Moyar presents a somewhat revisionist account of the history of American counterinsurgency campaigns. His individual chapters are very interesting, especially the ones about Iraq and Afghanistan. His basic argument is that FM 3-24 and its main proponents have not adequately appreciated the importance of leadership in successful counterinsurgency. The idea that leadership is the most important factor, however, misses the point that good leaders still need a good strategy, something that FM 3-24 provides. A good leader will vigorously and sensitively put into practice the basic tenets of population security, civil administration, and winning hearts and minds. Moyar's argument would be more successful if he portrayed himself as a complement to FM-3-24's advocates rather than a challenger. Nevertheless, this is a useful and interesting book that does convincingly show the critical need for a particular kind of innovative leader in counterinsurgency, especially in native armies. 301 pages.