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«Se la trasparenza dell'intelligibilità fosse assicurata, distruggerebbe il testo, mostrerebbe che non ha avvenire alcuno, che non deborda il presente, che si consuma immediatamente; dunque una certa zona di misconoscimento e di incomprensione è anche una riserva e una possibilità eccessiva – una possibilità per l'eccesso di avere un avvenire, e di conseguenza di generare nuovi contesti. Se tutti possono capire subito quel che voglio dire non ho creato alcun contesto, ho meccanicamente risposto all'attesa, ed è tutto lì, anche se la gente applaude e magari legge con piacere; poi, chiude il libro, ed è finita».
180 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
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139 people want to read
About the author
Jacques Derrida
655 books1,806 followersJacques Derrida was a French philosopher best known for developing deconstruction, a method of critical analysis that questioned the stability of meaning in language, texts, and Western metaphysical thought. Born in Algeria, he studied at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he was influenced by philosophers such as Heidegger, Husserl, and Levinas. His groundbreaking works, including Of Grammatology (1967), Writing and Difference (1967), and Speech and Phenomena (1967), positioned him at the center of intellectual debates on language, meaning, and interpretation.
Derrida argued that Western philosophy was structured around binary oppositions—such as speech over writing, presence over absence, or reason over emotion—that falsely privileged one term over the other. He introduced the concept of différance, which suggests that meaning is constantly deferred and never fully present, destabilizing the idea of fixed truth. His work engaged with a wide range of disciplines, including literature, psychoanalysis, political theory, and law, challenging conventional ways of thinking and interpretation.
Throughout his career, Derrida continued to explore ethical and political questions, particularly in works such as Specters of Marx (1993) and The Politics of Friendship (1994), which addressed democracy, justice, and responsibility. He held academic positions at institutions such as the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and the University of California, Irvine, and remained an influential figure in both European and American intellectual circles. Despite criticism for his complex writing style and abstract concepts, Derrida’s ideas have left a lasting impact on contemporary philosophy, literary theory, and cultural criticism, reshaping the way meaning and language are understood in the modern world.
Derrida argued that Western philosophy was structured around binary oppositions—such as speech over writing, presence over absence, or reason over emotion—that falsely privileged one term over the other. He introduced the concept of différance, which suggests that meaning is constantly deferred and never fully present, destabilizing the idea of fixed truth. His work engaged with a wide range of disciplines, including literature, psychoanalysis, political theory, and law, challenging conventional ways of thinking and interpretation.
Throughout his career, Derrida continued to explore ethical and political questions, particularly in works such as Specters of Marx (1993) and The Politics of Friendship (1994), which addressed democracy, justice, and responsibility. He held academic positions at institutions such as the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and the University of California, Irvine, and remained an influential figure in both European and American intellectual circles. Despite criticism for his complex writing style and abstract concepts, Derrida’s ideas have left a lasting impact on contemporary philosophy, literary theory, and cultural criticism, reshaping the way meaning and language are understood in the modern world.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
December 12, 2024
Letto solo fino a pagina 166. (Il resto resta segreto).
June 17, 2018
| I Have a Taste for the Secret |
‘A work that appears to defy translation is at the same time an appeal for translation; it produces translators, and new protocols of translation; it produces other events that make it possible for a translation that does not exist to be produced. (IHTFS, 16)’
Justice without strength is powerless. Strength without justice is tyrannical. Justice without strength is a contradiction because there are always wicked people. Strength without justice is an indictment. So justice and strength must be joined, and for that, what is made just must be made strong, or what is strong, just. (Pascal, Pensees, IHTFS, 19)’
‘In dealing with what-is-to-come, with the opening to the to-come – that is, not only the future, but what happens, comes, has the form of an event (IHTFS, 19)’
‘The future is not present, but there is a future, a context is always open. What we call opening of the context is another name for what is still to come. (IHTFS, 20)’
‘Justice – or justice as it promises to be, beyond what it actually is – always has an eschatological dimension. I link this value of eschatology with a certain value of messianism, in an attempt to free both dimensions from the religious and philosophical contents and manifestations usually attached to them (IHTFS, 20)’
‘Teleology is, at bottom, the negation of the future, a way of knowing beforehand the form that will have to be taken by what is still to come. (IHTFS, 20)’
‘what I call the eschatological or the messianic is nothing other than a relation to the future so despoiled and indeterminate that it leaves being ‘to come’, i.e., undetermined. (20-1)’
‘justice, in a sense that is a little enigmatic, analytically participates in the future (IHTFS, 21)’
‘Justice has to be thought of as what overflows law, which is always an ensemble of determinable norms, positively incarnated and positive. But justice has to be distinguished not only from law, but also from what is general. (IHTFS, 21)’
‘the future, justice, the messianic and eschatological, is something incalculable. (IHTFS, 23)’
‘the fact that death may arrive in any moment gives this justice the character of an immediate injunction. (IHTFS, 23)’
‘since justice is always in excess with respect to right, it can never be attained, is always deferred, and so is nit even an infinite idea in the Kantian sense but is even further removed, and is excessive in any case – and therefore one may be excused for not attaining it. But not al all! This excess presses urgently here and now, singularly. It does not wait. Imminence means that it presses in every instant: this is never present, but this will not be put off to tomorrow: this, the relation to the other – death. (IHTFS, 23-4)’
‘democracy is never ensured and never will be – will never be what it has to be, unless this right is absolutely guaranteed. (IHTFS, 26)’
‘Here, I am tempted to say that my own experience of writing leads me to think that one does not always write with a desire to be understood – that there is a paradoxical desire not to be understood. (IHTFS, 30)’
‘There were several different reasons for my refusal to be photographed, which did last a long time. One of them, a profound one, unquestionably has to do with being ill at ease with my own image – the relation to death that one reads in every portrait, the dissimulation of the face in writing, the problem I always have, for that matter, with my own face. (IHTFS, 53)’
‘I have had an occasion to say that deconstruction is a project in favour of the Enlightenment, and that one must not confuse the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment of tomorrow. (IHTFS, 54)’
‘I said for the first time in so many words that there is an indeconstructible, and that justice is indeconstructable. (IHTFS, 56)’
‘Deconstruction is justice, in the disproportion between the other and myself, between myself and myself as other. (IHTFS, 57)’
‘the secret is never broached/breached. If I am to share something, to communicate, objectify, thematize, the condition is that there be something non-thematizable, non-objectifiable, non-sharable. And this ‘something’ is an absolute secret, it is the ab-solutum itself in the etymological sense of the term […] it is the condition in any bond but it cannot bind itself to anything – this is the absolute, and if there is something absolute it is secret. (IHTFS, 57)’
‘the most tempting figure for this absolute/secret is death, that which has a relation to death, that which is carried off by death – thus which is life itself. (IHTFS, 58)’
‘Belonging – the fact of avowing one’s belonging, of putting in common – be it family, nation, tongue – spells the loss of the secret. (IHTFS, 59)’
‘A decision has to be prepared by reflection and knowledge, but the moment of the decision, and thus the moment of responsibility, supposes a rupture with knowledge, and therefore an opening to the incalculable – a sort of ‘passive’ decision. (IHTFS, 61)’
‘What I see at this moment has no relation to what you see, and we understand each other: you understand what I am saying to you, and for that to happen it is necessary, really necessary, that what you have facing you should have no relation, no commensurability, with what I myself see facing you. And it is infinite difference that makes us always ingenuous, always absolutely new. (IHTFS, 70)
‘God sees from your side and from mine at once, as absolute third; and so there where he is not there, he is there; there where he is not there, is his place. (IHTFS, 71)’
‘there is no way of proving a lie or a truth. If someone tells you, ‘I did not lie, I said something that is not true, but I did not lie, I had no lying intention, I gave testimony that is false but not false testimony’, you can never prove the contrary because it all took place within himself and so is a question of faith, and intentionality. (IHTFS, 73)’
‘The idea of testimony requires exemplarity, and that means absolute singularity: a testimony takes place once on the subject of what takes place once, the testimony is unique, irreplaceable – it is the logic of the instant. (IHTFS, 73)’
‘Deconstruction was inscribed in the ‘linguistic turn’, when it was in fact a protest against linguistics! (IHTFS, 76)’
‘the future is the opening in which the other happens [arrive], and it is the value of the other or of alterity that, ultimately, would be the justification. (IHTFS, 83)’
‘Ultimately, this is my way of interpreting the messianic. The other may come, or he may not. I don’t want to program him, but rather to leave a space for him to come if he comes. It is the ethic of hospitality. (IHTFS, 83)’
‘By definition there is no natural violence, an earthquake is not violent, it is only violent insofar as it damages human interest. (IHTFS, 92)’
‘A work that appears to defy translation is at the same time an appeal for translation; it produces translators, and new protocols of translation; it produces other events that make it possible for a translation that does not exist to be produced. (IHTFS, 16)’
Justice without strength is powerless. Strength without justice is tyrannical. Justice without strength is a contradiction because there are always wicked people. Strength without justice is an indictment. So justice and strength must be joined, and for that, what is made just must be made strong, or what is strong, just. (Pascal, Pensees, IHTFS, 19)’
‘In dealing with what-is-to-come, with the opening to the to-come – that is, not only the future, but what happens, comes, has the form of an event (IHTFS, 19)’
‘The future is not present, but there is a future, a context is always open. What we call opening of the context is another name for what is still to come. (IHTFS, 20)’
‘Justice – or justice as it promises to be, beyond what it actually is – always has an eschatological dimension. I link this value of eschatology with a certain value of messianism, in an attempt to free both dimensions from the religious and philosophical contents and manifestations usually attached to them (IHTFS, 20)’
‘Teleology is, at bottom, the negation of the future, a way of knowing beforehand the form that will have to be taken by what is still to come. (IHTFS, 20)’
‘what I call the eschatological or the messianic is nothing other than a relation to the future so despoiled and indeterminate that it leaves being ‘to come’, i.e., undetermined. (20-1)’
‘justice, in a sense that is a little enigmatic, analytically participates in the future (IHTFS, 21)’
‘Justice has to be thought of as what overflows law, which is always an ensemble of determinable norms, positively incarnated and positive. But justice has to be distinguished not only from law, but also from what is general. (IHTFS, 21)’
‘the future, justice, the messianic and eschatological, is something incalculable. (IHTFS, 23)’
‘the fact that death may arrive in any moment gives this justice the character of an immediate injunction. (IHTFS, 23)’
‘since justice is always in excess with respect to right, it can never be attained, is always deferred, and so is nit even an infinite idea in the Kantian sense but is even further removed, and is excessive in any case – and therefore one may be excused for not attaining it. But not al all! This excess presses urgently here and now, singularly. It does not wait. Imminence means that it presses in every instant: this is never present, but this will not be put off to tomorrow: this, the relation to the other – death. (IHTFS, 23-4)’
‘democracy is never ensured and never will be – will never be what it has to be, unless this right is absolutely guaranteed. (IHTFS, 26)’
‘Here, I am tempted to say that my own experience of writing leads me to think that one does not always write with a desire to be understood – that there is a paradoxical desire not to be understood. (IHTFS, 30)’
‘There were several different reasons for my refusal to be photographed, which did last a long time. One of them, a profound one, unquestionably has to do with being ill at ease with my own image – the relation to death that one reads in every portrait, the dissimulation of the face in writing, the problem I always have, for that matter, with my own face. (IHTFS, 53)’
‘I have had an occasion to say that deconstruction is a project in favour of the Enlightenment, and that one must not confuse the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment of tomorrow. (IHTFS, 54)’
‘I said for the first time in so many words that there is an indeconstructible, and that justice is indeconstructable. (IHTFS, 56)’
‘Deconstruction is justice, in the disproportion between the other and myself, between myself and myself as other. (IHTFS, 57)’
‘the secret is never broached/breached. If I am to share something, to communicate, objectify, thematize, the condition is that there be something non-thematizable, non-objectifiable, non-sharable. And this ‘something’ is an absolute secret, it is the ab-solutum itself in the etymological sense of the term […] it is the condition in any bond but it cannot bind itself to anything – this is the absolute, and if there is something absolute it is secret. (IHTFS, 57)’
‘the most tempting figure for this absolute/secret is death, that which has a relation to death, that which is carried off by death – thus which is life itself. (IHTFS, 58)’
‘Belonging – the fact of avowing one’s belonging, of putting in common – be it family, nation, tongue – spells the loss of the secret. (IHTFS, 59)’
‘A decision has to be prepared by reflection and knowledge, but the moment of the decision, and thus the moment of responsibility, supposes a rupture with knowledge, and therefore an opening to the incalculable – a sort of ‘passive’ decision. (IHTFS, 61)’
‘What I see at this moment has no relation to what you see, and we understand each other: you understand what I am saying to you, and for that to happen it is necessary, really necessary, that what you have facing you should have no relation, no commensurability, with what I myself see facing you. And it is infinite difference that makes us always ingenuous, always absolutely new. (IHTFS, 70)
‘God sees from your side and from mine at once, as absolute third; and so there where he is not there, he is there; there where he is not there, is his place. (IHTFS, 71)’
‘there is no way of proving a lie or a truth. If someone tells you, ‘I did not lie, I said something that is not true, but I did not lie, I had no lying intention, I gave testimony that is false but not false testimony’, you can never prove the contrary because it all took place within himself and so is a question of faith, and intentionality. (IHTFS, 73)’
‘The idea of testimony requires exemplarity, and that means absolute singularity: a testimony takes place once on the subject of what takes place once, the testimony is unique, irreplaceable – it is the logic of the instant. (IHTFS, 73)’
‘Deconstruction was inscribed in the ‘linguistic turn’, when it was in fact a protest against linguistics! (IHTFS, 76)’
‘the future is the opening in which the other happens [arrive], and it is the value of the other or of alterity that, ultimately, would be the justification. (IHTFS, 83)’
‘Ultimately, this is my way of interpreting the messianic. The other may come, or he may not. I don’t want to program him, but rather to leave a space for him to come if he comes. It is the ethic of hospitality. (IHTFS, 83)’
‘By definition there is no natural violence, an earthquake is not violent, it is only violent insofar as it damages human interest. (IHTFS, 92)’
July 5, 2025
“I have a taste for the secret, it clearly has to do with not-belonging.”
Since the interviews consist of a diverse range of topics it is not possible to collate my notes and reflections on them.With these interviews, Derrida connected me to my affection for philosophy. I am reminded of a lecture given by Catherine Malabou, where she defines wonder as the condition of affectivity (i.e. our capacity to be affected and engaged with the world). The aporetic experience, if one understands it to be the experience of wonder as, connects me to a sense of playfulness and friendship. This is what Derrida gifted me with here.
Since the interviews consist of a diverse range of topics it is not possible to collate my notes and reflections on them.With these interviews, Derrida connected me to my affection for philosophy. I am reminded of a lecture given by Catherine Malabou, where she defines wonder as the condition of affectivity (i.e. our capacity to be affected and engaged with the world). The aporetic experience, if one understands it to be the experience of wonder as, connects me to a sense of playfulness and friendship. This is what Derrida gifted me with here.
July 23, 2017
Loved this book, one of the highlights of my year! I read Derrida years ago and wasn't impressed, but this one made me want to read more, and rethink my understanding of Derrida. The book is about the singular, and presents a radical, exceptionally clear understanding that is highly complementary to that of other contemporary philosophers - Deleuze in particular but also Whitehead.
July 22, 2017
El capítulo quinto es excelente. Salva el libro.
September 26, 2025
delle segrete cose
July 30, 2012
Very insighful for any serious scholar of Derrida.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews