"Spec Ops--Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice" by William H. McRaven.
Quite often, books about special forces are heavily based on anecdote and action. They still explain and illuminate the tasks and missions of special forces, if the reader pays attention to the details and connects all the dots. William R. McRaven eschews that approach and makes the case for special forces in his book "Spec Ops", a book he penned while commander of Seal Team 3 in the 1990s.
By applying analysis to eight case studies, McRaven explains how special forces are used to achieve outsized results relative to their size. It always comes down to the smaller force beating out the larger one, but it takes speed, simplicity and "relative superiority"--the ability to maintain the initiative until mission completion.
McRaven relies on two conceptual graphics to explain how he takes the measure of each mission.
First, every special forces mission looks like an inverted pyramid resting on an narrow apex, top-heavy and easy to topple. At the bottom is planning, which requires simplicity. Preparation occupies the middle tier, relying on security (to keep the mission secret) and repetition (practice makes perfect). At the top are surprise, speed and purpose. The "friction" of war presses against the top-heavy side of the pyramid, as things going wrong threaten to upset the raid, which is reinforced by "moral factors"--the determination of the raiders to complete the mission.
Second, he also graphs the mission profile, ascending from a point of vulnerability (where detection by the enemy can kill the mission), up past a line of "relative superiority," where the raiders seize and hold the initiative. This line climbs sharply to the point where relative superiority can be achieved and maintained until mission completion. The longer the mission takes to reach relative superiority, McRaven marks as the "area of vulnerability". The larger it is, the greater the chance for mission failure.
McRaven applies his metric to take the measure of eight different missions: the German raid on Eben Emael, the Italian attack on the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, the british commando raid on St. Nazaire, the British midget sub attack on the battleship Tirpitz, the US Ranger raid on Cabanatuan, the US raid on Son Tay, and the Israeli raid on Entebbe.
In each instance, the raiding force rapidly gathered deep pre-raid intelligence on the target, spotted the weakpoints, then designed a plan to exploit those enemy weaknesses. Plans depended on swift and certain attack, and speed is of the essence. Raiders can only take what weapons they can carry, so if they do encounter heavier forces, their ability to fight with advantage will be negated.
The book is especially significant today, as Vice-Admiral McRaven now is in charge of Special Operations Command, whose Navy SEALs just recently took out Osama bin Laden. McRaven penned his analysis back in the 1990s, when he commanded SEAL Team 3. Yet the factors and "lessons learned" are clearly seen in the broad profile bin Laden raid: a simple plan with a simple goal, accomplished in five minutes and completed in less than an hour.