So the copy in the possession of this reviewer has 345 pages. It is owned previously and comes with highlights and annotations, so there might be a bit more to say than usual.
Hang on, I might be able to spot a core difficulty before reaching the end of the first full page of printed text on p xiii.
Quoth Prof Lessig on pxiv: "A free culture supports and protects creators and innovators." and the previous owner continues with the highlighter pen "It does this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from control of the past." [italics quoted].
It may be worth formalising what it is that innovators do that requires the protection of what is described as a free culture which the reader is given to understand further down the same page as being the opposite of permission culture in inverted commas. To the extent that the development and growth of culture requires the consent of a third-party to be bestowed or withheld, to what extent does the conversation about culture turn into one about the nature of privilege? To the extent that intellectual property rights are given as a result of the outcome of these processes, what would their purpose be and what are the responsibilities and duties that may be anticipated to be accompanied by them? To the extent that the culture of the past in Western Civilisation may make reference to facts of history, the complete works of Shakespeare and-or the King James Bible, what are the rights, responsibilities and duties of creators and innovators that may follow on from that? On the same page in text which is not highlighted, what is the significance of the we in general in inverted commas, and how would that relate in particular to the you in inverted commas? What else appears to be relevant in this context, including over on to pxv the concerns and requirements of groups and individuals understood to have particularly pronounced differences of point of view in inverted commas?
Further on pxv, the reader is offered "Indeed, as I reread Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free Society I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here are insights Stallman described decades ago." and taking account of three instances of I in the same sentence (there's another one on p242, and there are nine instances of I on p245 and seventeen on p244), to what extent do the we have a material concern (or at least a rhyme and metre conundrum) with this conclusion? Further, "The work of a lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own." appears to beg the question or two, to include the extent to which such a comment might induce Philippe Sands to reach for the sensodyne. The reviewer struggles with Prof Lessig's use of queer as verb (e.g. pxvi), and the character of instances of extremism need to be elaborated and understood so that they are not interpreted as meaning maximum-volume-screaming-not-like-me-ism.
The beginning of the introduction considers the difficulties that have presented interpreting rights based on the land extending upwards into the sky, indefinitely. There appears to be a basic weakness in a part of the argument in a part of a judgement offered on p2. The Causbys wanted to complain about low-flying military aircraft whose characteristics the reader understands have harmed their livestock, whereas the judgement appears to make a more general statement about aircraft flying at 36,000 ft which presumably would not induce such damage. Common sense revolts at the idea is placed in inverted commas on pages two and three, and so, what are the difficulties associated with arguments that travel from gut to mouth, by-passing brain and ignoring the interests of the other one(s), over there? The conversations about the handling of matters ob scena need to take place in an appropriate setting at the earliest opportunity. The footnote in the references cites the supreme court judgment, and includes a taking aphid, as well making reference to (via a link which appears to be not one, as the reader is informed that the author had been suggested) Keith Aoki - "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship" Stanford Law Review 48 1996 pp1293-1355.
It seems from this reviewer's point of view at the moment, that there appears to be a compressed difficulty about the connection between culture and privilege and there appears to be an associated difficulty with the nature of entitlements. On p229 of code version 2.0 , Prof Lessig points out "If you have a resource protected by a liability rule, then I can take that resource as long as I pay a state-determined price. That price may be more or less than you value it. But the point is, I have the right to take that resource, regardless." A basic problem here appears to be the impression is being made that if an individual relatively speaking is very wealthy, or otherwise very well-connected in the social sense, that individual has an entitlement to steal what he or she wants as long as the state puts its value on what is taken. (To what extent is this argument made good at the top of p251, at least to those that relate to the activities of state agents, and how should the activities of non-state agents best be handled and addressed?)
The Aoki paper reviews the contemporary legal difficulties associated with property rights attached to content distributed across cyberspace. It includes reference to a number of relatively thin concepts, e.g. "property", "sovereignty", "intellectual property", "authorship", "globalization", "unbundled", "hardening", "literary works", "private", "public", "map", "representation", "space", "international", "cyberspace" etc., and it may be desirable to attach such markers to suitable buckets into which various instances can be deposited for an assessment of quality, value and the merits of alternative claims, and to support proper rendering processes. From this reviewer's perspective, the basic issue at the beginning and the end of the paper appears to be one of poor availability of decent anchoring processes, and once those can be defined, then the others in between may become easier to handle and address.
Returning now to page three, the previous owner of the book isn't very impressed with 'Their "private interest" would not be allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.' in connection with an implied argument that the Causbys prior use of the land should not take priority over the use of the air over it subsequently by the military jets. The impression being created is that the case was only considering damage to the livestock and not the people of the household: were anchoring arrangements better in this instance, perhaps with a little foresight, there might have been some opportunity to purchase the Causby's property in advance and relocate their farm to a quieter site? The previous owner of the book asks: 'So what about now where the "Disneys" of our generation with their limitless pockets are defeating the public's property?' I shall wish upon a star and think about that one carefully.
On page 7, the reader is informed that Free Culture is not about the internet, but it is about an effect of the internet beyond the internet, namely an effect of how culture is made. The reviewer is on the look out for which effect the author has in mind, and to the extent that the effect is significant, what would be the corresponding principal cause and pathway to the effect Prof Lessig considers. The we is(/are) able, apparently, to distinguish between commercial culture on the one hand, and non-commercial culture on the other: an example of the latter being instances of old men sitting on park benches or street corners telling kids and others stories. The reviewer is mindful of just how fast time seems to fly and is old enough to have been able to read books in the twentieth century. The reviewer is currently separated from his copy of No Logo and isn't sure what Naomi Klein would make of all of this.
Considering commercial culture, which effect makes commercial culture, and to the extent that the primary driver of this process is an institutional requirement to book revenue (see p97, p127), just how much of what sells easily and its opposite should the law deem to be sufficient, who are the principal beneficiaries of these allocations and what are the external goods and bads; why would the we, understood in this context to be those not charged with drafting legislation, wish to map the law? Considering non-commercial culture, there still appears to be a narrative thread missing that connects privileges, duties and entitlements.
To what extent are there structural similarities between culture making and market making? (and making lawyers?! - p304) In the public space, Mr Blankfein points out "I would say that the obligations of the market maker are to make sure your clients are suitable and to make sure they understand it." In this context, what is the it, the thing over there, that je ne sais quoi , that tempting little twitchy-itchy? (and similarly on p146 in 'My point here is to map the change...'?) And would it be possible to elaborate the origins, purposes, and terms of Goldman's licence to make markets? (the issues on p109 need to be handled carefully - to what extent does this answer provide assistance with the handling of theologically non-compliant earlier cases?). Concerning the arguments at the end of p233, the conversations (separate to those relating to copyright) around the extent to which cultural bads provide enabling cover to facilitate third-party mischief need to take place at,in an appropriate time,setting.
On page 8: "At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated." What assumptions are made here, and for each, to what extent is this statement strictly accurate? And on the same page "The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly, then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could sell those exclusive rights in a commercial marketplace." Here, the previous owner of the book takes issue "I'm not sure if I agree that the primary purpose of the law was to protect the creators." which seems like fair comment. In the attached footnote, the author points out that the copyright law afforded privacy rights to the copyright holder to prevent the distribution of facts about the holder to third parties, and, at this point, the author references Warren and Brandeis' The Right to Privacy Harv Law Rev 4(5) 1890 pp193-220. The reviewer would wish to highlight:-
"It remains to consider what are the limitations of this right to privacy, and what remedies may be granted for the enforcement of the right. To determine in advance of experience the exact line at which the dignity and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public welfare or of private justice would be a difficult task; but the more general rules are furnished by the legal analogies already developed in the law of slander and libel, and in the law of literary and artistic property.
I. The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest."
and to suggest that these issues seem available to go through at,in an appropriate setting (as well as those presenting in Andrew Ross Sorkin's Too Big to Fail on pp220, 402, 512, 528-9, 541.). The model illustrated at the bottom of p132 appears to be leaning towards a comply or explain framework, and on p135, are there any concerns around regulatory arbitrage? What else may be relevant in this context?
Considering the argument at the end of page 8, and onto page 9, what would the implied entitlements be of culture-forming businesses and artists engaged in them, and what might this imply for modifications sought to trust, competition, labo(u)r and finance law? What else may be relevant in this context (to inc the arguments on pp60-1)?
#aphids - p10, p11, p12, p13, p17, p18, p19, p20, p23, p24, p25, p26, p27, p33, p34, p35, p53, p59, p61, p62, p64, p65, p66, p67, p68, p69, p73, p74, p75, p76, p77, p78, p83, p84, p85, p86, p87, p88, p90, p91, p94, p97, p98, p106, p108, p111, p112, p115, p117, p118, p119, p120, p122, p130, p131, p135, p136, p137, p138, p139, p140, p141, p142, p143, p144, p145, p146, p148, p151, p152, p153, p154, p155, p165, p166, p167, p168, p172, p177, p178, p179, p181, p182, p183, p184, p185, p186, p187, p192, p193, p195, p201, p202, p203, p204, p205, p206, p207, p215, p216, p217, p218, p219, p220, p221, p230, p232, p233, p234, p235, p236, p237, p243, p246, p250, p252, p253, p254, p255, p256, p276, p277, p278, p280, p283, p284, p285, p288, p290, p293, p294, p295, p298, p299, p301, p302, p303, p304
On p11, to what extent is it clear in "[The story that follows] is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its code." who the (sponsors of the) belligerent parties are and what their issues, arguments and claims would be?
On p12, "I believe it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the Causbys." appears to be a convoluted declaration.
On p19, to what extent is it clear what the good is in "in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the instrument that we are losing the sight of the value."? Once deconvoluted, to what extent does the issue boil down to arguments around the nature of privileges, duties and entitlements? On p24, to what extent might it be feasible to deconvolute creativity into those parts concerned with the presentation of cultural goods in the public domain from the shadow components that would need to be dis-aggregated, handled, addressed and resolved appropriately and properly?
The arguments on pp24-8 appear to contain a rich palette of convoluted symmetries playing the euphemisms at the entangled metaphors: it may be decent to reserve a space to consider Prof Lessig's taste in literature? On p29, concerning "Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal to first?", to what extent are the rights to perform Shakepeare as well as the performance itself considered in certain quarters to be commodities? What else appears to be particularly relevant in this context? The issues and arguments on pp36-8, p99, p11o, p117-9, pp122-4, pp124-30, p139 should be addressed in, at an appropriate time/setting; perhaps a dictionary definition of Lessigian is required to describe those on p204.
:-o p85, p88