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Lost in Translation: Vietnam: A Combat Advisor's Story
In September 1962, when Martin Dockery landed in Saigon, he was a young, determined, idealistic U.S. Army first lieutenant convinced of America’s imminent victory in Vietnam. While most of the twelve thousand U.S. military advisors in-country at the time filled support positions in Saigon and other major cities, Dockery was one of a handful of advisors assigned to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat units.
For eight months Dockery lived and fought in the heart of the Mekong Delta with an ARVN infantry battalion on missions and operations that often lasted several days. And for most of that time, whether tramping through the steaming, leech-infested jungle, hiking across canals, or engaging in sudden firefights, Dockery was the only American soldier with the unit.
Dockery’s solitary assignment with ARVN during the infancy of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia afforded him an understanding of Vietnam far more profound than most other Americans. Lost in Translation is his riveting account of the largely overlooked role of American combat advisors in the war. As he vividly evokes the sounds, smells, and vistas of the country and its people, Dockery depicts an army poorly trained, incompetent, and unwilling to fight for a government every bit as corrupt as that of the French colonial empire it replaced. Yet even worse than his daily fare of isolation, frustration, and danger was Dockery’s growing conviction that the advisory program was doomed. Though these dedicated, highly motivated advisors would do their best and persevere under the most trying circumstances, they would not succeed.
The author’s eyewitness testimony provides inescapable evidence that as early as 1962 the writing was already on the wall concerning the outcome of the Vietnam War. Although it would take U.S. leaders more than a decade to divine what the young officer learned in a single year, Dockery’s personal and penetrating analysis of the war—which he presented in a lecture at a Special Forces facility in Germany one week after his tour in Vietnam ended—proved chillingly accurate. Those who send soldiers to war should consider the realities and truths within these pages.
For eight months Dockery lived and fought in the heart of the Mekong Delta with an ARVN infantry battalion on missions and operations that often lasted several days. And for most of that time, whether tramping through the steaming, leech-infested jungle, hiking across canals, or engaging in sudden firefights, Dockery was the only American soldier with the unit.
Dockery’s solitary assignment with ARVN during the infancy of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia afforded him an understanding of Vietnam far more profound than most other Americans. Lost in Translation is his riveting account of the largely overlooked role of American combat advisors in the war. As he vividly evokes the sounds, smells, and vistas of the country and its people, Dockery depicts an army poorly trained, incompetent, and unwilling to fight for a government every bit as corrupt as that of the French colonial empire it replaced. Yet even worse than his daily fare of isolation, frustration, and danger was Dockery’s growing conviction that the advisory program was doomed. Though these dedicated, highly motivated advisors would do their best and persevere under the most trying circumstances, they would not succeed.
The author’s eyewitness testimony provides inescapable evidence that as early as 1962 the writing was already on the wall concerning the outcome of the Vietnam War. Although it would take U.S. leaders more than a decade to divine what the young officer learned in a single year, Dockery’s personal and penetrating analysis of the war—which he presented in a lecture at a Special Forces facility in Germany one week after his tour in Vietnam ended—proved chillingly accurate. Those who send soldiers to war should consider the realities and truths within these pages.
272 pages, Hardcover
First published July 22, 2003
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January 29, 2022
Hardly any discussion about the military aspects of the Vietnam conflict does not touch on the subject of ignorance and incompetence. The high-ranking military brass in Washington was ignorant, and so were the majority of American military advisers in South Vietnam. Their inadequate advice influenced the performance of the ARVN, and later of the US Army, negatively. Their blatant disregard of those Vietnamese and Americans who understood the Viet Minh and the tactics of guerrilla warfare played into the hands of the Communists. They fought ideology with technology. That Vietnam became a military disaster is to a substantial extent their fault.
So many and varied are these tales of incompetence that it seems as if competent, experienced advisers were the stuff of legends only; that they never reached Vietnam. However, such advisers indeed existed and worked tirelessly to improve the situation on a local level at least. Their efforts were, alas, not recognized by the majority, but their recorded knowledge can help avoid failures like the Vietnam conflict in the future. One such knowledegable adviser is the author of this book, Martin J. Dockery, who served as a combat adviser to a Vietnamese infantry battalion in the eventful, for both South Vietnam and America, 1963.
In LOST IN TRANSLATION, he had chronicled everything his personal experience had taught him and developed an approach, which amazes with its insightfulness and understanding of human relations.
Unlike many American advisers, who looked down on South Vietnamese commanders, Dockery emphasizes the importance of treating them with respect, of appreciating their work-load, and of criticizing current their policies and strategies only in private. One of the reasons why American advisers often had difficulties imposing their (good) advice on the ARVN was that they did not have a harmonious relationship with the Vietnamese commanders and therefore could not win the trust of the ARVN.
Another significant problem he addresses is the discord that existed between the Vietnamese population and the military – a highly risky situation in a war whose outcome depended on which side would manage to win over the people. Dockery warns against practicing military arrogance when dealing with civilians, as it can irritate them easily.
The trouble with many American military advisers was that upon arrival, they assumed that they were the commanders and their Vietnamese colleagues were their subordinates. Instead of focusing on developing a healthy relationship with the Vietnamese officers and generals, they rushed to impose their opinion on the decision-making process. In return, the Vietnamese commanders wasted more time and energy on avoiding the American advisers than on providing useful information, which in turn made the Americans assume that the Vietnamese military men were incompetent and could be ignored. Nothing good ever came out of this lack of collaboration: the ARVN could not benefit from American expertise, and at the same time, the American military personnel were kept in the dark and could not develop effective strategies. That is why another important advice Dockery gives is that the Vietnamese commanders should be treated as equals. Furthermore, advising should work both ways, and the Americans should set an example by asking the advice of the Vietnamese, who might have a lot of useful ideas.
Many Americans assumed that North Vietnam and South Vietnam were inherently separated entities. Considering that they were governed by two opposing regimes, it was easy to forget that only a few years ago they were one country, one people who fought against the despised French colonialists. Among the South Vietnamese commanders, there were quite a few who had fought with the Viet Minh, but chose South Vietnam after the First Indochina War because they disagreed with Ho Chi Minh's Communism. They knew the strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh. Had their opinion not been widely disregarded by the Americans, South Vietnam might have achieved more successes on the jungle battlefield.
To facilitate understanding, Dockery also draws a portrait of the perfect adviser, and what emerges is sadly the complete opposite of most American advisers in Vietnam. The perfect adviser is patient and tactful, adaptable and pleasant, honest and understanding. He displays high moral standards, which serve as an example for his unit, and devotion to his job. He keeps himself and his men in good physical condition that will allow them to endure jungle warfare. Most importantly, he knows his job and the unit he is advising about organization, equipment, and tactics very well. Generally, the traits of an adviser include all the traits of leadership, as well as the ability to adapt to diverse environments.
He should also be aware of the cultural background of the people he is advising. In the Far East, arrogance and dogmatism would result in a loss of face. While most American advisers assumed that because they came from a large and powerful country, they had to be respected automatically. However, as Dockery explains, to present himself favorably to Vietnamese, the adviser should prove his value in a gradual and unassuming manner. The highest form of advising is to advise in such away that the person advised takes the desired action, feeling that it was his own initiative.
Martin J. Dockery's book should have been distributed as required reading to all American military advisers in South Vietnam. Had all advisers worked on becoming the best versions of themselves, the ARVN, which was known to be an army making virtually no progress no matter how many advisers America assigned, would have improved its performance significantly. With his experience working in South Vietnam, Dockery proves that collaboration with the Vietnamese was possible; that getting rid of one's ignorance and making fewer mistakes was possible; and that the Communist insurgents were not inherently undefeatable. While its lesson cannot be applied to Vietnam anymore, LOST IN TRANSLATION should be required reading in the military, for it teaches simple but valuable lessons.
So many and varied are these tales of incompetence that it seems as if competent, experienced advisers were the stuff of legends only; that they never reached Vietnam. However, such advisers indeed existed and worked tirelessly to improve the situation on a local level at least. Their efforts were, alas, not recognized by the majority, but their recorded knowledge can help avoid failures like the Vietnam conflict in the future. One such knowledegable adviser is the author of this book, Martin J. Dockery, who served as a combat adviser to a Vietnamese infantry battalion in the eventful, for both South Vietnam and America, 1963.
In LOST IN TRANSLATION, he had chronicled everything his personal experience had taught him and developed an approach, which amazes with its insightfulness and understanding of human relations.
Unlike many American advisers, who looked down on South Vietnamese commanders, Dockery emphasizes the importance of treating them with respect, of appreciating their work-load, and of criticizing current their policies and strategies only in private. One of the reasons why American advisers often had difficulties imposing their (good) advice on the ARVN was that they did not have a harmonious relationship with the Vietnamese commanders and therefore could not win the trust of the ARVN.
Another significant problem he addresses is the discord that existed between the Vietnamese population and the military – a highly risky situation in a war whose outcome depended on which side would manage to win over the people. Dockery warns against practicing military arrogance when dealing with civilians, as it can irritate them easily.
The trouble with many American military advisers was that upon arrival, they assumed that they were the commanders and their Vietnamese colleagues were their subordinates. Instead of focusing on developing a healthy relationship with the Vietnamese officers and generals, they rushed to impose their opinion on the decision-making process. In return, the Vietnamese commanders wasted more time and energy on avoiding the American advisers than on providing useful information, which in turn made the Americans assume that the Vietnamese military men were incompetent and could be ignored. Nothing good ever came out of this lack of collaboration: the ARVN could not benefit from American expertise, and at the same time, the American military personnel were kept in the dark and could not develop effective strategies. That is why another important advice Dockery gives is that the Vietnamese commanders should be treated as equals. Furthermore, advising should work both ways, and the Americans should set an example by asking the advice of the Vietnamese, who might have a lot of useful ideas.
Many Americans assumed that North Vietnam and South Vietnam were inherently separated entities. Considering that they were governed by two opposing regimes, it was easy to forget that only a few years ago they were one country, one people who fought against the despised French colonialists. Among the South Vietnamese commanders, there were quite a few who had fought with the Viet Minh, but chose South Vietnam after the First Indochina War because they disagreed with Ho Chi Minh's Communism. They knew the strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh. Had their opinion not been widely disregarded by the Americans, South Vietnam might have achieved more successes on the jungle battlefield.
To facilitate understanding, Dockery also draws a portrait of the perfect adviser, and what emerges is sadly the complete opposite of most American advisers in Vietnam. The perfect adviser is patient and tactful, adaptable and pleasant, honest and understanding. He displays high moral standards, which serve as an example for his unit, and devotion to his job. He keeps himself and his men in good physical condition that will allow them to endure jungle warfare. Most importantly, he knows his job and the unit he is advising about organization, equipment, and tactics very well. Generally, the traits of an adviser include all the traits of leadership, as well as the ability to adapt to diverse environments.
He should also be aware of the cultural background of the people he is advising. In the Far East, arrogance and dogmatism would result in a loss of face. While most American advisers assumed that because they came from a large and powerful country, they had to be respected automatically. However, as Dockery explains, to present himself favorably to Vietnamese, the adviser should prove his value in a gradual and unassuming manner. The highest form of advising is to advise in such away that the person advised takes the desired action, feeling that it was his own initiative.
Martin J. Dockery's book should have been distributed as required reading to all American military advisers in South Vietnam. Had all advisers worked on becoming the best versions of themselves, the ARVN, which was known to be an army making virtually no progress no matter how many advisers America assigned, would have improved its performance significantly. With his experience working in South Vietnam, Dockery proves that collaboration with the Vietnamese was possible; that getting rid of one's ignorance and making fewer mistakes was possible; and that the Communist insurgents were not inherently undefeatable. While its lesson cannot be applied to Vietnam anymore, LOST IN TRANSLATION should be required reading in the military, for it teaches simple but valuable lessons.
January 29, 2026
Mr. Dockery was in South Vietnam in 1962 to some of 1963 when we had "advisors" there only. This was an excellent study of what that was like. His opinions and conclusions are always well thought out and sincere. Outstanding work in my opinion.
February 27, 2018
Martin Dockery, a lawyer by training, has in Lost in Translation written a spare account of his time in Vietnam as a combat advisor in 1963. He was idealistic, determined and focused. He also had no idea what he was doing. Immediately upon landing in Vietnam he was assigned to a battalion operating in the Mekong Delta. He was the only American advisor actually with the battalion, and except on leave in Saigon, he rarely if ever interacted with other Americans. It became obvious to him quickly that the South Vietnamese army was uninterested in prosecuting the war but rather sought to line its pockets with money. Early on in the book he writes a paragraph that sums up the situation as it was and would continue to be for the next 12 years:
“If there is a recurring theme to be found in this book, I suppose it is that the advisor program failed in Vietnam. It failed because, from the outset, cultural differences and the reality of human nature undermined the goal of forging South Vietnam armed forces into an effective force against the Viet Cong, who were surrogates for the communist government of North Vietnam. The Americans who served as advisors did their best and persevered under trying circumstances, but we did not succeed. And in the end, American military intervention failed. Although we had the tools, we did not understand the forces at work or the dynamics of nationalism. Even if we had understood, South Vietnam was a loser from the beginning because of endemic corruption, and lack of reform. Those of us on the ground—the combat advisors—in 1962-63 came to know these things and wondered at the naivete and unrealistic goals of the Washington policy makers.”
“If there is a recurring theme to be found in this book, I suppose it is that the advisor program failed in Vietnam. It failed because, from the outset, cultural differences and the reality of human nature undermined the goal of forging South Vietnam armed forces into an effective force against the Viet Cong, who were surrogates for the communist government of North Vietnam. The Americans who served as advisors did their best and persevered under trying circumstances, but we did not succeed. And in the end, American military intervention failed. Although we had the tools, we did not understand the forces at work or the dynamics of nationalism. Even if we had understood, South Vietnam was a loser from the beginning because of endemic corruption, and lack of reform. Those of us on the ground—the combat advisors—in 1962-63 came to know these things and wondered at the naivete and unrealistic goals of the Washington policy makers.”
October 12, 2014
it's an okay book
i liked his bluntness, and how he was true to himself in his writing and down to earth, not bragging about his "accomplishments" in Vietnam.
and since i'm from a "new" generation, i barely knew anything about the Vietnamese war, so it served as an insight on a little history.
although this is a memoir, i felt while reading it that i was reading something of an encyclopedia with facts about Vietnam, the Vietnamese, and the war.
i liked his bluntness, and how he was true to himself in his writing and down to earth, not bragging about his "accomplishments" in Vietnam.
and since i'm from a "new" generation, i barely knew anything about the Vietnamese war, so it served as an insight on a little history.
although this is a memoir, i felt while reading it that i was reading something of an encyclopedia with facts about Vietnam, the Vietnamese, and the war.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews