in his strategy was to not divide the world in American and Soviet spheres of influence. He sought the emergence of long term powers in Europe and Asia
b) Once the balance of power was restored he sought to reduce the Soviet Unions ability to expand beyond her borders.
c) The third step was to convince the Soviet Union to reject their universalism and adopt particularism in favor of national diversity. This could be achieved through counter-pressure
2. The assumptions surrounding NSC-68 between 1950-53 as a result of the Korean War. Following the loss of China to Communism and the Soviets detonation of an atomic bomb and NSC-68, which defined the course of US policy, was written. This was a stricter definition of containment. The new belief was that the Soviet’s had to change themselves and that no diplomacy could achieve this.
3. Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look” which lasted from 1953-61. They sought to avoid isolationism and take an active role in containing Communism. They held great fear of the “domino theory” in Indochina. The New Look included 3 main points: continuation of Truman’s strategy of containment; a strategy of deterrence which involved drawing clear borders and defending them; the use of liberation (political, psychological, economic, and covert means) to “roll back” Communist influence.
4. Kennedy-Johnson “flexible response” strategy from 1961-69. Wanted to distance himself from his predecessor whose policy he felt was becoming unwieldy. The ultimate goal was to prevent one bloc of nations from overcoming the US. The goal was not to remake the world, but balance the power within it. But, this view did not change from the zero-sum assumptions of the IKE administration (this was the belief that any victory for communism was a defeat for the US). Flexible Response was to prepare the US for responding in any of a number of ways to Communist aggression (Viet Nam was a test case for Flexible Response)
a) Bolster conventional, nuclear, and unconventional (guerrilla warfare) military capabilities
b) The strategic missile build up (which proceeded even after the myth of the “missile-gap” had been exposed)
c) A renewed effort to solidify alliances
d) A new emphasis on non-military instruments of containment
e) Attempts to manage more effectively domestic resources vital to defense
f) An expansion of IKE’s efforts to open up areas of negotiation with the Soviets.
5. The complex of ideas referred to as détente put forward by Nixon and Kissinger in the early 1970s and continued by both Ford and Carter until the invasion of Afghanistan. Détente was a relaxing of tension between nations. But, through détente Nixon and Kissinger believed that they could contain the power and influence of the Soviet Union.
a) Three philosophical changes
(1) The first stage was to recognize the multidivisional nature of power. Nuclear weapons were spreading parity throughout the world. The zero-sum game must be abandoned.
(2) Accept that conflict and disharmony were a part of life and the international order. This meant giving up the attempt to change the internal nature of other societies.
(3) The third stage was to recognize the limits of foreign policy. The defense policy shifted from “superiority” to “sufficiency.”
b) Requirements for implementing a strategy of détente
(1) Engagement of the Russians in serious negotiations on substantive issues.
(2) “Linkage.” This was the belief that all issues were fundamentally related. This was difficult for the Russians because they liked to compartmentalize issues.
(3) The effort to establish links between the US and USSR’s chief rival in the Communist world as a means of putting further pressure on Moscow. This was achieved through Nixon’s trips to China.
August 15, 2015
This is an essential book for students of American history. It covers the time from Kennan's 'Long Telegram' in 1946 outlining the grand strategy of containment and how that was fleshed out through different presidential administrations. It is an excellent and clearly written book that discusses policy at the highest levels, and both it's successes and failures. It is a very important work of scholarship and one of the handful of books for which I bought a physical copy AND a Kindle copy. My pages abound with notes and my Kindle copy is heavily bookmarked and yours will be, as well, if you get you a copy. I am indebted to my instructor on the Cold War at American Public University, Dr. Christi Bartman, for inspiring my interest in the subject.
August 21, 2015
Strategies of Containment should not be categorized as good supplement reading in a Cold War history course: it should be considered essential reading. The book can be considered dense with the information it imparts, but Gaddis's lucid penmanship makes it a surprisingly easy read, even to people without previous background in U.S. foreign policy. Gaddis is the best American historian of the Cold War and, from all his books, this one constitutes the backbone of the best Cold War history education one can hope to attain.
February 5, 2009
If you are a Poli Sci buff and want to know every last Poli Sci-geek detail of the history and politics of the Cold War, this is the perfect, comprehensive history of our side of the beginning, escalation, and strategies of the Cold War (since there isn't too much to say about the abrupt and unanticipated end).
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