A century before Martin Luther and the Reformation, Jan Hus confronted the official Church and helped to change the face of medieval Europe. A key figure in the history of Europe and Christianity and a catalyst for religious reform and social revolution, Jan Hus was poised between tradition and innovation. Taking a stand against the perceived corruption of the Church, his continued defiance led to his excommunication and he was ultimately burned at the stake in 1415. What role did he play in shaping Medieval Europe? And what is his legacy for today? In this important and timely book Thomas A. Fudge explores Jan Hus, the man, his work and his legacy. Beginning his career at Prague University, this brilliant Bohemian preacher was soon catapulted by virtue of his radical and popular theology to the forefront of European affairs. This book fills a real gap in contemporary understanding of the medieval Church and offers an accessible and authoritative account of a most significant individual and his role in history. Jan Hus belongs to the pantheon of extraordinary figures from medieval religious history. His story is one of triumph and tragedy in a time of chaos and change.
In this useful corrective study of Jan Hus, Thomas Fudge successfully places his subject in his historical time and contextualises both his life and ideas within the theology and thought of the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, while also properly scrutinising the process of Hus' trials from 1408 onwards, culminating in his examination, sentencing, and execution at the Council of Constance in 1415, with reference to contemporary canon law and later medieval beliefs about what constituted heresy. Intellectually, Fudge substantiates two interrelated claims, firstly, that Hus was a realist and not a nominalist, and, secondly, that his thought developed independently from that of John Wyclif, whose writings on both the eucharist and dominion were more overtly nominalist. Importantly, he conclusively shows that Hus never rejected transubstantiation in favour of Wyclif's remanentism, and that his eucharistic beliefs were strictly orthodox. While Wyclif was a radical whose ideas undermined the whole basis of Christian society and authority and denied the real presence of the mass, Hus was a reformer whose beliefs remained embedded in traditional catholic dogma, however much he questioned the authority of ecclesiastical bodies and persons. So, why then was Hus burned as a heretic? In a sense, Hus was a substitute for the deceased Wyclif, a live subject who could be publicly executed in place of the Oxford doctor, and this explains why his accusers were so willing to accuse Hus of holding Wyclifite beliefs on the eucharist which he never actually propounded: by burning Hus they could by extension burn Wyclif and his ideas. However, it is also the case that Hus was influenced by Wyclif when it came to ecclesiology, particularly in regard to the illegitimacy of immoral priests and the lack of authority of magistrates not in grace (although he continued to reject donatism, the claim that unworthy priests lacked sacramental efficacy) and in the categorical difference between the invisible Church of those saved by grace and the visible institutional church of sinful believers. However, as Fudge also explains, in no sense were these beliefs in accord with what would later become protestantism - Hus, like Wyclif, grounded his theology of grace in Augustine (most of Hus' references to Wyclif are actually to the latter's use of Augustine), developed no theory of double predestination, as in Luther and Calvin, and, alongside transubstantiation, defended the efficacy of good works, while never going as far as Wyclif in his theory of dominion which ultimately questioned all visible ecclesiastical authority, only recognising the authority of those ministers of the invisible Church in a state of grace. But, what Hus did do, again in accord with Wyclif, was question papal authority, although he did not go so far as him in attacking monasticism or episcopacy, and postulated that a pope was not necessary for the government of the Church, a clearly heretical doctrine (the conciliarists at Constance, while abrogating to themselves the government of the Church and the power to depose contending popes, never questioned the necessity of the papacy for normative ecclesiastical governance and regarded the election of a new pope recognised by all participants as their prime duty and the principal cause of the Council). Hus was, and until his death professed himself to be, a true catholic who sought to return the Church to its purer origins and the teachings of Christ, but at the same time he did hold beliefs about the papacy and authority which were clearly heretical by contemporary standards. Hus did not and could not make the intellectual jumps made by Wyclif and later by Luther and Calvin into outright denial of the legitimacy of the Church of Rome. Ultimately, it was Hus' unwillingness to recognise traditional Church authority, whether it be of popes Gregory XII and John XXII, or of the archbishop of Prague, or of the Council of Constance, and to elevate his own conscience, subject to appeal to Christ as revealed in the Bible, as ultimate arbiter of the legitimacy of belief above that of ecclesiastical institutions and canon law that led to his trials and ultimate punishment. As Fudge rightly reveals, Hus was not executed for his beliefs per se, which the Council did not properly explore, but for contumacy - his persistent failure to accept correction by his ecclesiastical superiors - and that in the accepted practices of his time, this constituted heresy. For a Church seeking through a general council to reunify after the Great Schism and put aside three competing popes with differing allegiances, and thereby to restore order and authority to the Church, Jan Hus, with his questioning of authority, whether papal, consiliar, priestly, or temporal, and in his denial of the necessity for a pope, arguing Christ not Peter was the rock upon which the Church was founded, was a threat once he refused to accept correction and the judgement of those in ecclesiastical authority over him. Those who claimed the keys to the kingdom of heaven through the Petrine commission and apostolic succession could not tolerate one who stubbornly denied their authority if he considered their teaching in error or their conduct unworthy. Fudge also traces Hus' afterlife, detailing how his death created a martyr cult which encouraged and propounded far more radical ideas about the eucharist, episcopacy, and iconoclasm than he ever held, and provided the seed for a Bohemian nationalism which he had never declaimed. Even in the Ultraquism - lay communion in both kinds - which provided the unifying theological reason for the Hussite revolt after his death, Hus had never been a militant, arguing in its favour but not making it a matter of doctrinal purity. The problem for the Church, as with his views on authority, was not so much the beliefs about lay communion which Hus held, but his refusal to properly amend them when instructed so to do. Hus, despite later historiography, iconography, and mythology was not a proto-protestant. He was a catholic reformer who at a time of disputed authority went so far in challenging the ecclesiastical hierarchy as to attract censure, refused to accept correction, and was too willing to associate with the ideas of Wyclif which the Church had found heretical. Hus was found a heretic not so much because of his beliefs but because he continued to hold them when ordered not to, thus denying the authority of the Church hierarchy and showing himself contumaneous. As a theologian Hus was not original, and indeed can best be described as an Augustinian more than a Wyclifite, rejecting as he did Wyclif's denial of the real presence, but he was an effective preacher and propagandist, radicalised by the trials he underwent, who by his questioning of authority, belief in the superiority of his own conscience, and stubbornness in failing to obey ecclesiastical instruction brought about his fiery fate, dying as much a catholic as he had ever been. And, as Fudge shows, it is as a catholic reformer, not as some presage of protestantism, that Jan Hus is to be under stood, both as product of and and moral challenge to the thought and practices of his age, a heretic not by belief but through contumacy and as judged by the prevailing tenets of his time made into a martyr to Christian conscience.
4 “First, he actively contributed to his own death. Second, he cultivated a martyr’s complex. Third, the men of the Council of Constance did much in their power in an effort to spare his life. Fourth, Hus can be regarded both as reformer and heretic.”
7 “This book concludes that Jan Hus was a heretic. The specificity and complexity of the medieval understanding of heresy demands this conclusion. By the ecclesiastical and legal standards of the later Middle Ages, Hus placed himself, and therefore was correctly adjudicated, outside the official church. To conclude otherwise is to apply something other than a fifteenth-century standard.” The argument is that those who in any way walked beyond the pale of the Christian society of Europe were considered heretics by that society. Hus did.
27 “Relics and pilgrimage remained significant features of religious life at the end of the Middle Ages. These phenomena are an opportunity for raising questions of authority and theology.” Hus expressed skepticism because he was devoted to truth (28). One of the themes this biography sounds if the theme of Hus’s integrity. It led him to challenge that which had become socially acceptable: from clerics who frequented prostitutes (of which Prague had an epidemic) to unsubstantiated accounts of miraculous events.
30 “The Platonic world view of Augustine is apparent in Hus but it is specious to imagine Hus rad Plato or the Platonists. Notional Augustinian constructs can be found throughout Hus.” Integrity in religion is interior integrity.
37 “Hus asserted he dared to maintain that popes could err and if all cardinals and popes were to be destroyed, the true church would remain.” That was truly radical, and the discovery of this made a difference in Luther during the Leipzig disputation, when he read the acts of the Council of Constance.
73 “’By the help of God I have preached, still am preaching, and if His grace will allow, shall continue to preach; if perchance I may be able to lead some poor, tired, blind, or halting soul into the house of Christ to the King’s supper.’” From his letters. Fudge’s point is that Hus was first of all a preacher, a proclaimer.
99 “then it seems evident that ideas of reform in Prague were beginning to coalesce in a political sense under the leadership of Hus.” In an age and a society in which everything had to be aligned: religion, society, politics, all.
113 “It is fair to note that unlike Wyclif and other late medieval reformers, Hus did not call for the dissolution of the monasteries and cloisters. Cleansed of abuses and immorality, the religious life retained a valuable expression of the Christian life and faith.” He was not so radical as some.
118 “Hus made a decision not to appear in 1411 when summoned to the papal curia. That decision proved decisive. The complications put in place then led to the verdict at Constance. The 1411 summons placed Hus in a predicament. He either had to appear and face condemnation or decline to appear and be denounced as disobedient.” His disobedience was to the society in which the church was dominant, which the church construed as disobedience to the church.
131 “It is impossible to read the various accounts of the trial at Constance or letters and documents Hus wrote between 1412 and 1415 and not conclude that Hus lacked tact or the ability to assess the impact of his bluntly stated opinions. He had come to the Council under the protection of Sigismund yet he alienated the emperor with comments on how sin turned legitimate authority into an illegitimate charade and not even a king in mortal sin remained a king . . .” Integrity, which is powerful, was tactlessly wielded. Hus died for his integrity and for his imprudence. As Fudge puts it: reformer and heretic.
144 “His judges, struggling with the crisis of authority which had engulfed the Latin Church, needed Hus to submit to conciliar authority. Failing that, those same judges were determined to find him guilty, if not of outright doctrinal deviance then certainly of contumacy.” Tactless persistence anchored in integrity could be construed as contumacy.
147 “The judicial process against Jan Hus and his summary execution electrified Bohemia. There were pockets of satisfaction at his demise but widespread indignation seems to have been the general response. Alive, Hus had been moderate, even conservative, on many doctrinal and social issues. Dead, he became a martyr and his name and memory appropriated to validate doctrines and practices he clearly would not have approved of.” Resulting in a distorted historiography of Hus.
151 “The martyrdoms of Hus and Jerome provided the emotional basis for revolution. The other motivation was theological and had everything to do with the eucharist. The central plank in the house of religious reform in medieval Bohemia was the eucharist.” Utraquism was an issue Hus identified with but nowhere so central as it became for the Husssites.
235 “The holy character of Hus’ life has been fairly represented and none have argued either in the fifteenth or the twenty-first century against his character. The irregular lives of men like Pope John XXIII and Sigismund could offer no challenge and even men like the conciliarist Dietrich of Niem kept concubines. Hus’ record appears to be without blemish. The words of Augustine are instructive: insignificant souls do not produce heresies. Only great men have been heretics.”
A large thesis, I enjoyed it. Very thoroughly researched and interesting. Dr Fudge is a great professor and lecturer, so I was glad to find a copy of this to read.