I’ve been fascinated with Nathanael Greene since I was very young. He was an interesting person in himself, but what interests me even more is that he never got credit for the influence he had, not just on the outcome of the Revolution, but on military strategy and doctrine.
Greene grew up in a Quaker family in Rhode Island. His father didn’t believe in anything like a liberal education, so anything Greene learned that wasn’t written in the bible, he taught himself. He was particularly interested in military history and strategy, and in 1774, he joined the New Hampshire militia. It says something about mobilization for that war, and something about Greene, that within two years year he went from being a private in a state militia to a major general in the Continental Army. But he got Washington’s attention and became one of his favorites.
Greene had some moderate success as a strategist during the early years of the war, but really won Washington’s favor by keeping the army clothed and fed as its quartermaster through Valley Forge and some incredibly lean years. What he really wanted though, was a field command, and he continually reminded Washington of this. But Washington needed an opportunity to give him one.
By the summer of 1780, the Continental Army in the South was under the command of Horatio Gates, an ambitious general who disliked George Washington and thought he wasn’t suited to be the commander in chief. Gates thought he himself should have the job. It didn’t help Gates’ case when he led the army into a disastrous battle at Camden, South Carolina, in which they were nearly annihilated. Gates was relieved of his command, and Washington sent Greene to lead what remained of the southern army.
The idea was to somehow wrest control of Georgia and the Carolinas away from the British. But there was no way Greene would be able to accomplish this in open battle, when they were outnumbered nearly 7 to 1, had little artillery and not enough horses and were in relatively hostile territory, since the South was known for having a higher ratio of loyalists. So Greene maneuvered, constantly on the move, crisscrossing through the South, getting the British to chase him, occasionally turning to fight them, but then quickly abandoning the field once he had harangued the British enough.
Greene came to the realization that the war didn’t have to be about taking and controlling territory. He instead chose to make sure that every time his army made a stand and the British chased them off, it was at a huge cost to the British. They could have the land. Greene’s campaign included three major battles, at Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse and Eutaw Springs, and technically, Greene lost every one of them. But in the end, the British expended so much energy chasing him and his tiny army, that they had effectively given up control of the South simply because they weren't there. And they were so exhausted and depleted from the chase, and from the cost of driving Greene off those battlefields, that they chose to hole up far away in Virginia, at Yorktown. There, they were surrounded by Washington’s army from the north, hemmed in by the French fleet off the coast, and the entire British Southern army surrendered. It effectively ended the war.
In reality, what Greene conducted was an insurgency, and the British never figured out how to deal with it. It didn’t come down to territory or positioning, it came down to the fact that Greene dictated the terms of engagement, and the British let him. The British were willing to give up a thousand soldiers in order to gain the field at Guilford Courthouse. Greene was willing to give up the field at Guilford Courthouse at the cost of a thousand British soldiers. The British general, Cornwallis, who was considered their best strategist, played right into his hands. He maneuvered Cornwallis all over the south, led him away from the territory he was there to secure and into the territory from which he never escaped. It was incredibly dramatic, and it was truly brilliant.
And yet, very few people in the United States know who Nathanael Greene was. Part of that is a general lack of knowledge of our own history, and part of it is the fact that Greene never got his due. He wasn’t a politician, he died young and wasn’t really a part of the administration of the United States after the war. He went pretty quietly. But his contribution was one of a few fundamental elements that affected the way that war went, at a time it could have gone either way. I would love to see more research and more writing done on who he was and what he did.