What do you think?
Rate this book
Central Problems of Philosophy
Universals (Volume 2)
Universals begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist positions on properties, outlining the way each handles the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and abstract reference. The debate about properties and philosophical naturalism is also examined. Different forms of extreme nominalism and minimalist realism are critiqued. Later chapters defend a traditional realist view of universals and examine the objections to realism from various infinite regresses, the difficulties in stating identity conditions for properties, and problems with realist accounts of knowledge of abstract objects. The debate between Platonists and Aristotelians is examined in the context of the relationship between properties and an adequate theory of existence. The book's final chapter explores the problem of individuating particulars. Universals makes a difficult topic accessible while maintaining the sophistication of argument required by a more advanced readership, providing an authoritative treatment of the subject for both students and scholars.
- GenresPhilosophyMetaphysics
192 pages, Paperback
First published March 31, 2001
2 people are currently reading
82 people want to read
About the author
J.P. Moreland
91 books256 followersJ.P. Moreland is the Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola University in La Mirada, California. He has four earned degrees: a B.S. in chemistry from the University of Missouri, a Th.M. in theology from Dallas Theological Seminary, an M. A. in philosophy from the University of California-Riverside, and a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Southern California.
He has co-planted three churches, spoken and debated on over 175 college campuses around the country, and served with Campus Crusade for Christ for 10 years. For eight years, he served as a bioethicist for PersonaCare Nursing Homes, Inc. headquartered in Baltimore, Maryland.
His ideas have been covered by both popular religious and non-religious outlets, including the New Scientist and PBS’s “Closer to Truth,” Christianity Today and WORLD magazine. He has authored or co-authored 30 books, and published over 70 articles in journals, which include Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Philosophia Christi, and Faith and Philosophy.
He has co-planted three churches, spoken and debated on over 175 college campuses around the country, and served with Campus Crusade for Christ for 10 years. For eight years, he served as a bioethicist for PersonaCare Nursing Homes, Inc. headquartered in Baltimore, Maryland.
His ideas have been covered by both popular religious and non-religious outlets, including the New Scientist and PBS’s “Closer to Truth,” Christianity Today and WORLD magazine. He has authored or co-authored 30 books, and published over 70 articles in journals, which include Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Philosophia Christi, and Faith and Philosophy.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 7, 2020
9/10.
Only problem is not being longer.
Only problem is not being longer.
March 17, 2015
The question before the house: In what manner do two entities possess the same attribute? If Socrates is white and Plato is white, how do they both possess the quality “white?” Moreland will go on to argue, "Qualities are universals and not particulars and quality instances--like red are complex entities with at least three constituents in them--a universal, an individuator, and a tie of predication” (Moreland 192; page numbers are from the 1985 University of America edition). Moreland then argues that the main rival to this ontology--trope nominalism--fails to give a coherent alternative.
A trope is an individuation of concrete particulars. These particulars are not themselves a transcendental universal. The tropist will challenge the realist along these lines: A problem for the realist: how can Socrates’ redness and Plato’s redness be the same if they are in different locations, or if one is round and the other square. Realist response: we can hold that the “f-of-a” is a state of affairs. This is the having of a quality by a particular. It is a particular and a universal standing in a relation of exemplification. The universal is different from the having the universal.
Problems for trope nominalism:
* how does it account for grounding numerical differences between two entities that share all their pure properties in common? What is it that grounds the “thisness” of Socrates and the “thatness” of Plato? If red₁ and red₂ are two exactly similar tropes, then how are they not the same thing?
** the trope view cannot account for individuation because its criterion of existence is independent existence. It makes the trope’s nature identical to a place. We have nothing then but bare particulars.
***trope nominalists use the argument of “exact similarity” to avoid the realist construction. By contrast, the realist argues that cases of exact similarity (ES) are grounded in universals (110).
Moreland then offers a number of other arguments against trope nominalism. Most of these are highly technical in character and would make this review rather unwieldy.
Evaluation:
Along with the above arguments, Moreland gives fascinating accounts of infinite regresses and medieval debates, which are still relevant today (see Russell's set paradoxes). He successfully argues his case for the existence of universals. In the following I do not necessarily disagree with him, but am simply noting some observations:
1. I do not think the distance between Moreland and Wolterstorff is all that great. In any case, Wolterstorff wrote 30+ years ago, so I wonder if his position changed.
2. What is the relevance of JPM's account of universals to Christian theology? Granted, that wasn't the scope of the book, but it is nonetheless an interesting question.
Conclusion:
I found this book a helfpul introduction to some highly specialized literature.
A trope is an individuation of concrete particulars. These particulars are not themselves a transcendental universal. The tropist will challenge the realist along these lines: A problem for the realist: how can Socrates’ redness and Plato’s redness be the same if they are in different locations, or if one is round and the other square. Realist response: we can hold that the “f-of-a” is a state of affairs. This is the having of a quality by a particular. It is a particular and a universal standing in a relation of exemplification. The universal is different from the having the universal.
Problems for trope nominalism:
* how does it account for grounding numerical differences between two entities that share all their pure properties in common? What is it that grounds the “thisness” of Socrates and the “thatness” of Plato? If red₁ and red₂ are two exactly similar tropes, then how are they not the same thing?
** the trope view cannot account for individuation because its criterion of existence is independent existence. It makes the trope’s nature identical to a place. We have nothing then but bare particulars.
***trope nominalists use the argument of “exact similarity” to avoid the realist construction. By contrast, the realist argues that cases of exact similarity (ES) are grounded in universals (110).
Moreland then offers a number of other arguments against trope nominalism. Most of these are highly technical in character and would make this review rather unwieldy.
Evaluation:
Along with the above arguments, Moreland gives fascinating accounts of infinite regresses and medieval debates, which are still relevant today (see Russell's set paradoxes). He successfully argues his case for the existence of universals. In the following I do not necessarily disagree with him, but am simply noting some observations:
1. I do not think the distance between Moreland and Wolterstorff is all that great. In any case, Wolterstorff wrote 30+ years ago, so I wonder if his position changed.
2. What is the relevance of JPM's account of universals to Christian theology? Granted, that wasn't the scope of the book, but it is nonetheless an interesting question.
Conclusion:
I found this book a helfpul introduction to some highly specialized literature.
March 18, 2012
Universals (Central Problems of Philosophy) aims to be an introductory work on the issues of Universals aimed at undergraduates and professional philosophers, highlighting the various theories and ways of addressing the issues. In this aim, it is successful. It also aspires to be a defense of traditional realism, as well as a critique of the various other attempts at understanding properties. In this aim, it is not.
For the first goal, I will give a brief summary. The way properties are understood varies. There are three main ways to do this; Extreme Nominalism (the claim that qualities are not real, but some convenient fiction), Moderate Nominalism (the claim that qualities are real, but they are particulars),and Realism (the claim that qualities are real, and that they are universals). Moreland goes through each of these and explains how they answer certain questions involving (1) Predication, (2) Exact Similarity, and (3) Abstract Reference (properties themselves which have properties which stand in relation to other properties). He provides a more than adequate overview of each, as well as helpful principles regarding Identity as well as types of distinctions.
For the second aim, I'm afraid Moreland fails. This, however, is not a matter of poor argumentation. On the contrary, Moreland demonstrates a wonderful ability to reason through puzzles and understand the issues at hand. To begin with, Moreland accepts that those who prefer Extreme Nominalism are normally starting from a point of parsimony. It will be helpful to go into brief detail about this point. Extreme Nominalism (EN) is justified parsimoniously. The author supposes that this is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Its hard to say what is uneconomical in a metaphysical sense, but at the very least, it is best to believe only what one has sufficient reason to believe. If two competing theories explain some phenomenon equally well, the simpler one should be supposed.
So imagine 10 red spots.
A pure realist will claim that there are 3 kinds of being here, the universal red, the nonspatiotemporal nexus of exemplification, and the particular. There are thus 21 beings all together; 1 universal, 10 nonspatiotemporal extemplifications of redness, 10 particulars.
A moderate Nominalist will claim that there are 2 kinds of being (the quality-instance of redness and the particular), 10 particulars and 10 quality-instances of red, thus 20 beings altogether.
Armstrong's impure realism would claim that there are 2 kinds of being (the universal red, its spatiotemporal exemplification through the particular) 1 universal red, 10 particulars and thus 11 total beings.
Extreme Nominalism would claim that there is only 1 kind of being, and thus only 10 beings.
The problem again arises, which is a more costly ontological addition to the taxonomy of being, kinds or beings? The answer is tough.
The author seems to assume that the Realists ease of explanation of properties and quality instances leaves the burden of proof onto the Nominalists. Although how easy it is to explain these issues via Realism is a virtue, I think the more serious burden of proof lies upon the Realist since their view is, objectively, the least parsimonious.
Now, with this in mind, it seems that Moreland can only suppose Traditional Realism if he properly addresses Extreme Nominalism, Moderate Nominalism, and Impure Realism. He exhibits his argumentative virtuosity in achieving these aims, but I would like to focus on his assessment of Armstrong's Impure Realism.
Armstrong's realist position starts with an acceptance of naturalism as well as strong physicalism. There are no entities which exist which are not spatiotemporal in their nature, and anything that is to be counted as an entity must have causal powers. Armstrong does not believe that the traditional realist views allow for causal powers of their universals, and therefore since neither condition is met, there is no reason to accept them. I am in full agreement with Armstrong on this point. Armstrong also denies the existence of internal relations, because they could not be spatially located. Perhaps this is true, but my epistemic account may still be useful in Armstrong's ontology.
To allow for universals in a naturalist depiction, Armstrong denies the axiom of localization, that is that a thing can only be located at one place at one time. His view of universals are that they are multiply located spatiotemporal things (though this is not strictly true, as will be illustrated later) in the particulars that exemplify them.
To Armstrong, universality and particularity are inseparable. This leaves a Thick and Thin particular. The Thick particular is what it is in the state of affairs for A to be F. The Thick particular enfolds its properties so that they are spatially located where the particular is.
The Thin particular is an abstraction of a particular from its properties. It is not a thing per say, but the individuating factor that makes the Thick particular more than just a bundle of universals.
Armstrong denies immanent relation realism. That the Thick particular is a complex entity formed by a universal, a substratum, and a relational tie of predication. Instead, Armstrong posits immanent non-relational realism. Where particularity and universality differ by a formal distinction. They are inseparable and too intimately conjoined to be related.
After setting up Armstrong's realism, Moreland evaluates it.
Moreland does not think Armstrong's account is a viable form of realism in a naturalistic framework. He thinks that any naturalist should accept:
PIL: If entity e exists in toto at location L, then both (1) if x has proper parts, they overlap with and only with sub-regions of L, and (2) neither e nor any of its proper parts overlap with some other location P such that P is not identical to L or a sub-region of L.
The problem is both that he supposes that this principle is necessary for any entity in a naturalistic framework and that universals in Armstrong's assessment are entities.
The first I can understand, but universals in Armstrong's sense are not entities, they are ways an entity is. A way is not a thing, but how a thing is. So the second assumption is wrong at best and a strawman at worst.
Moreland also supposes that if his universals are entities which are co-located, they can both be in motion and at rest if some A has F and some B has F and A is stationary while B is moving.
This, again, would be a valid criticism of Armstrong if Armstrong's universals were entities. But they are not.
What Armstrong says is that for any being, if it exists, it must have causal powers. So a universal is a way of being which has causal powers (or perhaps just is the dispositional powers of a particular, though Armstrong would certainly reject this), therefore it would exist in the naturalistic sense. But it would also not be a full being because it cannot exist without being exemplified, and anything which exemplifies it is tied to it as its way of being. So the negative charge of an electron is the way the electron is in the state of affairs of being an electron. This charge clearly has causal powers, but it is also not a distinct entity in the way Moreland supposes Armstrong takes it to be.
What Moreland is failing to do is introduce Armstrong's notion of states of affairs which are a component to understanding his idea of universals. Armstrong distinguishes between two approaches to ontology. One is thingyness the other is factness. States of affairs are a fact-type ontology where the things in he universe are not sufficient alone to account for the way things are. What is also necessary is their arrangement, the way they are, how they relate to one another and how their ways interact. I am convinced that something like this is close to the truth, but I won't argue for this here.
Moreland is talking about Armstrong's ideas under the precept of a thingish ontology. So of course universals will be taken as entities. But this is a mistake. Whether this is a deliberate move on Moreland's part is another matter. Considering that A World of States of Affairs is included in the bibliography and frequently referenced throughout this book, it is hard to see how it couldn't have been. In A World of States of Affairs, Armstrong specifies his form of ontology and there is even a section on "Universals as Ways" where he says they should not be considered to be things, or even entities. but ways (A World of states of Affairs, 3.6 UNIVERSALS AS WAYS, p. 30).
So from these facts, one of two assumptions can be made. (1) Moreland understood Armstrong's understanding and deliberately set up a strawman position (which Armstrong himself would not agree with). Or (2), considering how explicit Armstrong himself is about these points, Moreland did not pay very close attention to Armstrong's arguments. If (1), it is a display of serious intellectual dishonesty and leaves one to question the other arguments Moreland has set up, only to knock down. If (2) his scholarship is questionable and how seriously we ought to take his arguments if they are laden with misinterpretations as a consequence of not reading carefully.
I hate to suggest it, but Moreland seems like a man who knows his stuff. I am leaning towards (1), but will leave room for the benefit of the doubt.
Following this exposition, Moreland moves on to say that there are at least four advantages to the realist views vs Armstrong's (or more precisely, Moreland's Armstrong) and Campbell's.
1. F-ness needs to be brought together with its instances so that its instances may properly be called F. Armstrong's account succeeds in this as well.
2. The universal being in its instance is explained by traditional realism in a superior way to that of Campbell or Armstrong.
Campbell has them being members of sets, but this doesn't clarify what it is for those things to be in their instance.
Moreland's Armstrong can't explain it as well either because the colocation only says that the instance is at the same place as the individuator, rather than in it. This would be true if Armstrong's universals were entities, but since they aren't, Armstrong's account actually succeeds here as well.
3. Traditional realism allows a way of grounding the relationship of the Universal with the particular as a complex entity. Campbell fails in this because his properties are simples and identical to their particular, but then fail to establish the distinctness of the quality.
Armstrong succeeds, but in a way detrimental to his naturalism, according to Moreland. He claims that Armstrong's universals are entities in complex state of affairs relationships with their particular, but that this is a form of realism since the universals are spatiotemporal "entities". But, again, they are not. So Armstrong's view again succeeds while maintaining Naturalism and without conceding to traditional realism. The relationship is a Thick particular which is a complex entity where the universal is grounded in its instance by being the way a particular is.
4. Traditional realism explains how universals transcend their instances.
Campbell's view fails this because the members of a set cannot transcend the set itself. Armstrong in Moreland's analysis does this, but by denying the axiom of localization. If the violation of this is allowed, the universal transcends its instances by being spatiotemporally identical to them. But this should not be seen as a serious problem of universals as ways, rather than as entities.
So despite what Moreland says to the contrary, Armstrong's view is successful on all of these counts. Thus he supports no negative argument against Armstrong, nor any positive argument for traditional realism contra Armstrong.
My rationale for giving this book 2 stars is as follows:
As an introduction, it is fantastic. Despite some grammatical errors here and there, he provides the reader with a rich understanding of the vocabulary and methods of the debates about universals. Normally, this alone would warrant at least 4 stars. However, in light of what I believe is a deliberate straw man argument against Armstrong (I am not sufficiently well read in the other authors discussed to judge whether they were also represented unfairly), I would give this book no stars. There are few things I dislike more than intellectual dishonesty. And if it was simply a misreading, his impoverished scholarship would also necessitate a poorer evaluation of the work in question. Knowing that Moreland's goals were two-fold, I thought it would only be fair to factor the evaluation of both into the total work.
My suggestion, read this only in order to become acquainted with the field of study and you will gain more than you will lose.
For the first goal, I will give a brief summary. The way properties are understood varies. There are three main ways to do this; Extreme Nominalism (the claim that qualities are not real, but some convenient fiction), Moderate Nominalism (the claim that qualities are real, but they are particulars),and Realism (the claim that qualities are real, and that they are universals). Moreland goes through each of these and explains how they answer certain questions involving (1) Predication, (2) Exact Similarity, and (3) Abstract Reference (properties themselves which have properties which stand in relation to other properties). He provides a more than adequate overview of each, as well as helpful principles regarding Identity as well as types of distinctions.
For the second aim, I'm afraid Moreland fails. This, however, is not a matter of poor argumentation. On the contrary, Moreland demonstrates a wonderful ability to reason through puzzles and understand the issues at hand. To begin with, Moreland accepts that those who prefer Extreme Nominalism are normally starting from a point of parsimony. It will be helpful to go into brief detail about this point. Extreme Nominalism (EN) is justified parsimoniously. The author supposes that this is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Its hard to say what is uneconomical in a metaphysical sense, but at the very least, it is best to believe only what one has sufficient reason to believe. If two competing theories explain some phenomenon equally well, the simpler one should be supposed.
So imagine 10 red spots.
A pure realist will claim that there are 3 kinds of being here, the universal red, the nonspatiotemporal nexus of exemplification, and the particular. There are thus 21 beings all together; 1 universal, 10 nonspatiotemporal extemplifications of redness, 10 particulars.
A moderate Nominalist will claim that there are 2 kinds of being (the quality-instance of redness and the particular), 10 particulars and 10 quality-instances of red, thus 20 beings altogether.
Armstrong's impure realism would claim that there are 2 kinds of being (the universal red, its spatiotemporal exemplification through the particular) 1 universal red, 10 particulars and thus 11 total beings.
Extreme Nominalism would claim that there is only 1 kind of being, and thus only 10 beings.
The problem again arises, which is a more costly ontological addition to the taxonomy of being, kinds or beings? The answer is tough.
The author seems to assume that the Realists ease of explanation of properties and quality instances leaves the burden of proof onto the Nominalists. Although how easy it is to explain these issues via Realism is a virtue, I think the more serious burden of proof lies upon the Realist since their view is, objectively, the least parsimonious.
Now, with this in mind, it seems that Moreland can only suppose Traditional Realism if he properly addresses Extreme Nominalism, Moderate Nominalism, and Impure Realism. He exhibits his argumentative virtuosity in achieving these aims, but I would like to focus on his assessment of Armstrong's Impure Realism.
Armstrong's realist position starts with an acceptance of naturalism as well as strong physicalism. There are no entities which exist which are not spatiotemporal in their nature, and anything that is to be counted as an entity must have causal powers. Armstrong does not believe that the traditional realist views allow for causal powers of their universals, and therefore since neither condition is met, there is no reason to accept them. I am in full agreement with Armstrong on this point. Armstrong also denies the existence of internal relations, because they could not be spatially located. Perhaps this is true, but my epistemic account may still be useful in Armstrong's ontology.
To allow for universals in a naturalist depiction, Armstrong denies the axiom of localization, that is that a thing can only be located at one place at one time. His view of universals are that they are multiply located spatiotemporal things (though this is not strictly true, as will be illustrated later) in the particulars that exemplify them.
To Armstrong, universality and particularity are inseparable. This leaves a Thick and Thin particular. The Thick particular is what it is in the state of affairs for A to be F. The Thick particular enfolds its properties so that they are spatially located where the particular is.
The Thin particular is an abstraction of a particular from its properties. It is not a thing per say, but the individuating factor that makes the Thick particular more than just a bundle of universals.
Armstrong denies immanent relation realism. That the Thick particular is a complex entity formed by a universal, a substratum, and a relational tie of predication. Instead, Armstrong posits immanent non-relational realism. Where particularity and universality differ by a formal distinction. They are inseparable and too intimately conjoined to be related.
After setting up Armstrong's realism, Moreland evaluates it.
Moreland does not think Armstrong's account is a viable form of realism in a naturalistic framework. He thinks that any naturalist should accept:
PIL: If entity e exists in toto at location L, then both (1) if x has proper parts, they overlap with and only with sub-regions of L, and (2) neither e nor any of its proper parts overlap with some other location P such that P is not identical to L or a sub-region of L.
The problem is both that he supposes that this principle is necessary for any entity in a naturalistic framework and that universals in Armstrong's assessment are entities.
The first I can understand, but universals in Armstrong's sense are not entities, they are ways an entity is. A way is not a thing, but how a thing is. So the second assumption is wrong at best and a strawman at worst.
Moreland also supposes that if his universals are entities which are co-located, they can both be in motion and at rest if some A has F and some B has F and A is stationary while B is moving.
This, again, would be a valid criticism of Armstrong if Armstrong's universals were entities. But they are not.
What Armstrong says is that for any being, if it exists, it must have causal powers. So a universal is a way of being which has causal powers (or perhaps just is the dispositional powers of a particular, though Armstrong would certainly reject this), therefore it would exist in the naturalistic sense. But it would also not be a full being because it cannot exist without being exemplified, and anything which exemplifies it is tied to it as its way of being. So the negative charge of an electron is the way the electron is in the state of affairs of being an electron. This charge clearly has causal powers, but it is also not a distinct entity in the way Moreland supposes Armstrong takes it to be.
What Moreland is failing to do is introduce Armstrong's notion of states of affairs which are a component to understanding his idea of universals. Armstrong distinguishes between two approaches to ontology. One is thingyness the other is factness. States of affairs are a fact-type ontology where the things in he universe are not sufficient alone to account for the way things are. What is also necessary is their arrangement, the way they are, how they relate to one another and how their ways interact. I am convinced that something like this is close to the truth, but I won't argue for this here.
Moreland is talking about Armstrong's ideas under the precept of a thingish ontology. So of course universals will be taken as entities. But this is a mistake. Whether this is a deliberate move on Moreland's part is another matter. Considering that A World of States of Affairs is included in the bibliography and frequently referenced throughout this book, it is hard to see how it couldn't have been. In A World of States of Affairs, Armstrong specifies his form of ontology and there is even a section on "Universals as Ways" where he says they should not be considered to be things, or even entities. but ways (A World of states of Affairs, 3.6 UNIVERSALS AS WAYS, p. 30).
So from these facts, one of two assumptions can be made. (1) Moreland understood Armstrong's understanding and deliberately set up a strawman position (which Armstrong himself would not agree with). Or (2), considering how explicit Armstrong himself is about these points, Moreland did not pay very close attention to Armstrong's arguments. If (1), it is a display of serious intellectual dishonesty and leaves one to question the other arguments Moreland has set up, only to knock down. If (2) his scholarship is questionable and how seriously we ought to take his arguments if they are laden with misinterpretations as a consequence of not reading carefully.
I hate to suggest it, but Moreland seems like a man who knows his stuff. I am leaning towards (1), but will leave room for the benefit of the doubt.
Following this exposition, Moreland moves on to say that there are at least four advantages to the realist views vs Armstrong's (or more precisely, Moreland's Armstrong) and Campbell's.
1. F-ness needs to be brought together with its instances so that its instances may properly be called F. Armstrong's account succeeds in this as well.
2. The universal being in its instance is explained by traditional realism in a superior way to that of Campbell or Armstrong.
Campbell has them being members of sets, but this doesn't clarify what it is for those things to be in their instance.
Moreland's Armstrong can't explain it as well either because the colocation only says that the instance is at the same place as the individuator, rather than in it. This would be true if Armstrong's universals were entities, but since they aren't, Armstrong's account actually succeeds here as well.
3. Traditional realism allows a way of grounding the relationship of the Universal with the particular as a complex entity. Campbell fails in this because his properties are simples and identical to their particular, but then fail to establish the distinctness of the quality.
Armstrong succeeds, but in a way detrimental to his naturalism, according to Moreland. He claims that Armstrong's universals are entities in complex state of affairs relationships with their particular, but that this is a form of realism since the universals are spatiotemporal "entities". But, again, they are not. So Armstrong's view again succeeds while maintaining Naturalism and without conceding to traditional realism. The relationship is a Thick particular which is a complex entity where the universal is grounded in its instance by being the way a particular is.
4. Traditional realism explains how universals transcend their instances.
Campbell's view fails this because the members of a set cannot transcend the set itself. Armstrong in Moreland's analysis does this, but by denying the axiom of localization. If the violation of this is allowed, the universal transcends its instances by being spatiotemporally identical to them. But this should not be seen as a serious problem of universals as ways, rather than as entities.
So despite what Moreland says to the contrary, Armstrong's view is successful on all of these counts. Thus he supports no negative argument against Armstrong, nor any positive argument for traditional realism contra Armstrong.
My rationale for giving this book 2 stars is as follows:
As an introduction, it is fantastic. Despite some grammatical errors here and there, he provides the reader with a rich understanding of the vocabulary and methods of the debates about universals. Normally, this alone would warrant at least 4 stars. However, in light of what I believe is a deliberate straw man argument against Armstrong (I am not sufficiently well read in the other authors discussed to judge whether they were also represented unfairly), I would give this book no stars. There are few things I dislike more than intellectual dishonesty. And if it was simply a misreading, his impoverished scholarship would also necessitate a poorer evaluation of the work in question. Knowing that Moreland's goals were two-fold, I thought it would only be fair to factor the evaluation of both into the total work.
My suggestion, read this only in order to become acquainted with the field of study and you will gain more than you will lose.
May 27, 2008
Along with the metaphysics of substance, the problem of universals is the paradigm case of a perennial issue in the history of philosophy."
What are properties? How do they relate to the things that have them? Can multiple objects have the same property? Can a property exist if no object has it? How do we classify similar (but distinct) objects? In the aptly
and simply named Universals, J. P. Moreland offers a survey of the three dominant approaches to answering these and related questions: extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and realism. Moreland himself favors realism, but his treatments of all three positions are balanced and reasonably thorough.
The book is intended for philosophy students and professionals, so the language gets a bit technical at times. But it is an introductory text, so readers don't need extensive background knowledge to make sense of the arguments.
What are properties? How do they relate to the things that have them? Can multiple objects have the same property? Can a property exist if no object has it? How do we classify similar (but distinct) objects? In the aptly
and simply named Universals, J. P. Moreland offers a survey of the three dominant approaches to answering these and related questions: extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and realism. Moreland himself favors realism, but his treatments of all three positions are balanced and reasonably thorough.
The book is intended for philosophy students and professionals, so the language gets a bit technical at times. But it is an introductory text, so readers don't need extensive background knowledge to make sense of the arguments.
October 15, 2012
Great intro the some of the chief problems and debates concerning the one and the many.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews